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1A) The ’Shifting Sands’ o f Environmentalism: nature and social norms
"All science rests on shifting sand." Karl Popper.
"Public opinion exists only where there are no ideas." Oscar Wilde.
1. Introduction: 1990 - the age of environmental communication in Britain
It is well established in social research, that whether it is manifest in an emerging 
social movement or in the increasing issue salience of media coverage, environmentalism 
historically occurs in fluctuating "cycles” or waves (Downs 1972) (Brand 1990). Similarities 
have been drawn between the peak of attention for the set of environmental issues relating 
to the ’limits of growth’ in the late sixties/early seventies and the peak of attention for a new 
range of global environmental issues and in particular ’global warming’ in the late 
eighties/early nineties (Ruedig 1995). For the period of the case study of this dissertation, 
the popularity of environmentalism in Britain was at the crest of a tidal wave that threatened 
to submerge the policy agenda with a new basis for political claims and leave an indelible 
imprint on British public life. By the early nineteen nineties the British public had indicated 
an aptitude for the "new environmental consciousness" (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990) that 
appeared to be becoming an irreversible social trend.
In the 1989 European elections fifteen per cent of the population voted for the Greens, 
an unusual event for British politics in contrast to other Northern European countries that 
have proportionally representative electoral systems. Public opinion polls repeatedly 
highlighted public concern for the environmental issue relative to other social issues.1 
Perhaps more importantly, people were beginning to take the environment into account for 
making everyday decisions and choices. This cultural shift in values introduced changes into 
the social structure of British society. Industry was beginning to discuss environmental 
standards for practices and products, as politicians were threatening environmental regulation, 
and consumers, investors and employees demanded changes. The established environmental
1 The "highs" in the opinion polls were when thirty five per cent responded that pollution environment was 
the most or second most important issue facing Britain today in July 1989, and 31 per cent claimed to have 
taken part in five or more environmental activities in the last year or two in July 1991 (MORI The Independerá
10/09/91).
2organisations, such as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature 
witnessed an unparalleled increase in membership, funds and resources, audiences with 
politicians and businessmen and unprecedented access to journalists and editors. The 
mushrooming of green chip investment funds, environmental consultancies, and the 
emergence of organisations such as Media Natura and Panos offering communication and 
campaign design services and quality publicity and photographic services to other 
environmental organisations, highlighted the professionalisation, specialisation and market 
orientation of a developing movement sector. Increasing vegetarianism and the use of nature 
symbolism and environmental ethics by advertisers indicated that environmentalism was 
becoming a form of cultural consumption. The assertion that "we are all environmentalists 
now!" was never voiced with more enthusiasm, confidence or cynicism than in 1990.2 Even 
a Prime Minister whose name in "Thatcherism" had become synonymous with the neo-liberal 
policies of the New Right had joined the environmental bandwagon.3
Public discourse was making environmental problems increasingly visible in the early 
nineties, as environmental meanings penetrated different spheres o f everyday experience and 
social life. Whether this involved wearing T-shirts exhibiting potent green symbols, writing 
academic philosophy that theorised about the moral relation of man to nature, or making 
political decisions that reduce the price of lead-free petrol, it is clear that meanings relating 
to environmental problems were increasingly being used as a resource in the social 
construction of meaning in all spheres of culture in British society.
The explosion of public communication about environmental concern provided a new 
opportunity structure for the political actions of the environmental organisations. As the 
established experts on the production of environmental critique, the new cultural legitimacy 
of environmental claims produced a favourable context for Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature to pressurise the Government for changes in public
7 "Wc are all environmentalists now!" is the common rallying call for the new actors making environmental 
claims. It was the title of a chapter in Porritt and Winner’s (1988) green classic The Coming of the Greens, but 
also fulfils a similar function in the ’joke-book’ The Green Bluffer's Guide (Milsted 1990). The duplicity of this 
usage aptly demonstrates that the catchphrase implies a range of meanings from the sincere to the ironic/cynical. 
This perhaps covers the range of motives available for the new adherents to the "new environmental 
consciousness* in British culture at the time.
3 Thatcher’s speech to the Royal Society in September 1988 is taken as the initial turning point in the 
Conversative Government thinking towards an acknowledgement of the significance of the environment as a 
political issue (Flynn and Lowe 1992) (Grove-White 1993).
3policy and the introduction of ’ecological modernisation’. The popularity and increasing 
resonance of public debate on the "new environmental consciousness" in the mass media 
offered an action context for the organisations to mobilise environmental critiques and define 
their preferred policy options. As well as promoting the global environmental perspective and 
utilising their international organisational links, Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature mobilised critiques into media ’packages’ that were relevant 
to the national policy discourse. One example of this was the attempt to criticise British 
policy practices by referring to European Community environmental standards (Haigh 1984). 
The production and mobilisation of environmental information through the media discourse 
became the basis of a political strategy for incorporating the new environmental perspective 
into Government and industry practices. In this sense the ’success-oriented*4 sector of the 
environmental movement, started to act as a set o f "cultural pressure groups" in British 
politics. In an era when the definition of what precisely is environmentally problematic and 
non-problematic constitutes a currency for social communication, the specialism of the 
environmental organisations as collective actors was manifest in shaping the public culture 
of environmental problems into a strategic resource for achieving specific political objectives. 
The mass media discourse became a key arena for the actions o f environmental organisations.
It is neither original nor controversial to cite the media as an influential factor in the 
ascendancy of environmental issues on the public agenda over the last two decades.5 
However, the media is often introduced as an ’ad hoc’ explanatory factor for the development
4 Smelser (1962) makes the distinction between ’success-oriented* and ’value-oriented’ movement 
organisations. The professionalised environmental organisations Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF 
may be defined as 'success-oriented’ for this period in the early nineties. The 'value-orientations’ of the British 
public had become a resource for the goals defined by their political strategies.
5 This is the finding of many analyses of the environmental movement organisations and the media e.g. 
(Lowe and Goyder 1983), (Lowe and Morrison 1984), (Greenberg 1985), (Burgess et al. 1993), (Hansen ed. 
1993), and the issue salience of environmental issues and technological risks in news discourse e.g. (Downs 
1972), (Brookes et al. 1976), (Atwater, Salwen et al. 1985), (Strodhoff, Hawkins and Schoenfeld 1985), (Peltu 
1988), (Lichtenberg and Maclean 1988), (Gamson and Modigliani 1989), (Burgess 1990). The movement sector 
itself appears in little doubt over the value of public communication resources for advancing environmental 
claims, the first edition of the public directory Green Pages: the business o f saving the world states (Elkington, 
Burke et al. 1988:p.l96): "The overall conclusion must be that the printed word, whether in the form of books, 
newspapers, magazines or computer print-outs, remains a tremendously powerful medium for communicating 
environmental information.”
4of an environmental movement6, or seen as part of a linear mono-causal social process of 
which environmental protest is the outcome7. The deficit in such analyses has been partially 
rectified by the introduction of the constructivist perspective into media sociology on the 
production and communication of environmental meanings, e.g. Hansen (1991), Anderson
(1991) , Burgess et al. (1990), Burgess and Harrison (1993), Einseidel and Coughlan (1993), 
an increasing emphasis on the construction of collective identities, e.g. Melucci (1989), Eder 
(1993; 1995), and the dynamics of communication about technological risks, e.g. Beck
(1992) Krimsky and Plough (1988), Nohrstedt (1991; 1993). Starting from these insights I 
develop a ’public agenda-building’ perspective for environmental communication in the media 
and operationalise this perspective to analyse the mobilisation activities of the three major 
environmental organisations in a key policy event. This will contribute to our understanding 
of the actions of the ’success-oriented’ sector o f a social movement during a phase of media- 
heightened environmental critique. First I consider the role of nature as a symbol in the 
cultural code o f a society.
2. Nature, Culture and Society: environmentalism as symbolic action
In the early 1990s the environmental critique carried by nature symbolism appeared 
to be an ascendant political ideology in British culture. What does it mean that people seemed 
to be more inclined to be mobilised by issues concerning nature than issues concerning the 
treatment of other human beings in the society of which they are part? What is special about 
nature, and what makes conflicts about nature different from social conflicts about the 
distribution o f resources?
The relationship between man and nature is a key cultural code of modernity 
(Passmore 1974) (Pepper 1984) (Eder 1988; 1995). The dominant tradition in the modem
6 This is understandable for early studies of environmental organisations using traditional pressure group 
models that predate the dynamic explosion of environmental issues in the news in the late eighties and early 
nineties, such as Lowe and Goyder (1983). It is less forgivable in more recent studies, such as those of Yearley 
(1990) and McCormick (1991).
7 For example Mazur's (1990:p.295) research on the news coverage of nuclear and chemical risks relates 
’quantity of coverage’ to ’quantity of demonstrations’ to infer that news coverage translates via ’audience 
beliefs* directly into public protest actions: "My thesis is that the amount of reporting about an environmental 
or technological hazard, rather than what is reported about the topic, is the primary vehicle of communication 
about such risks, and that the beliefs of the audience follow directly from the intensity and volume of reporting.*
I
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5discourse on nature has been the subordination o f nature to man. However the scientific 
knowledge which has allowed the rationalisation and instrumentalisation of man’s relationship 
to nature throughout the course of modernity has also sustained a counter-code for a more 
sentient and expressive relationship to nature.1 *8 Green political theorists often argue for a 
reversal of this cultural code for society and advocate an ’ecocentric’ approach that prioritises 
nature, e.g. Eckersley (1992). Others have adopted the ’anthropocentric’ perspective that 
there is a distinction between the expansion of productive forces per se, and the expansion 
of productive forces that transform nature in a way that leads to worse life-conditions for 
human beings, e.g. Grundman (1991). That culture offers more than one way of viewing the 
world indicates that the knowledge basis of social experience is dependent on the culturally 
organised and shared symbols which give the world meaning. This means that the potential 
for mobilising an environmental critique, i.e. a claim for a different relation to nature, is 
therefore also dependent on a culture and the worldviews that are resonant within a particular 
society.9
Anthropology tells us that nature is a key symbol for mediating social relationships 
in what are sometimes referred to as primitive societies. For example, the work o f Mary 
Douglas (1966; 1975) shows us that symbols of nature are used for defining the taboos and 
rituals which regulate the patterns of social behaviour in primitive societies. The hierarchy 
and social stratification of such societies is negotiated by references to nature - which animals
1 Historical research by Thomas (1983) defines the modern relationship of man to nature by four
dichotomies which illustrate the dual basis of the dominant cultural code of modernity and its counter-code:
townycountry; cultivation/wildemess; conquest/conservation; and meat/mercy. Fiddes’ (1991) work defines
meat-eating as an expression of man’s domination over nature. Much of the work on the imagery of landscape,
e.g. Williams (1972), Olwig (1984) on Denmark, illustrates that the wilderness of nature becomes the focus for
the expression of liberation from existing dominant political norms. Eder (1995a; 1995b) has characterised the
cultural code of European culture by distinguishing between the dominant Greek model for a ’bloody culture’
and its counter code the Jewish model for a ’non-bloody culture’.
9 This perspective is supported by Eder (1995:p.9) who for the special case of environmentalism where there 
are ’contradictory certainties’ (i.e. competing sets of scientific facts) extends the notion of the social construction 
of norms to the social construction of facts: "Culture organises man’s relationship to nature, including his way 
of conceptualising it: this consequently implies that facts are dependent on culture." Such a perspective avoids 
charges of ’relativism* by seeing culture as a limiting condition for knowledge and action, a view which is 
supported by the empirical work of Thompson (1984) on energy policy actors. This culturaiist perspective 
relates to both the cognitive and action levels of social reality and is therefore superior to descriptive 
behavioralist accounts that simply translate conditions in the natural world into public opinion. For example, 
Yearley (1991 :p.3) is guilty of such a flaw when he states: "It is probably possible to identify a list of more-or- 
less agreed central environmental issues. And the sense that they are related is no doubt enhanced by some 
of the complexities thrown up by the natural world. Thus, concern about ozone has entered the public’s 
conscience through the destruction of the ozone layer high up in the atmosphere."
6are sacred, which may be eaten, which may not and which may only be eaten on special 
occasions. Taboos and rituals defining the relationship between mankind and nature regulate 
the standards o f social behaviour.10 Nature is the source o f values through which people are 
able to negotiate their social position relative to others in the society. It is by referring to 
nature that people are able to communicate across the boundaries o f social distance. Douglas 
refers to this process whereby symbols of nature are used to enforce a hierarchical system 
of social stratification - primitive societies are relatively ’closed’ from the outside world - as 
the "purity rule".11
Taboos and rituals define how people interact with nature to reproduce the specific 
sets of social relationships that define the structure of a society. Dirt is ’matter out of place’. 
So wherever there is impurity, there are rituals of communication to negotiate this problem. 
This indicates that nature is not only a symbolic resource for defining the ’polluting’ aspects 
of social life, but that this process of definition gives rise to a language and communication. 
Pollution is a social construct that is given meaning through culture. Moreover there is no 
reason why the logic o f modem societies should consider itself too rational for this type of 
analysis. The rituals and taboos of modernity may simply be produced by a more highly 
complex arrangement o f social relationships than those of primitive societies. Complex 
societies still have to use symbolic mechanisms to communicate the exchanges which produce 
their specific sets of social relationships.12
Nature is the reference by which people define what is ’pure’ and ’impure’ in their
10 Sec also Eder (1988; 1995b), Rappaport (1979) and Richards (1993) for further accounts on the role of 
nature symbolism in the regulation of primitive societies.
11 Douglas (1975: p.214/216) states: "In Hinduism .. wherever the organic erupts into the social, there is 
impurity; birth, death, sex, eating and defecating incur impurity and so are hedged with rituals ... All other 
media express the purity rule... The purity rule is a control system to which communicating humans submit. 
It imposes a scale of values which esteem formal relations more than intimate ones... (I)t is an apparently 
necessary part of our common system of communication to distance our social life from animal origins."
12 This extension of the application of the purity rule to contemporary societies is in part acknowledged by 
a development in Douglas* own perspective, she states (1975: p.239): "When I first wrote Purity and Danger 
about this moral power in the tribal environment, I thought our own knowledge of the physical environment was 
different. I now believe this to have been mistaken. If only because they disagree, we are free to select which 
of our scientists we will harken to, and our selection is subject to the same analysis as that of any tribe.” The 
perspective of Melucci (1989) on collective identities is also pertinent here in that it takes the ’appeal to nature’ 
as a key element in identity construction in contemporary societies. For Melucci the ’appeal to nature’ as an 
expression of need is a reaction to (he psychological pressures on the individual of the processes of 
hypersocialisation at a stage of complex modernity.
7culture. The way that we use these purity rules, what we commonly refer to in everyday 
language as ’laws of nature’ such as our perceptions of beauty and health, regulates how we 
interact with nature and provides the moral standards by which we are able to negotiate our 
relationships with other actors in our society. Nature is a cultural element that enables us as 
a collectivity, as a community, and as a society to morally reconstitute what we refer to as 
’’civilisation" by our individual and collective actions.
Though it is built around the authority of the rationality of scientific knowledge and 
man’s domination over nature, the Western cultural tradition for modernity has always since 
its origins in the Enlightenment maintained a counter-cultural tradition arguing for a more 
mystical and sentient relation with nature (Eder 1988; 1995). The eighteenth century 
Romantic movement is just one example of this counterculture. Deep ecology13, new 
religious sects, travelling people, alternative medicines and the Gaia hypothesis are more 
contemporary examples. It is worth noting that these countercultural movements in the West 
draw inspiration and symbols from the Oriental and Indian cultures over which the dominant 
Enlightenment tradition deems itself to be more rational (Young 1990). For example, the 
name "Greenpeace" is taken from a North American Indian mythology where the ’warriors 
of the rainbow’ will return to restore the land to its former glory.
The important point to make with regard to contemporary societies is that people are 
increasingly referring to nature to construct identities and define their social relationships and 
that this is occurring in the mainstream rather than at the margins of public life. Concern for 
nature, "environmentalism", is no longer lentils and sandals or a mystic retreat from the 
rational society, but may be pineapple face wash or sandalwood shaving cream on the shelves 
of the Body Shop. The ethical retreat of the ’sect’ has given way to acts o f cultural 
consumption. Environmental ethics are fashionable. People are referring to nature to 
communicate about the changes that are occurring in their everyday lives in contemporary 
societies. Ethical standards are changing, and this is impacting on the social structure of 
societies, even if the outcome is that people choose to buy unleaded petrol or fit a catalytic 
converter to their BMW rather than undergo a profound spiritual conversion. It becomes 
clear then that the ’return to nature* does not necessarily indicate a retreat to ’primitivism’, 
nor is it simply a cynical marketing ploy, but it is a way that people negotiate the boundaries
13 On the movements for deep ecology, see Luke (1988) and Devall and Sessions (1985).
8that define what is "new" to society as a collectivity. It is a way that people deal with the 
moral dilemmas that are thrown up by processes of social change.
The so-called primitive societies were relatively ’closed’ to external cultural influence, 
apart from the prying presence o f anthropologists from the West. At the same time such 
societies tended to be in a condition of stasis, having a stable order and hierarchy of social 
relationships. Today’s complex societies are clearly different. Nonetheless, nature plays the 
same role today as it did in the primitive societies: nature is the key symbolic code for our 
morality, it gives us lessons on how to conceive of social differences. In the rapidly changing 
contemporary world that has been described as a 'postmodern condition’ (Lyotard 1984) 
(Harvey 1984), ’late modernity’ (Giddens 1990; 1991; 1995) and ’risk society’ (Beck 1992; 
Beck et al. 1995), people have to negotiate more differences - nature/society; private/public; 
race; gender; insider/outsider - in constituting the social relationships which make them part 
of a society, and define them as a citizen, as a person, and as an individual.
In contemporary societies, nature becomes the source of moral arguments for actors 
to stake a claim for a "new" social space in the changing society, but each individual or 
collective actor is in competition with other actors. Conflicts arise over what we understand 
as the ’quality of life’ - e.g. what sort of towns do we want to live in?14 Political 
communication becomes necessary to negotiate the differences between competing actors in 
the collective search to establish a consensus for society. It is for this reason that what has 
been refered to as ’life politics’ (e.g. Giddens 1991) has become one o f the most 
characteristic features of late modem, complex or contemporary societies.
One might wish to argue that environmental problems are not just social 
constructions: they are real. The natural world is under attack - the seas are rising, the 
climate and seasons are less predictible, exhaust fumes do cause asthma and lung problems. 
Indeed the scientific consensus tells us today that environmental problems do exist. That 
environmental problems, such as global warming, CFCs, and the ozone hole are constructed 
in the language, symbols and cultural authority of science does not make them less real. But
14 Initially such types of social conflicts were thematised, carried and introduced by "new social movements" 
that appeared across Western Europe and the United States in the early eighties. On the characteristics of the 
"new social movements" which organise and mobilise themselves around issues concerning contradictions in 
the social relationships of gender, modem uban living, and the nature/society relationship, see Brand, Buesser 
et al (1983), Olofsson (1988), Moscovici (1990), Melucci (1989) and Eder (1993). Such concerns are now 
articuJaied in mainstream discourses.
9why is the science that has served mankind so well since the Enlightenment unable to find 
‘technical fix’ solutions to these environmental problems? And why does the selection of 
environmental problems in the public sphere seem to shift and change as much at the whim 
of cultural novelty as by the rational design of mankind? The answer lies in the disagreement 
by scientists over the ’hard’ factual evidence that is the basis of environmental problems 
(Eder 1995). ’Hard science’ is itself in internal conflict over the basis of environmental 
problems; the naturalistic ’objectivity’ models of scientific analysis produce contradictory 
results. This means that science is not able to legitimate a single course of action - a 
’solution’ - that will eradicate an environmental problem. Instead people contest the facts. 
Furthermore, the basis of scientific models are themselves defined within the socially defined 
culture of a discipline (Thompson 1984) (Wynne 1990). Scientists are also motivated by goals 
that are strategically defined. When the experts disagree, the task of legitimating a course of 
action moves from the expert discipline o f science and the policy community to the public 
sphere, where politicians, industrialists, trade unions, environmental pressure groups, and 
members of the public, employ ’softer’ logics to mobilise competing claims about how to 
tackle an identified environmental problem.
This illustrates that environmental problems are constructed in a complex social 
process whereby public actors communicate, interact and contest specific sets of social 
relationships in a society. In this production of a collective project for ’ecological 
modernisation’, society takes on a responsibility for the unknown damage that its present 
actions may cause in the future. This is a historically ’new’ perspective. Society begins to 
negotiate the ’risks’ which its own technological development poses to its survival. It is the 
articulation and definition of such ’risks* to collective and individual life that is the substance 
o f environmental politics. To the question of what makes the environmentalist project 
different as an ideology from its predecessors in Western political cultures, we may answer 
that ’environmentalism’ does not find belief in the liberation o f one class of mankind from 
another but in the desire to save the world from itself. What then is the substance of 
environmental politics?
Public actors are able to draw on different resources than scientists when they attempt 
to legitimate their arguments in the public sphere. Obviously, protest actions such as using 
human chains to block the roads to ports where animals are exported to be eaten as veal in 
France are symbolic and ritual collective actions that are designed to raise the contentious
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issue of animal welfare and rights on the public agenda. Such struggles and demonstrations 
tend to occur at the early stage of the public mobilisation of an environmental problem.15 
Once problems appear in the public discourse, and the increasing prominence of coverage 
for environmental topics in the mass media is a self-evident feature of recent years, public 
actors are able to use moral and aesthetic appeals to nature as well as appeals to scientific 
facts to legitimise environmental problems. This constitutes an appropriation of cultural 
authority from natural science, a de-mystification of the legitimacy of scientific knowledge 
for political claims. It also makes the basis o f the actions which public actors use to raise 
environmental problems a type of political communcation that is symbolically mediated. 
Environmental action is a type of symbolic politics.
Historically the force of environmental critique has come from the public protest. 
Indeed for the case of environmental critique, it appears that rather than the ’system* 
penetrating the Iifeworld, we witness the symbols of nature - symbols of the lifeworld - 
penetrating and extending the system of public communication. The Body Shop Ltd did not 
receive its name nor its success as a commercial enterprise purely by chance. It seems that 
in contemporary societies people are increasingly willing to find ’impurity’ - i.e. ’pollution’, 
environmental problems - in the changing social relations that bind their societies as the basis 
for constructing identities.16 Environmentalism becomes the cultural expression of fear 
changes in the basis o f everyday social life. Thus the Britain which prioritises the welfare 
of its animal livestock and the beauty of its Twyford Downs over profit from export trade 
and better road links for commuters, and sometimes over the plight of the socially 
disadvanted and homeless, is a Britain in flux and change. Not only is this a Britain which 
is concerned for nature, but a Britain which is concerned for the future, which feels 
threatened by the imminent integration with mainland Europe and a lack of cultural 
distinction from the traditional enemy of the veal eating French.
Drawing initially from an analysis o f structural change in the Federal Republic of
13 See the discussion on social movements and media research below for a description of the usual patterns 
of phases of development in an environmental movement.
16 This applies both to the advent of environmentalism and to the recent resurgence of xenophobic 
movements in mainland Europe. Whereas environmentalists refer to nature in advocating the purity of a global 
society, racists refer to nature for advocating the purity of one ethnic grouping within a society. Both define 
the present condition of society as ’impure’ as a demand for social change. As Douglas (1966:p.l62) states: 
"Purity is the enemy of change."
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Germany, Beck (1992; et al. 1995) refers to this condition where conflicts over the 
distribution of resources are replaced by conflicts over the distribution of risks as ’’risk 
society". In the imminent ’veal’ wars with the French at the EC level that were promised by 
the British Minister for Agriculture in response to the livestock transportation campaigns, it 
is possible to identify one example of a symbolic form for national identity that is 
constructive for the British variant of the "risk society". In this case, the risks that have been 
publicly defined at the nature/society boundary are taken up by the national Government to 
define Britain as a culture and a society that is in conflict with the French. The problem 
concerns the moral treatment o f animals: it is a risk to the moral values o f the British if the 
French turn British bom calves into ’veal* using methods that we British consider ro be 
cruel. The protestors claim that the Government has a responsibility to defend the rights of 
animals that are bom in Britain. The British Government wishes to displace responsibility 
or blame for the ’impurity’ o f the moral risks that have been raised publicly in Britain from 
themselves and their fanners to the French.17 It is perhaps worth noting that a week later 
the public discourse in Britain was able to demonstrate that not all the French are tainted by 
this moral ’impurity’ of ’veal eating’ by highlighting the presence of Brigitte Bardot, a 
famous animal rights activist and vegetarian, at the funeral of the killed woman protestor. 
This indicates that the political disputes between the Government and the protestors at the 
national level are mediated within symbolic exchanges in the media discourse.18
Two further points arise from this example regarding how environmental critiques 
affect and impact upon social structure. Firstly, at the national level the public mobilisation 
of an environmental critique reintroduces the business rationale o f farming practices back into 
the ethical sphere o f social life. Farmers must become responsible for the animals in a "new" 
moral way that operates beyond economic interests in profitable trade. This may be seen as
17 When national Governments take up such claims the game becomes one of displacing the responsibility 
for risks to another country behind a thinly veiled nationalism. One might argue that the bizarre alliance of the 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Greenpeace in the recent Brent Spar international dispute is another 
example of a politician's ’free-riding’ opportunist attempt to displace the responsibility for environmental 
concerns to a foreign national arena - in this case the Dutch and British.
** Brigitte pays tribute to Animat Rights Woman was the front page headline in the popular press. Women 
are good signifiers of purity because they have a different, wholesome, less wasteful relation to nature than 
men. In addition to satisfying 'news values’, the presence of Bardot was a symbolic attempt by the campaigners 
to detract from the anti-French nationalism of the Government's response and re-focus on the issue of animat 
rights.
12
evidence that environmental critique introduces a de-differentiation of the national culture o f  
modernity, whereby the different spheres o f expert knowledge lose their traditional authority 
and become re-moralised in the public sphere. The populist impetus of environmentalism 
disembeds the experts from their positions of power. Indeed environmental critique is often 
strategically initiated by ’movement intellectuals’ (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990) who are 
excluded from the existing institutions of power.
Secondly, at the international or supra-national level, British values are placed in 
opposition to French values, and for trade to continue (and there are supposed to be no 
barriers to trade within Europe now!) such conflicts must become regulated by a common 
European public policy over which there is a degree of political consensus. In this case, then, 
a nationally defined environmental problem becomes the basis for a cross national European 
conflict. Although they are based in culture, environmental problems have a role in shaping 
the social relationships which define societies not only as collective identities but also as 
collective actors with national public policy interests. This is why at the European level 
disputes, such as the one over the standards for ’eco-labelling’ are so difficult to solve. They 
appear to be based on incommensurable claims that arise from different national cultural 
perspectives on the relationship to nature.
It is tempting to argue that environmental problems acknowledge no geographical 
boundaries, indeed this was a lesson that the Western world was taught by the radioactive 
fall out from the explosion of the Chernobyl reactor. The unknown threats that were, and still 
are, posed to human life by radioactive fallout, which in Britain contaminated the uphill 
pastures of Cumbria and North Wales, then the sheep, and then three years later the human 
foodchain through the sale of Iamb were not predicted by the scientists. However, if  
environmental problems know no geographical boundaries, they are nonetheless defined 
within a national cultural setting. Each European nation has a cultural myopia in the selection 
o f environmental problems. The British have empathy with the animals and defend the 
aesthetic beauty of the nation’s landscape - "the Garden o f England" - against the scourge 
o f redevelopment, but are content to distribute raw sewage and radioactive waste from 
Sellafield along the beaches of the west coast and Ireland. Italians consistently rank top in 
the Eurobarometer scales for environmental concern, but beat to death thousands of birds in 
a ritualistic slaughter at the start of the hunting season. The French seem less concerned 
about the risks of nuclear power than any other European nation, whereas the Germans
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appear to be more concerned about the threat to life of any form of modem technology but 
happily drive their cars faster than any other European nation. This shows that although 
environmental problems may be viewed as part o f a historical countercultural tendency 
against the rationality of modernity and the ethos of scientific progress» they are nonetheless 
are defined» communicated and contested through sets of social relationships in specific 
historical and cultural settings. Furthermore, environmental protest feeds on the tradition for 
political mobilisation against the state within a national political culture, thus the women 
protesters at the British ports have their sororial predecessors in the anti-nuclear protests at 
Greenham Common in the early eighties.
The ’veal’ type of public protest which is characterised by human chains and non­
violent actions may be seen as a ’ritualised’ event, a symbolic form of protest action. Rituals 
and symbolic action have been noted as the specific form of protest action for 
environmentalists (Wynne 1982), and the staging of dramatic symbolic events by 
environmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth is well documented, e.g. Greenberg
(1985). Referring to such cases of protest as ’ritualised* does not trivialise their significance 
or undermine the value of the political pressure which they have brought to bear on the 
Government. On the contrary, symbolic production and the staging of cultural rituals is a 
rational form of action in conditions of ’uncertainty’. When people are unable to draw 
conclusively on scientific reasoning, ’rituals’ serve as the most rational form of cultural 
expression for legitimising an actor’s political claims. ’Ritualised’ actions that highlight the 
’impure’ and unpalatable aspects of the treatment of nature by farmers constitute a potent 
way of communicating dissent within British society. This type of political action readily 
achieves a cultural resonance within society because of its ’novelty’. The forum where 
environmental protest becomes manifest as a critique against specific actors, ’the polluters’, 
is the institution of public communication, the mass media and public discourse. It is for this 
reason that the exponential growth of environmental concern that we have witnessed and 
experienced in Britain over the last decade has been carried in the public texts that are news. 
It is from the news that we leam about environmental problems, and either accept or ignore 
their significance to our patterns of social behaviour. One day we may eat veal in blissful 
ignorance and with cultural impunity, the next we may not.
To recap on the argument: Nature is a resource that actors in contemporary societies 
are increasingly turning to in the attempt to construct "new" political identities that are an
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expression o f the changing basis of their social relationships. The complex social process 
whereby environmental problems are identified within a national culture brings scientific 
knowledge into the public sphere. When environmental problems enter the mainstream 
system of public communication in the mass media, actors may appeal to other types of 
resonance in the culture of a society than the rationality o f scientific facts. For example they 
may make aesthetic or moral claims. This does not make scientific knowledge an illegitimate 
basis for founding a political consensus, but means that it must achieve a cultural reflexiv ity . 
Furthermore, the involvement of lay actors in this process o f the definition of environmental 
problems, and the often futile quest for a political consensus on ’solutions*, has the effect of 
rendering the previously hidden world of policy communities and their scientific experts 
visible and accountable in public. It is at this point where ’life politics’ (Giddens 1991) 
impacts upon the public policy decisions that are made by national Governments, and at the 
same time is part of the process which redefines the "new" basis o f social relationships that 
constitute a society.
In this dissertation I shall analyse the production and mobilisation of environmental 
critique by the environmental organisation as a form of symbolic action and attempt to gauge 
the potential it has to influence politics.
3. Social Movements and Mass Media: towards a 'public agenda-building’ 
perspective for political activism
The substantive aim of the following research is to reconstruct the media 
communication strategies o f the three major environmental organisations over the duration 
of a specific public policy episode. A primary source of data will be the news texts in which 
the environmental organisations lodged their claims against the public policy proposals of the 
Government. The "Dirty Man of Europe" case study will attempt to show that environmental 
organisations maintain the potential to affect public policy decisions by discursively shaping 
the news coverage o f environmental affairs. This process o f framing the contents of the news 
discourse as part of a political strategy is the dimension of the environmental organisations’ 
actions which is the object of inquiry.
Such a perspective runs against the conventional wisdom of much empirical social 
movement research which tends to use news coverage as a primary data source for verifying
the empirical existence of a specific number of protest events - i.e. mobilisations - which 
have occurred on the public stage for a social problem over a given time.19 The social 
movement perspective that I propose does not take the mobilisations of protestors on the 
streets, the number of demonstrators or even shifts in public opinion polls on an issue, as an 
empirical indicator for measuring the existence or ’success* o f the movement. Building on 
the insights of the political process (McAdam 1982) and political opportunity structure (POS) 
(Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1991; Kriesi Koopmans et al 1992) models for social movements 
which emphasise the structural opportunities that facilitate or resist the challengers20, the 
measure for ’success* will be defined by the ability of the movement organisations to 
introduce changes in the Government’s public policy stance on the environment. What then 
is the theoretical model for how the actions of the environmental organisations may serve to 
introduce changes into public policy?
According to the POS model the political system provides an institutional context 
which determines the potential for repression or incorporation o f the collective actions of the 
challengers and a measure for the ’take-up* or political effectiveness of the strategies which 
challengers may employ. The strength o f the political opportunity structure model is that it 
defines the significance of collective action in relation to the institutional structures of 
political power within a society, and that it provides a context for measuring the ’effects’ of 
collective action by analysing the realignments that occur between actors in the conventional 
party political system and interest group politics.21 The weakness of the political opportunity 
structure model lies in an overemphasis on political institutions and politics (in the narrow 
sense of the party political system) as the context for the mediation of ideas and claims of 
challengers. In contrast the frame alignment model (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford
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19 Here I refer to the empirical tradition of social movement research following Tilly (1978) that analyses 
waves and cycles of protest that occurred as public events in the social world e.g. Tarrow (1989), Franzosi 
(1990). In contrast to this perspective. Gill in’s (1980) pathbreaking research uses the notion of hegemony to 
analyse the rise and fall of a movement through television coverage.
20 Kriesi (1990; et al. 1992), a distinguished advocate of the POS model, identifies three broad sets of 
properties that defme the opportunity structure for ’challenging’ a political system: a formal institutional 
structure; informal procedures and prevailing strategies for dealing with 'challengers’; and a configuration of 
power that is relevant for confrontation with the ’challengers’ - i.e. a party political system. The 'members' of 
the political system produce strategies for dealing with 'challengers’ on the basis of these three components.
31 For a discussion of the organisation and political 'effectiveness* of social movements from a similar 
structural perspective, see Gundelach (1989). Huberts* (1989) discussion of the political influence of the Dutch 
environmental movement also takes participation in the polity process as the yardstick for 'effectiveness*.
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1988, 1992) for social movements emphasises the active role that is played by movement 
organisations in defining and constructing social problems. According to this perspective 
collective actors need resources and access to networks, so that the meaningful interpretations 
of social problems which they define - frames22 - serve to build a consensus for the 
participatory mobilisation of other actors in a specific campaign.
The ideational elements or interpretative frames (Snow and Benford et al. 1986; 
Gamson 1988; Gamson and Modigliani 1989) that are mobilised by the protest actions of 
challengers introduces a process of identity formation and consensus building into the public 
sphere, whereby social problems become defined and the boundaries of conflict are drawn 
between the opposed collective actors in society. Extending this perspective, social 
movements not only exist within a political opportunity structure, but may also be seen as 
a form of political expression that is constructive of the political opportunity structure. When 
actors protest they mobilise a collective identity which appears as a "sign” in the public 
sphere. This symbolic expression of protest renders ’visible’ the contradictions which are 
produced by the structural cleavages that exist in contemporary societies.23 As nature is 
increasingly defined as problematic for social relationships (Jamison and Eyerman et al. 
1990; Eder 1993), the political expression o f environmental protest becomes part of the 
process which defines social problems and sets public policy agendas in contemporary 
societies.
The status that is attributed to frames by Snow and Benford (1992) whereby they are 
said to require an ’empirical credibility’ to be consensus building, has been criticised for
n  Snow et al (1986: p.464) take the concept of framing from Goffman (1972) "to denote ’schemata of 
interpretations’ that enable individuals ’to locate, perceive, identify, and label' occurences within their life space 
and the world at large. By rendering events or occurences meaningful, frames function to organize experience 
and guide action, whether individual or collective". Frames are the conceptual tools which actors use to convey, 
interpret and evaluate information.
23 Social movement theorists who emphasize the process of identity formation through collective action, e.g. 
Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1980) (1989) consider that the "visibility" of a social movement in the public 
domain serves as a symbolic means for building a constituency during periods of mass mobilisation. For 
Melucci this collective identity is a resource which is constructed through collective action and relates the 
cognitive level of strategy formation and emotional experience to the action level of making networks and 
negotiating decisions and outcomes with other actors. He states (1988:p.342/3), "Collective identity provides 
the base for shaping expectations and for calculating costs and benefits of the action. The construction of a 
collective identity involves continual investment and occurs as a process. As it approaches the more 
institutionalized forms of social action, an identity may crystallize into organisational forms, system of rules, 
and leader relationships. In less institutionalized forms of action its character is closer to a process which must 
be continually activated to make the action possible."
1wavering between positivist epistemology and radical constructivism (Gamson 1992; 
Koopmans and Duyvendak 1994). For the case of environmental problems which are social 
constructs because the scientific experts disagree over the basis of "facts" (Eder 1995), the 
notion of the ’empirical credibility’ of frames in producing a mobilisation potential becomes 
a question of whether a frame has what Snow and Benford (1988) themselves refer to as 
’narrative fidelity*. This means simply that to succeed frames must achieve a resonance in 
the culture o f a society. They must relay the ’new’ message o f the movement in a way that 
communicates, builds on and challenges the existing traditions and discourses in a society.24 
Questions of whether a frame is a true factual representation o f an objective condition of 
environmental degradation are bypassed in the arena of incommensurable claims that is 
environmental news. Environmental claims achieve (or do not achieve) legitimacy as a 
meaningful definition of a problem as competing ’as i f  realities. This means that getting a 
message across to a constituency may depend more on a collective actor’s ability to utilise 
the cultural tools (Swidler 1986) available - e.g. by making references to nationalist 
sentiment, tradition, resonant cultural narratives - than on the truth or scientific accuracy of 
the claims that are made.
Snow and Benford’s frame alignment model was originally designed to explain the 
mobilisation of individual participants and consensus-building within a social movement.25 
In its later formation the notion of "master frame" (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992) is 
introduced to identify the key frame which serves to organise the series of frames that are 
produced by the movement into a sustained protest campaign. This notion of "masterframe" 
has been used to analyse the process of mobilisation between networks o f groups in the
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24 A key contribution of the Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990) perspective is that from their comparative 
analysis of knowledge interests (an identity indicator) and political strategies (a political action indicator) for 
the Swedish, Danish and Dutch environmental movements, the combined cognitive and strategic dimensions of 
an environmental movment’s actions become visible whilst the comparative dimension indicates that such 
movements are bound to emerge and act within the specificities of a national political cultural setting.
25 This initial restriction of frame potency to 'building the group from within* has a hint of the determinist 
'shared grievance* as the explanatory variable for mobilisation potential. The emphasis on internal identity as 
a resource was intended to contradict the tendency in the resource mobilisation perspective for seeing grievances 
as omnipresent and on that basis dismissing identity as a relevant factor for mobilisation. Resource mobilisation 
perspectives focus on the effectiveness of the organisation’s use of available internal resources (McCarthy and 
Zald 1977), but do not adequately cover the role of identity in mobilisation (Ferree and Miller 1985). 
Contemporary social movement theories, including resource mobilisation, political process, POS and also frame- 
alignment models, have all attempted to explicitly distance themselves from the traditional focus on 'grievance* 
as the explanatory variable for collective behavior (see discussion in McAdam 1982).
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development of a specific campaign of action (Gerhards and Rucht 1991). Building on the 
Snow and Benford framing perspective and McAdam’s (1988) work on recruitment to social 
movements in "micro-mobilization contexts", Gerhards and Rucht (1991) re-emphasise the 
importance of frames as resources for building networks between different established social 
movement organisations in the development o f a campaign.26 They develop the concept of 
"meso-mobilization contexts" to refer to the mobilisation of groups rather than individuals. 
These meso-mobilization contexts facilitate: structural integration by linking groups together, 
pooling resources, and enabling a preparation for protest activity and public relations 
exercises; and ideological integration by developing a common frame of meaning which 
serves for the interpretation of the problem and the linking of concerns to its definition of 
a public issue (Gerhards and Rucht 1991: pp.2-3).
The function of a meso-mobilization context is as an in term ediary structure  that fulfils 
the tasks of developing campaign ideas and linking the core groups who have the 
responsibility for collecting organisational and material resources (1991: p.31). The 
theoretical impetus to draw from Gerhard and Rucht’s notion of meso-mobilization contexts 
is that social movements should no longer necessarily be seen as being structurally bound into 
a single unified protest group or set of groups. On the contrary as a collective actor the 
protest groups exhibit a flexibility in their organised potential for mobilisation through 
networking across a wider public domain. The empirical analysis o f  Gerhards and Rucht 
deals with two short-lived localised protest events in Berlin. If meso-mobilization contexts 
are discernible within relatively short-term protest events, then for a sustained long-term 
national protest campaign, such as the environmental protest, it seems plausible that meso- 
mobilization contexts may themselves inhere into relatively stable structures and constitute 
the networks, frames and structures of an emergent organised social movement. What we 
may be witnessing in the intermediary structure o f meso-mobilization contexts is the dynamic 
transformation and professionalisation o f a movement as it extends its campaign activities to 
target the mainstream rather than the margins of public life as the arena for consensus 
building.
26 This constitutes a self-conscious attempt to operationalise a model that draws on an the integration of 
elements from both the identity-oriented and resource mobilization-oriented paradigms of social movement 
research. Researchers in the field of social movements had been advocating such a shift in social movement 
research for some time, e.g. Cohen (1985), Klandennans and Tarrow (1988), McAdam (1988), Zald and 
McCarthy (1988), Jamison, Eyerman et al. (1990).
As the ’life cycle’ of a social movement develops over time, on the other hand it may 
remain a closed private sect and not build a broad constituency, the social movement 
organisations become established, organised and professional public actors.27 Protest 
activism becomes characterised by the actions o f professionalised social movement 
organisations which seek to build consensus across a broad public constituency. This 
specialisation of protest activism into ’experts* and ’followers’ tends to replace the 
intermittent cycles o f mass public protest demonstrations against a series of ’one-off targets 
that were prevalent, for example, in the protests against the proposed building of nuclear 
power plants in the early eighties. Such a transformation in the organisation and structure of 
activism within a movement necessitates that we re-evaluate our notion of what constitutes 
m obilisation  over a social problem.
The process of an historically sustained environmental protest may be seen as part of 
a complex process whereby broader constituencies of actors with different interests and levels 
of commitment are built up into the interrelated networks of a public campaign. At this phase 
of an environmental movement the notion of individual participation  for the broad 
constituency of movement supporters is largely displaced to the cognitive level which shapes 
perceptions rather than the level of direct action for the movement’s goals. Political strategies 
and goals become the specialist activity of the small band of professional ’movement 
intellectuals’ who act as entrepreneurs in the mass media discourse to place their strategic 
environmental claims on the political agenda.28 For the mass constituency commitment may
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n Jamison and Eyerroan ct al. (1990:p.9-ll) describe four phases in the historical development of the 
environmental movments in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands. In brief these may be characterised as an 
initial public education; a new kind of organised ecology movement; a social movement at its high point marked 
by increasing specialisation and a practical orientation to politics; and a fragmentation of the movement into a 
cluster of specialised and competitive organisations. My present discussion refers to an environmental movment 
that is somewhere between the latter two stages but without adhering to the pessimistic conclusion of Jamison 
and Eyerman et al. that sees the movement in inevitable decline as the conflicting interests of the specialised 
environmental organisations are increasingly prevalent. Such a 'life cycle* is characteristic of the development 
of the environmental movements in Western Europe and at the beginning of the nineties the movments may be 
seen to be dominated by five types of organisation: conservation associations. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, 
a national umbrella organisation, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (van der Heijden, Koopmans et al.
1992). Descriptive accounts of the contemporary environmental movement in the UK confirm the primacy of 
these professionalised organisations (McCormick 1991; Szerszynski, Miles et al. 1995).
2* Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990:p. 11-12) refer to these actors as ’movement intellectuals' and 
emphasize their creative role in the mobilisation of a protest movement: "their status as intellectual as well as 
the role they perform emerges in the spaces, the organisations, and the networks, which themselves constitute 
the movement. Movement intellectuals are in an important sense creators of the movement, for in their work 
as publicists, spokespersons, organisers, and so on, they mediate between the individual activist and event and
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constitute an ethical conviction or be limited to a passing fancy, thus producing a myriad of 
part-time or inconsistent beliefs in the public culture. Supporters require little investment in 
terms of protest action beyond paying their subscription fees. However, over the long term 
the embedding of environmental claims within the culture of a society provides a resource 
for actors to evaluate their beliefs and monitor their everyday decisions by environmental 
criteria. Acts of consumption such as the purchase of an environmental light bulb may in 
time appear more rational. In a sense the environmental movement becomes a process of 
social learning in which the organisations offer to teach the public moral lessons. Much 
depends on the cultural depth which the environmental claims of the specialist activists are 
able to reach.* 29 Such a perspective for environmental protest makes the stimulus/response 
and ’grievance’ models of public attitudes and social change (e.g. Inglehart 1990; 1992) 
appear oversimplistic. Rather than individuals, it is the environmental problems which are 
m o b ilised  into the public discourse as part of a complex process o f  agenda-building.30
At this phase of public protest one might argue that the mass media discourse itself 
constitutes a "macro-level mobilisation context" of public communication by linking the 
environmental organisations, the "master frames" which they mobilise, and the networks of 
actors and constituencies who support, oppose or are indifferent to their political claims.31 
As the constituency becomes generated within the media mainstream, cultural identification
the formation of the collective." Their earlier analysis (1989) of Greenpeace, the most hierarchically structured, 
professionalised and specialised of the environmental organisations, supports this perspective for a ’success- 
oriented’ type of social movement organisation. See also Rucht (1995) for similar findings on Greenpeace.
29 Klandermans (1988:p. 193) concludes on consensus formation and mobilisation: "Consensus is not created 
by convincing individual after individual; rather, groups of individuals linked by social networks learn to move 
together in the direction of the movment organization. Individuals must choose whether to go along or deviate 
from the groups they are involved in." Social learning remains a collective entreprise even when achieved 
through interaction with the public discourse rather than involvement in a movement network.
30 Agenda-building (cf. also agenda-setting) is an established concept for the negotiations between networks 
actors in the establishment of public policy agendas and the definition of social problems (Cobb and Elder 1983) 
(Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) (Kingdon 1984). Similarly, the concepts of media agenda-setting (McCombs and 
Shaw 1972) (Lang and Lang 1983) and media agenda-building (Weaver 1978) have been prominent in 
communications research. It seems a profitable development to combine these perspectives for analysing how 
social movements make claims in the public discourse which affect public policy decisions and outcomes.
31 This perspective extends the frame alignment model (Snow and Benford) from the mobilisation of 
individual participants within social movement groups, and extends the meso-mobilisation of groups into 
networks through the production of a joint "masterffame" (Gerhards and Rucht) to the specialist sustained 
campaign activity of mobilising environmental frames into the mainstream public discourse.
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with environmental claims is opened up as a discursive opportunity and resource to all actors. 
Rather than aiming to attract activists on the streets in public demonstrations, this type of 
specialist mobilisation and protest activity is engaged at a discursive level of political debate. 
Mobilisation may be seen as a form of ’public agenda-building’.32 Mobilisation seeks to 
build consensus and legitimacy for a specific way of viewing a social problem by placing the 
cognitive tools - i.e. frames - for its definition and interpretation into the public discourse. 
This process of consensus mobilisation is distinct from consensus formation where 
consciousness is raised in networks of movement subcultures (Klandermans 1984; 1988). As 
an organisational strategy, it is no longer oriented towards legitimating the existence of the 
movement by forming a mobilisation potential, but towards legitimating the political 
strategies of the established movement that are defined by its action goals. Consensus 
mobilisation becomes a strategic resource which environmental organisations use against their 
political opponents.33
Social conflicts characterised by demonstrations or strikes against the policies of the 
state on a defmed problem - e.g. nuclear power, privatisation of state-owned industries - 
appear on the public stage as series of periodic or fluctuating "cycles of protest". When a 
specific collective actor contests a state’s public policy agenda, the "visibility" of a social 
movement in the public sphere, i.e. its framing strategies34, serve as a "sign" for building 
consensus among constituencies of supporters and dissent from opponents among the actors 
who are part of society. In this way, the social conflicts over a state’s public policies which 
may over time result in institutional and structural changes in the political system, are at the
M In the following I shall use the term mobilisation in this sense of the mobilisation of meaning into the 
public discourse, i.e. "agenda-building". This follows in a tradition of a constructivist model for political 
communication that has developed from a combination of social movement and media analysis perspectives, e.g. 
Strodhoff, Hawkins and Schoenfeld (1985), Gamson (1988; 1992; 1995), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), 
Hansen (1993) and Coule (1993).
33 Introducing widespread public support becomes the aim behind the mobilisation of consensus for 
environmental knowledge that is produced by the agenda building activities of social movement organisations. 
Klandermans (1988:p.l82) indicates that, "However important the adequate dissemination of knowledge may 
be, it is of course never more than a condition for the actual objectives of consensus mobilization, which create 
a widespread positive attitude toward the action goals."
34 The concept of framing is widely used as the analytic category for the ideological constructs and 
normative argumentations that are mobilised by social movements in the media to contest public policies, e.g. 
Snow and Benford (1986), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), and Eder (1995). Frames have also been used as 
a conceptual tool in media analysis (Altheide 1976; Gans 1979; Glasgow University Media Group 1976) though 
sometimes in ways that tend to focus on the media at the expense of the audience (Neuman, Just et al. 1992).
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same time the "visible" reference point for actors to relate these political confrontations to 
their own social lives. The competing political claims of actors in a social conflict exist as 
a cultural resource for people to rationalise the actions which reconstitute their social 
relationships in specific social settings. This indicates that as well as being manifest in a 
structural institutional configuration of political parties and interest groups, politics also 
works at the more latent level of the process of social change that is initiated by everyday 
decisions and actions. The cognitive appeal of a social movement’s frames may not translate 
directly into mass protest activism, but by sustaining the "visibility" of a social problem 
within a political culture the organisations’ actions are a constructive factor in maintaining 
the potential for policy change within the political opportunity structure.
The communications-based perspective which I propose applies a cognitive twist to 
the concept o f political opportunity structure, by emphasizing framing and network-building 
as part of the discursive process which builds the agenda for and m obilises a social problem. 
Such a theoretical model acknowledges the increasing role of communication resources in the 
construction and mediation of politics.35 Public discourse is more than a process which 
consists of a variety of intertextual activities, it is a cultural field that specific actors are able 
to use to dominate others. It is through the public discourse that political actors frame 
problems, make claims and contest social relationships. News has a special role in this 
process of communication. The social function o f news is to represent the contests that are 
pertinent to a society at a given time. News is a cultural resource or "tool kit” (Swidler 1986) 
which is available to the actors in a society for relating the significance of public events to 
their own social lives. In societies where politics is increasingly based on mediated 
information, the role of the mass media provides an important link between the political 
actors who hold power, the collective actors who challenge them, and the constituencies who 
provide them with electoral and cultural legitimacy.
The process of news reporting continuously assigns meaning to issues, constructs and 
reconstructs social problems, defines the available political options and serves to provide 
public visiblity to collective actors and their claims. News is an interesting form of public
35 Following Habermas (1987) (1989) the thesis for the increasing importance of communicative action in 
the reproduction of relationships in "late modem" (Giddens 1989, 1991) or complex societies (Melucci 1989) 
is an established tenet of social theory. This is relevant both in relation to individual and collective action and 
in the process of the social reconstruction of society as a collective project, that Touraine (1981) refers to as 
the "self-production" of society.
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discourse.36 The news is different every day. Events in the news are permanently 
ephemeral, but when placed repeatedly, daily, in a time series, the news signifies what is 
pertinent to the society to which we belong. The news has a potentiality: it is our point of 
access and our resource to the knowledge about the world of which we are part and to which 
our actions contribute. Politics is a societal critique which is lodged in the news. In this sense 
the news is a ’reflexive* resource for actors to locate themselves and their actions in a shared 
political environment. News discourse is pervaded by a moralising agenda which makes it 
particularly suited for the normative critiques that are mobilised by moral protest actions (Lee
1989). It is in the news that "the corrupt" are named and blamed. It is by the news that we 
are confronted by the moral polemics of collective actors, party politicians and interest 
groups. And it is from the news that we learn about social problems, and either accept or 
ignore their significance to our patterns of social behaviour. In a world of communications- 
driven politics the role of the news as the key resource o f mediated information for 
individuals to experience events, monitor their social actions and form opinions ought not to 
be understated. The validity of such a perspective is supported by descriptions of the society 
which is emerging from the current process of structural transformation as an ’informational 
society’ (Luke 1989).37 The increasing communicative basis and media transmission of 
politics has even led some commentators to lament the popularisation of politics and suggest 
that political communication in contemporary societies is devoid of normative intent to the 
extent that it has become reduced to the value of a symbolic spectacle.38
The mass communication research tradition (e.g. Blunder 1983) has been criticised 
for separating the fields of production and reception of news and for being excessively 
media-centric at the expense of an understanding of how collective identities are constituted
36 News discourse has its own thematic forms and structures. See van Dijk (1988) (1991). Cottle (1995) 
discusses the role of ’new formats’ as discursive contexts for vying social interests in a mediated public 
contestation.
37 Luke (1989) directly links the rise of new social movements to the ’informationalizing of postindustrial 
societies*.
M This is the perspective of Edelman (1989). Commenting on the American case his outlook is too 
pessimistic in that it claims that the symbolic basis of political communication denies the possibility for 
meaningful participation as a basis for collective action. On the contraiy, as the identity perspective - e.g. 
Melucci (1989) - indicates, it is the symbolic basis of politics which provides collective actors that exist outside 
the party system, e.g. Greenpeace et al., with the cultural resources for voicing their opinions through the 
media.
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(Schlesinger 1991). Recently emphasis has been placed on the role o f ’source strategies’ in 
the production of news contents (Schlesinger 1990)39 and the role of the audience as 
interpreting, meaning-constructing actors (Rosengren, Wenner et al. 1985; Jensen and 
Jankowski eds. 1991; Neuman Just etal. 1992). Complementary to this perspective the news- 
based analysis o f social movements has developed explanatory models for the emergence of 
interpretative frames as an element of political discourse (Donati 1992, Gamson 1988).
Starting from such a public discourse perspective, this dissertation will use the 
newsprint media coverage as a data source for reconstructing and analyzing the agenda­
building information which three established social movement organisations mobilised during 
the three-months cycle o f a campaign against the British Government’s policy agenda. I argue 
that a key factor determining the relative success of the organisations’ campaigns were the 
cognitive, identity and communications resources that were available to the professional 
activists for constructing political claims and mobilising them into the public discourse. The 
success of such agenda-building activism depends not only on receiving favourable coverage 
from journalists who report the news, but more importantly on penetrating the thematic 
structures of news with biased information - i.e. frames - so that the reports on 
environmental topics are open to favourable interpretation by the actors who ’read* the news. 
Established environmental organisations use their specialist knowledge and communication 
skills for building an extensive cognitive network of latent support in the public domain. In 
this way an ’as i f  consensus is established for the organisations’ political goals. It is this 
constructed resource of public legitimacy that enables the organisations to exert influence on 
the policy agenda through coverage in the mass media.
At this phase of an environmental movement characterised by professionalised media- 
oriented organisations, the strategic dimension o f the construction of political action is 
defined by the ’issue salience’ of the organisations’ media messages - its agenda-building 
properties - rather than the participation by individuals (or small networks of amateur grass 
roots activists) in protest events. Instead o f an integrated large-scale movement structure, it 
becomes more accurate to refer to the specialised mobilisation function o f the small network
39 In a comparative analysis of the ’mediatization’ of the public debate on climate change based on 
interviews with scientists, journalists and environmental protection agencies, Monnont and Dasnoy (1995) 
conclude that the role of the press in problem definition is limited relative to the source actors and their 
communication strategies.
of professionals in the organisations - 'movement intellectuals' (Jamison, Eyerman et al.
1990) - and the receptive function of public constituencies to whom they appeal for funds, 
part-time commitments, membership and credibility.40
In the following I attempt to operationalise this perspective into an analysis o f the 
news coverage of the three major movement organisations in the British Dirty Man of Europe 
policy event. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature 
mobilised claims into the national news media as part of a relatively unified campaign against 
the Government's new policy proposals for the environment. This "Dirty Man of Europe" 
campaign was a discursive protest cycle, it was rendered visible in the semantic contents and 
arguments of news discourse. The empirical object of analysis for this research is the 
strategic dimension of the communication which was lodged in the news by the 
environmental organisations in a discursive campaign against the Government's policy 
thinking.
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40 Of course different phases of activism may still be present within the same movement. For example the 
grass-roots public demonstrations against the exportation of live animals in early nineties Britain co-exist with 
the activities of the established professional movement sector of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace, the WWF 
and other environmental organisations which have a political campaign agenda which is more specialised and 
strategically oriented to the public policy arena. The relationships between the two levels of actism is not 
necessarily competitive and may even be complementary. Indeed the specialist organisations may feed off the 
grass-roots protest against the conditions of exported animals and act to shape this message for the political 
discourse. What we witness are two different but related levels of environmental agenda-building.
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B) Environmental Mobilisation in the Public discourse: a methodology for retrieving 
data on a ’collective actor’ from news
Here I present a methodology for retrieving data on the communicative actions of the 
environmental movement from a sample of news texts. These introductory comments are 
extended in the following sections of the analysis C, D and E.
X. Sample Definition and Retrieval
The news sample was collected from the CD ROM package for The G uardian  
newspaper covering August, September and October 1990. The G uardian  is acknowledged 
as having a higher quality and quantity o f environmental coverage than other British 
newspapers (Lowe and Morrison 1984). It may be considered as an "opinion leader" on 
environmental matters. Furthermore, as environmental matters have been consistently shown 
to be a "middle class concern"1, The G uardian  may be considered as a discursive field 
where the debates for the environmental contest are enacted. A strategic factor in the choice 
of the sample concerned its "time span". The three months August, September and October 
1990 cover the period o f the public launch of T his Common In h erita n ce , which was intended 
to be the first integral policy statement on the Environment by a British Government.2 As 
such the news sample spans a period when the claims-making activities of the environmental 
organisations in the media are likely to be heightened.
The sample was retrieved by searching for the names of all the environmental 
organisations in the United Kingdom in the CD ROM for The G uardian. The list of names 
for all the British environmental organisations was initially compiled from the indices o f the
1 No matter how one defines "middle class" - by occupational indicators (Cotgrove and Duff 1980; 1981), 
by value indicators (Milbrath 1984), or as a culturally embedded social construction or "habitus" (Eder 1993) - 
the findings show that concern for the environment is a characteristic of the "middle classes". Furthermore the
theory of "new social movements" claims that the latest wave of environmentalism is carried by the "new 
middle classes", see e.g. Offe (1985), Brand, Buesser et al. (1983).
2 More detail on the policy events which culminated in the Conservative Government’s publication of This 
Common Inheritance on the environment is given in sections D, E and F. For an overview of environmental 
politics in Britain prior to this, see Flynn and Lowe (1992) for a descriptive account of Conservative Party 
thinking, Lowe and Flynn (1989), O’Riordan (1988) and McCormick (1991) for background on British 
environmental policy, and Grove-While and Burke (1989) and Grove-White (1993) for the movement’s thinking 
on the opportunities for making interventions into policy matters.
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following sources: E nvironm ental G roups in P olitics (Lowe and Goyder 1983); all 
environmental organisations that appeared in the EUI British news data-base on environment 
1987-91 (Statham 1993); The W orld H andbook on E nvironm ental O rganisations (1990); A 
Year in the  G reenhouse: An E nvironm ental D iary (Elkington 1991); The Green C onsum er 
G uide (Elkington and Hailes 1988); The E nvironm ental D irectory  (1991); and G reenpages 
vol. I (Elkington, Burke et al. 1988) and vol. II (Button 1989); D ie F riedens- und  
U m weltbewegung in  G rossbritannien  (Rothgang 1990); and the F riends o f the Earth 
H andbook (1990). In addition to the names of the organisations common abbrieviations or 
common misrepresentations, such as "WWF" and "World Wildlife Fund" for the World 
Wide Fund for Nature, were also searched. Each article that was retrieved by this method 
was read to confirm the validity of the reference. References to other environmental 
organisations that appeared in articles but were not in the original list of organisations were 
then searched and added to the original sample. Non-British organisations that appeared but 
were not active in the United Kingdom were excluded. This searching strategy provided a 
sample of references to the environmental organisations that were active in the British media 
discourse in the key period in August, September and October, 1990.
The overall number of article references to environmental organisations in the news 
sample is given in Table B .I. This list of environmental organisations represents the 
organisations that are active in the news discourse during the period of the Government’s 
White Paper Publication.3
The emergence of a new set of organisations with multi-national concerns and the 
revitalisation of conservation organisations has been noted as a characteristic feature o f the 
cycle 5
5 The British Green Party which is a political party and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament which is 
the prime organisation of the peace movement are excluded from the sample of environmental organisations. 
The British Greens do not have the same significance to the environmental movement as their European 
counterparts since they are permanently excluded from power by the British electoral system. Although the 
public protests of the peace movement in the early eighties served as a precursor to the contemporary 
environmental movement, CND is not strictly nowadays an organisation which engages in environmental 
activities. In 1990 CND was re-activated to voice opposition against the Gulf War in Britain.
Table B.I: Environmental Organisations in The Guardian August, Sept. & Oct., 1990
environmental organisation total number of article references
Friends of the Earth (FoE) 56
Greenpeace 35
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 23
Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) 18
National Trust (NT) 15
Countryside Commission 14
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 14
(RSPCA & SRSPCA)
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) 14
Council for the Protection of Rural England/Wales 13
(CPRE & CPRW)
English Heritage 13
The Ramblers' Association 12
Regional Wildlife Trusts 10
The Body Shop Ltd. 7
The Campaign for Real Ale (CAMRA) 6
Country Landowners’ Association 6
The Forestry Commission 6
Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE) 5
Four article references: Centre for Alternative Technology; Green Alliance; Institute of Environmental Health Officers; Royal
Horticultural Society; Royal Society for Nature Conservation; Henry Doubleday Research Foundation/National Centre for Organic
Gardening.
Three article references: Earth scan; Media Nitura Ltd.; League Against Crue! Sports; Soil Association; The Vegetarian Society;
Women’s Environmental Network (WEN).
Two article references: British Field Sports Association; Civic Trust; Groundwork Trust; Institute of Terrestrial Ecology; Food
Commission; Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission; International Council for Bird Preservation (ICBP); Learning Through 
Landscapes Trust; National Food Commision; Open Spaces Society; Pesticides Trust; Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings 
(SPAB); Transport 2000.
One article reference: Advisory Committee on Releases in the Environment; Agricultural and Food Research Council; Anglers'
Co-operative Association; Ark; Babymilk Action Coalition; Broads Authority; British Horse Society; British Trust for Ornithology; British 
Wind Energy Association; Campaign for Lead Free Air (CLEAR); Clean Technology Unit; Cleanaway Ltd.; Company of Imagination; 
Concord Filins; Council for National Parks; Council for Posterity; Council for Independent Archaeology; Cranfteld Institute of Technology; 
Cumbrian's Opposed to a Radioactive Environment (CORE); Earth First!; Ecology Building Society; ECOTEC Research and Consulting: 
EcoverLtd.; Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS); Environmental Resources Ltd.; Environmental Transport Association: Fanning 
and Wildlife Advisoty Group; Fauna and Flora Preservation Society; Findhom Association; Friends Provident; Grassland Research Institute; 
Homeowners* Friendly Society/Green Chip Investment Fund; Historic Churches Preservation Trust; Institute of Biology; Institute of 
Virology; National Council for Voluntary Organisations; National Housing and Town Planning Association; National Playing Fields 
Association; National Society for Clean Air; Naturalists Trust; Noise Abatement Society; Panos; Peace Pledge Union (PPU); Pure Meat 
Company; Research in Food and Agriculture; Red Deer Commission; Science and Engineering Research Council; Scottish Scenic Trust; 
SustainAbility Ltd.; T raid craft Ltd.; Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust; Whale Club of the World; The Whale and Dolphin Conservation 
Society; Zoological Society /Hawk and Owl Trust.
tlHlSï ■JüiPJlUXii-il4!iaiL!ftUIUlIWyi|ittlHHIIH BüWHWj - ““Mi
29
of environmental concern in the eighties and early nineties.4 The crude figures for media 
resonance indicate that for the British case this characterisation broadly holds true. Friends 
of the Earth ought to be considered along with Greenpeace as organisations that have 
experienced exponential growth in membership and national prominence. The World Wide 
Fund for Nature seems to be a prime case for a revitalised version of a more traditional 
conservation organisation but has experienced a period of growth comparable to that of 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.5 It is also worth noting that alongside the organisations 
for the traditional national concerns for animal treatment (e.g. Royal Society for the 
Protection of Birds), landscape aesthetics (e.g. Council for the Protection of Rural England) 
and access (e.g Ramblers' Association), and the national cultural heritage (e.g. National 
Trust), new types of organisation based on consumer preference (e.g. Campaign for Real Ale 
CAMRA), publishing and producing about nature (e.g. Earthscan, Panos), ethical 
consumption (Ethical Investment Research Service EIRIS), ethical production (e.g. The Body 
Shop) and alternative science (e.g. Centre for Alternative Technology) have also emerged 
over the last decade.6
The three most prominent environmental organisations in the overall news sample are 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. Broadly speaking 
these three organisations may be considered as the media-oriented sector of the British 
environmental movement. The news texts covering these three organisations were retrieved 
in full and analysed in a comparative context by the methodology described below.
In addition to being the most resonant organisations in the media, Friends of the 
Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are also the three organisations 
which have have cross-national concerns, and mobilise campaigns across a broad range of 
environmental issues, that can be local, national, international and global in scope.
4 Concerning contemporary environmental movements, Eyerman and Jamison (1989: pp.89) state: "(T)he 
current environmentalist wave is characterised, on the one hand, by a revitalisation of the older, more traditional 
conservation societies and, on the other hand, by the meteoric rise of a multi-national environmentalist 
corporation, namely Greenpeace International."
5 In the period from 1986 to 1990 Friends of the Earth’s membership increased from 25 000 to 200 000 
and Greenpeace’s from 70 000 to 380 000. Over the same period the membership of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature increased from 107 000 to 231 000 (McCormick 1991; Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995).
6 Compare for the list of organisations cited in the work of Lowe and Goyder (1983) with those that appear 
in this three months of media discourse as proof of the emergence of these new types of organisation in the 
British environmental movement.
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Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth often deal with environmental issues that arise 
from uncertain scientific findings and which therefore take the form of a controversy in 
public debate. Environmental issues concerning nuclear power, global warming, or the 
detrimental effects of pesticide use in fanning are a few examples of this type of "risk" issue. 
The World Wide Fund for Nature on the other hand takes up issues that are less 
"controversial" within the national context, but are focused beyond the limits of national 
concerns, such as the preservation of the black rhino, the conservation of Amazonian 
rainforest, and the funding of Nature Parks in Tanzania. Such concerns are unlikely to 
achieve national media attention unless they are mobilised by an environmental organisation 
and highlighted for editorial and journalistic attention. Like the controversial "risk" issues, 
this "world wide" type of environmental issue is more likely to be covered in the news when 
the issue or controversial opinion can be attributed to publicly known third party.
Public image is a primary capital for these environmental organisations. They must 
cultivate their public identity by exerting control over the way that the media represents them 
and their environmental campaigns. They are keen to remain the "goodies" in the public eye, 
whilst at the same time portraying their targeted opponents which may be the government, 
the farming lobby, or a polluting factory etc., as the "baddies" (see below section E). Since 
their opponents are often powerful public actors with ready access to the media, such as the 
Government or multi-national companies, this maintenance o f a favourable public image in 
the news is in itself a considerable achievement. Not only is this achievement indicative of 
an impressive array of communication skills, but when one also considers that the major 
source of validation for environmental organisations’ legitimacy claims comes from an ethical 
stance, the organisations need to be remarkably skilled to avoid being 'hoisted by their own 
petard*.
The production o f environmental communication is a complex process that ought not 
be reduced to a simplistic linear model o f production and reception (Hansen 1990). In the 
following I analyse the contents of The G uardian  media coverage o f Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. The aim is to learn about the social 
relations between the environmental organisations, media actors and other actors, in the 
production of environmental communication as newstext. Emphasis will be placed on text 
analysis in the attempt to reconstruct how a critique became lodged in the news in the ’Dirty 
Man of Europe’ policy event.
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2. The Social Theoretical Basis of the Model
It is widely accepted that media communication plays an important role in raising 
environmental awareness (Lowe and Goyder 1983) (Lowe and Morrison 1984) (Hailes, 
Hlkington et al. 1988). Less work has been done on the textual content that is produced by 
this "processing" of environmental concern in the public media, and the active role that is 
played by the environmental movement - i.e. their ’source strategies’ (Schlesinger 1990) - 
in this communicative process.
Existing analyses of environmental organisations in Britain and their communication 
activities tend to be based on the "pressure group" model, e.g. (Lowe and Goyder 1983), 
(Grant 1990). This assumption from the political science tradition that environmental 
organisations are "pressure groups" may be unnecessarily prescriptive in determining our 
interpretation of their actions. As I have mentioned in section A, environmental problems are 
social constructions (Everden 1992) and the production of environmental meaning in a 
national cultural setting is a complex societal process (Hansen 1990). Building on a social 
movements perspective, e.g. (Touraine 1980) (Melucci 1989) (Brand, Buesser et al. 1983) 
(Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990), theorists in the rest of Europe, Scandinavia and the United 
States have been less reliant than their British counterparts on the "pressure group" model 
for interpreting the significance of environmentalism as a form of political protest action.7
Following in the social movements tradition, I claim that there is a strong case for 
arguing that environmental organisations act as "cultural agents" rather than "pressure 
groups". The actions of contemporary environmental organisations are primarily designed 
to communicate to the public discourse rather than gain discrete attention from actors in the
7 In the analysis of the British case, I think that this deficit is due more to a bias in British academic culture 
towards using the ‘pressure group” model for analysing political action rather than an essential difference in 
the activities of the British movement from its European counterparts. Historically, this may be due to the 
influence of the ”civic culture” thesis (Almond Verba 1963) which defmed rational British political behaviour 
as "playing within the rules of the game”. Early analyses of the British environmental movement, such as Lowe 
and Goyder’s excellent study (1983), rightly used the 'pressure group* model as they were dealing at that time 
with nature conservation rather than the more politically activist type of environmental organisation. Lowe and 
Goyder’s model even had the foresight to stress the importance of the media and what they refer to as the 
"attentive public” to environmentalism. Ruedig's (1990) review essay on the analyses of political activisim and 
social movements in Britain is in my opinion mistaken to conclude that the social movement perspective in 
Britain is lacking due a lack of political activism. Suffice it to say that two other German authors Murphy 
(1985) and Rothgang (1990) found ample data for analysing the British case of political activism and the 
environmental movement in the eighties using a "new social movements” perspective.
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policy making process. Over the long term these two political aims may not be incompatible, 
but it is mistaken to assume that the aim of achieving media resonance may be interpreted 
solely as an aspect of the aim to become an internal policy actor. Indeed in contemporary 
societies, environmental protest action appears increasingly to consist in a form of "cultural 
agenda-setting" or "cultural agenda-building".8
Environmental organisations mobilise normative arguments into the public discourse. 
As "cultural agents" their intention is to ’bias’ the representation of the environmental contest 
in the national culture, so that Government and Industry actors are forced not only to 
legitimate activities which damage the environment, but also to seek legitimation from the 
public on the basis of environmental values that are set by the organisations. In this sense the 
environmental organisations construct the "public" as a constituency who legitimate or 
delegitimate social claims by environmental critieria. To the extent that this is their intention 
the environmental organisations may be considered as a "cultural pressure group".9
Achieving media resonance is a well documented aim of environmental organisations 
(Anderson 1990) (Greenberg 1985). Media resonance is not simply appearing in the news, 
but the ability to present arguments in the public discourse. Environmental organisations use 
the media resonance which their actions achieve as a resource for shaping the public 
discourse on "environmentalism". By mobilising environmental claims into news texts the 
organisations "shape" the structure of the public discourse on the environment in Britain. 
This means that other actors in the public discourse - citizens, businesses, government, 
political parties and even scientists - must refer to the information and arguments that have 
been mobilised by the organisations when they too attempt to legitimise their actions by 
environmental values. As more actors are confronted by environmental "problems" in the 
public discourse, the more need there is to attempt to legitimise actions by referring to 
environmental values. The mobilisation activities of the environmental organisations can be 
seen as a deliberate attempt at "cultural agenda building". Their communicative actions seek 
to predetermine the basis by which other actors are judged in the public discourse. In this 
way, the actions o f the environmental organisations affect the set o f social relationships
1 On agenda-setting and agenda-building see the discussion in section A.
9 I first coined the term 'cultural pressure group" in an earlier pilot version of the methodology for this 
study (Statham 1992).
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which constitute the environmental contest in a national setting. At the present historical stage 
in the British environmental debate, the "politics" o f the environmental contest occurs 
primarily in the public discourse which is prior to the policy discourses of Government.
The public discourse on the environment may be seen as an ongoing process of social 
learning in a society, the forum where the competing claims are contested and possible 
courses of action legitimated or delegitimated. However, social learning in the language of 
environmental discourse does not guarantee that society is taking a path towards sounder 
environmental practices. It merely guarantees that more different types of collective actors 
are able to engage in environmental discourse. This means that an environmentally 
"sustainable" future is maintained as a theoretical possibility for society but it certainly does 
not predetermine the outcome of the historical event.
In contemporary societies "nature” has increasingly become a cultural resource for 
actors to find "problems" with the existing set of social relationships (Melucci 1989) (Beck
1992). References to "nature" are important symbolic carriers of such identity formations and 
serve to communicate a collective identity to the rest of a society.10 They redefine society 
as a collective project. The use of nature symbolism to mobilise ideas about society induces 
a reflexivity  into political culture. When actors refer to ideas of nature they identify a ’new’ 
project for modernity. This produces an increased reflexivity  in social communication because 
it mobilises a "new" political ethic into public discourse which relates back definitively to 
the social world. It is for this reason that the environmental movement is cited by social 
theorists as a proof for the thesis of an increasingly reflexive m odernity in late modem 
societies (Giddens 1989; 1990) or the coming of the "postmodern" condition (Featherstone
1991). Furthermore, talking about the so-called "problem of nature" (Eder 1993) has even 
become fashionable. It is plausible therefore to see environmental meanings as a special key 
feature of the national political cultures of contemporary societies.
Figure 1 is a model for the process whereby media resonance on environmental 
"problems" is produced by the mobilisation activities of the environmental movement in the 
public discourse.
A prerequisite for environmental agency is that nature is identified as the basis for a 
"problematic" in the existing set o f social relationships in a society. Environmental agency
10 On the construction of collective identity see Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995).
produces the resource o f meanings which actors construct to define the environmental 
problematic as a deep structural cleavage in contemporary societies. It is this type of agency 
which constitutes the environmental movement as an active element o f national culture. To 
put it simply, there is a social contest between actors over the definition of environmental 
"problems". The main competitors in this contest are the environmental movement and the 
Government, the movement uses the "problem of nature" to mobilise a critique against the 
public policy stances of the Government.
Figure 1,
Social Theoretical Model 
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The environmental movement is sustained by an institutional structure of organisations 
at times when the "cycles" of activism11 among the wider constituency of the movement 
may be at a low ebb. Environmental organisations12 are the structures in which the force
11 On ’cycles o f protest’ see Tarrow (1985; 1989). See Buerklin (1984) for an overview of the analytic use 
o f  the notion o f ’cycles’ in social science.
11 In this dissertation I use the simple term "environmental organisations" for the social movement 
organisations which as structures sustain the cultural movement o f "environmentalism" (e.g. Friends of the
Earth). Others have in the pressure group tradition described them as Non-Governmental Organisations, NGOs, 
(Grove-White and Burke 1989) (Princen and Finger 1994) and Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations, 
ENGOS, (Harries-Jones 1993). However, I find it unhelpful to label a collective actor by what it is not rather 
than by what it is. One attempt that tries to label the environmental collective actor by what it does is
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of the movement is sustained as a collective actor. Environmental organisations draw on the 
resource of environmental meanings in a national culture and mobilise selected information 
about environmental "problems" (e.g. scientific facts) into the public discourse. This 
mobilised critique contests the activities of Government and Industry by refering to 
environmental value criteria as the legitimate basis for action. In other words, environmental 
agency produces a specific type of media resonance in the public discourses of contemporary 
societies, namely that which is produced by a "countercultural opposition". The structural 
location of this ’special1 media resonance which sustains a countercultural bias in the public 
discourse is illustrated in Figure 1.
The actions o f Government (and its responsibility for regulating the actions o f 
Industry) also draw legitimacy from elements of national culture which appear in the public 
discourse. However, government policy formation and implementation is not based on 
environmental values but on a different rationale (e.g. free market values or social justice 
values). This brings the Government into a cultural opposition with the mobilisations of the 
environmental organisations in the public discourse. In other words, the critique of the 
environmental organisations which resides in their media resonance constructs the 
environmental contest against Government actors in the public discourse. It attributes a 
political specificity to the notion of the environmental contest by relating environmental 
claims to contemporary social events. When faced by judgement that is based on 
environmental criteria, the policy making activities of the Government and the practices of 
Industry no longer appear as legitimate or rational decisions. The task of an environmental 
organisation is to use media resonance to make the cultural contradiction of the 
environmental problematic into a social opposition against the actions of Government and 
Industry actors. This means, firstly, that environmental organisations make a cultural 
contradiction into a social contest, and secondly, that Government and Industry actors are 
the primary targets of their communicative actions. In this sense the environmental 
organisations carry the environmental contest into contemporary political debate and into
Environmental Meaning Producing Institutions, EMPIs, (Szerszynski 1991 :p2), in addition to being rather 
cumbersome, this term lacks precision and analytic utility refering indiscriminately to "pressure groups, 
government bodies, industries, advertising agencies and media organisations". Furthermore, the environmental 
organisations do not simply "produce meaning", they mobilise selected information on environmental problems 
which is a resource in the public discourse for other actors to use for "producing meanings" by relating the 
environmental contest to their social relations.
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wider society.
Environmental mobilisation is not simply a case of appearing in the public discourse, 
so that the organisations can ’lead’ public opinion by magic like the Pied Piper of Hamelyn. 
On the contrary, environmental mobilisation is a process whereby the organisations attempt 
to transform the legitimating function of the public discourse towards an environmental basis. 
Environmental mobilisation is a strategic type of political action that is designed to have 
influence on the outcome of specific events in the environmental contest. Furthermore, the 
potential for mobilising "novel " aspects of contemporary culture into the public discourse is 
enhanced for environmental organisations relative to other social actors, since this potentiality 
for innovation inheres in the structural location of their media resonance in the public 
discourse which serves to mediate notions o f "ecological uncertainty" or "risks" from the 
level o f cultural symbols into the everyday practices and contests of social life.
This indicates that the media resonance which is produced by acts of environmental 
mobilisation in public discourse has a special definitive role in the "self production" 
(Touraine 1980) of contemporary societies. Environmental organisations do not appear in the 
news by chance. Regardless of the, at times, banal social relevance o f the ’plots’ in which 
they appear at the surface of newstexts, the debates which environmental organisations raise 
in the newsmedia are never politically benign. They are a key element in the ’public agenda 
building’ process and the emergent "politics" of contemporary societies.
3. The Model for Public Discourse Analysis
From this brief introduction to the social theoretical basis o f the thesis for 
environmental mobilisation in the public discourse, I now take a step towards identifying how 
environmental claims-making activities become specific empirical instances of media 
resonance. This involves moving from social theoretical considerations to the methodological 
implications for the analysis o f public discourse, and more specifically the media resonance 
of environmental claims.
The strategic dimension of environmental claims is by necessity always evident in the 
media resonance which they sustain and produce in the public discourse. This is because 
media resonance is not just an indicator for ’events’ that occur in social reality, it is part of 
the process by which actors constitute social reality in a cultural setting. As an active element
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of public discourse, the notion of an environmental problematic only makes sense to the 
reading public as a contest between competing social actors. Indeed, unless they are seen as 
part of a contest between real social actors, there is no reason for environmental problems 
to appear in the news.13 Media resonance may be seen as a ’collective’ discursive field that 
is reproduced by the strategic communicative acts of competing actors in a society. By 
achieving media resonance environmental problems are produced in relation to the 
contemporary events in the social world. This means that media resonance is an indicator for 
the ’cutting edge’ of a political culture, it gives ’life* to the social relationships which are 
contested in a national setting.
Figure 1 identified the structural location of media resonance as an arena of public 
discourse produced by the social contest that is waged by the environmental movement 
against Government actors in a national cultural setting. Following on from this, Figure 2 
illustrates the field of media resonance that is produced by acts of environmental mobilisation 
in the public discourse. Furthermore, Figure 2 represents the strategic dimension of the 
claims which are used to mobilise the environmental contest as a political event in this 
empirical sample of newstexts.
As the set of newstexts were collected by coding the names of the environmental 
organisations, the sample of media resonance covers the field of public discourse in which 
the organisations are active and not the whole public discourse on "environmentalism".14 
In other words, my sample of newstexts is biased towards the media resonance of the 
strategic communicative actions of environmental organisations. This is taken as an indicator 
for the communicative actions of the "political wing" of the environmental movement.15
13 To achieve media resonance environmental problems must have a “news value”. This means that they 
are related to current events and deemed pertinent to a society. On the concept o f  "news values”, see Fowler 
(1991). Environmental problems can achieve a "news value” by being a topical political ’event’, e.g. at the time 
of a piece o f environmental legislation, an International Conference on Global Warming etc.. Sometimes such 
’events* are deliberately staged by environmental organisations as a means for achieving a specific type of media 
resonance. The following analysis will attempt to extend our knowledge o f this process as a type o f political 
action.
14 For a sample and descriptive account o f the whole public discourse on "environmentalism” in Britain from 
1987-91 inclusive, see Statham (1993; 1995).
15 Eder (1995) distinguishes three "packages'' of environmental framing devices: the ”conservationist”; the 
"fundamentalist”; and the 'political ecology”. At the present stage of environmental communication the two 
former "packages" tend to be becoming superceded by the dynamism o f "political ecology" in the public 
discourse. I take the sample o f  media resonance covering the environmental organisations as an indicator for 
analysing one specific aspect o f  the dynamism of "political ecology" in public discourse: the agenda-building
The discursive field for environmental claims-making through the media is shown in 
F igu re  2. Empirically, the semantic contents of my sample of media resonance may be seen 
as a discursive field where environmental themes appear in a strategic relation to government 
responsibility contexts.
F igure 2.
M acro-Representation of News Sample on Environmental Contest 
Environm ental Mobilisations in Media Resonance
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Following the earlier discussion on the social theoretical basis o f the environmental 
mobilisation thesis, it is clear that the social contest which appears in my sample of media 
resonance is produced by the strategic attempts o f the environmental movement to oppose 
Government (and Industry) actors. Making the Government actors responsible and responsive 
is a  social function o f the media resonance which is intentionally produced by the strategic 
activities of the organisations. Furthermore, the bias in the news sample means that the 
specific sets of environmental themes and government responsibility contexts which achieve 
media resonance as a result o f this type o f political action have a strategic relation: the 
environmental themes are raised to promote the government responsibility contexts. In this 
sense, environmental mobilisation may be considered as the initiation of a "promotional
properties o f  the media-oriented environmental organisations.
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culture" that favours specific environmental claims in a national political setting.
The relation between environmental themes and government responsibility contexts is 
a key axis of my empirical sample of media resonance on the environmental contest. It is by 
this axis that meanings at the level of text are related to social events, both in the process of 
environmental mobilisation (making the "text" - production of news) and in the process o f 
interpreting the claims as part of a social contest (reading the "text" - public reception o f 
news). Hence I use this axis which relates meaning at the level of text (specific "news 
events") to meaning at the the level of social reality (the contest between actors) for 
constructing the analytic categories for retrieving the empirical contents of the organisations’ 
environmental claims from the news sample.The remainder of this section will develop a 
brief outline of this method for the analysis of the process of environmental mobilisation by 
the organisations. More detail is given in the sections C, D and E  which undertake this 
public discourse analysis.
The field of public communication which is constructed between environmental themes 
and government responsibility contexts in the news sample is represented schematically in 
Figure 2. When the organisations make claims that refer to environmental themes, they are 
engaged in a process of encoding the media resonance of the environmental contest. At the 
same time, when environmental themes are the source of claims they are raised as 
"problems" with reference to social contexts. Environmental claims are not just 
environmental themes; they have empirical targets, both at the level of text (in "news 
events") and in the reading of the text by actors as part of a social contest (in events that 
affect peopled social relationships). Environmental claims-making is a process which 
necessarily makes existing social relationships conflictual, otherwise it would not achieve the 
"news value" to resonate as a news topic. The environmental organisations’ claims-making 
activities maintain a specific impetus for the delegitimation of their opponents in the social 
contest. Environmental themes and government responsibility contexts are thus present in the 
public discourse as elements of the same communicative process. They make sense together 
as the components of a news narrative that mediates from text to social reality, and may be 
considered respectively as the "source" and "target" elements of my sample o f empirical
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media resonance.16
In short, the set of political meanings which resonates in the media (as a result of the 
organisations’ environmental mobilisations) are based on claims which encode environmental 
themes that legitimate government responsibility contexts, i.e. delegitimate Government 
actors. Hence the environmental mobilisations of the organisations induce a process of 
encoding and delegitimation into the public discourse on the environmental contest. 
Environmental themes and government responsibility contexts constitute the strategic 
orientation of the organisations’ communicative actions which resonate in the media. Other 
actors may then use this communication as resource for the construction of political meaning 
about the environmental contest.
In Figure 2 I represent the empirical set of "newstexts" in the centre of the diagram. 
This is the empirical form of resonant public discourse, i.e. "news”, that is constructed by 
the organisations’ influence over the relation of environmental themes to government 
responsibility contexts. In addition to this, newstexts have a specific location in time and 
place, they are socially embedded. This brings to light another aspect of the mobilisation 
activities of environmental organisations: by making claims that relate environmental 
problems to contemporary social events, the organisations attribute a specificity to the 
environmental contest in the national setting. As a result of the organisations' actions, the 
environmental contest is not only made pertinent to contemporary political debate, but ’real’ 
as a social contest and series of events that people can associate with their lives and their 
own actions. This process o f making the environmental contest specific in its relevance to 
the contemporary social world may be refered to as "framing"17 the environmental discourse
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16 Gusfield's (1981) seminal work on the example o f drink-driving laws defmes a notion o f the "ownership" 
and "responsibility" for public problems. In my schema, problem "ownership* would be akin to the mobilisation 
o f  environm ental themes by environmental organisations, and causal and political "responsibility" to the 
governm ent responsibility contexts which are mobilised into the public discourse. I refrain from the term 
"ownership", since this overstates the monopoly of power which environmental organisations may exercise in 
the process o f defining environmental problems. As social constructions environmental problems are "owned" 
by everybody (and by those who are held responsible for serving the public interest, i.e . Government) to the 
extent that they may be "owned" at all.
17 "Framing" has been used by sociologists to refer to how actors perceive the social world (Goffman 1972), 
how social movements use their collective identity as a strategic resource (Benford and Snow 1988) and as a 
unit for analysis and interpretation o f public discourse (Gamson 1988) (Johnston 1992). "Framing" is how actors 
relate the cognitive level (culture) to the social world in their strategies for competing in the public discourse. 
Hder (1995) has outlined a theory for the political transformation o f modem environmentalism based on framing 
and communicating nature in the public discourse.
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as part of social reality. The framing process performs a ‘problem specification’ function in 
the environmental discourse by identifying specific related sets of environmental issues and 
contested fields in relation to social events.
As the "political wing” of the environmental movement, Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature tend to frame the environmental discourse 
as a contest against Government and Industry actors. They do this differently and have 
distinct "images” in the public discourse. I refer to the range o f contents of an environmental 
organisation’s mobilisations as its "public cam paign culture". These will be compared for 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in section C.
The structural location of the collective "public campaign culture" for the media- 
oriented sector of the environmental movement is shown in Figure 2. This "public campaign 
culture" constructs the environmental themes and government responsibility contexts that 
resonate in the news. Each organisation has a "public campaign culture" which is a resource 
for making environmental claims that are politically contentious. An organisation’s "public 
campaign culture" is an analytic category for its discursive action repertoire in the news 
media. This means that the three organisations’ environmental claims mobilise specific 
"types" of environmental issue cultures and specific "types" of contested fields which 
define environmental problems as political "events" in the public discourse. In this way the 
mobilisations of the environmental organisations perform a role of "environmental problem 
specification" for British society.
Environmental issue cultures and contested fields are the "units" which constitute the 
"public campaign culture” of an environmental organisation (see section C for detail). They 
are categories for the specific ways in which the organisations construct environmental issues 
to dispute the action-contexts over which Government has influence. These are the strategic 
contents of news which are raised when the organisations make environmental "problems" 
by referring to specific social events.
Since environmental "problems" are ’real* only as social constructions, their political 
existence is dependent on how they are defined. For example, the difference between 
references to "global wanning", the "greenhouse effect" or the "ozone hole" that appear in 
the news is not a scientifically based distinction about the natural world. On the contrary, it 
is a social preference for "wording" which is used by an actor for communicating an 
environmental "problem" in the public discourse. Environmental organisations mobilise
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specialist "expert" knowledge on the environmental contest (e.g. the claims of scientists or 
deep ecologists) into the wider public discourse. Legitimating claims in the public discourse 
requires a different language than legitimating claims on the basis of natural science or as a 
religious creed. Environmental organisations perform this task of "framing” environmental 
problems in a national culture. This implies that an environmental issue which is named in 
the news, e.g. "global warming", is a symbolic framing device that is used for making claims 
about the social contest on the environment resonate in public. It is environmental agency - 
acts o f mobilisation * that ’produces’ how an issue is named in the news. This is the process 
by which an identified problem is mediated from an expert discourse into the broader public 
discourse. It also indicates that the environmental contest is socially constructed.
To summarise, the role of the "public campaign cultures" which are mobilised by 
environmental organisations is that of defining and shaping what is considered to be the 
environmental contest in a national cultural setting. This process o f mobilising political 
meaning through news texts may be refered to as environmental framing, which is a type of 
public agenda building that is specific to contemporary societies.
4. The Model for Newstext Analysis
The thesis for environmental mobilisation focuses on a special case of "news source" 
actors, namely the environmental organisations, and how they are able to use their source 
status to "frame" the environmental contest as a political event in Britain. How can we 
analyse the "affective" properties of this source communication, and the strategies on which 
it is based as a type of communicative action, from the set of empirical newstexts which it 
produces?
Quantitative levels o f coverage can tell us neither about the contents of environmental 
communications nor about the strategic properties o f claims that are made by actors in 
specific cases during a political event. In order to add qualitative detail to the quantitative 
occurences of media resonance in the sample, the following analytic model is used which 
combines content analysis and text analysis methods. This research strategy facilitates a 
reconstruction of the public discourse that is produced by the environmental organisations* 
actions within the context o f their contested social relationship to Government actors in a key 
policy event.
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Figure 2 showed a macro-level representation of the location of the newstext sample 
as a discursive field of media resonance in the public sphere. Furthermore this media 
resonance was seen to be produced by the organisations’ campaign activities against 
Government actors in the social contest on the environment and be constituted by the relation 
of environmental themes to government responsibility contexts. Figure 3 is taken from the 
the centre of Figure 2, and represents an analytic model for an individual newstext taken 
from the overall sample of newstexts that appear in Figure 2.
This means that Figure 3 gives a representation of an individual text (micro-level unit 
of discourse) from the sample of newtexts that is produced by the claims-making activities 
of the environmental organisations. All the newstexts in the sample are constructed by the 
relation of environmental themes to government responsibility contexts. The strategic 
information on the environmental contest that is constructed by this relation inheres into a 
news narrative. It is this relation which mediates meaning from the level of text to the level 
o f the social actors in the environmental contest and their relationships. In short, this is the 
axis by which a text achieves the ’duality* to exist both as a cultural element (news discourse 
level) and gain access to the process by which actors construct reality in their social 
relationships (actor level). Figure 3 introduces four discourse elements, namely "O '1 the 
organisation’s name; "A" issues relating to the organisation’s activities; "E" issues relating 
environmental problems; and "G" issues relating to the responsibility o f Government actors. 
These four discourse elements are analytic constructs. Together the four discourse elements 
constitute the components of a standard model for a news narrative on the environmental 
contest that appears in the overall news sample.18 In other words, they are designed to 
retrieve the components of the relations between environmental themes and government 
responsibility contexts that appear in the set of newstexts in the sample. This requires further 
explanation. First I introduce the four discourse elements.
18 This standard model for the narrative which appears in a newstext from the sample was constructed on 
a "trial and error" basis of coding and classifying the information of the actual sample o f newstexts.
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Figure 3.
M icro-Representation of an  Individual Text
News N arrative on an "Event" in Environmental Contest: 
the four discourse elements "O ", "A", "E" and "G"
In news narratives produced by acts of environmental mobilisation, environmental theme(s) 
relate to government responsibility context (s) to construct the environmental problematic as 
a social event. Four analytic categories were constructed as dimensions for coding the 
elements of these news narratives. These four discourse elements are:
"O " the environmental organisation’s name
"A" issues relating to the organisation’s activities
"E" issues relating to environmental "problems’1
"G " issues relating to the responsibility of Government (& Industry) actors
envi ronmen tal 
theme (s)
"A"
/  | \
/ \
/  1 \
a 0 a 1 i + - - "G"
\  1 /
\ /
\  1 /
"E"
■NEWS NARRATIVE"
govexnmen t 
responsibi lity 
context(s)
[Note: an environmental claim is produced by the three discourse elements "E", "A" and 
"G ". These discourse elements relate issues that construct "bias" into the news narrative on 
an episode from the environmental contest. As such they are indicators for the claims which 
the organisations mobilise to produce "bias" in the reporting of an environmental event.]
I
The discourse element "O" is simply the organisation’s name. It is by this discourse 
element that the sample was retrieved and defined. Obviously the organisation’s name has 
less scope for being an elaborate discourse element in the narrative of the text than "A", "E" 
and "G " which represent the different types of issues that construct the environmental
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contest.19
The "A" issues are the "activity issues" o f the organisation. This discourse element 
refers to the activities and actions of the environmental organisations that appear in the text. 
Like the discourse element "O ”, the "A" issues refer to the environmental organisation. The 
issues relating to the organisation’s activities "A" constitute the component of the news 
narrative in which the environmental organisation appears as an "actor". Hence the discourse 
element "A" is an indicator for the self-legitimation strategies o f the environmental 
organisations that are mobilised into newstexts. This concerns what an environmental 
organisation is reported as doing in the text, whether this action involves staging an event, 
liasing with the Opposition Party Leader, criticising the activities of another environmental 
organisation, publishing a report, commissioning a piece of scientific research, engaging in 
a practical environmental development or conservation programme etc..
The "E" issues refer to environmental problems that appear in a text. This discourse 
element "E ” is a component of the news narrative that serves as an indicator for the issue 
legitimation strategies of the organisation. These are the types of environmental issue topics 
that are named and elaborated in a newstext. They are raised by the environmental 
organisation to publicise themes and contest its opponent actor, Government. Examples 
include traffic noise and pollution in the countryside, destruction of the aesthetic beauty of 
the natural landscape, health risks of food grown using pesticides, the imminent extinction 
of a rare species, the threat of global warming, the risk of nuclear power. A content analysis 
of this analytic category is undertaken in Section C to ascertain the environmental thematic 
range o f concern that is mobilised by the campaigns of the three major environmental 
organisations.20
The "G" issues are those which construct the responsibilities of Government (and *30
19 Indeed the organisation’s name element "O" only becomes an elaborate element of a news narrative when 
it is used so that the "name” itself symbolises the organisation and actions in a way that attributes a given 
normative value to them. For example the name “Greenpeace* is a symbol that as a “public image” represents 
more in the public discourse than a description of an actor, in some cases when the name appears in the public 
discourse it may attribute a normative value to the actions of this organisation.
30 In section C the resonance of the environmental issue discourse element "E" is divided into twelve sub­
categories of types of "environmental issue cultures": "global wanning"; "rainforest etc."; "rare fauna"; 
"nuclear"; "mining"; "car"; "energy"; "industrial waste pollution"; "agricultural waste pollution"; "natural 
environment"; "green business"; and "green politics". The resonance of these twelve sub-categories of the 
environmental issue "E" discourse element are compared to draw indicators on the type of environmental 
problem specification that is mobilised by the campaigns of each organisation.
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Industry21) actors for environmental problems in a newstext. This discourse element "G” 
is a component of the news narrative that serves as an indicator for the delegitimation 
strategies (i.e. "blaming") which are used by the environmental organisations against their 
targeted opponent actors. Indeed it is the Government responsibility issues "G" which 
construct the Government actors as an opponent of the environmental organisation. Examples 
include Government negligence for regulatory policies for controling biological substances, 
Government failure to comply with European legislation, the car industry’s unwillingness to 
introduce environmental critieria into their assessment of the efficiency of new technology.
I undertake a content analysis of these Government responsibility issues in Section C to 
ascertain the targets of the environmental organisations’ respective campaigns.22
Newstexts make sense as individual units (van Dijk and Kintsch 1983); each article 
has a "storyline" or narrative about an "event" which serves to raise the environmental 
contest into public debate. The four discourse elements "O", "A", "E ", and "G" are the 
essential components of a news narrative which is produced by environmental mobilisation. 
These discourse elements contain the strategic information on the environmental contest 
which appears empirically in public texts. It is the discursive contents of these four 
components which construct the strategic meaning o f news narrative in a text. These four 
discourse elements constitute the argumentative structure in which a specific environmental 
claim is embedded into the narrative of a text.
Mobilising environmental claims is a communicative process that involves the 
selection of environmental topics, self-promotion of the organisation, and the identification 
of responsible actors. For this public discourse analysis methodology, I consider an 
environmental claim which appears empirically in the newstext - resulting from an 
environmental organisation’s mobilisation activities - to be constituted by a combination o f 
the three discourse elements which relate the environmental contest, namely: environmental 31*
31 The primaiy opponent actors of the environmental organisations are the Government. I take the 
government responsibility context to include the actions of industrial actors, since the Government is ultimately 
responsible for the mechanisms which regulate the actions of Industry.
n  In section C the resonance of the government responsibility issue discourse element "G" is divided into 
ten sub-categories of types of ‘contested fields*: nuclear n; energy (non nuclear) y; agriculture a ; industry 
1; transport t; business b; party politics p; labour 1; government e; and sponsorship d. The resonance of 
these ten sub-categories of the government responanibility "G" discourse element are compared to draw 
indicators on the type of specification of contested fields and practices that is mobilised by the campaigns of 
each organisation.
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issues "E "f issues relating to the organisation’s activities "A", and the responsibility issues 
of Government "G". The interrelations between these four discourse elements shown in 
Figure 3 give a prototype model for the narrative structure o f a "news story" on an episode 
in the environmental contest. In each example of text where environmental mobilisation is 
present the three component discourse elements "E", "AH and "G” are "packaged" into a 
news narrative so that the reported episode from the environmental contest is given a 
"cultural bias".23
This dissertation undertakes an analysis of this process whereby acts of environmental 
mobilisation by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature 
produce a "cultural bias" that affects political outcomes. How then are these discourse 
elements retrieved, coded and reconstructed from the individual texts? And how are the 
individual texts reconstructed into the "cycle" of a policy event?
5. Newstext Coding and  Analysis
5.1 Environmental mobilisation sample
All texts contain the discourse element "O ", an organisation’s name, since they were 
retrieved from the CD ROM news database by coding this item of data. The three discourse 
elements "E", "A" and "G" refer to issues which are constitutive of the environmental claims 
in the news narrative on an event - it is in these three discourse elements that a "cultural 
bias" is manifest into a news narrative. Those texts which do not contain the three discourse 
elements ME", "A" and "G" are excluded from the sample for discourse analysis, since this 
means that they are references where the environmental organisation is simply mentioned "in 
passing" rather than being an "actor" in the discourse. I refer to these excluded newstexts 
as "passing references".24 *34
23 When actors use culture as a resource for engaging strategically with other actors in a society they make 
ideological constructs which have a "cultural bias". In short, an ideology is how an actor makes strategic use 
of culture. The concept of "cultural bias" is drawn from the anthropological work of Mary Douglas (1968) 
(1975). It has been applied to the analysis of actor networks by M. Thompson (1984) (1988). On the 
"packaging" of claims into the media discourse, see Gamson (1988) and Eder (1995).
34 "Passing references” are produced when a journalist refers to an environmental organisation  ^ name when 
reporting on a topic that is not pan of the environmental contest resulting from the organisations activities. This 
type of references to the environmental organisations are indicated in the visual database by the symbol # .
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It is an assumption of the thesis for environmental mobilisation that the organisations 
act in order to have influence over the definition o f the environmental contest that appears 
in public texts. As I require data on how the environmental organisations shape the semantic 
contents of news on the environmental contest those where the organisation does not appear 
as an actor in the contest are excluded from the sample.
In fact relatively few examples of the articles referring to Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature were "passing references” (#) where the 
organisation does not appear as an actor in an episode from the environmental contest. Only 
ten o f the 56 articles mentioning Friends of the Earth, six of the 35 articles mentioning 
Greenpeace, and one of the 23 articles mentioning the World Wide Fund for Nature can be 
classified as "passing references". That these three organisations usually appear as "actors" 
in a news discourse concerning the environmental contest, rather than by chance, itself bears 
testimony to their claims-making potential.
After removing the "passing references" to the three environmental organisations, the 
sample for discourse analysis comprised a total of 98 articles: 46 provide data on the 
environmental mobilisation activities of Friends of the Earth, 29 on those o f Greenpeace, and 
22 on those of the World Wide Fund for Nature.
5.2 Text contents
To demonstrate the method for content and text analysis I refer to an example from 
the sample. Figure 4 gives an example of a newstext that has been retrieved from the CD 
ROM database on Friends o f the Earth. Not ju s t white but deathly palid  (FoE a), appeared 
on 26th September, 1990, and is referred to as newstext (FoE a) in the visual database for 
the Friends of the Earth sample (see below). For each of the 98 newstexts where an 
environmental organisation appears as an actor in the environmental contest a similar 
"profile" o f text contents was constructed.
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Figure 4. A Newstext sample - (FoE a)
TITLE *.26-09-90: FEA Not just white but deathly pallid 
REPORTER : unnamed 
PAGE :18
FRIENDS of the Earth summed it up well. Judge yesterday’s white paper on the environment by its 
verbs. This is the policy paper which Chris Patten pledged would nail the lie about Britain being "the dirty man of 
Europe." This is the programme which he promised the Conservative Party Conference last year would "nail the lie. not 
by words but by actions".
So what new firm commitments are included in its 350 proposals? Only a tiny number and even these 
are modest. Whether one turns to the full 300-page £24.50 full version or the shorter 40-page £2.50 summary, one searches 
in vain for hard pledges introduced by such verbs as implement, establish, enact. Instead on global warming the Government 
promises to encourage, promote, monitor or press for; on the countryside it pledges itself to endorse, review, consider and 
consult; and on towns and cities it will encourage and promote. This is not an action programme, but a discussion paper.
Not even the silky words of Chris Patten could mask the threadbare contents of his glossy documents. 
Take energy: there is no target for the reduction of energy, no minimum standards for the energy efficiency of household 
appliances such as the US has introduced, no incentives like linking mortgage tax relief to the energy efficiency of 
dwellings. A new cabinet committee on energy is promised, but there is not even a commitment to restore the cuts made 
to the existing Energy Efficiency Office. Or take the motor car. which produces four times its own weight in carbon dioxide 
gas each year: there are no new taxes or hints of new taxes on bigger engines or dirtier fuel and no stricter regulations 
requiring catalytic converters. There is no commitment to switch more subsidy from roads to public transport. All we get 
is a commitment to extend the MoT test to improve the tuning of vehicles. Even Los Angeles, a city built for the car, will 
have tougher controls in the next decade than London.
Mr Patten specifically ruled out new energy taxes, and although a year ago there was excited speculation 
about the way in which taxes and charges could be used to control pollution, all he was prepared to say yesterday was that 
the Government would continue to look at ways in which the market could control pollution more effectively. Instead of 
targets, minimum standards and new regulations, industry is being exhorted to improve itself. Industry will not like this. 
It will inhibit action.
The market does not allow the individual company to pioneer new cleaner methods if its competitors 
are to be allowed to continue to use cheaper, easier and dirtier procedures. Industry likes a level playing field where each 
company has to play to the same rules. What has gone wrong? It looks like a combination of penny-pinching by the 
Treasury, empire-defending by cabinet colleague, and a Prime Minister whose enthusiasm for protecting the environment 
has waned as the costs and the necessary regulations have become apparent.
There is no inherent contradiction between conservatism and conservation, but it does pose problems 
for Mrs Thatcher and her philosophic objections to the three necessary mechanisms: public expenditure, regulation, and 
a national strategy. And yet “strategy" is included in the subtitle to yesterday’s white paper; and there are new regulations 
(hedgerows, for one), and at least one area where there will be an increase in expenditure (preserving cathedrals). Mr Patten 
is still in negotiation with the Treasury, but after the huge sums he won for the poll tax subsidies he is not expected to come 
away with very much for the environment. Of course there are major programmes already in the pipeline, but they 
mainly reflect EC directives, not ministerial initiatives: the £28 billion programme to improve drinking water and clean up 
beaches by better sewage disposal was resisted by ministers until privatisation was completed; the £6 billion programme 
to tackle acid rain followed five years of resistance by ministers. Even now, the UK has reduced by 50 per cent its original 
commitment to install desulphurisation equipment (because of electricity privatisation); is making the smallest cut of major 
EC members; and will remain by far the biggest sulphur dioxide polluter in the EC. There is more than just hedgerows and 
heritage in yesterday’s package, but most of it is hype.
There is not much action on the street, let alone in the stratosphere. Round one is lost; but with 
concerted effort, environmentalists can still ensure that the action starts in round two.
DATE 26-09-90
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5.2.1 actors and events - contents indicators
The i. environmental mobilisation indicators, ii. contested field indicators and iii. 
m edia coverage indicators are initial descriptive indicators for retrieving information on the 
actors and events who appear in a newstext. The codings for the article (FoE a) are given 
in F igure  5.
F igure  5.
"P rofile” o f Friends of the E arth  Text No.34:
Date: 26/09/90 ref: (FoE a)
Headline: Not ju st white but deathly palid
Size: 790 words Page: 18 Section: Feature
i. environm ental mobilisation indicators:
occurence o f "staged event": $ yes
organisation a "source" of text: s yes
organisation’s information present in text: i yes
organisation spokesperson quoted in text: S no
ii. contested field indicators:
environmental problem scope: National N
actor field scope: National N
"type" o f  contested Field: government internal decision making e
policy o r non policy field: policy field o
iii. m edia coverage indicators:
environmental organisation: positive +
environmental organisation’s activities: positive +
environmental problems: positive +
govemment/industry negative -
5 .2 .l . i .  environm ental mobilisation indicators
These are an initial coding for the discursive actions of the environmental organisation 
that appear in the newstext. It codes simply: whether the organisation has "staged an event"
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to enhance the possibility of achieving media resonance ($); whether it is an explicit"source" 
for the production of the text by journalists (s); whether information produced by the 
organisation (e.g. scientific data, reports) appears in the news narrative (i); and whether a 
spokesperson from the organisation is quoted directly in the text (5).25
For the case of the newstext (FoE a), the first two sentences, "Friends o f the Earth 
summed it up well. Judge yesterday’s white paper by its verbs." (FoE a), indicate that the 
organisation has used the "verb” stunt as a "staged event" ($) to raise this particular article 
as news. The organisation can also be considered as a "source" actor (j ) o f the semantic text, 
which is structured around the points raised by the stunt. Thirdly, the organisation's selected 
and reported information (i) on environmental topics and government responsibilities is the 
basis o f the argumentation on the environmental problematic that appears in the article. 
However, a Friends o f the Earth spokesperson is not explicitly cited.
5 .2 .1 .n . contested field indicators
These are an initial coding for the "event" from the environmental contest that is 
reported by the news narrative. The contested field is constructed into the news narrative as 
an "event" by the environmental organisations’ opposition to a Government actor. Four 
indicators are used for analysing the contested field in the news narrative, namely: the scope 
o f  the environmental problem (W world/global, E  european, N national, or L local); the 
scope o f the actor field (W world/global, E european, N national, or L  local); "type" of 
contested field (nuclear n, energy (non nuclear) y, agriculture a , industry i, transport t, 
business b , party politics p , labour 1, government e, or sponsorship d); and whether or not 
the contested field was a policy field (o) or a non policy field (x).
For the case o f the newstext (FoE a), environmental problems in the news narrative 
are discussed primarily in the national context (N), the primary actor field of the contested 
"event" (Friends o f the Earth v. Government) is national (N), and refers to government 
internal decision making (e) in terms of policy matters (o).
25 The symbols in brackets are the coding elements for the visual database (see below). If these symbols 
appear in the visual database for an article then an incident of a staged event, or sourcing, or mobilising 
information, or spokesperson occurs in the news narrative. If the symbol is absent then it did not occur.
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These are a coding for the evaluations of the actors and topics in the environmental 
contest that are made by the media actor who "writes" the text. These are the values that the 
journalist attributes to the characters in a news narrative, i.e. journalistic commentary on the 
environmental organisation; its activities; the environmental problems; and the Government 
(or Industry) actor.
In the news text (FoH a) the environmental organisation (+ )  and its actions (+ )  are 
viewed positively - "Friends o f the Earth summed it up well" (FoE a) - as are the prognoses 
for environmental problems (+ ) that it raises. The Government on the other hand is viewed 
negatively (-). In this case the journalist strays from "objectively" reporting events and 
opinions, and agrees with the line taken by Friends of the Earth against the Government.
5 .2 .2  environm ental discourse • contents indicators
The i. environm ental news narra tive  indicators and ii. discursive stunts and 
explicit fram ing devices are indicators for the semantic elements which constitute the 
environmental claims that appear in a news narrative. Its is through these text elements that 
the strategic orientation of the organisation*s claims - the strategic information produced by 
its activism - is mobilised as a news narrative relating to the environmental contest. These 
indicators appear at the surface level of text and serve for reconstructing the discursive action 
strategies of the organisations. In other words, these coded discourse elements are used to 
reconstruct: firstly, how the organisation "frames" the environmental contest in the news (i); 
and secondly, how it uses polemics, reasoning devices and references to cultural elements 
to legitimise its own stance and delegitimise that of its opponent (ii). Together these 
indicators will be used for reconstructing the claims-making practices of the environmental 
organisations in the news. The codings for the article (FoE a) are given in "text profile" that 
is represented in Figure 6.
5.2.1.iii. media coverage indicators
^UUHUunygyBBSBl
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"Profile" of Friends of the E arth  Text No.34:
Date: 26/09/90 ref: (FoE a)
Headline: Not ju st white but deathly palid
Size: 790 words Page: 18 Section: Feature
i. environmental news narrative indicators, discourse elements:
"Q M environmental organisation’s "name": 
simple descriptive usage for naming organisation
"A" issues relating organisation’s activities, self-legitimation strategies:
Production of counter document on Government’s record. Organisation’s use of links to 
media actors to relay detailed and specific criticisms of Government’s White Paper policy 
document; use of discursive stunt ("judged by its verbs") to highlight inaction of proposed 
programme
"E" environmental issues, issue legitimation strategies:
global wanning threat; energy efficiency; car use/roads/public transport; drinking water 
quality; conservation o f hedgerows; heritage; acid rain threat; use o f beaches; sulphur dioxide 
emissions
"G" government responsibility issues, opponent delegitimation strategies:
Government national policy strategy for environmental protection; use of regulatory controls 
over industry; policy instruments for effective implementation; role of state 
intervention/market mechanisms in Conservative policy
» . discursive stunts and explicit fram ing devices:
Discursive stunt: "Friends o f the Earth summed it up well. Judge yesterday’s white paper on 
the environment by its verbs ... one searches in vain fo r  hard pledges such as implement, 
establish, enact. Instead on global warming the Government promises to encourage, promote, 
m onitor or press fo r; on the countryside it pledges itself to endorse, review, consider and 
consult; and on towns and cities it will encourage and promote. This is not an action 
programme but a discussion paper. ”
Figure 6.
Reference to "the D irty man o f Europe”.
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These are the discourse elements which constitute the narrative of newstext, i.e. the 
organisation’s name ”0 " ,  environmental issues referring to problems "E", issues referring 
to the organisation’s activities "A" and the responsibility issues of Government "G". These 
are written down in a descriptive shorthand for coding (see Figure 6 for (FoE a» . This 
descriptive coding represents the four discourse elements as the components of a news 
narrative in which the organisations environmental claims are embedded. The environmental 
claims that are made by an organisation and which bias’ a news narrative are constituted by 
a ’package’ of the three elements relating to issues "E", "A” and "G" .
In the newstext (FoE a), the organisation’s name "O" "Friends of the Earth" is not 
used in an elaborate way (e.g. as a metaphor or as a synonym for environmental action) but 
simply functions to label the organisation as a collective actor.
For the newstext (FoE a) the issues relating to the organisation’s activities ”A" that 
appear in the news narrative are the production o f a document that criticises the 
Government’s national policy document and the mobilisation this document to opinion leading 
journalists. This strategy by Friends of the Earth is precipitated by a "staging" of their 
critical report as an event and by using a discursive stunt "the document should be judged 
by its verbs" to gain media resonance.
In the case of (FoE a) a multiple number of environmental problems are named as 
environmental issues "E" in the news narrative. As the news narrative covers the 
environmental contest as a national strategy for producing an environmental agenda, several 
environmental problems are raised in the context o f the development o f a national integrated 
programme. In articles covering other types o f  "event" from the environmental contest, e.g. 
a case of direct action against nuclear weapons testing (Gpc U), a single environmental 
problem may be elaborated and developed in greater detail than those mention in (FoE a). 
The narrative in (FoE a) mentions the following environmental problems as issues: global 
warming threat; energy efficiency; car use/roads/public transport; drinking water quality; 36
5.2.2A. environmental news narrative indicators26
36 These descriptive indicators for the discourse elements "E" and "G" are coded into sub-categories for 
envirionmental issue cultures and contested fields and are used for comparing the organisations* "public 
campaign cultures" in Section C. The descriptive indicators for claims in the news narrative - the discourse 
elements "A", "E”, and "G" - are comparatively "weighted" and used for reconstructing the cases of 
environmental mobilisation in the "cycle" of a political event in Section D.
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conservation of hedgerows; heritage; acid rain threat; use of beaches; sulphur dioxide 
emissions. This selection of environmental issues is part of the "environmental problem 
specification" function of environmental mobilisation. The environmental topics which the 
organisation intends to legitimate are raised in relation to the development of a national 
environmental policy strategy.
Finally, the MG" issues relating to the responsibility of Government (and Industry) 
concern the development of this integrated national environmental policy strategy. In (FoH
a) the news narrative explores the policy instruments that are available for effective 
environmental control, the existing policy record of the Government and its regulation of 
industry, and the role of state intervention and market mechanisms in a Conservative policy 
for the environment.
5.2.2.Ü. discursive stunts and explicit framing devices
These are the empirical surface elements of a newstext which are produced as either 
direct or reported speech in the news narrative and attributed to the environmental 
organisation. Discursive stunts and explicit framing devices maintain the arguments of the 
environmental organisation which inhere into the news narrative. Explicit framing devices 
may be based on moral, aesthetic or factual reasoning devices and are the explicit claims that 
are attributed to the organisation in a text. Discursive stunts are appeals to cultural elements 
(e.g. nationalism, anti-authoritarianism, popular culture) that make the organisation’s 
arguments resonate in the media. Both explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are ways 
that the environmental organisations "package" their claims to achieve media resonance for 
the environmental contest. This "packaging" adds to the "news value” of the news narrative 
enabling it to resonate in the public culture. Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts 
are designed to achieve a cultural resonance. This is how the organisation has the opportunity 
to assert its "image” and articulate its environmental reasoning devices in the media 
discourse.27
In the case of (FoE a) the discursive stunt from the Friends of the Earth report is that 
the Government’s White Paper should be "judged by its verbs”. This ’novel* piece of
27 A full definition of the distinction between explicit framing devices and discursive stunts is given in the 
introduction to section £.
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amateur discourse analysis is picked up by the journalist and used as the basis for a news 
narrative which stresses the inaction of the Government, This case of "packaging" by Friends 
of the Earth makes the usually hidden world of public policy detail visible and easily 
accessible to the reading public. Reference is also made to the overall discursive stunt for the 
White Paper, "the Dirty Man of Europe" frame. There are no explicit framing devices in this 
example, although the argument of the news narrative is taken from the Friends of the Earth 
circular to journalists criticising the White Paper. Other types of discursive stunts and explicit 
framing devices are analysed and discussed in detail in Section E.
5.2.3 "W eighting" technique fo r discourse elements in  a newstext
Following on from the coding methodology for newstexts described above, I now turn 
to the first step that is necessary for reconstructing the coded discourse elements into 
individual cases o f environmental mobilisation. Here I present a method that produces an 
numerical indicator for the "bias" in the news narrative of a text. The "bias" in a news 
narrative is indicated by the relative prominence of the four discourse elements "O ", "A", 
"E", and "G" in a text.
The model for the analysis of a newstext (Figure 3) identified the four discourse 
elements "O ", "A", " E '\  and "G" which were descriptively coded as indicators for an 
environmental narrative, i.e. the strategic information on the environmental contest in a 
newstext. The following technique gives an indicator for the comparative resonance o f these 
four discourse elements in a news narrative on the environmental contest. This indicator 
shows the prom inence of the organisation’s name "O", the issue referring to its activities 
"A", the issues referring to environmental problems "E", and the issues referring to 
Government responsiblities "G" in the argumentative structure o f a news narrative on an 
episode in the environmental contest. The "weighting" technique is undertaken for each 
newstext in the sample.
Each newstext in the sample of an organisation is attributed a total resonance of 24 
units. This total figure o f 24 units of resonance is then divided between the four discourse 
elements, the organisation’s name "O ", activity issues "A", environmental issues "E", and
57
Government responsibilitiy issues "G ", for each of the 98 texts using the following 
method.28
Viewing each text as a unit that is made up of the four components that have been 
coded as discourse elements - "O ”, "A”, "E" and "G" - this gives six possible relations 
between the four elements which construct the news narrative. These six possible relations 
are the following (see also Figure 3):
"O*' - "A" "O" - "E" "E" * "A" "A" * "G" "E" - "G" "G" * MOn
The 24 units of resonance are divided between these six relations, so that each is attributed 
with 4 units of resonance. Two possible types of relationship are possible between the two 
discourse elements in each of these six relations:
1) In the news narrative on the environmental contest one discourse element may be a subtext 
o f another discourse element. For example the issues relating to environmental problems "E" 
may be a subtext o f the issues relating to Government responsibility "G". In such a case 
where "E" <  " G '\  one unit of resonance is attributed to the discourse element "E" and three 
units of resonance to the discourse element "G". This means that "E" is the subtext ( < )  of 
"G" in the news narrative, or conversely that "G" is the context ( > )  of "E".
2) In the news narrative on the environmental contest one discourse element may be linked 
to another discourse element, so that neither is more prominent in the text. For example, the 
issues relating to environmental problems "E" may be integrated with the issues relating to 
the responsibility o f Government "G”. For example, this may occur when the elaboration of 
environmental problems is interwoven with the identification o f Government responsibilities 
in the text. In such a case where "E" =  "G", two units of resonance are attributed to each 
o f the two discourse elements "E" and "G". In this case "E" is linked (= )  to "G".
When added together, these "weightings" for the six relationships divide a total of 24 units 
o f resonance between four discourse elements for each text. In a given text each of the four
“ The coding of these discourse elements for the newstext (FoE a) is given in Figure 6. as environmental
narrative indicators.
. . • i * a u
discourse elements "O", "A"» "E" and "G" achieves of ’’weighting" of 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 
9 units o f resonance so that the total of the four elements is 24 units of resonance. This gives 
a comparative numerical indicator for the prominence of each discourse element in the news 
narrative of a newstext. Nine units of resonance is the "maximum" indicating that a discourse 
element is dominant in the news narrative of a text, whereas three units of resonance is the 
"minimum" indicating that a discourse element is not very prominent in the news narrative 
of a text.
For example, for the newstext (FoE a) the following weighting was achieved:
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«0« l  +  i +  i is 3 units of resonance
"A" 3 +  2 +  2 is 7 units of resonance
”E" 3 + 2  +  2 is 7 units of resonance
"G" 2 + 2  +  3 is 7 units of resonance
»
Total resonance per text is 24 units of resonance.
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For the newstext (FoE a) this gives a "weighting" for the discourse elements in the 
news narrative whereby the organisation’s name "O" has 3 units of resonance; the issues 
relating to the organisation’s activities "A" have 7 units of resonance; as do both the 
environmental issues ”E" and the Government responsibility issues "G". This "weighting" 
is indicative of a text where the organisation’s name is not prominent in the news narrative 
which ’narrates’ the environmental contest, but where issues relating to its activities (the 
mobilisation of a discursive stunt) are integrated with the elaboration of environmental 
problems and the identification of governmental responsibilities (the environmental policy 
critique).
The "weighting" technique divides 24 units between the discourse elements "O", "A", 
"E" and "G". It draws from the qualitative coded contents of a newstext and gives these 
discourse elements a relative quantitative weighting. In doing so, the method reconstructs the 
prominence of the discourse elements "O", "A", "E", and "G" for the news narrative on 
the environmental contest in each text. The relative prominence of the four discourse 
elements in the news narrative is indicative of the "bias" that has been engaged into a text 
by the mobilisation activities of an environmental organisation. The "weighting" figures for 
prominence will therefore be used in the reconstruction of the environmental mobilisations 
from the coded discourse elements that is undertaken in the remainder of the dissertation.
5.4 Visual databases: Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature
Following on from the "weighting" technique described above, Table B .n  shows the 
possible types o f "weighting" for a discourse element in the news narrative of a text on the 
environmental contest.
There are seven possible "weightings" that a discourse element can achieve in a single 
text, namely: three, four, five, six, seven, eight, or nine units of resonance. This scale of 
units of resonance, where three is the "minimum" and nine is the "maximum", indicates the 
prominence of a coded discourse element in a news narrative. Subsequently, there are seven 
levels of prominence for a discourse element in the news narrative of a text, namely: lowest
(3), low (4), relatively low (5), medium (6), relatively high (7), high (8), and highest (9). 
As I mentioned earlier, these "weighted" resonances for the four discourse elements per text
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serve as an indicator for the ’bias* in a news narrative. Such a ’bias’ in a news narrative is 
a product of an enviromental organisation’s claims-making activities, i.e. its discursive 
practices.
Table B .II: Possible types of "weighting" for a discourse element in a news narrative
discourse element 
resonance
discourse element 
prominence
is subtext of is linked to is context of
*9* units highest 0 0 3
*8* units high 0 1 2
*7’ units relatively high 1 0 2
0 2 1
'6* units medium 0 3 0
1 1 I
'5* units relatively tow 1 2 0
2 0 I
*4’ units low 2 1 0
’3’ units lowest 3 0 0
This "weighting" technique was undertaken for the discourse elements for each of the 
98 texts in the news sample of Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature. These are represented along with the coded indicators for actors and events - 
contents in the Visual databases below. Figures Fa and Fb are the visual database for the 
news sample of Friends of the Earth, Figures Ga and G b are the visual database for the 
news sample of Greenpeace, and Figure W  is the visual database for the World Wide Fund 
for Nature.
The visual database functions as a coding scheme for the media resonance that is 
achieved by an environmental organisation over the three-month sample period. The 
individual articles are represented in time sequence from left to right across the visual 
database. Each article is identified by the symbols | A | B | c | . . e t c . ,  then (if necessary) 
| a  | b  | c  | . .etc., in times series for a each text referring to an organisation and reporting the 
environmental contest, (or alternatively by the symbol # for a "passing” reference).
The visual databases represent a shorthand coding for the news sample of the three 
environmental organisations. For each newstext in the sample of an environmental 
organisation a time series representation of the "weighting" of the four discourse elements
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is given from left to right. In addition, the coded environmental mobilisation indicators (I.i) 
appear at the top, the contested field indicators (I.ii) at the bottom, and the media coverage 
indicators (I.iii) for each discourse element in the middle, for each article. Furthermore, each 
visual database is followed by a time-sequence listing o f the titles of all the articles that are 
represented.
One of the problems of content analysis techniques is that the coded material is often 
not easily accessible to the analyst or the reader. One of the primary advantages of this type 
o f data representation - that is retrieved from the coding of text - is that it maintains the 
interactive qualities of the different dimensions of the coding within a comparative context. 
This facilitates the identification o f different patterns and types of resonance in relation to the 
indicators for the actors and events for the production, processing and reception of this 
resonance (which are "reported" in the text). In this sense the visual database has an 
advantage, it enables the analyst at an initial stage to test hypotheses concerning the media 
resonance o f environmental organisations in relation to indicators for their production and 
communication which appear in the text.
On the basis of the comparative prominence of the four discourse elements in each 
text and related actor and event indicators - which are shown in the visual database - different 
types of resonance may be identified which represent the different types of environmental 
discourse that are produced by the mobilisation activities of the environmental organisations. 
The visual database presents the different types of quantifiable data in an interrelated way for 
the news samples o f each organisation. It provides a ’mixed* qualitative/quantitative 
representation of the data (an initial quantified reconstruction of the qualitative coded 
material). This enables the analyst to identify patterns and trends in the data samples for the 
organisations (over time and by contents) that deserve closer qualitative analysis by more 
detailed hermeneutic techniques (e.g. frame analysis).
Figure Fa: Friends of the E arth’s media resonance The Guardian Aug/mid-Sep 1990
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Figure Fb: Friends of the E arth ’s media resonance The Guardian mid-Sep/Oct 1990
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FRIENDS OF THE EARTH Texts: Headlines
prior to  the "news cycle": 
August
01 03\08\90 A Environment pure or poor? Environment Guardian reports on 
the different ways pressure groups operate in the jungle of 
overseas development.
02 *03\08\90 B Environment. Money for old hopes. Why do aid programmes 
go wrong and is there any real chance that the agencies are 
learning from past mistakes? Environment Guardian reports on 
the complex problems encountered and the new thinking 
gaining ground.
03 07\08\90 C Incinerator chums up worries on milk. ... reports on residents’ 
concern about emissions o f smoke near a dairy farm.
04 10\08\90 D Environment. Village green - A whiff of tourism can divide 
communities the world over. ... looks at schemes in North 
Wales and Cyprus.
05 10\08\90 E Countryside plan of no benefit.
06 10\08\90 F TV advert "misleading".
07 14\08\90 # Disparate dream.
08 15\08\90 G Chimneys, castles and candy floss. Run of the river.
09 17\08\90 H Scheme to cut farm nitrates "a contemptible exercise".
10 17\08V90 # Earth First! is a militant US environmental group committed to 
direct action in support o f conservation.
11 17\08\90 I Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the threat he poses 
could do one of two things - encourage energy efficiency or 
cause further environmental destruction.
12 20\08\90 # The Pub crawl: revolutionary sign of the green man. In the 
first in a series on drinking habits ... visits organic bars in the 
North East.
13 21\08\90 J TUC wants green stewards at work.
14 22\08\90 K "Macho cult" of cruelty.
the "prologue" discourse:
15 28\08\90 # Rhythms of the rainforest.
16 28\08\90 L Pesticide firms want farm curbs.
17 29\08\90 M Dramatic rise in N-waste estimates.
18 30\08\90 # Diary.
19 31V08\90 
September
N Environment Eco-soundings.
20 01\09\90 O Vaccines buried at drug firm site.
21 04\09\90 P Swiss headquarters financed through stocks and bonds o f 
companies in rain forest logging, nuclear weapons and 
pesticides. Investments tarnish green image o f WWF.
22 07\09\90 Q PWR inspector recommended approval on fuel supply and 
environmental grounds.
23 10\09\90 « French boycott call on "dirty” BMWs.
24 11\09\90 R Labour bids for green ground.
25 12\09\90 S Frank makes his monstrous debut.
26 14\09\90 T Night plough cuts weeds. Hoe o f darkness.
the "news event" discourse:
27 17\09\90 u The National Children’s Home’s latest ad campaign launches 
today eshewing the shock tactics of recent years for a gentler 
image.
28 18\09\90 V Surrey bans use of peat as Fisons attacks ’’one-sided" FoE camp.
29 ’ 24\09\90 w Chickens drop into generation game.
30 24\09\90 # Activists take on big names over creation of party machine.
31 25\09\90 X Sparks fly in the great debate. The issue of nuclear power has 
always been a hot potato.
32 25\09\90 Y Diary.
33 25\09\90 Z Struggle at the green machines’s wheel, the Greens agree on the 
problem, but there is less evidence at the Conference of 
consensus on the way ahead.
34 26\09\90 a Not just white but deathly palid.
35 26\09\90 b balancing act civilizes media circus. ... on the unexpectedly 
restrained press launch o f the Patten blueprint yesterday.
36 26\09\90 c Mixed reaction from the critics.
37 28\09\90 d Resort digs in to save beach.
38 28\09\90 e Environment. Toronto’s anti-pollution drive. Does Chris patten’s 
blueprint deserve admiration or abuse? ... finds Toronto’s 
planners are more ambitious.
39 29\09\90
October
# Zeitgeist.
40 01\10\90 f Europe "should meet US targets” on cleaning up diesel exhaust.
the "epilogue" discourse:
41 08\10\90 g Welsh wind farm project "would spoil rural views".
42 09\10\90 # Thatcher cool on exchange rate euphoria.
43 11\10\90 h Water watchdog to prosecute five firms.
44 12\10\90 i Farmers offer deal to avert free market "devastation".
45 12\10\90 j Plutonium test on volunteer attacked as absurd.
46 16\ 10\90 k Tough environment programme falls short of closing Sellafield 
(and) decision to stop Sizewell B. Labour sets out green policy.
47 16\ 10\90 1 Leading article. Green in judgement.
48 17 \10\90 m Ministry accused of acting as "poacher and gamekeeper”. 
Doctors condemn pesticide secrecy.
49 20\10\90 n Property. Reaching for the stars.
50 22\10\90 o Four in five avoid officially recommended safe route.
51 23\10\90 P Lucas turns blind eye to green worries on diesel emissions.
52 24\10\90 q Greenpeace puts company in dock.
53 24\10\90 # Society.
54 25\10\90 r Draft prospectus for power sell-off leaked.
55 26\10\90 s Cuts in farm cash "will cause exodus".
56 29\10\90 t Is this the dawning of the age of awareness? Katherine
Hamnett’s campaign for environmentally friendly cotton.
Figure Ga: Greenpeace’s media resonance The Guardian August & September 1990
staged ev 
source 
mob. info 
quoted
maximum
9
units 8
O f  7
resonances
5
minimum 4 
~3 
2 
1
maximum^
9
units 8
of 7
resonances 
5
minimum 4 
“ 3 
2 
1
maximum_
9
units 8
of 7
resonances 
5
minimum_4
3
2
1
maximum_
9
units 8
of 7
resonances 
S
minimum_4
3
2
1
iss scope 
act field 
cont field 
policy (?)
article reference (time sequence») 
A|b !c Id !#!e !f !#Ig I#
environmenta
ilHì # I I ! JlKlLllMlNiO jPlQlR! S 
1 mobilisation indicators
!$!#!  
I « I # I 
! i i # i  
s\ I# I
$ ! #  
s |  # 
i l #  
SI#
l#l$
! # | s
il#li
« < s i s|s|s|
i  i i  i i
S\S\ I
"0" environmental org, "name"
*E" environmental issue(s)
L J L i l  I
A u g u s t
ÜÏI ! I iiiy ,
L L i l l l i - i  i J
S e p t e m b e r
"G" government "responsibility" issue(s)
media
repre-
senta-
tion 
+ pos.
= neut.
- neg. 
_^ > Time > 
(month)
contested
b| |n|n|pIi 
x| |x|x*«î 
field indicators
Figure Gb: Greenpeace’s media resonance in The Guardian, October 1990
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contested field indicators
GREENPEACE Texts: Headlines and News Section
prior to the "news cycle":
A ugust:
01 A 02-08-90:HOM
02 B 03-08-90:FEA
03 C 13-08-90:HOM
04 D 16-08-90:HOM
05 # 17-08-90:FEA
06 E 17-08-90:FEA
07 F 18-08-90:HOM
08 # 20-08-90:FEA
09 G 23-08-90:HOM
10 # 24-08-90:HOM
‘Nuclear dream* given the cold shoulder by scientists 
Environment Pure or poor? Environment Guardian reports on 
the different ways pressure groups operate in the jungle of 
overseas development
Dounreay promoted as world centre for reprocessing Nuclear 
plant seeks reactor fuel trade
Engineer criticises ‘string and sticky tape* repair Safety ’in 
doubt* as N-power gauges fail
Earth First! is a militant US environmental group committed to 
direct action in support of conservation 
Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait and the threat he poses 
to vital oil supplies could do one of two things - encourage 
energy efficiency or cause further environmental damage 
Trapped gas ‘will add to global heat’
The Pub Crawl: Revolutionary sign of the green man - In the 
first o f a series on drinking habits Michael Morris visits 
organic bars in the North East 
Protesters board nuclear ship 
Nuclear protesters freed
the "prologue" phase:
Septem ber:
11 H 04-09-90:HOM
12 # 07-09-90:FEA
13 I 07-09-90: FEA
14 J 07-09-90: FEA
15 K 11-09-90:HOM
16 L 12-09-90:HOM
Swiss headquarters financed through stocks and bonds of 
companies in rain forest logging, nuclear weapons and pesti­
cides investments tarnish image of WWF 
Diary
Fears for a sea o f caesium 
Testimonies from the atoll 
Labour bids for green ground 
Virus risk to blue flag bathers
the "news event" phase:
17 M 18-09
18 N 25-09-
-90.HOM  
90: HOM
19
20
O 25-09- 
P 25-09
90: FEA 
90: FEA
21 Q 25-09-90:EG
22 R 26-09-90.HOM
23 S 27-09-90:FEA
O ctober.
24 # 06-10-90:WEE ZEITGEIST
Toxic waste imports boosted by illicit trade
Environment Secretary scorns Britain’s ‘dirty man* tag
Greenpeace ’bias* puts Patten in a rage
Diary
Struggle at the Green machine’s wheel The Greens agree on 
the problem, but there is less evidence at the conference of 
consensus on the way ahead
Sparks fly in the great debate The issue of nuclear power has 
always been a hot potato 
Mixed reaction from the critics 
Andrew Moncur
the "epilogue" phase:
25 T 09-10-90:HOM
26 U 09-10-90:FOR
27 V 11-10-90:FOR
28 W 12-10-90:FOR
29 X 15-10-90:HOM
30 Y 16-10-90:HOM
31 Z 19-10-90:HOM
32 a 24-10-90:HOM
33 # 24-10-90: FEA
34 b 26-10-90: FEA
35 c 30-10-90:FOR
Mersey polluters breached limits 859 times 
Greenpeace told to leave N-Test site
Poland ‘used as dumping ground’ for toxic waste 
Greenpeace ship released after discovering ‘nuclear test site’ 
Tough environment programme falls short of closing Sellafield 
decision to stop Sizewell B Labour sets out green policy 
River attack
Greenpeace puts company in dock 
Society
The new cold war 
Moscow resumes Arctic N-tests
Key to News Sections in The G uardian:
HOM Home News
FOR Foreign News
FEA Feature
EG Environment Guardian (special)
WEE Weekend Supplement
Figure W: WWF’s media resonance in The Guardian Aug/Sep/Oct 1990
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WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE: Headlines and News Section
prior to the "news event" 
A ugust:
01 A 01-08-90: FEA
02 B 03-08-90: FEA
03 C 03-08-90: FEA
Environment Pare or poor? Environment Guardian 
reports on the different ways pressure groups operate in 
the jungle of overseas development 
Environment Money for old hopes Why do aid 
progammes go wrong and is there ant real chance that 
the agencies are learning from past mistakes? 
Environment Guardian reports on the complex 
problems encountered and the new thinking gaining 
ground
the "prologue
Septem ber:
j«
04 D 04-09-90: FEA Leading article: Blood and the rhino
05 E 04-09-90:HOM Swiss headquarters financed through stocks and bonds 
of companies in rainforest logging, nuclear weapons 
and pesticides Investments tarnish green image of 
WWF
06 F 04-09-90:HOM WWF paid for helicopter used to kill poachers
07 G 04-09-90: HOM Gun law rules in battle to save rhinos and elephants
08 H 05-09-90: HOM Controversy forces rethink on Fund's investment 
policy. ’Unethical’ firms to be dropped by WWF
09 I 05-09-90: HOM Tough-talking campaigner in the wildlife fund hot seat 
Wednesday people
10 J 07-09-90: FEA Foreign Fields Jan Rocha in Corumba Brazil
11 K 14-09-90: FEA Eco Soundings
12 L 15-09-90: CIT Investors beware your money may not be going where 
you think
13 M 15-09-90: HOM Roads endanger ancient forests
the "news event"
14 # 24-09-90:FEA Unfair shares as the flighty come down to earth
15 N 25-09-90:FEA Diary
16 O 26-09-90:HOM Mixed reaction from the critics
17 P 27-O9-90-.FOR Chinese "flouting rhino ban" Peter Biles in Nairobi
18 Q
O ctober:
28-09-90:FEA Hugh Synge continues our occasional series on 
endangered plant species with a report on the Cafe 
marron, the rarest plant in the world Environment 
Fencing with extinction
19 R 05-10-90:FEA Chaos threatens climate conference
the "epiloguetl
20 S 19-10-90:FEA The land of a thousand islands gets another dressing
down
21 T 20-10-90:HOM Antique rhino horn trade halted after thefts from 
country houses
22 U 20-10-90: WEE MOTORING Putting the ‘car’ in caring
23 V 26-10-90:FEA The new cold war
Key to News Section in The G uardian:
HOM Home News
FOR Foreign News
FEA Feature
CIT City News
Headlines of articles referring to  the W hite Paper: 
This Common Inheritance September 25th 1990
a) p rio r to the "news cycle"
no references
b) the  "prologue" phase
27-08-90:HOM 
31-08-90:HOM 
31-08-90: FEA 
07-09-90:HOM 
11-09-90:HOM 
15-09-90: WEE
Tighten farm planning law, ministers told 
World treaty on climate mapped out 
What a waste
Decision gives cold comfort to nuclear lobby 
Labour bids for green ground
Home Front: Signs to save power and prosper - The crisis in the Gulf confirms that 
politics and the environment is a dangerous and therefore combustible mix, writes 
John Elkington
c) th e  "news event" phase
i) prelude: the week before
19-09-90:HOM
21- 09-90:HOM
22- 09-90:HOM
Labour’s green plan for farmers
Government to oppose EC call to cut carbon dioxide emissions 
Environment proposals no threat to car economy
ii) "news event": The White Paper v. "the dirty man of Europe"
24-09-90: HOM
24- 09-90: FEA
25- 09-90:HOM 
25-09-90: HOM
25-09-90:HOM
25-09-90: FEA
25- 09-90: FEA
26- 09-90:HOM 
26-09-90:HOM
26-09-90:HOM
26-09-90:HOM
26-09-90:HOM
26- 09-90:FEA
27- 09-90: FEA 
27-09-90: FEA
27- O9-90:SPO
28- O9-90:HOM 
28-09-90:FEA
28- 09-90:FEA
29- 09-90;WEE
How tomorrow’s Environment White Paper became the victim of inter-departmental 
crossfire in Whitehall. Patten stars in whodunnit 
Green appeal in recession 
Climate chief challenges US
Environment Secretary scorns Britain's ‘dirty man* tag. Greenpeace bias
puts Patten in a rage
White Paper will not solve ecology crisis, say Greens at Wolverhampton. Patten plan
doomed at first hurdle
Diary
Struggle at the Green machine’s wheel The Greens agree on the problem, but there 
is less evidence at the Conference of consensus on the way ahead 
Environment plan to make polluters pay
Chris Patten unveils his comprehensive clean-up programme to counter looming 
ecological disaster and combat pollution 'from street comer to stratosphere*
Waging war on dirty rivers with old pop bottles
Balancing act civilises media circus Michael White on the unexpectedly restrained 
press launch of the Patten blueprint yesterday 
Mixed reaction bom the critics 
Not just white but deathly pallid
Whitehall's pressurised reactors Commentary Hugo Young 
Andrew Moncur
Halifax Town 1, Manchester United 3 Leighton is again the fall guy 
Government puts up its green team
Environment So what can I do? The White Paper’s suggestions for the caring citizen 
Does Chris Patten’s blueprint deserve admiration or abuse? Fiona Reynolds manages 
a half cheer Environment: A Patten but no real shape 
Zeitgeist
29-09-90:WEE
29-09-90:WEE
SOUND BITES
SIMON RAE THE WORLD IS TOO MUCH WITH US
iii) postcript: the week after
02-I0-90:HOM
04- 10-90: FEA
05- 10-90: FEA 
05-10-90:FEA 
05-10-90 :FEA 
05-10-90:FEA
Ministers take slow route to cleaner cars as Patten calls for catalytic conversion 
Even the party faithful finds Tory transport policy hard to swallow Free market’s 
road to ruin 
A Country Diary
Building in the problems 
A decade of fumes
d) the "epilogue" phase
09- 10-90:HOM
10- 10-90:HOM
11- 10-90:HOM 
16-10-90;HOM
18- 10*90:HOM
19- 10-90: FEA 
25-10-90:HOM
25- 10-90:FEA
26- 10-90 :HOM
27- 10-90: WEE
Play fields sold for debts 
Conservative rivals clash over Europe 
Patten pushes case for the environment
Tough environment programme falls short of closing Sellafield decision to stop 
Sizewell B Labour sets out green policy
Hurd and Major top the political popularity list Guardian ICM Poll 
Sinking more quickly into the mire Commentary 
Riviera climate forecast for Britain 
Quote
NFU protesters say market forces may bring rural dereliction 
Gardening: Green thumb - Some dilemmas in turning organic
Key to News Sections in The G uardian:
HOM Home News
FEA Feature article
WEE Weekend supplement
SPO Sport
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5.5 Research strategy
After presenting the visual databases for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the 
Worlds Wide Fund for Nature, I now indicate the ways in which the contents of the news 
discourse are reconstructed in the remainder of the analysis.
In the next section C I analyse the process of "environmental problem specification" 
that is undertaken by the news campaigns of the three environmental organisations. This 
involves a reconstruction of the environmental issue cultures of the organisations’ campaigns 
from the discourse element "E", and a reconstruction of the contested fields that the 
organisations mobilise from the coded discourse element "G". When related together these 
elements give the "public campaign cultures" of the environmental organisations in the news. 
In section D I reconstruct the "cycle" of environmental claims that are made by the three 
environmental organisations over the four time-phases of a political event: "prior to the news 
cycle"; the "prologue"; the "news event"; and the "epilogue" discourse.
The four discourse elements "O", "A", "E" and "G" construct a news narrative on 
the environmental contest into a text. The three discourse elements referring to the issues 
relating to the organisation’s activities "A", environmental issues "E", and the Government 
responsibility issues ”G” are the indicators for the environmental claims that are mobilised 
in the narrative. It is the combination of these three discourse elements into a specific 
"package" that "biases" the representation of the environmental contest in a newstext.
Each newstext may be considered as a case or an episode in the environmental 
contest. The "weighting" technique attributes 24 units o f resonance to each text. In section 
D the units of resonance for the three discourse elements for environmental claims - "E", 
"A" and "G" - are aggregated for each week of news in the three months of the sample. This 
gives a discourse pattern for each organisation for each newsweek in the "cycle” o f the 
political event covering the Government’s launch of the White Paper This Com m on 
Inheritance . The detailed coded descriptions of the the discourse elements "A", "E" and "G" 
are then reconstructed within the framework of the "cycle" that is produced by this 
reconstruction of the "weightings" for each newsweek.
In section E I reconstruct the discursive stunts and explicit framing devices29 o f the
29 These represent the linguistic structures of a news narrative that appear in the text and are produced by 
the organisations’ acts of mobilisation. I discuss these in detail in the introduction to section E.
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three organisations which penetrate the semantic contents of the newstexts. This provides 
more detailed information on the communication strategies o f the organisations in a political 
event.
Together these three sections can be considered to constitute three types of "frame 
analysis" of the organisation’s environmental mobilisations: an analysis of how the 
organisations’ campaigns "frame" the topics for the British environmental discourse (section
C); an analysis of how the organisations strategically "frame" a political event (section D); 
and an analysis of how the organisations "frame" cultural elements to promote themselves, 
raise environmental problems, and delegitimise opponents in the British public discourse 
(section E).
6. Content Analysis • Preliminary Indicators
In this final part of the methodological section I give the findings of the preliminary 
content analysis (5.2.1 actors and events above) covering 1. environmental mobilisation 
indicators; 2. contested field indicators; and 3. media coverage indicators. These initial 
findings are intended to set the agenda for the more detailed analysis of the thesis for 
environmental mobilisation which appears in the remainder of the dissertation.
M
6.1 environmental mobilisation indicators
As mentioned above (5.2.l .i) , environmental mobilisation indicators are coded from 
the contents o f the news text sample for each organisation and are represented at the top of 
the visual database. These are an initial coding for the discursive action of the environmental 
organisation, i.e. whether the organisation has "staged an event" to achieve/enhance the 
possibility o f achieving media resonance ($); whether it is an explicit "source" for the 
production o f the text by journalists (r); whether information produced by the organisation 
(e.g. scientific data, reports) appears in the news narrative (i); and whether a spokesperson 
from the organisation is quoted directly in the text (5).
The coded environmental mobilisation indicators for the news samples of Friends of 
the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are represented in graph B .l.
For each o f the three organisations the most frequently occuring environmental
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mobilisation indicator refers to mobilised information (i), namely when information produced 
by the organisation (e.g. scientific data, "facts") is used in the news narrative. Cases of 
mobilised information (i) occurred in more than two thirds of the articles for each 
organisation. This indicates that Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature are active in producing the information that defines the environmental contest.
Actors from the organisations are directly cited (5) in the newstexts in two thirds of 
the articles in the Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace samples, and in a half of those in the 
World Wide Fund for Nature’s sample. This shows that the activists from the organisations 
are routinely attributed space in the news narrative for commenting on events. It suggests that 
the activists have close links with and good access to the journalists who produce the texts.
Regarding the "staging of events" ($) and the explicit "sourcing" (r) indicators, these 
are apparent in more than half of Greenpeace’s articles, in just less than half of Friends of 
the Earth’s articles, and about a quarter of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s. This indicates 
that the two more media-oriented organisations, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, are 
more likely to use communication strategies to gain entry to the news agenda than the World 
Wide Fund for Nature. Furthermore, it shows that Greenpeace is more likely to "stage 
events" to achieve coverage and is more keen to appear as an explicit "source" of an article 
than Friends o f the Earth. Conversely, Friends of the Earth rely more on producing 
information that is reported in the news narrative (in which the organisation is as succesfu) 
as Greenpeace). This implies that Greenpeace has a more self-assertive "image" in its 
discursive practices than Friends of the Earth.
6.2 contested field indicators
The contested fields indicators (see 5.2.1.Ü above) are coded for each text from the 
samples for Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature and 
appear at the bottom of the visual database for each organisation. These are an initial coding 
for the "event" from the environmental contest that is reported by the news narrative. The 
contested field is constructed into the news narrative as an "event" by the environmental 
organisations* opposition to a Government (or Industry) actor. Four indicators are used for 
analysing the contested field in the news narrative, namely: the scope of the environmental 
problem (W world/global, E european, N national, or L local); the scope of the actor field
(W world/global, E european, N national, or L local); "type" of contested field (nuclear n, 
energy (non nuclear) y , agriculture a, industry i, transport t, business b, party politics p, 
labour 1, government e, or sponsorship d); and whether or not the contested field was a 
policy field (o) or a non policy field (x).
Here I deal only with the indicators for the scope of the environmental problem (iss 
scope) and the scope o f the actor field (act field) that appears in a news narrative on a 
contested event.30 These coded indicators for the contested fields in the news samples of 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are given in graph
B.2.
The scope of the actor fields which appear in the Friends of the Earth sample are 
predominantly national (N), whereas in the Greenpeace sample two thirds of the actor fields 
are national (N) and one third world/global (W). In the case of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature two thirds o f the actor fields in its news sample are world/global (W) and only one 
third national (N). This indicates that Friends of the Earth are primarily involved in national 
events from the environmental contest, whereas Greenpeace are also active in supranational 
events, and the World Wide Fund for Nature are primarily involved in supra-national 
environmental events. This gives a preliminary indicator for the scope of the environmental 
organisations' campaigns in Britain. Friends o f the Earth are national actors, Greenpeace are 
firstly national actors and secondly supra-national actors, and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature are firstly supra-national actors and secondly national actors.
The scope of the environmental problem(s) (iss scope) which appears in a news 
narrative is not the same as the scope of the actor field (act field). The propensity for the 
scope of environmental problems to extend beyond the scope of the actors in the event is a 
preliminary indicator for the "framing" function of environmental issues. The environmental 
issues cited in a campaign can extend ("globalise") or shrink ("localise") the notion of the 
contest that is present in the actor field.
In the case o f Greenpeace, two thirds o f the actor fields had a national (N) scope and 
a third a world/global scope (W). In contrast, for the scope of environmental problems this 
trend is reversed: two thirds of the environmental problem scopes in the Greenpeace sample 
are world/global (W) or european (E) and one third are national (N). This indicates that the
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30 The other indicators for contested fields are reconstructed in section C below.
environmental problems in the Greenpeace discourse have a tendency to "globalise" the 
environmental discourse, i.e. refer events to a wider problematic.
For the case of Friends of the Earth’s sample, which has a predominantly national (N) 
scope of actor field, a third of the environmental problems raised have a world/global (W) 
or european (E) scope, whereas a majority are national (N), and a few local (L). This 
indicates that the environmental problems that are raised in the Friends of the Earth discourse 
maintain a national emphasis, but do also refer events to a wider problematic - a 
"globalising" tendency - and in a few cases to a narrower problematic - a "localising" 
tendency.
The case of the World Wide Fund for Nature is different from that of Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace: the overall scope of the environmental problems in the sample is 
similar to the overall scope of the actor fields mentioned. As the World Wide Fund for 
Nature discourse has a tendency for mobilising supra-national events, it is difficult for the 
environmental problematics raised to further "globalise" the discourse. However the 
organisation does not show a tendency to "localise" the supra-national actor fields to national 
environmental problems. This indicates that unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature acts primarily as a supra-national actor in the national news 
discourse. There is a slight increase in the number of world/global (W) relative to the 
national (N) indicators for the World Wide Fund for Nature moving from the scope of actors 
to that of the environmental problems in the news narratives. This shows that the World 
Wide Fund for Nature does have a tendency for "globalising" the national events that it 
enters.
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6.3 media coverage indicators
The media coverage indicators (see above 5.2.1.iii) are a coding for the evaluations 
of the actors and topics in the environmental contest that are made by the media actor who 
"writes" the text. These are the values (positive + , negative or neutral = )  which the 
journalist attributes to the characters in a news narrative, i.e. journalistic commentary on the 
environmental organisation (0); its activities (A); the environmental problems (E); and the 
Government (or Industry) actor (G). These are coded for each article in the news sample and 
appear in the middle o f the visual databases, next to the discourse element - "O", "AM, "EM
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or ”G" - with which they are closely related. The media coverage indicators for samples of 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are represented in 
graph B.3.
The media coverage indicator shows how the actors and problems reported in a news 
narrative on the environmental contest are evaluated by the journalist producing the text. In 
general it seems that the journalists who "write" the newstexts tend to view the actors in the 
environmental contest neutrally but are more willingly to offer values (usually positive) when 
elaborating environmental problems.31
As an acting organisation (O & A), Friends of the Earth is predominantly attributed 
with a neutral value (= ) ,  i.e. reported ’objectively*, in the sample of news. In an eleventh 
of the news narratives where it appears. Friends of the Earth’s activities (A) are reported 
favourably ( + ) .  A fifth of Greenpeace’s news narratives report its activities (A) favourably 
( + ) .  This indicates that Greenpeace is more likely than Friends of the Earth to have 
favourable reportage on its actions.32 3In contrast, the World Wide Fund for Nature’s actions 
(A) are attributed with negative values (-) in a third of its coverage. This finding is explained 
by the occurence of a series of "scandals" in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s practices 
during the sample period (see later).
The opponent Government and Industry actors (G) are attributed a negative value in 
more than half of the Greenpeace sample, more than a third o f the Friends of the earth 
sample and more than a quarter of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s sample. This shows 
that the organisations’ environmental mobilisations and blaming strategies have an influence 
over the journalist’s evaluative coverage o f their opponents in the environmental contest. 
Greenpeace seems to have the blaming strategies that are the most prevalent at "shifting" the 
bias of the reporter.
More than half o f the environmental problems (E) raised by Greenpeace are treated
31 The work of Lowe and Morrison (1984) has indicated that in the early eighties journalists were willing
to attribute favourable coverage to the topics of environmental organisations. Unlike the present, this was at a 
time however when environmental claims were not seen to be overtly politically contentious.
33 This may be due more to the polemical style of Greenpeace news discourse which is designed to achieve 
sensationalist "new values" than a journalistic preference or favouritism towards Greenpeace. There is less scope 
for the journalist to offer explicit opinions on the policy-related discourses of Friends of the Earth and the 
conservation activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature than in the "news events" in which Greenpeace 
"stages itself* as the key actor. Later I discuss this difference in communication strategies as a division of 
communicative labour between the environmental organisations (Section D).
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favourably (+ ) by the journalist; as are more than a third of those raised by Friends of the 
Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature. This indicates that the organisations have the 
environmental problems which are raised by their mobilisation activities favourably reported 
by journalists. The environmental problems raised by Greenpeace are more often reported 
in an evaluative way that is favourable, but this does not mean that Greenpeace is the most 
’successful* environmental mobiliser or that which is most favourably treated by journalists. 
Such evaluations depend on the type of environmental issue topics and contested fields that 
are raised, the style and narrative contents of the reports which cover events, and the 
significance of the "news events1 to the establishment of a national political agenda on the 
environment. It is to these matters which I now turn.
UIi
I
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C) ’Public Campaign Cultures’ in the Mass Media Discourse: theme mobilisation, target
I construction and environmental framing patterns
1. Introduction
l.X "Public campaign cultures"
An issue that has been successfully mobilised for public attention is also by definition 
"newsworthy". When environmental organisations "make the news" they are exercising and 
pushing the right to have their arguments heard. The role o f a "free press" in a western type 
liberal democracy is supposed to ensure that opposition voices are heard as a routine but 
fundamental part of democratic procedure. Actors do not, o f course, have equal resources 
of access to the public sphere.1 However, it is their ability to remain on the public agenda 
which makes the environmental organisations’ attempts to be heard against the superior 
power resources of government and industrial actors an interesting case-study. Their 
continued potential, as news sources and sources of expertise for journalists to draw on, for 
framing the environmental "contest" indicates that the organisations maintain a special 
resource for political communication.2 In this thesis I argue that their ability to exercise 
discursive power is due to a special potential for strategically mobilising environmental 
culture as a resource for making political claims in contemporary societies.
Environmental organisations make themselves, their actions and their campaign of 
information "newsworthy". This is a normal everyday practice for a contemporary 
environmental organisation. The extreme case is when they "stage events", when protest 
actions are performed as stunts or in a way that is highly dramatic and visible. According 
to media analysis folklore, this novelty  aspect appeals to the media’s perception of a "news" 
story, and particularly for the tabloid press and television news (Greenberg 1985, Anderson 
1990; 1993). Furthermore this suggests that the organisations construct their claims into
1 The seminal work o f the Glasgow University Media Group (1976) and Hall (1978) has claimed that 
governments tend to be the ’primary definers’ in mass media discourse.
2 An early study by Sachsman (1976) indicated that environmental organisations seem to have a special 
capacity for influencing news production by demonstrating that 53% of environmental stories in the San 
Francisco Bay area were the outcome of public relations efforts.
70
"news event" formats as a specific strategic dimension of their actions. Achieving media 
coverage is the intended outcome of the organisations’ actions. Their actions mobilise pre­
selected and culturally biased information into the media arena of public discourse. In other 
words, environmental organisations act to "make the news". The prime examples of this 
media strategy in Britain are Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.
I think this assumption of the media analysis of environmental organisations' activities 
is correct. However, it is an assumption and not a finding of most existing analyses.3 It is 
not sufficient simply to enumerate the quantitative amounts of coverage to reach such 
conclusions about the nature of the organisation's actions. More qualitative work on the 
discursive contents o f mobilisations (and how this affects their reception by journalists and 
the public) is necessary to substantiate such claims. The environmental organisations do not 
co n tro l the media agenda simply by achieving coverage, their mobilisations are always 
subject to the possibility of unintended outcomes. As public communications their 
significance and "success", i.e. their resonance in the national political culture, is also 
dependent on the processing of their messages by journalists and reception by specialist and 
non-specialist publics.
With the notable exception of a recent analysis of the news coverage of Greenpeace 
(Hansen 1993), little attempt has been made to systematically analyze the contents o f the 
environmental organisations' mobilisations. Indeed the qualitative contents of the 
organisations* communications are often presumed as an accepted part of "common sense" 
public knowledge rather than analyzed. Anecdotes about notorious incidents involving the 
organisations (and usually the most dramatic actor - Greenpeace) have tended to serve as a 
basis for sweeping claims about the historical significance of their actions, e.g. Cassidy 
(1992).
If the basis o f the environmental organisations* political action does occur through 
public communication media, i.e. their ability to 'frame the debate* on the environment in 
Britain, then it is essential to analyze the range o f contents which they mobilise into the 
media discourse as a routine part o f their actions. This has been a significant empirical deficit 
in previous work on the environmental organisations and the media. How is it possible to 
make valid claims about what the organisations do and communicate, and the significance
3 See for example the analyses of Greenberg (1985), Mazur (1990) and Cassidy (1992).
this has for a society, without analysing the resources o f information which they use to 
construct claims and be contentious in the public discourse?
This section undertakes a reconstruction of the contents of the environmental 
organisations’ "communication campaigns" from the context where they appeared, namely 
the news discourse. The contents of the public communications made by Friends of the 
Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are reconstructed from the three 
months sample news coverage in August, September and October 1990. As this period covers 
the publication of the British Government’s White Paper policy document, it is a key period 
for the campaigning activities of the organisations.
One assumption of the analytic model (see section B) is that environmental 
organisations construct "campaigns” into the public communication media by mobilising 
claims which relate environm enta l them es to governm ent responsib ility contexts. This 
constitutes a specific type o f political action. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature mobilise "communication campaigns" that range over distinct sets of 
environm enta l them es and governm ent responsib ility  contexts. I refer to the range o f  contents 
of an organisations* "communication campaigns" as a "public campaign culture".4
Other public actors - e.g. policy-makers, politicians and business actors - use what 
the organisations are saying and the topics which they raise as a pre-condition for entering 
the public discourse on the environment. The organisations* collective "campaign culture" 
is a resource for actors in the public discourse and is therefore a key indicator for the type(s) 
o f environmental discourse that is (are) constructed within a national political culture. In this 
sense the discursive actions of the environmental organisations serve as a "gatekeeper" for 
other actors to enter the public debate on the environment.
"Public campaign cultures" are produced and mobilised by the organisations to set the 
national political agenda on the environment. These communications constitute an encoded  
culture for making environmental claims against the Government. A "public campaign 
culture" indicates the issues and public policy fields on which the organisations seek to 
’frame the debate* in the environmental "contest".
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4 Each organisation has a "public campaign culture” which is a resource for making environmental claims 
that are politically contentious. An organisation’s "public campaign culture" is an indicator for its discursive 
action repertoire in the news media. Furthermore the "public campaign cultures" of the three major 
environmental organisations may be considered to constitute a collective "campaign culture" for mainstream 
political activism by the British environmental movement.
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The methodology for public discourse analysis that is defended here codes sets of text 
contents by relating source  elements (environm ental them es) to ta rg et elements (governm ent 
responsibility con texts) for individual cases of communication. When reconstructed these 
related contents may be used as data for interpreting the strategic intentions of the 
organisations' communicative actions within the public culture. In this section I analyze the 
types of environmental issues "E" and types of government responsibility issues "G" that are 
constructed in the news discourses of each organisation. The reconstruction is undertaken in 
three steps: Firstly, what type of environmental issue cultures ("E") do the organisations 
mobilise? Secondly, which type of contested fields for governm ent responsibility ("G") do 
they highlight? And thirdly, how do these two variables relate together in specific cases and 
construct the contentious 'oppositions’ which constitute an organisation's "public campaign 
culture"?
The reconstructed contents of these environmental mobilisations tell us about the 
environmental topics, opponents and public policy arenas which Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature contest in the public discourse. The 
contents show the topics and contests with which the organisations ’frame the debate* in 
Britain. Furthermore it identifies the 'opponent' actors whom the contents of this 
communication aim to critically engage in the British environmental discourse.
1.2 Fram ing environmental issues and  social contests
Environmental issues are social constructions.5 They are produced within a social 
context and "framed" by actors as symbolic packages that are communicated in public 
discourse.6 This means that the environmental issues that are mobilised by the organisations 
reflect the context of their production. They construct a claim which is made against a target 
actor. In most cases the environmental organisations make claims against government and 
industry actors. This illustrates that environmental claims are based on a social contest
3 On the social construction of nature see the introduction section A and the perspectives of Evemden (1992) 
and Eder (1986; 1993; 1995).
6 On social movements, framing and the construction of symbolic packages as a strategic resource, see Snow 
and Benford et al. (1986), Snow and Benford (1988; 1992) and for a media discourse perspective Gamson 
(1988; 1995), Gamson and Modigliani (1989).
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between actors with opposed interests. Indeed the intended role of environmental claims 
which are mobilised in the news is to re-construct a social contest between actors. In most 
cases a re-constructed opposition is made between the "public interest" and "government 
actions and practices". The "public" tends to be seen as pro-environmental supporter and the 
government as the actor who is responsible for the poor condition of the environment.
The role o f an environmental organisation in the news process is communicative. 
Environmental organisations are sources o f news who when they appear in the discourse 
possess a specific potential to be politically contentious due to the type of information which 
they produce, "package" and mobilise. Environmental information maintains a propensity for 
resonance within the national political culture by drawing on the popularity of a cultural 
tendency that is opposed to the dominant industrial ideology of modem societies. The 
organisations frame this counter-modernist tendency into specific claims on issue topics and 
public policy arenas. Indeed the widely perceived opposition between the "public" and the 
"government" on the environment is an indicator of the "success" which the environmental 
movement’s communication strategies have had in framing the environmental "contest" in 
Britain over the last decade.7
Over the past decade the organisations have used the cultural resource of the 
popularity of certain environmental themes for "framing" an em ergent national political 
agenda on the environment. This constitutes a considerable political achievement at a time 
when in Britain the Thatcher Governments have exerted a hegemonic influence over national 
political culture (see e.g. Keat and Abercrombie eds. 1991; Gamble 1990). Government and 
media actors have followed in the wake of the environmental organisations and entered the 
environmental agenda at a later date.
Public discourse theory defines the role of the environmental organisations as a 
m edia tor between on the one hand the cultural resource o f the public perception of 
environmental themes, and on the other the political agenda of government. My hypothesis 
is that the environmental organisations take on a creative role in this process. By comparison
7 The vast number o f opinion polls which show an increase in environmental concern within the hierarchy 
of public values, relative to full employment, low inflation, or whatever (see for example Eurobarometer 
surveys), confirm the social significance o f environmental issues in contemporary societies. Although the 
'results* of any public values analysis are o f limited utility - since the "public” is not a single actor with a 
uniform standardised perception of the political world - opinion poll surveys are key indicators for political 
debate because they are claims that tell the government what it should be doing. Opinion polls are significant 
because they can frame the debates of key political actors.
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the constructive role o f the media actors is less creative. Journalists put the contents o f the 
environmental information into "news framesM. Their primary role is simply to process the 
environmental information they receive into the formats of ’structures of news’. Media 
processing adds "news values" to the content of the communication, it does not control the 
strategic orientation of the contents and targets of communication.8 In contrast to the media 
actors, the organisations’ mobilisation of information "frames" the social contest on the 
environment into distinct political conflicts, based on specific issues, events and actors. It is 
the environmental organisations rather than the journalists who activate the environmental 
discourse into a political contest.9
The balance of tills ’division of labour* between environmental organisations and 
journalists in producing the politically active contents o f environmental news may shift over 
tim e. As "specialist" environmental posts are created within the journalistic field, the media 
actors are likely to become less dependent on the organisations for expert knowledge and 
m ore able to produce their own environmental argumentations and opinions. Nonetheless the 
"reporting" function of the media will ensure that the organisations remain a key (though not 
necessarily the only legitimate) voice in the public discourse. The journalists’ reception of 
their mobilisations may simply become more discriminating. They may require more 
evidence before believing the environmental organisations’ claims.
Nonetheless, it is at present the organisations who "make" the issues that "make" the 
environmental news agenda. They act strategically, using a cultural resource with the specific 
aim  of changing the existing social structure. In other words, the organisations’ mobilisation 
o f  biased normative communications into the public discourse makes them an active element 
o f  political culture.
This characteristic makes the environmental movement different from the labour 
movement, and other social movements whose claim for a re-organisation o f the social
s I elaborate on my usage of the concepts of 'structures of news’ and "news values" in the concluding 
section. 'Structures of news’ are drawn from van Dijk (1985) (1988), Fowler (1991) gives an overview of the 
m ore established concept of "news values".
9 It is worth noting that analyses that are based on interviews with environmental journalists (Lowe and 
M orrison 1984) (Anderson 1990; 1993) tend to overstate the importance of the journalist in producing the news 
contents of environmental discourse because their primary source o f data is the media actors' self-perception 
o f  their role. Obviously when interviewed, actors define themselves as the reference point for describing 
changes in the production of environmental news; they may not be aware of changes in the practices of other 
actors in the process.
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structure is based on a redistribution of social structural resources and macro-historical 
narrative, e.g . the power of the labour force in the capitalist system of production. The 
resources o f  the environmental movement are drawn from a specialism in the knowledge and 
communication of claims in contemporary societies, it is a cultural power that is available 
in the present political culture. This is also why the contemporary environmental 
organisations are media and public relations based - they are designed to promote widespread 
access to the environmental knowledge that is gained from scientific research. 
Communications based organisations such as Friends of the Earth are famously short of 
structural organisational resources; their power is qualitative, normative, ephemeral and 
communications based rather than quantitative, structural and systemic. This may constitute 
a difference between "contemporary" movements and "modem" social movements.10
In the following I undertake a content analysis o f the agenda-building properties of 
the organisations* claims that are lodged in the news discourse: environmental issue cultures 
(2.); government/industry contested fields (3.); the process of environmental issue framing 
and target construction (4.). These elements are used to reconstruct the "public campaign 
cultures" o f the three organisations.
2. Mobilising environmental themes into news coverage: environmental issue 
cultures, frames and campaigns
Environmental organisations enlist public legitimacy to mobilise claims against the 
existing political agenda of Governments. The specific environmental issues that appear in 
news discourse need to be understood within this ongoing context o f a social contest.11 Each 
text represents a social relation from the environmental contest. It is of fundamental 
importance that this social relation is maintained within the analysis of environmental issues, 
since it is the framework which gives the issues meaning. Environmental issues cannot be 
understood outside o f the social context of their production and communication. They are not
10 I take up this argument on the concluding section F which looks at the environmental organisations as 
a new type of collective actor.
11 A primary methodological concern has been to maintain within the analysis the relations between the four 
discourse elements which constitute a news narrative on the environmental contest: the organisation's name 
("O'), environmental issue indicators ("E") and the indicators for the source actors ("A") and target actors 
("G”) for the social production and communication of the environmental contest.
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"objects”, but cultural "frames" that offer a biased view of social reality. They are 
ideological products that are strategically communicated in public discourse to produce social 
change.12
All environmental themes are ultimately related in the same counter-modem cultural 
tradition that is present and active in contemporary societies (Eder 1992; 1993; 1995). The 
globalisa tion  o f the environmental theme has been one o f the most significant innovations in 
the environmental discourse over the last decade. Indeed it is one of the primary 
characteristics of the current wave of "environmentalism", that Jamison, Eyerman et al.
(1990) have identified as a "new environmental consciousness".13
The first aim of this section is to compare the range of environmental issues ("E") 
that the organisations mobilise in their campaigns. This is undertaken below, where I use the 
category of environmental issue culture to describe the sets of specific "framed" issues that 
mobilise environm enta l them es in the campaigns of the organisations.
The globalisation of "the environmental problem" as a contested "event" unifies all 
the environmental issue cultures, (and environmental campaigns) into a single unified theme, 
namely a counter-modem cultural tendency. Environmental issues may be specific as 
"frames" (e.g. "car exhaust emissions" and "global wanning" are two issue frames) but they 
are no longer distinct from one another: they are elements of an issue culture that is 
mobilised by a specific type of social contest in contemporary societies. Furthermore, this 
means that specific environmental issues are cultural frames which are embedded in the 
context of their production, a contest which is just one act or "event" in the ongoing social 
contest over the environment that occurs between competing actors, e.g. Friends of the Earth 
v. motor industry, or Friends of the Earth v. car owners, or Greenpeace v. British 
Government.
121 do not intend to retrace the steps of the argument regarding the "objectivity" of environmental problems 
that are identified as issues in conditions of risk and uncertainty. Here it is sufficient to establish the status of 
their existence as socially constructed partial claims in the public discourse. Environmental issues are 
constructed and mobilised to communicate the social contest of which they are part. Science-based "objectivity" 
claims are simply a type of "framing device” that is used by actors for legitimating environmental claims. This 
works as an appeal to the rationality and symbolic authority of scientific evidence. Apart from the appeal to 
scientific knowledge there are also other types of "framing devices”, such as those which are based on moral 
or aesthetic appeals for a better "quality of life".
13 Princen and Finger (1994) and Ruedig (1995) have also noted the global dimension of issues to be 
characteristic of the contemporary wave of environmentalism.
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This constructed "nature" of environmental issues within an issue culture has 
important consequences for our interpretation of the social significance of the appearance of 
a specific environmental issue "frame" in the news. The analysis retrieves data from an 
assumed opposition in text: environm ental them e to governm ent responsibility context. This 
representation of the social contest produces a standardised text-structure: environmental 
claims oppose government and industry actions and interests. One actor, the "source" 
(environmental organisation), is mobilising claims against another, the "target" (a government 
or industry actor). The type of newstext which is produced by the mobilisation activities of 
the environmental organisations has a simpler narrative structure than an environmental 
editorial or feature article. It covers reported "events" between opposed actors rather than 
making environmental argumentations which are designed to lead public opinion. This 
indicates that the campaign activities of the organisations tend to produce and work within 
their own genre of news.14
An environmental issue "frame" (e.g. "global wanning") is produced and 
communicated in a contested event. It is necessary to interpret the significance of this issue 
"frame" as an element which targets a specific field of Government (or Industry) activity as 
a contested event since this is the context o f its production. Indeed it is this contested action 
of an opponent which ’causes* the mobilisation by an environmental organisation. In other 
words, specific environmental issue "frames" have meaning in the context of the campaigns 
in which they are produced, embedded and mobilised. Issue "frames" that appear in the news 
are key indicators for the organisations’ campaign cultures but ought not to be interpreted 
(or coded) in isolation from the context of their production, namely the contest between
14 In editorials or features that appear at the journalist's initiative there may be several layers of expressed 
opinions and environmental argumentations in the same article. This produces a more complex argumentation 
or narrative structure than simple news reports on "events" where the organisations are active. Nonetheless, my 
sample does include editorials and features in addition to the "hard" news reports, but only ones which have 
been produced by and refer to the actions of an environmental organisation. In such editorials and features the 
contents of the argumentations expressed are still drawn from the organisations' mobilised information and so 
the model remains an adequate analytic framework. In any case, journalists usually only take on the role as 
opinion-leaders in exceptional circumstances that are directed by external events. In such cases special news 
formats and genres are used to note the exceptional deviance from the normal structure of news, e.g. "editorial 
columns", "special features" on the day of the Government's publication of its White Paper.
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source and target actors.15
To take one example of how single issue frames may constitute a unified issue culture 
that works across and integrates different contested contexts, a famous and long-running 
Friends of the Earth campaign has been against the use of the "car". When opposing the 
British Government’s de-regulation policy for roads, motorways or public transport, Friends 
o f the Earth may mobilise criticisms against the increasing problems of congestion and 
pollution brought about by cars in towns. At the time of an international or European 
Community conference for setting emissions standards, they may mobilise against the health 
risks to the public from both leaded and unleaded car emissions. When global warming is 
a topical news issue the organisation may mobilise scientific data on the amount of carbon- 
dioxide produced by cars and the contribution of this to the problem of global warming. 
Before a National Budget, Friends of the Earth may support a piecemeal policy proposal for 
a "car-tax" or reduction in the price of unleaded petrol. In other circumstances the 
organisation might mobilise information against the motor industry by using environmental 
cost-benefit analyses to criticise the inefficiency of car technology. Increasing the efficiency 
of cars would reduce energy consumption and pollution. Improving the quality of the 
bodywork and durability of the motor would make cars last longer and be more re-cyclable, 
thus reducing the problem of waste production. At other times Friends of the Earth may 
choose to criticise the quality of public life where everyone in London spends two hours in 
a traffic jam every day of the working week. They may appeal to the simple values of a 
return to the bicycle.
Clearly the communication campaigns of the environmental organisations may produce 
many different issue "frames" whilst remaining within a broadly defined environmental issue 
culture. At the same time even these broadly defined environmental issue cultures are 
interrelated by the universal nature of the environmental "contest" which identifies a 
fundamental cleavage in contemporary societies. The examples of environmental issues 
"frames" described above all mobilise problematics relating to the "car" issue culture that 
are elements o f public campaigns by Friends of the Earth. Even so the "car" issue culture 13
13 Gamson and Modigliani (1989) just code the issues in their analysis of nuclear power. This has the 
’effect’ of reifying the issues beyond the social context of their production, namely a contest between actors. 
The changes in issue "frames" which they identify are interesting, but tell us little about the changes in power 
relationships in the contest between movements and government institutions that may have brought them about.
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itself is only a composite element of the issue culture relating to "global wanning”, that in 
turn is only pan o f the total issue culture of "environmentalism". This illustrates that the 
cultural resource for environmental meanings that is available to the organisations, namely 
the potential for mobilising specific issue "frames" from an environmental issue culture, is 
highly fle x ib le . Issues are "frames" that sh ift according to the specific context of the 
contested "events" between actors which they seek to re-construct.
I refer to this fle x ib le  property of the issue "frames" across contested contexts as 
thematic shift. The media agenda building activities o f the environmental organisations 
attempt to bias and control the range of the thematic shift of the environmental problematic 
within public discourse. The organisations intend to prioritise their favoured interpretations 
of the environmental problematic that appear in the media. In this sense their actions frame 
the environmental discourse within the national political setting.
Although the communicative property of issue "frames" makes the environmental 
problematic thematically flexible, the specific environmental issue "frames" which appear in 
the news construct "real" oppositions of interests between actors. For example, the issue 
"frames" raising the "car" problematic for Friends of the Earth serve to construct oppositions 
o f interests between sets of actors in different contexts: e.g. actors with vested interests in 
the Government’s de-regulation policies for transport versus the public interests of de­
congesting and de-polluting towns and localities; actors with interests in technologies which 
produce toxic emissions versus the interests o f public health concerns; interests of the motor 
industry in profit versus the interests o f public consumers in ’safe’ and ’clean* (but 
affordable) technology; the interests of private car owners versus the collective public interest 
in the "quality o f life" and living environment etc...16
In each case a specific "car" issue "frame" reconstructs a "contest" between the
16 Nature and the environment are by definition perceived as a collective common good. Advocates of 
'environmentalism* are arguing that nature ought not to be at the disposition o f individual interests but available 
to all, namely that it should be a 'public good". This is the basis o f  the conflict between the notion of the 
common good and the partial vested interests (usually of Government or Industry) that is mobilised by 
environmental issue frames. Opponent actors may be blamed for their actions which are counter to public 
interest and "anti-social” (i.e. the stigma of named "polluters"). The constructed nature of environmental 
discourse makes it possible to identify a wide range o f "polluters". A recent development is that business actors 
are now able to present themselves (through PR activities) as servers of the public interest rather than 
"polluters". Multi-national chemical companies such as Shell and BP have greater financial resources than 
environmental organisations for promoting their claims. This means that the organisations have to become 
cleverer and use new communication strategies to make their claims stick. Such competition for legitimacy has 
proliferated in the development and mobilisation of environmental issue frames in recent years.
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competing actors and the social relations on which their interests are based. None of the 
single issue ''frames’’ exhaust the possibility for other "frames'' from the "car" issue culture. 
On the contrary they invite re-framings and counter-framings in the public debate. It is this 
flexible quality that makes specific "frames" contentious but locates them in the time and 
space of public discourse as a single case or "event" in an ongoing and incommensurable 
"contest”. This shows that the role of the environmental organisations' mobilisation activities 
is not simply to 'raise the debate' but to 'frame the debate’ in public discourse. Their 
activities shape the range of "contests" that resonate in an environmental issue culture within 
a time and space of public discourse.
The "car" example shows that environmental issue "frames" are part of an issue 
culture that is produced by environmental campaigns and contested in the public discourse. 
Environmental issue "frames" are communicative and their "framing" potential is fle x ib le  in 
both the "source" actors and the "target" actors which they may define and the interests and 
values which such communications may contest. The mobilisation of environmental 
information is an strategic action. The selection of which specific "framing" will be used for 
an environmental theme in a campaign is determined by the type of constructed "event" and 
the target audience to be reached through the news medium. These are strategic decisions that 
are taken by environmental organisations in their day-to-day routine practices. To be 
pertinent in public discourse environmental claims must re-construct a real opposition of 
interests between social actors. Environmental issues do not appear out of thin air, they are 
"framing devices" that are raised from within a political culture and designed to work in 
specific social contests.17
In this analysis the environmental issues which appear in the sample of news coverage 
are coded from a set of texts that have been retrieved by using the name of the environmental 
organisations. This biases the environmental issues in the news sample to those which are 
produced by the activities of the environmental organisations rather than by other actors. The 
organisations are the "source" actors, the "mobilisers", for this sample of environmental
17 Sociological analysis has tended to brush aside the debate over the status of environmental issues as social 
constructions. For example, the concept of environmental issues used by Yearley (1990) reifies the issues into 
objects that have a natural existence beyond the social relations that produced them. This is not a tenable 
sociological position. Similarly I criticised Gamson and Modigliani (1989) earlier for analyzing data on 
environmental communication by coding and comparing issue-frames without taking into account the social 
contexts which produce the specificity of each mobilised "frame”.
news. Clearly the environmental issue frames and issue cultures which appear in the 
discourse, do so as active elements of the organisations* "public campaign cultures". They 
do not appear merely by chance, but are framed, produced and mobilised into the public 
discourse by the organisations' campaigning activities. The organisations’ campaigning 
activities (rather than journalistic initiative or invention) is the context of their production. 
Furthermore, this means that the environmental issues which appear in this sample are 
intended to communicate and reconstruct "contests" which shape the national environmental 
agenda. They are elements of the organisations’ campaign activities in the public discourse.
In this section (2.) I reconstruct the environmental issues that were mobilised by each 
environmental organisation’s campaigning activities over the sample period. This serves to 
give a first indicator for the different range o f  contents in the "public campaign cultures" of 
Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. It raises three 
questions o f interrelated significance: Which environmental issues and issue cultures figure 
prominently in the organisations* campaign activities? To what extent is there a division o f  
them atic in terest in the environmental topics on which the organisations campaign? How are 
the organisations’ "public campaign cultures" complementary and competitive in the range 
of environmental issue cultures which they construct?
In each text an environmental organisation has mobilised information into the 
argumentative structure of the news. The analytic category for environmental issues "E" 
codes a description of the "type(s)N of environmental problematic which appear(s) in a 
specific text (see methodological section B ).18 Here I divide the descriptions of the data 
collected by the environmental issues "E" category into twelve "types" which are intended 
to represent different environmental issue cultures.
To compare the discursive activities o f Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature I use the following twelve categories for the different "types" 
of environmental issue cultures which are raised by the campaigns:
1) global warming comprising references to global warming, the ozone hole, greenhouse 
effect, carbon dioxide emissions, and CFC emissions; 1
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11 In the analytic model the prominence of the environmental issues "E" is "weighted" relative to the 
organisation’s name "O ", the  activity issues "A", and government responsibility issues "G" for the 
argumentative structure o f each text. In addition to this the contents of the environmental issue "E" category 
is descriptively coded. Taken together this description and "weighting" gives an indicator for reconstructing the 
type and prominence o f an environmental problematic that is mobilised in the text.
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2) rainforest etc. referring to exotic flora and habitats, tropical rainforest, and the 
Antarctic;
3) rare fauna referring to rare endangered exotic animal species;
4) mining concerning the extraction of natural resources;
5) nuclear covering every aspect of the nuclear debate, N-power, N-testing, and radio­
active waste;
6) energy concerning non-nuclear energy production affairs in the national context and 
including alternative energy;
7) industrial waste pollution covering toxic and chemical waste emissions and sewage 
processing;
8) agricultural waste pollution covering farm slurry, nitrates and pesticide pollutionda 
including references to farming techniques designed to alleviate such problems, e.g. 
organic fanning;
9) natural environment dealing with all aspects of the destruction of the British natural 
environment, Greenbelt, landscape and flora and fauna;
10) car covering all problems related to transport: shipping, road use, and the use of cars, 
car technology and emissions;
11) green business relating green market affairs, projects, development, and green 
tourism; and, 12
12) green politics referring to green parliamentary political affairs, "green democracy" 
and the ethics of environmental pressure group activities.
These categories are described in the keys to the pie charts f, g and w which 
represent the range o f the different types o f environmental issue cultures that are mobilised 
in the news discourses of the three organisations.
The campaigning activity o f Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature in producing environm ental them e(s) is reconstructed by combining the 
"type" of environmental issue culture with its "weighted" resonance for the news discourse 
o f each organisation. The overall "types" of environmental issue cultures which appear in the 
set of texts are then aggregated for each organisation. This gives a comparative indicator for 
the range of environmental issue cultures and their relative resonance in the "public campaign 
cultures" of the organisations. It shows the range of environmental issue cultures that the 
three organisations mobilise during this key period for the British environmental "contest".
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature, the three 
most resonant environmental organisations, mobilise public campaigns that raise 
environmental issues and issue cultures which relate critically to both national and 
international governm ent responsibility context(s). The communicative intent of these 
environmental issues cultures is to frame and highlight specific government responsibility 
contexts and action arenas.
"Global warming", "rainforest etc.", and "rare fauna" issue cultures refer to global 
problems and are more likely to frame a supra-national context. In contrast "industrial waste 
pollution", "agricultural waste pollution", "natural environment", "car" , "green business" 
and "green politics" issue cultures are more likely to frame and concern dom estic problems 
and be set in a national context. "Mining" and "energy" environmental issue cultures may 
communicate concerns relating to either a national or a supra-national context, whereas the 
"nuclear" issue culture is special in that it may frame either national or supra-national or both 
contexts simultaneously. These framing characteristics o f the different types of environmental 
issue cultures are tendencies rather than fixed guidelines.
For example, when the "global warming" issue culture is mobilised alone, it refers 
to a supra-national context. However when it is combined in a frame with other issue 
cultures, "global wanning” may refer primarily to a national rather than a supra-national 
context. Thus in a specific article "global wanning" issues may be combined with "energy" 
issues in a "blaming" frame which primarily criticises a national responsibility con tex t, e.g. 
a Government policy advocating more "fossil fuels" (carbon dioxide producing) energy 
production. Indeed this kind of "linkage" between the twelve environmental issue cultures 
when highlighting responsibility contexts is a common feature, partly due to the flexible and 
shifting nature of environmental themes. Environmental organisations mobilise claims by 
combining different environmental issues and issue cultures into frames that identify and 
highlight resp o n sib ility  contexts. I refer to such combinations of environmental issue cultures 
in specific cases o f  mobilisation (i.e. individual texts) as frame clusters of environmental 
issue cultures.
The presence of multiple environmental issue cultures in a single text, namely a
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"frame cluster", is a common feature of the social construction of environmental claims.19 
This ability to combine different environmental issue cultures in a mobilisation is an indicator 
for the discursive fra m in g  repertoires of the environmental organisations in the news.
In section 1.2 I described how the specific environmental issues in news texts are 
"frames" which represent (and reconstruct) a social contest between the interests of 
competing actors. Indeed the environmental issue frames which are mobilised by 
environmental organisations are culturally biased to oppose a target interest, most often that 
of an opponent government or industrial actor. Environmental issues literally "frame" the 
environmental contest. They highlight the different social contexts where an environmental 
problem may be contested. For this reason they are most likely to appear in a text as clusters 
of specific issue frames. For example the "global wanning", "nuclear", and "energy” issue 
cultures are all represented in the Friends of the Earth text, Sparks f ly  in the grea t debate. 
T h e  issue o f  nuclear pow er has alw ays been a hot p o ta to  (FoE X). This cluster of 
environmental issue frames enables the focus of this contest to shift and range across local 
(possible health risks to inhabitants near a nuclear power station), national (prospects of 
future energy production) and global (apocalypse of an overheated earth) levels of concern. 
At the same time several interrelated actors are profiled as "contestants", e.g. scientific 
experts, politicians, government policy actors on nuclear power, the public at risk, and the 
environmental organisations themselves. The shifting range of the frame cluster of 
environmental issues draws and ties these actors into a set of contested social relationships.
Environmental issue frames are the elements which construct the contested 
environm en ta l them es o f a campaign into a text. The special property of environmental issues 
gives them a "shifting" quality across the social contexts that represent the environmental 
contest in the news. They are especially prone to them atic sh ift because they are constructs 
which "exist" as contested issues, i.e. social constructions for which there is no single 
"objective" legitimated consensus. Specific environmental issues necessarily imply a broader 
issue culture and hence a broader action-context for the environmental contest.
Table C.I gives the aggregate amount of resonance that was produced in the news
19 Indeed for this reason more than one environmental issue culture is coded per text. When two or more 
environmental issue cultures are present the "weighted" resonance of the environmental issues "E" category is 
divided equally between the number of issue cultures present.
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discourse of each organisation for the twelve types o f environmental issue culture. It 
identifies the environmental issue cultures that were raised in the news texts of Friends of 
the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature and the combinations of issue 
frame clusters that were mobilised in specific articles.20 I now undertake a reconstruction 
o f the environmental issue culture "types" for the three environmental organisations in a 
comparative context.21
20 For example, article B of Friends of the Earths news coverage (FoE B) combines 'rainforest" and "rare 
fauna" issue cultures into an environmental issue frame cluster that "works* within a single text.
21 Hansen’s analysis of Greenpeace (1993) is the only other attempt to re-construct the claims-making fora 
of an environmental organisation from news data. He takes eighteen categories for "Greenpeace-environment 
issues". In increasing order of significance, they are: green politics/parties; North Sea/Baltic seal deaths; Gulf 
War pollution; the arts/books; environmentalism/env. movement; Rainbow Warrior affair; government env. 
politics; ozone layer/global warming; air pollution/acidrain; other; sea/beach pollution; conservation/endangered 
species; waste disposal/management; exploitation natural resources; and nuclear power/arms/waste. I find this 
eclectic categorisation to be of limited analytic value. "Waste disposal/management”, "exploitation natural 
resources” and "government env. politics" do not relate to specific environmental claims, but to the government 
and industry action-contexts which the claims criticise. "Gulf War pollution" and "Rainbow Warrior affair" refer 
to political "events", whereas "the arts/books" appears to refer to a section of the newspaper. It is difficult to 
see how a coder may differentiate between non-comparable indicators. For example, "sea/beach pollution” is 
an environmental issue that can be the result of "waste/disposal management" activities by goveroment/industry. 
They are different dimensions of communication about a single reported problem. It is to avoid this type of 
confusion that my analysis maintains a distinction between the environmental issues "E" and the targeted 
responsibility contexts "G" which they construct into public discourse.
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Table C .I: Resonance of different types of environmental issue cultures in news coverage 
for Friends of the E a rth , Greenpeace and the WWF.
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* letters refer to the specific articles (see section B for titles and visual databases) where the environmental issue cultures appear
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2.i) Friends of the £arth and Greenpeace
The pie charts f  and g show the environmental issue culture resonance of Friends of 
the Earth’s and Greenpeace’s discursive actions over the sample period. Both organisations’ 
campaigns register in all twelve categories for environmental issue cultures types. This shows 
that they are ’active’ across the full scope o f the British environmental agenda.
Friends of the Earth’s environmental issue resonance is m ore evenly divided between 
the issue culture categories than Greenpeace. This indicates that Friends of the Earth are the 
generalists in the British environmental discourse, they campaign more evenly across the full 
range of resonant environmental themes. In  comparison Greenpeace tend to mobilise a more 
selective range of environmental issues.
The most resonant environmental issue culture in the Greenpeace discourse is the 
"nuclear" category which accounts for 31% of the total resonance (pie chart g). This is 
followed by "industrial waste pollution" with 20%, and the "global warming" and "rainforest 
etc." issue-cultures which comprise 12% and 11%, respectively, o f the environmental issues 
raised by Greenpeace.
The high prominence of the "nuclear" and "industrial waste pollution" issue cultures 
indicates that these are primary elements in Greenpeace’s environmental issue fram ing 
repertoire. Greenpeace favours campaigns against the nuclear threat and industrial pollution 
and raises these topics regularly in the public discourse. Nuclear threat is a high prominence 
issue culture that works at both the national and supra-national levels, whereas industrial 
pollution tends primarily to be a national issue. Together these two issue cultures comprise 
over half the environmental issue resonance of the Greenpeace discourse. This indicates that 
"nuclear" and "industrial" issue frames maintain a strategic importance in defining the 
thematic orientation of Greenpeace’s "public campaign culture". Furthermore the nature of 
these two environmental issue cultures suggests that Greenpeace’s campaigns mobilise an 
"anti-technology" critique into the public discourse.22
Broadly speaking, Greenpeace’s campaign ideology appears to be more "anti­
technology" than "pro-nature" : it tends to raise environmental themes relating to the risks of
n  Indeed Greenpeace’s popularity rose initially in tandem with the waves of mass demonstrations and 
popular protests against nuclear weapons and power in the seventies and early eighties that took place in most 
Western democracies. For descriptions of the organisationsal development of Greenpeace, see Eyerman and 
Jamison (1989) and Rucht (1995). For the actual figures on the exponential growth in Greenpeace UK 
membership, see McCormick (1991).
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complex modem technologies and dangers of pollution from industry rather than aesthetic 
or moral issues concerning the beauty of the natural environment.
In their analysis o f Greenpeace, Eyennan and Jamison (1989) point out that "anti- 
technology" critiques tend to be mobilised as piecemeal "blaming" strategies rather than as 
a fundamental ideological claim with historical significance for society. From this they tend 
to conclude that the "technological dimension" of what they refer to as Greenpeace’s 
"cognitive praxis" (and by implication that of the movement) is an impoverished and 
opportunistically motivated version of a potentially radical anti-technological critique.
"As a movement, environmentalism has never been anti-technological, it has 
instead singled out and opposed the destructive and negative applications of 
science and technology..'' (p. 112: 1989).
The empirical data presented here on the environmental issue cultures of Greenpeace’s 
campaigns confirms an anti-technological ideological orientation that is latent in the 
mobilisation of "nuclear" and "industrial waste pollution" issue frames. These environmental 
topics do single out examples of the destructive and negative applications of science and 
technology. However that they appear as issue frames that identify and oppose specific 
"applications of science and technology" does not preclude a ’deeper’ societal significance 
for environmental activism. On the contrary specific issue framing is simply a feature of the 
organisations* mobilisations activities which keeps the movement ’alive* by activating 
technological risk themes in the public discourse at times when waves of mass demonstrations 
or protests may have ended or reached a nadir.
The relatively high prominence of the "global warming" and "rainforest etc." which 
both account for about an eighth of Greenpeace’s environmental issue resonance indicates an 
orientation in Greenpeace campaigns towards mobilising supra-national environmental themes. 
Indeed the prominence of issues frames for constructing the global warming problematic 
suggests that Greenpeace’s anti-technological critique extends to the global level. Greenpeace 
raise concerns about scientific competence and technological risk in the public discourse as 
a routine element of their mobilisation activities. This serves to communicate the focus of 
their mobilised concerns across local, national and global responsibility contexts.
In contrast to the technological risk critiques, the relatively prominent "rainforest"
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type issue frames indicate that Greenpeace do also mobilise on the aesthetic concerns 
regarding endangered exotic habitats. However, Greenpeace’s aesthetic concerns with nature 
tend to be supra-national and focus on beautiful places that are far away from Western 
civilisation. This may be a part of the mystical/romantic element of Greenpeace ideology. 
At the same time it shows that Greenpeace "work” with the popular public images of global 
issues by framing exotic habitats in far away places. This type of global issue is a good PR 
exercise as images of disappearing exotic habitats have a strong popular appeal in 
contemporary Western societies. Also this type of issue is more open to the high quality 
photographic and aesthetic representation which attracts public attention more than the 
scientific details of global warming. Such concerns make few demands on the attentive public 
to invest in changing their social activities. The public is granted access to the environmental 
theme as a commodity for cultural consumption, a symbolic form of "armchair tourism" 
rather than a basis for constructive critique. Greenpeace mobilise more of this type of 
environmental issue frame than Friends o f the Earth.
Friends of the Earth’s communication on environmental themes is more evenly 
differentiated between the twelve issue culture categories than Greenpeace. The organisation’s 
make-up of environmental issue frames does not share Greenpeace’s "anti-technological" 
bias. Instead the pie ch art f shows that the "agricultural waste pollution" is the most resonant 
environmental theme in the Friends of the Earth discourse. This issue culture maintains 16% 
of Friends of the Earth’s environmental issue resonance, followed by "natural environment" 
issues with 13%, "car" 12%, “energy" and "industrial waste pollution" 11%, "global 
warming" and "nuclear" 9%, "green business" 6%, and "rainforest etc." 5%.
The focus on agricultural practices and pollution and the domestic natural environment 
which together constitute just less than a third of the environmental issue resonance, 
illustrates that Friends of the Earth place a greater emphasis on themes relating to the 
countryside in a national context than Greenpeace. Whereas Greenpeace’s primary domestic 
issue relates to pollution caused by industrial emissions, Friends of the Earth lead on the 
pollution caused by fanning techniques. This indicates one example of a thematic division 
o f interest in the discourse mobilisation activities of the two most resonant environmental 
organisations. Greenpeace take industry whereas Friends o f the Earth take agriculture.
Nonetheless Friends of the Earth do maintain an interest in mobilising against 
industry, in particular at the national level. The relatively high resonance of environmental
9 0
issue cultures relating to "car", "energy” affairs, and "industrial waste pollution" highlights 
the type of "anti-industrial" critique in Friends of the Earth’s environmental issue fram ing  
repertoire. Whereas Greenpeace specialise on targeting industrial emissions and technological 
risks, Friends o f the Earth generalise across the polluting sectors of British industry. Friends 
of the Earth raise issues which bring the activities of the productive sectors of industry and 
agriculture into the public spotlight rather than simply highlighting examples of the 
potentially risky ’effects’ of industrial and nuclear emissions.
In addition, "energy" and "car" are types of issue frames which engage the public as 
a responsible actor rather than simply "blaming" the govemment/industrial technological 
complex. For example, a key "energy" issue frame concerns Friends of the Earth’s campaign 
against the Government’s privatisation plans for public utilities and the effects of this on costs 
to consumers (see later). Friends of the Earth’s environmental issue framing confronts the 
activities of the attentive public more directly than Greenpeace. Like its "car" issue culture, 
which identifies an industrial product as a realm for public choice on environmental values, 
Friends of the Earth’s "energy" issue culture appeals to the public as actors with divided 
interests: both as consumers who want cheap power and as the victims of pollution and as 
potential contributors to global warming. In contrast to Greenpeace, the environmental issue 
cultures which comprise Friends of the Earth’s "public campaign culture" are oriented to the 
national domestic level and seek to cognitively involve the public into practical responses.
The resonance of the "nuclear" issue culture in Friends o f the Earth’s discursive 
repertoire is much lower than for Greenpeace. This suggests that the nuclear environmental 
them e has a different strategic role in the campaign communications of the two organisations. 
From  the distribution of environmental issue cultures, it seems plausible that Friends o f the 
Earth’s "nuclear" issue frames are more likely to be mobilised as a concern within the 
national policy context, whereas I indicated above that Greenpeace mobilise the nuclear threat 
as a universal global concern that is an supra-national ’effect’ of technological risk.
Earlier I identified the "natural environment” issue culture mobilising issue frames 
concerning the national countryside as the second most prominent category in Friends o f the 
Earth’s campaign culture. By comparison issue cultures relating to supra-national exotic 
habitats and animals play a minor role in the Friends of the Earth communication campaigns. 
The "rainforest etc." category accounts for only 5% of Friends o f the Earth’s environmental 
issue resonance, compared to 11% for Greenpeace. This indicates that Friends of the Earth
campaigns rely less on the populist appeals of distant faraway lands and instead focus the 
environmental debate more concretely on the practical and policy concerns within the national 
context. The supra-national oriented issue culture which does resonate significantly in Friends 
o f the Earth’s discourse is the "global warming" category, which accounts for 9%. This 
relatively high figure is probably due to importance of global warming as an issue within the 
national British environmental debate. Global wanning has become a framing device that 
links and integrates other issue cultures at the national and supra-national levels.23
A further noteworthy point is that the "green business" category accounts for 6 % of 
Friends of the Earth’s environmental issue resonance, but only 2%  of Greenpeace’s. This 
illustrates that Friends of the Earth are more active than Greenpeace in the development of 
green projects, tourism, and market opportunities. Friends of the Earth are more ’openly’ 
active in the market discourse between business enterprise and consumers than Greenpeace. 
This is an indication of the organisation’s greater orientation towards engaging in the 
practical applications o f environmental action and proposing piecemeal "solutions" than 
Greenpeace, which focuses more on mobilising green rhetoric and morality into the public 
discourse.
Furthermore Greenpeace’s "green politics" issues frames have more resonance than 
Friends of the Earth’s. In addition to its orientation to public rhetoric, this is probably an 
outcome of Greenpeace’s "blaming" strategies which are more directly critical of the Green 
Party and other environmental organisations activities than Friends of the Earth. Friends of 
the Earth is less disposed to comment publicly on the activities of other members of the 
environmental movement. It tends to take a more pragmatic integrationist and less 
competitive stance than Greenpeace within the environmental movement.
To summarise, what trends does the division o f thematic interest that has been 
identified in the "public campaign cultures" of the two organisations indicate about their the 
discursive action repertoires? Friends of the Earth confront the British public directly with 
environmental issues that raise topics concerning the major policy sectors of government. 
Their framings also tend to offer the public a "choice" of a action-contexts as possible 
responses, whether it be buying unleaded rather than unleaded petrol, using a bicycle rather 3
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33 As I described earlier, "global wanning” is now a common currency for making environmental claims, 
it may be an element of 'internal' national policy debates or other contested fields that principally have a 
national focus.
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than a car, or simply voicing opposition to, rather than consent for, the Government’s 
environmental policy. Greenpeace do not allow their public this "freedom of choice": 
Greenpeace preserve the responsive action-context as their own territory and the public are 
simply invited to agree with the Greenpeace line. In this sense, the environmental issue range 
of Greenpeace’s "public campaign culture" is more geared by the demands of its own "public 
image" needs than that of Friends of the Earth. Greenpeace’s environmental issue frames 
tend to mobilise elite-actor "blaming" strategies that have a "populist" tilt. In contrast Friends 
of the Earth’s "public campaign culture" is eclectic but primarily serves to raise and publicise 
environmental concerns with the national policy agenda.
2.ii) The W orld W ide Fund for Nature
The pie chart w  shows the distribution of the environmental issue resonance between 
the twelve issue cultures for the World Wide Fund for Nature. Unlike Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace which had full complements, the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
mobilisations only register issues in nine o f the twelve issue cultures. This shows that the 
World Wide Fund for Nature is not ’active’ across the full thematic scope of the British 
environmental agenda, but maintains a specialist concern in a specific sector of the 
environmental agenda. What division o f thematic interest is maintained by the organisation's 
specialist "public campaign culture"? And secondly, what implications may be drawn for 
the discursive action repertoire o f the World Wide Fund for Nature from the thematic 
composition o f its campaign culture?
"Rare fauna" and "rainforest etc." categories together account for more than two 
thirds, 68%, o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s environmental issue resonance. This 
confirms that the World Wide Fund for Nature’s specialist role within the movement consists 
in mobilising supra-national themes relating to endangered rare animal species and exotic 
habitats into the national discourse. It shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature’s key 
public campaign activities focus on exotic habitats in distant lands and highlight the ’real’ 
possibility that such species and places may disappear unless conservationist steps are taken.
The balance between these two supra-national themes slightly favours "rare fauna" 
(37%) to "rainforest etc." (31%) issue frames. This division indicates a tendency to 
emphasize issues relating to the possible extinction of specific animals rather than the habitat,
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i.e. the whole ecosystem of which the animal is only an element. "Save the Elephant" and 
"Save the Rhino" campaigns are famous and long-standing pillars of the World Wide Fund 
for Nature’s fundraising and public communication strategies. Indeed a similar campaign, for 
the Panda, even provides the symbol for the World Wide Fund for Nature’s logo. These 
exotic animals have been the star performers in many natural history television documentaries 
and are convenient attention "pegs" for the World Wide Fund for Nature to reach the public. 
They are popular, appeal to children, have educational content, are open to stunning visual 
representation and may be easily applied to marketable merchandise.24 Furthermore, this 
type of supra-national conservation themes tend to be politically benign and are less 
controversial than technological risk themes in the national policy context.
In contrast to animal campaigns, "rainforest etc." issues tend to appeal to a more 
discerning and politicised environmental public. "Rainforest" issues open and mobilise a 
discourse on the "sustainability" of ecosystems in a global context. This not only confronts 
an attentive public with a grasp of the interrelatedness of environmental problems, but 
extends the single issue into a broader concern with global sustainability and brings the 
campaign focus into an emergent supra-national policy arena. In the contemporary world 
"rainforest e tc .” issue frames indicate a more politicised campaign repertoire than "rare 
fauna" concerns.25
The resurgence of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s activities and membership 
figures during the most recent wave o f environmentalism has been documented (McCormick 
1991) (Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995). A key feature of this phase of environmentalism has 
been the globalisation of the environmentalist critique. Without overstating the distinction, 
it seems plausible that the global "rainforest etc" issue frames are a product of the World 
Wide Fund for Nature’s re-newed activity in the wake o f the most recent cycle o f public 
attention for the environment. By comparison the "rare fauna" issue frames are more likely 
to be part o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s traditional conservationist campaigning
24 Donati’s (1992) analysis of the Italian WWF noted that the organisation is willing to exploit the 
marketability of its image and association with nature.
25 Within the “rainforest* issue culture, single issue attention "pegs" may still be used to reach the public. 
For example, like the animal campaigns, "Save the Tropical Rainforest" or "Save Tropical Hardwood* 
campaigns can be packaged as a single unit and marketed for appeal to a broad public. The main difference is 
that they maintain a latent reference to the ongoing global debate rather than remaining an eclectic set of supra­
national single issue campaigns.
strategy. It appears that the globalisation o f the environmental discourse has revitalised and 
revolutionised the focus, content and thematic scope of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
campaigns. Indeed the traditional "public campaign culture" is encapsulated but extended into 
a new focus on the "global sustainability" o f entire ecosystems. This situation has evolved 
due to the globalisation of the environmental discourse rather than as a result of the 
organisation’s intentions.26 Nonetheless the World Wide Fund for Nature’s environmental 
thematic concerns now brings the organisation into fields of international regulatory policy 
negotiation.27 Contemporary environmental debate makes the World Wide Fund for Nature 
into an actor with supra-national policy concerns.
In addition to "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna", a further supra-national issue culture 
"global warming" is the fourth most resonant issue frame. "Global warming" accounts for 
7 % o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s total environmental issue resonance. This means 
that three quarters o f the organisation's issue frames were composed of supra-national 
orientated concerns relating to "rare fauna", "rainforest etc." and "global warming". The 
comparatively lower resonance of "global warming" issue frames indicates that the World 
W ide Fund for Nature tends to focus on the aesthetic issues relating to the destruction o f the 
w orld’s natural environments rather than the scientific disputes about the reasons for or 
"causes" of this situation in a global context. It is likely that "global warming" issue frames 
are used in campaigns which relate the organisation’s concern for the destruction of natural 
habitats to the supra-national intergovernmental policy agenda. Policy-makers and 
Governments require more science-based rational justifications for conserving the world’s 
natural environments than the public. In policy debates scientific information is at a premium 
for justifying claims. Hence the role of "global warming" frames may be to operate as a 
frames that combine with "rainforest" frames, thus enabling the World Wide Fund for Nature 
to extend the claims from their conservation campaigns into supra-national policy concerns.
The "nuclear" and "mining" issue frames both account for a minimal proportion (2%) 
o f the organisation’s environmental issue resonance. These types of issue frames may be 
either national or supra-national, however their low resonance shows that they are most likely *17
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26 The organisation’s transformation of its name from the World Wildlife Fund to the World Wide Fund 
for Nature plus its development of a new mission statement Mission for the 1990s were both brought about the 
attempt of the organisation to 'catch up* with the global concerns of contemporary environmentalism.
17 See Princen and Finger’s (1994) case study of the WWF’s role in the ivory trade ban.
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to appear as sub-frames of the more resonant campaign themes. Whereas the thematic 
distribution of Greenpeace’s environmental issue cultures indicates that its campaign culture 
is "anti-technological" rather than "pro-nature", the reverse is true for the World Wide Fund 
for Nature. The World Wide Fund for Nature campaigns focus on "nature" as an issue in 
itself, rather than highlighting the deleterious industrial practices which are producing this 
situation. This feature distinguishes the World Wide Fund for Nature from Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace, whose campaigns raise issues that identify the actors and action- 
contexts who are deemed responsible for the world’s environmental problems.
The thematic trends in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s supra-national 
environmental issue cultures are repeated on a smaller scale at the national level. Indeed the 
third most resonant issue culture in the organisation’s discursive action repertoire is the 
"natural environment" with nine per cent. This indicates that the World Wide Fund for 
Nature retain an active concern in the aesthetic and moral issues relating to the nation’s 
landscape, flora and fauna. In stark contrast the issue cultures relating to the nation’s key 
productive sectors of energy, agriculture and industry did not register at all in resonance of 
the organisation's campaign culture. These were the prominent national issue cultures in the 
campaigns of Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace, which indicates a difference in the 
division o f thematic interest between them and the World Wide Fund for Nature in the 
national arena. Even at the national level the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises "pro- 
nature" rather than "anti-technology" environmental issue frames.
Another feature of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s distribution of environmental 
issue resonance at the national level concerns the significant resonance of the "car" and 
"green business" issue cultures which both account for five per cent. This prominence of 
"car" and "green business" issue frames indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature 
mobilise projects that are designed to contribute market-related solutions to the problems of 
the British countryside and natural environment. Like Friends o f the Earth, at the national 
level the organisation is prepared to advocate consumer pressure and censure the public about 
using cars.
To sum up, the environmental themes in the campaigns o f Friends of the Earth and
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Greenpeace maybe considered anthropocentric, they relate "man" and "nature"28 into a 
formula of "cause and effect". In contrast the World Wide Fund for Nature focus on "nature" 
rather than "man". However despite this focus on "nature", the World Wide Fund for Nature 
may not be considered eco-centrists even in the most casual sense of the word. The 
organisation has made a rather late (and strategic) entry into the public discourse on the 
"value" of nature in the contemporary world. New perceptions o f "environmental ethics" 
have affected its perception as an organisation with an "interest" in nature rather than vice 
versa . 29
The World Wide Fund for Nature’s traditional campaigns have focused on "nature” 
as a distinct entity that is separate from "man", and failed to make "man" responsible for his 
actions towards "nature". This orientation is a legacy of the colonial "divide and rule" 
conservationist policies that overseas development organisations like the World Wide Fund 
for Nature endorsed in the past. The globalisation of environmental discourse has introduced 
a new perception into overseas development and conservation policies. In the globalist 
elements of the emerging perception, "man" and "nature" are united in "habitat" and "global 
sustainability" becomes a justification for extending the orientation of campaigns into the 
policy arenas o f national and international intergovernmental institutions. The World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s globalist "package" is an emergent perception that has been mobilised as 
a response to changes in the public values of nature in Western societies, it competes with 
the traditional colonialist perception of overseas conservation. At the present time elements 
o f both "packages" co-exist in the thematic interests of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
campaigns. It is likely that despite the apparent incommensurability of their claims some 
working compromise between the two "packages" will take the form of a "new" World Wide 
Fund for Nature conservation campaign strategy. 24
24 By the "man" in the "man and nature" relation I refer to mankind which includes both man and woman. 
It seems pertinent to retain "man" as the reference point because the dominance of the male attitude to nature 
rather than the female attitude to nature seems to have been a contributing factor to the ecological crisis that 
confronts modem societies today.
w Indeed in 1990 the World Wide Fund for Nature even commissioned a report from Lancaster University 
(Grove-White et al 1990) to examine how changes in the perception of environmental ethics might be compatible 
with the organisation’s future policies.
3. Targeting government responsibility contexts in news coverage: 
environm ental campaign targets and  contested fields
The sample o f texts in this analysis represents a particular dimension of the 
environmental contest, namely that which is produced by the activities of the environmental 
organisations when they mobilise environmental issues with the specific intention of 
contesting government (and industry) actors in the public discourse.30
Mobilising environmental claims into news may be seen as two related parts of a 
communicative process: the selection of environmental topics and the identification of 
responsible actors. The selection of environmental topics is a key role of the environmental 
organisations in the public discourse, but so is the ability to identify opponent actors and 
target the fields of activity for which their opponents are deemed culpable for environmental 
damage. Both parts o f this communicative process occur in the medium of public discourse. 
This is why the retrieval of data from news that is defended here codes the relation of 
environmental themes and government responsibility contexts from each text.
Whereas the last section 2. focused on the type of environmental issues and issue 
cultures that are mobilised into the news coverage by the organisations, in this section I 
analyze the types o f contested fields which are raised and targeted as "responsibility 
contexts" by their campaigning activities in the news discourse. Following on from the 
environmental issue culture analysis (above), this reconstruction gives a second indicator for 
the range o f contents o f the "public campaign cultures" that are mobilised by Friends o f the 
Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in the British news discourse. It 
identifies which contested fields and public responsibilities the organisations construct into 
the news. After the environmental issue cultures, this is a second element of the discursive 
action repertoire of the environmental organisations.
Two related questions define my inquiry into the process o f target construction by 
which the organisations name their opponents in the public discourse: Firstly, which 
government and industry action contexts do the three organisations* campaign activities 
"make responsible" in the public discourse? And secondly, how are the organisations* "public 
campaign cultures" complementary and competitive in the range of contested fields which
30 The sample was retrieved by coding the names of the environmental organisations and represents the 
specific arenas of news discourse in which they are active.
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they construct and the opponents who they target?
News texts make sense as individual units, each article has a "storyline*' or narrative 
about an "event" which serves to raise the environmental contest into public debate. 
Environmental issue cultures and contested fields which are mobilised by the environmental 
organisations are contextualised at the surface level of news within a narrative of actors, 
events and opinions. Reported "events" appear in a narrative structure or "storyline" which 
is a "peg" or framework for positioning the ’deeper* themes of the environmental contest into 
prominence in the public discourse. It tends to be the news genre - e.g. a "scandal" - rather 
than the thematic contents of news - the "environmental contest" - which defines the stylistic 
way "events" are related in news story or narrative.31 Nonetheless, appearing in a news 
story or narrative is an important way for environmental organisations to raise the ’deeper* 
themes through which they mobilise the environmental contest. It enables them to bring the 
cultural cleavage of the environmental contest to the surface of public debate.
For the current purposes of analysis it is necessary to look beyond the immediate 
"events" that appear as "stories” at the surface of news and retrieve the thematic elements 
o f the news contents which are pertinent to the environmental debate. A news story or 
narrative is a framework which enables the organisations the potential to mobilise the 
thematic contents - i.e. the specific environmental issue cultures and contested fields of 
government and industry - which they intend to frame the public debate. In this sense a 
mobilisation of thematic contents into a news stoiy or narrative serves as a discursive "act" 
in the ongoing social contest over the definition of environment problems.
The ’success* of the environmental organisations in framing the debate depends on 
their ability to ’bias* the selection of thematic contents which appear in a news story. This 
’bias’ might occur in the selection of thematic contents from the environmental debate which 
are used in a news story and that "work" either pro or contra the ’real’ interests o f the 
competing actors in the environmental contest. The ability to build environmental agendas 
through news coverage has direct consequences for the future potential of actors who engage 
in the social contest over the environment. It shapes the resources for them to speak with
31 The surface contents of news stories often appear ’trivial" due to the stylistic tendencies of journalists, 
who are prone to sensationalist - "man bites dog" - rather than objective representations of reality. One way 
that environmental themes achieve a "news value” is when they may be defined, categorised and related as a 
public ”scandal”. This has the effect of producing an endless series of environmental "scandals" in the news.
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authority and act with influence in the continuing public discourse on the environmental 
problematic.32
Environmental news stories are important not because they tell the truth or lie about 
"events", but because their thematic contents influence the potential for the actors who 
compete in the environmental contest to continue acting in the future debate. News coverage 
re-constructs the environmental contest by decisively selecting the range of thematic contents 
which are the key topics for contemporary debate. It constructs ’real* oppositions between 
the competing actors in the environmental contest by shaping the context of public legitimacy 
for their future actions. On what basis is this legitimacy contest constructed?
The competition between environmental organisations and the government actors is 
the key axis o f opposition in the environmental contest. It is ’activated* as a legitimacy 
contest in the public discourse by an opposition of interests between "the public" and "the 
government" that is mobilised by the campaign activities o f  the organisations. The field for 
legitimacy over which environmental organisations and their opponents compete is the notion 
o f serving the "public interest". Serving the "public interest" is a source of legitimacy for 
the claims that the environmental organisations make in the public discourse. At the same 
time this act of claims-making constructs a responsibility context for government (and 
industry) actors. It makes the act of opposition to the government ’specific’ in time and place 
by defining a practice in which government activities may be considered negligent by 
environmental criteria.33
The environmental organisations’ campaign activities invoke a process of ta rge t 
construction into the public discourse, they specify who are the culprits and which are the 
harmful activities that are contra to public interest. This gives a shape and structure to the 
environmental contest by identifying a responsible set o f actors and activities for the 
environmental problems that are named as issues. Moreover it binds the environmental issues
32 The underlying thematic content of environmental disputes which environmental organisations frame into 
news stories affects the structure of the power relationships between actors in the environmental discourse 
because it identifies the key themes and responsibility contexts for the contemporary debate. It tells the public 
which issues they should be thinking about and the government what they might be held accountable for.
33 Due to the publicising function of the "news" the accountable actor is ultimately always the Government, 
even though an industrial polluter may be directly blamed and a policy context not explicitly mentioned. If a 
claim is made that someone is acting against the public interest then the Government are necessarily implicated 
as a culpable actor, since their role is to serve the interests of the British public.
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that are raised into a context of contested social relations, and thereby gives them meaning 
as an act in the environmental contest.
In each text strategic information has been mobilised into the argumentative structure 
of the news by an organisation. The environmental organisations use a notion of the "public 
interest" to mobilise their preferred environmental themes and de-Iegitimise the activities of 
government which they contest. The latter are the government responsibility contexts that 
appear in texts.34
In Section 2 . 1 differentiated the total resonance of environmental issues "E" between 
twelvfc sub-categories of issue cultures for each organisation. This reconstruction gave an 
indicator for the range o f environmental theme that is raised by the campaign activities of an 
organisation. Here I differentiate the total resonance of government responsibility issues "G" 
into sub-categories o f contested fields that are targeted by the organisation's news 
campaigns.
The analytic category for government responsibility context "G" descriptively codes 
the contested field which appears in a specific text (see methodology section B).35 Here I 
divide the total coded resonance of responsibility issues "G” for each organisation between 
five targeted arenas o f governmental and industrial activity: energy; production; services; 
political relations; and government & institutional activities. Each of these 
govemment/industry arenas is further sub-divided into two categories of contested fields. In 
all this provides ten categories for "types" of contested fields that the environmental 
organisations’ campaign activities mobilise into news texts. Together these ten categories 
provide the basis for comparing the different "types" of contested fields that are mobilised 
by the discursive actions of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature:
w Typically, in a text the organisations frame an environmental issue which highlights the responsibilities 
of government actors by defining a contested field. In this sense, the organisations may be seen as the "source" 
and government the "target" actors of the contested claims that appear in the sample of news.
35 In the analytic model the prominence of the government responsibility issues "G" is "weighted" relative 
to the organisation’s name "O", issues relating to the activities of the organisations "A", and the environmental 
issues "E" for the argumentative structure of each text. In addition the cornent of the government responsibility 
issues "G" is coded descriptively.
101
1) Energy arena:
nuclear contested field n,
representing nuclear energy production, nuclear industry and 
testing
energy (non nuclear) contested field y,
representing all non-nuclear energy production, including fossil
fuels and renewable sources
2) Production arena:
agriculture contested field a,
comprising agriculture, farming and fishing activities
industry contested field i,
comprising heavy and chemical industrial production and 
construction (inc. mining and waste)
3) Services arena:
transport contested field t,
including transport infra structure, shipping and vehicle activities 
business contested field b,
comprising business concerns, commerce, media and consumer 
activities (inc. tourism)
4) Political relations arena:
party politics contested field p, 
covering party political "politics" activities
labour contested field 1,
including labour and trade union activities, social welfare and 
employment concerns
5) Governm ent & Institutional activities arena:
government contested field e,
covering the internal discussions, policy making and
decision-making of government
sponsorship contested field d, the sponsorship, funding, aid, 
development and research activities undertaken by private 
and public institutional foundations
In addition to this coding for "type", each contested field is further coded for whether 
it appears as a "policy" field o, or as a "non-policy" related field x. This classifies the extent 
to which the environmental organisations target opponent actors in a policy context.
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Whereas a multiple coding strategy per text was employed for the environmental issue 
cultures (2. above), a single coding strategy is used for the contested field in a text. Only the 
dominant contested field is coded for each text. There are two reasons for this: Firstly, less 
contested fields than environmental issue cultures appear in a text because the contested field 
is embedded in the "event” of the news story or narrative. News stories tend to relate single 
"events", or at most two related "events" where one is more prominent and contextualises 
the other. This means that each text is likely to have a dominant contested field that appears 
in the primary news event. Secondly, unlike environmental issues which are communicative 
and tend to appear in frame clusters (section 2.), contested fields are more context bound and 
mutually exclusive.36
The ten contested field categories are described again in the keys to graphs f , g & w 
(see below), which show the distribution of contested fields that are mobilised by the 
activities o f the three organisations. Percentage figures for the distribution of the total 
resonance of contested fields, and its split between "policy" and "non-policy” contexts are 
also given. This data appears in Table C .II and the codings for each article are represented 
in time series at the bottom of the visual database for each organisation (section B). This data 
is also represented in the graphs f, g and w.
36 Sometimes more than one contested field may appear in a single text. For example, the British 
Government may be criticised over their inadequate implementation of existing regulatory measures for river 
pollution (which would be coded government contested field e) and a chemical company depositing more than 
its legal quota of waste into the river may also be contested (which would be coded industry contested field i). 
In such cases the contested field which appears in the main "event" of the news story is coded as this is the 
primary responsibility context that appears in the article.
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Table C.II: Resonance of different types of contested fields in news coverage 
for Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the WWF.
contested field no. of articles "policy" framing "non-policy" framing total resonance o & x
device resonance o device resonance x
F G W s F G W s F G w s F G W s
0 P W u 0 P W u 0 P w u 0 P w u
E c F m E c F m E c F m E c F m
n nuclear 4 11 0 1 23 16 0 3 7 62 0 6 30 78 0 1
5 9 9 0
8
y energy 5 1 0 6 28 0 0 2 8 8 0 1 36 8 0 4
8 6 4
a agriculture 6 0 0 6 40 0 0 4 5 0 0 5 45 0 0 4
0 5
i industry 7 7 3 1 22 39 23 8 25 14 0 3 47 53 23 1
7 4 9 2
3
t transport 1 0 2 3 7 0 16 2 0 0 0 0 7 0 16 2
3 3
6 1 8 1 7 0 7 1 29 4 44 7 36 4 51 9
b business 5 4 7 1
p politics 4 3 0 7 33 25 0 5 0 0 0 0 33 25 0 5
8 8
1 labour 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 15 0 0 1 15 0 0 1
5 5
e government 8 6 3 1 55 33 25 1 5 12 0 1 60 45 25 1
7 1 7 3
3 0
d sponsorship 3 0 6 9 0 0 0 0 IS 0 35 5 15 0 35 5
0 0
total 4 2 2 9 2 1 7 3 1 1 7 2 3 2 1 6
6 9 2 7 1 1 1 3 0 0 9 8 2 1 5 8
5 3 9 9 0 8 4 3 0 7
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3.i) Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace
Graphs f  and g give the government responsibility contexts that are constructed in the 
news samples o f Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. They show the resonance of 
government responsibility issues "G" across the ten "types" of contested fields for the two 
organisations. In addition each contested field is broken down into those which appear as 
"policy" contexts o and those which appear as "non-policy" contexts x.
When comparing graphs f  and g it is evident that Friends of the Earth’s campaign 
activities construct government responsibility contexts in all the ten categories for contested 
fields, whereas Greenpeace produces only six "types" of contested field. This indicates that 
Friends of the Earth target opponents from across the full range of national political activity 
and sectors of production, whereas Greenpeace specialise on targeting specific responsibility 
contexts of government and industry. From this it is possible to draw the first conclusion 
regarding the process of target construction by the organisations campaign activities: Friends 
of the Earth are generalists, but Greenpeace are specialists who select and target specific 
contested fields in the public discourse.
The overall division between "policy" o and "non policy" x related contested fields 
indicates another general difference between the two organisations. For Friends of the Earth 
two thirds of contested fields appear as "policy" o (66.5%) and a third (33.5%) as "non 
policy" x related. In the case of Greenpeace a half (53%) appear as "policy" o and a half 
(47%) as "non policy" x contested fields. This shows that Friends of the Earth are more 
likely to criticise opponents by referring to policy matters than Greenpeace. It is common for 
Friends of the Earth to criticise government (and industry) actors by identifying their 
"policy" obligations in the public discourse. Furthermore, the campaign activities o f Friends 
o f the Earth are more strategically oriented towards the national policy agenda than 
Greenpeace. This gives an indication that Friends of the Earth’s mobilisation activities aim 
to construct policy options in the public discourse and be legitimate within the institutional 
political framework. Indeed Friends of the Earth’s criticism may serve to mobilise the 
harmful activities o f industrial actors through the media into policy debates. Greenpeace on 
the other hand are more likely to "blame" their opponents without referring to the political
l■■llyy|lTl^ llnlmllllllllllllllll^ TTTTrl^ T^mT^ ïïTT^ TîlfT^
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institutions as a possible forum for correcting environmental damage by policy-making.37
One of the findings of the previous section 2.i) was that the "nuclear" environmental 
issue culture is dominant in the Greenpeace discourse accounting for about a third (31 %) of 
the total environmental issues. The "industrial waste pollution" issue culture accounted for 
a further fifth (20%) of Greenpeace’s mobilised environmental issues. Here graph g shows 
that the nuclear contested field n which accounts for more than a third (36.5%) of 
responsibility issues is the most prominent in the Greenpeace discourse, followed by the 
industry contested field i which accounts for a quarter (25%). The high compatibility between 
environmental issue "types" and targeted contested field "types" shows that Greenpeace’s 
primary mobilisations are streamlined, single issue dominated campaigns. This specialisation 
for promoting key environmental issues and contested fields as single topics indicates a 
highly strategic orientation towards the selection o f campaign topics. It suggests that 
Greenpeace mobilise a specific environmental issue to "blame" a specific contested field of 
responsible actors. By avoiding a complex textual relation of source to target, Greenpeace’s 
communication in the media discourse avoids the possible ambiguities of interpretation that 
might otherwise arise. Greenpeace mobilises clearly defined issues against easily identified 
targets whilst remaining on a single campaign topic. That the organisation is able to achieve 
this "effect" in the media shows that Greenpeace maintains considerable control over the 
coverage and representation of its campaigns.
The fields o f  nuclear energy production/testing and heavy and chemical industrial 
production are the key campaign issues and targets o f Greenpeace. After the nuclear n and 
industry i, the main contested fields for Greenpeace are government decision-making e which 
constitutes a fifth (21%) of responsibility contexts and party politics p with a tenth (11%). 
Together these two contested fields account for a third o f the responsibility contexts 
constructed by Greenpeace. This shows that although the organisation’s campaigns are less 
policy related than those of Friends of the Barth, Greenpeace does nonetheless target the 
national political field with responsibility. Greenpeace enters national politics to attribute
37 Here there is a general indication that Friends of the Earth "blaming" strategies are more constructive 
in producing policy options than Greenpeace’s which tend to "blame" the government and industrial actors 
unconditionally on moral grounds (see later).
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blame to opponent actors at opportune times.38
When an opportunity presents itself for criticising the actions of the Government and 
political parties (including the Green Party), Greenpeace is prepared to enter the arena of 
conventional political activity. The Greenpeace motive is to condemn conventional politics 
for its inadequacy as a forum for environmental problems. This confirms that Greenpeace’s 
interest in conventional politics is strategic and tied to the promotional hinction of 
Greenpeace campaigns rather than a desire to enter the political agenda by constructive policy 
discourse.
In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth’s campaign activities construct a full 
complement of contested fields. The primary contested field in the Friends of the Earth 
discourse is the government e category which comprises a fifth (18.5%) of the resonance of 
responsibility contexts. This is followed by the heavy & chemical industry field i (15%) and 
in descending order of prominence: agricultural production a  (14%); fossil fuel & renewable 
energy production y (11.5%); business, commercial & media activities b  (11%); party 
politics activities p (10%); nuclear energy & industry n (9%); sponsorship, funding, aid & 
development d and labour, union & welfare activities I (both 4.5% ); and finally transport and 
vehicle activities t  (2%).
Friends of the Earth target a wide range of government and industry contested fields 
and in particular focus on "internal" government activities and policy decision-making. More 
than nine tenths o f the government e contested fields appear as "policy” related o contexts 
in the Friends of the Earth news sample, whereas this proportion drops to three quarters for 
Greenpeace (15.5% out of 20%). It is not surprising that both organisations have a tendency 
to refer to policy related contexts when targeting the intemal decision-making processes of 
the Government. However, these figures confirm that Friends of the Earth are more likely 
to enter the governmental field with policy options and proposals than Greenpeace, who tend 
instead to find non-policy targets to construct when criticising intemal governmental affairs. 
When contesting Government, Friends of the Earth make environmental claims that articulate
M The visual database shows that four of the six articles that constructed the government e contested fields 
occurred during the "news event" phase of the White Paper "event" (see D  later). This shows that Greenpeace 
involvement in targeting Government and national political affairs is enhanced due to the special circumstances 
o f the White Paper event. Similarly, the Greenpeace party politics p target construction occurred in the special 
circumstances o f commenting on the Green Party Conference (Gpc P) and on the Labour Party’s opposition 
environmental policy proposals (Gpc Y). This shows that Greenpeace enter the discourses on national politics 
strategically, at times that are opportune for mobilising "blame”.
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problems and identify potential solutions within a policy discourse. Friends of the Earth 
campaigns use the media for entering into policy discourse with Government whereas 
Greenpeace targets Government actors with blame. This pattern of target construction 
identifies Friends of the Earth’s aim to be engaged centrally in the production of the British 
environmental policy agenda.39
In section 2.i) I showed that the five most resonant environmental issue cultures in 
Friends of the Earth’s sample are: "agricultural waste pollution"; "natural environment" 
(national); "energy" (non-nuclear); "car & transport"; and "industrial waste pollution".
From these five "agricultural waste pollution" is the highest prominence issue. Graph 
f shows that agricultural production a is the third ranked contested field in the Friends of the 
Earth sample accounting for about a seventh of the responsibility contexts (14%). 
Furthermore a high proportion of the agricultural production a  contested field appears as 
policy related o contexts (12.5% out o f a total 14%). This indicates that Friends of the 
Earth’s mobilisation activities focus on promoting a campaign against agricultural policy. 
Agriculture and farming practices are a key campaign that Friends of the Earth mobilise and 
contest as a policy discourse.
Another that is mobilised by Friends of the Earth as a policy discourse against 
Government is the campaign on energy production (fossil fuels & renewable). "Energy" 
(non-nuclear) is the third ranking environmental issue culture and energy production y is the 
fourth ranking contested field. As in the case of the agriculture campaign a high proportion 
of the energy production y contested field appears as "policy” related o responsibility 
contexts (9% out of the total 11.5%). This shows that Friends o f the Earth's concerns for 
energy production by fossil fuels and renewable sources constitute a key campaign that is 
waged against policy actors.
Whereas fanning and energy concerns are established campaigns against policy sectors 
of government (and industry) responsibility, concerns with industry hold a slightly different 
position in Friends o f the Earth’s campaign repertoire. Graph f  shows that the industrial 
production (heavy and chemical) contested field i accounts for more than a seventh (15%)
39 The graphic model shows that six o f  the eight Friends o f the Earth articles that are coded as government 
e contested fields occurred during the "news event* phase of the White Paper event. This shows that like 
Greenpeace, Friends o f  the Earth strategically timed the selection o f  the internal policy actions of Government 
as a target during the special conditions o f the White Paper press launch.
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and is the second ranking government responsibility context that is constructed by Friends 
of the Earth. Section 2.i) showed that "industrial waste pollution" (11%) and "mining" (3%) 
together account for a seventh of environmental issues mobilised by Friends of the Earth. As 
in the cases of farming and energy the figures for issues and contested fields tally closely, 
which indicates that concerns for industrial production constitute another key campaign for 
Friends of the Earth. However, in contrast to fanning and energy, Friends of the Earth’s 
heavy and chemical industry campaign is not mobilised principally against "policy" o 
responsibility contexts. More than half of the industry i contested field appears as "non 
policy" related x contexts (8% out of a total 15%). This indicates that Friends of the Earth 
are more likely to blame industrial actors rather than policy actors for the heavy industrial 
and chemical practices which they contest.
It is interesting to note that the reverse holds for Greenpeace. The industry i contested 
field is once more a highly prominent responsibility context but three quarters of it appear 
as a "policy" o related (18.5% out of 25%). This shows that Greenpeace tends to campaign 
against policy actors for concerns relating to heavy industrial and chemical practices. 
Greenpeace focuses more directly on the policy related dimensions of industrial targets than 
Friends of the Earth. Such a finding is surprising when one considers that the Greenpeace 
discourse exists at a calculated distance from the national policy discourse. However a closer 
examination shows that four out of Greenpeace’s five industry i contested fields which are 
"policy" related in fact have a supra-national orientation. Virus risk to blue fla g  bathers (Gpc 
L) and Poland ’used as dumping ground‘ fo r  toxic waste (Gpc W) are coded with an 
European, whereas Toxic waste imports boosted by illicit trade (Gpc M) and The new cold 
war (Gpc b) have a World/Global issue scope.40
The policy related orientation o f the industry i responsibility contexts in the 
Greenpeace sample is produced by issues with a international scope. This indicates that 
Greenpeace principally perceives "policy" as a target for identifying the supra-national 
governmental responsibilities for the damage caused by harmful industrial practices. 
Targeting supra-national policy measures with "blame" is a tool for Greenpeace to condemn 
the inadequacy of policy instruments and at the same time promote a globalisation of the 
governmental responsibility for environmental damage. International policy contexts rather
40 Sec bottom o f Friends of the Earth's visual database for the codings o f  issue scope (iss scope) for each 
article. Refer also to the contested fields indicators in the methodological section B.
than industrial actors are targeted with "blame” for the damage caused by heavy industrial 
and chemical practices. Conversely, the national "internal" policy agenda receives sparse 
critique from Greenpeace for the environmental damage caused by industrial practices.
The composition of Friends of the Earth’s industry i contested fields is revealing too. 
Two of Friends o f the Earth’s three "policy" o related industry i contested fields concern 
issues with a National scope (FoE V h), whereas the other has an European issue scope (FoE 
q). Of the four "non policy" x industry i contexts (FoE C F  O d), two have a National and 
two a Local issue scope. This shows that in contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth 
tends to target industry i contested fields as a national or sub-national responsibility context. 
Furthermore, Friends of the Earth are likely to "blame" an industrial practice as a "non 
policy" context when it is a localised concern, e.g. Incinerator chums up worries on milk. 
... reports on residents’ concern about emissions o f smoke near a dairy farm  (FoE C), and 
as a "policy” related context when it is a national concern, e.g. Water watchdog to prosecute 
five firm s (FoE h). This confirms that for criticising industrial practices Friends of the Earth 
is more active in the national policy field than Greenpeace. Indeed the only time an 
international European policy context is constructed for an industry i contested field in 
Friends of the Earth’s sample, is for an article that is mobilised by Greenpeace, Greenpeace 
puts company in dock (FoE q Gpc a).
A comparison between the graphs f  and g highlights another distinction between the 
campaign cultures o f Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace this time relating to their targeting 
of nuclear concerns. The nuclear contested field n dominates the responsibility contexts 
which appear in the Greenpeace sample, accounting for more than a third of the total 
resonance (36.5% ). Four fifths o f these appeared as "non policy" x related (29% o f the total 
36.5%) and a fifth as "policy" o related contexts. This contrasts with the nuclear n contested 
field for Friends o f the Earth which accounts for less than a tenth of responsibility contexts 
and is composed o f a fifth "non policy" x and four fifths (7% out of 9%) "policy" o related 
contexts.
This shows that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace oppose nuclear industry, nuclear 
energy production and testing by targeting the nuclear n  contested field in different ways. For 
Friends o f the Earth nuclear practices are primarily a contested policy arena, whereas for 
Greenpeace the nuclear campaign is carried into other spheres o f life that are not related to 
policy. Unlike the heavy and chemical industry i which Greenpeace contests as an
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international policy responsibility, government and industry actors take the blame for nuclear 
damage in a "non policy" related x context. It suggests that instead of making a policy 
context responsible, Greenpeace blames government and industry actors directly and 
unconditionally for the risks to life which are posed by the nuclear threat.41 Whereas 
Greenpeace blame the actors, Friends of the Earth are more likely to criticise nuclear 
concerns as a "policy" related o discourse.
In the cases of industry i and nuclear n  contested fields (Greenpeace’s two prominent 
responsibility contexts) Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace target different aspects o f the 
responsibility contexts with "blame". Their strategies are complementary rather than 
competitive. This suggests that there is a tacit division o f communicative labour in the process 
o f target construction between the two organisations.42 Moreover, Friends of the Earth do 
not compete for the two key responsibility contexts of Greenpeace campaigns. This indicates 
that Friends of the Earth take a generalist and integrationist role within the public 
campaigning activities of British environmental organisations and leave Greenpeace to their 
’expert’ campaign specialities.
Further evidence of this generalist role is shown by the spread of Friends of the 
Earth’s target construction across the ten contested Helds. I have already noted that the 
Friends of the Earth campaign repertoire mobilises "policy" related o responsibilities for the 
fields of government decision-making, agriculture, energy and nuclear. In the case of 
criticising heavy and chemical industry i, national policy related responsibilities are also 
mobilised but not predominantly. Together these four topics are the established pillars of 
Friends of the Earth's public campaign activities. It is significant that industry, agriculture,
41 It is worth noting that the nuclear issue has been the central crusade in the Greenpeace campaign history, 
from the initial pioneer voyages into nuclear testing zones to its present activities. For Greenpeace the nuclear 
issue is linked to man’s universal destruction o f the world. The nuclear contest may not be resolved as a "policy 
issue", the perceived fault has a greater cultural depth than such dn admission would allow. Greenpeace identify 
responsibility contexts far and wide for nuclear concerns, from the local to the global domain, e .g . the 
sufferings o f indigenous peoples in exotic places due to the radiation contamination from Western nuclear 
testing. Fears fo r a sea o f caesium and Testimonies from the atoll (Gpc I, J). The nuclear debate is a key theme 
in the radicalism of Greenpeace ideology in that its resolution is unconditional and the potential risk is universal. 
For Greenpeace this excludes the possibility for the pragmatic "half way solutions" of policy rationality. Like 
industiy i the contest is primarily waged against actors who are defined in a supra-national context (see 4. 
below).
42 The hypothesis for the existence of a division o f communicative labour by the environmental organisations 
(that is expressed in differences between their strategic mobilisations) is tested in relation to the White Paper 
event in the next pan o f this analysis.
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energy and nuclear concerns are also the key policy sectors for environmental action by the 
national Government.
The transport t  contested field is less well established as a single pillar in the Friends 
of the Earth campaign repertoire. Although the "car & transport" issue culture accounts for 
an eighth of environmental issues in the Friends o f the Earth sample (section 2.i)), by 
contrast the transport, shipping & vehicle t  contested field produces only a fiftieth (2%) of 
government (and industry) responsibility contexts. This indicates that mobilised "car & 
transport" issues extend beyond the parameters of contested transport activities (and policies). 
Indeed "car & transport" issues construct responsibility contexts for opponent actors in the 
fields of business b (FoE D p), energy y (FoE I), party politics p (FoE R p), and 
government decision-making e (FoE a c e f), but only once in specific reference to a 
transport policy context (FoE o).43
This shows that the "car" is an environmental issue that "works" across and links 
different government and industry responsibility contexts in Friends of the Earth’s 
campaigns. The "car" campaign produces a different type of target construction than 
"energy" and "agriculture" which identify single specific policy relevant contexts. The car 
campaign links and unifies several targeted contested fields. It serves to mobilise and 
integrate several contested fields against government (and industry) actors.
The "natural environment" is another prominent Friends of the Earth issue that serves 
this integrating function across different responsibility contexts. Friends of the Earth mobilise 
environmental issues concerning the destruction of the natural environment in news texts 
which highlight business b (FoE D), government "internal" decision-making e (FoE E f N , 
a, b, c), labour & welfare 1 (FoE G), sponsorship d (FoE K), heavy & chemical industry i 
(FoE V, d), and energy y (FoE g) contested fields.
The car and nature campaigns show that the property of thematic shift o f 
environmental issues is used by Friends o f the Earth to target different fields of government 
and industry in a single instance o f mobilisation. These two cases show that unlike those of 
Greenpeace, Friends o f the Earth’s public campaigns tend not only to construct a specific 45
45 Table C .I gives the environmental issue frames (and frame clusters) mobilised in each article for the 
environmental organisations, and the "type" o f contested field (in each article) appears at bottom of the 
organisation’s graphic model. Combining the two makes it possible to identify which environmental issue frames 
constructed which responsibility contexts. Indeed this analytic task is undertaken more systematically and in a 
comparative context in section 4. below.
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contested field per issue, but in some cases "link" their targeting of different fields through 
one issue.
This tendency indicates that whereas Greenpeace’s "blaming” strategies are specialist, 
one-dimensional and specifically orientated, Friends of the Earth’s target construction 
maintains the depth of relating a single environmental issue to several contested fields, i.e. 
it "spreads the blame". In doing so Friends of the Earth’s environmental argumentation 
engages more practically in identifying the action-contexts where changes in behaviour and 
potential solutions may be realised. The public campaigns on car and natural environment 
topics achieve this "effect" for the organisation by promoting a "linkage" between several 
related responsibility contexts. It integrates the "blaming" against the whole spectrum of 
government and industry actors who are responsible for environmental damage relating to 
the topics o f nature and cars in Britain. This enables Friends of the Earth to emphasize the 
interrelatedness of the causes o f these environmental problems by identifying a range of 
related responsible actors.
Such a "spreading of the blame" provides the basis for an appraisal of the complex 
basis of environmental problems and their potential solutions. It constitutes a more 
constructive critique of environmental responsibilities than that of Greenpeace. If Friends of 
the Earth’s mobilisations assert that different actors are responsible for nature and car 
problems, by identifying distinct but related activities that are deleterious to the environment, 
then an appreciation of the "complex" interrelatedness of environmental problems (and their 
potential solutions) is made public knowledge. More streamlined campaigns (such as those 
of Greenpeace or against established policy sectors) are more likely to promote a mono- 
causal understanding of environmental problems.
To recap: Friends of the Earth construct policy related responsibility contexts by 
generalising across the spectrum of the national environmental agenda, whereas Greenpeace 
specialise on targeting nuclear (as non policy) and industrial (as supra-national policy) 
contested fields. Government internal decision-making is a prominent target field for both 
organisations, but more so for Friends o f the Earth who are also more likely to focus on the 
policy activities o f Government. Greenpeace’s campaign culture is dominated by the 
streamlined campaigns against the nuclear threat and heavy and chemical industrial 
production, both o f which are oriented supranationally. Friends of the Earth’s campaign 
culture maintains streamlined campaigns against the national policy sectors of agriculture,
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(non nuclear) energy and nuclear energy. In addition Friends o f the Earth contests heavy and 
chemical industrial production as a national campaign.
In Friends o f the Earth’s campaign culture the prominent environmental issue frames 
relating to the natural environment and cars "link" several contested fields. Such "bridging" 
campaigns relate a more "complex" appraisal of the interrelatedness of the environmental 
problematic than the streamlined campaigns of Greenpeace. It is worth noting that the 
communications o f the two primary media oriented organisations do not compete over similar 
campaign territory. Their campaigns are complementary and distinct, even on campaign 
topics which overlap. This gives an indication that there is a division o f communicative 
labour in the public campaign targeting o f Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.
3.ii) The W orld Wide Fund fo r N atu re
Graph w illustrates the responsibility contexts that are constructed in the news sample 
of the World Wide Fund for Nature. Whereas Friends o f the Earth mobilised all contested 
fields and Greenpeace six, the World Wide Fund for Nature’s activities produce only five 
contested fields. This indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature’s communication is 
specialist rather than generalist in the "type" of targets which it selects. Like Greenpeace, 
the World Wide Fund for Nature highlights the responsibilities of opponent actors on specific 
topics and contested fields in the news.
Half (53%) of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s contested fields appear as "policy" 
related o and half (47%) as "non policy" related x contexts. This balance between "policy" 
and "non policy" contested fields is similar to Greenpeace, but shows that the W orld Wide 
Fund for Nature is less oriented towards opposing policy related actors than Friends of the 
Earth.
Unlike either the Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth case, the target construction o f 
the World Wide Fund for Nature produces a neat division between the contested fields which 
are "policy" o related and those which are "non-policy" related x. This indicates a dual 
strategy for mobilising responsibility contexts. On the one hand, the organisation targets the 
contested fields o f government "internal" decision-making e, heavy and chemical industry 
production i and transport, shipping and vehicle activities t  as "policy" related o discourses. 
And on the other, it wages "non policy" x related campaigns against business & commerce
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b and development & sponsorship d contested fields. Hence there are two strategies in the 
target construction activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature: one for making "policy" 
actors responsible, and one for making "non policy" actors responsible for their actions.
It is worth noting that World Wide Fund for Nature is itself a key non governmental 
actor for international conservation, development and research (Princen and Finger 1994). 
This means that the organisation may construct responsibility contexts where it may be an 
actual or potential "responsible" actor. The World Wide Fund for Nature’s construction of 
I responsibility contexts may serve to highlight the organisation’s own activities, serving as a
form of self-legitimation, promotion and/or public accountability. Neither Friends of the 
Earth nor Greenpeace campaign through the media towards this goal of justifying their own 
practical attempts to alleviate environmental damage.44 The two media orientated 
r organisations are less involved than the World Wide Fund for Nature in activities which are
designed to alleviate the conditions of environmental damage. Instead their campaignj
 ^ activities target other actors with "blame" and make them publicly accountable.
Two distinct campaign strategies are evident in the World Wide Fund for Nature 
! sample: targeting which contests government (and industry) actors in specific fields; and
! promoting which informs and legitimises the organisation's own projects in another set of
j specific fields. Under this categorisation both Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace primarily
f engage in targeting strategies.45
! This raises the question of which contested fields the World Wide Fund for Nature
j ’promotes’ and which it 'targets’.
| Graph w shows that the construction of responsibility contexts by the World Wide
1 Fund for Nature is dominated by the business b and development d contested fields. These
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** One minor exception to this rule is presented by Friends o f the Earth’s •agritourism" projects which 
appear in the media as a promoting rather than targeting campaign strategy. Whether "agritourism" projects 
constitute a practical attempt to alleviate environmental damage is a disputed point, which is why Friends of 
the Earth has to justify its actions.
45 The distinction between promoting and targeting campaign strategies is analytic; environmental 
organisation may mobilise communications seeking to achieve both goals. However Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace communicate principally to contest the actions of other actors (usually Government or Industry), 
whereas the World Wide Fund for Nature communicates about a contested field where it is itself the key actor. 
The World Wide Fund for Nature’s communications construct "responsibilities" for its own action context, it 
"contests" within its own contested field. This role functionally distinguishes the World Wide Fund for Nature 
from Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace. The World Wide Fund for Nature is a non governmental 
organisation and its communications strategies are subsequently more likely to "promote" than "blame" the 
government responsibility contexts which it raises in the public discourse.
...........................................................................
two contested fields comprise a third (34%) and a quarter (23.5%), respectively, of the 
responsibility contexts in the organisation’s discourse, and include all the fields that appear 
as "non policy" x related. This shows that the contested fields which the World Wide Fund 
for Nature are most keen to highlight are development and business activities, both of which 
are defined beyond the aegis of policy actors. It indicates that sponsorship, development, 
research, marketing and business are the fields which the organisation raises in the news. The 
motive for mobilising these action contexts is more likely to be ’self-promotional’ than for 
’blaming’ government and industry opponents. The World Wide Fund for Nature are less 
concerned than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace with public "blaming" strategies against 
Government actors. For the World Wide Fund for Nature, publicity serves a different 
function - one that informs the public about the actions that are being taken in response to 
the environmental problems. Business b and development d are the fields for the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s promotional strategy.
More than two thirds (68%) of the environmental issue resonance mobilised by the 
World Wide Fund for Nature are "rare fauna" and "rainforest etc." issue frames (see B) ii 
above). This orientation towards global conservation issues implies that the business b and 
development d fields which appear in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s news sample in fact 
refer to their own supra-national projects and finance schemes for overseas development 
programmes. The two dominant contested fields business b and development d mobilise 
responsibilities for actors within the organisation’s own environmental projects, who may 
include government actors, supranational governmental bodies, business sponsors or the 
practical fundraising and conservation actors of the WWF itself. A consequence of this is that 
the responsibility contexts of the World Wide Fund for Nature are not only less politically 
contentious than those of Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace, but serve a different function, 
that of publicising the organisation’s own activities in the field of world conservation.46
If politicising the environmental debate is not the primary aim of the organisation’s 
campaign culture, then why does the World Wide Fund for Nature seek publicity for its 
activities? The answer lies in the organisation’s need to legitimise its public image as the key
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46 Unfortunately for the World Wide Fund for Nature this publicising function also extends to giving the 
organisation "bad publicity”. This is what happened during the series of ”scandals” relating to its fundraising 
and conservation activities that appear in the sample coverage. In this exceptional period the organisation was 
effectively using "blaming” strategies against its previous actions and policies to "promote” the idea that it had 
now rectified its fundraising and conservation activities (see later).
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actor in world conservation. Maintaining this public image opens up opportunities for 
sponsorship and patronage from government and industry actors. Such resources are needed 
to fund the practical conservation activities of the organisation.
The World Wide Fund for Nature has a fundraising tradition for seeking patronage 
from individual wealthy benefactors. Prince Philip is one of the most famous British patrons 
of the organisation. Another example o f this patronage is the *1001 club’, whereby one- 
thousand-and-one individual benefactors each contribute $10 000 to the organisation’s 
funds.47 In addition to such sums more than £25 Million is contributed by the British public 
annually.48 It is likely that this donating public includes many patrons among the rich and 
influential.
Detailed coverage of World Wide Fund for Nature’s projects in the Feature sections 
o f a quality newspaper, like The Guardian, enables the organisation to prime this special 
public and attributes it with the prestige o f a responsible and established public actor. This 
type of coverage also provides the organisation a public platform for approaching private 
business for donations. Indeed the World Wide Fund for Nature annually accept substantial 
financial contributions from industrial, business and government organisations. This shows 
that the media coverage of environmental issues serves a different function in the World 
Wide Fund for Nature campaigns than it does for Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. 
Although the World Wide Fund for Nature does not perform as many stunts to achieve 
attention, media coverage is nonetheless a vital element in the organisation’s fundraising, 
project planning and implementation strategies.49
This ’promotional’ nature of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s public communication 
strategies tends to preclude references to "policy" o responsibility contexts. Overseas 
environmental development activities are usually outside the ambit of the immediate policy 
concerns of Government. More specifically, the low resonance of "policy" o related business
47 Source The Guardian 05/09/90.
41 Source The Guardian 03/09/90.
49 Needless to say the "scandals" were a Public Relations disaster for the World Wide Fund for Nature. 
They were however "leaked" from internal sources in the organisation who were unhappy with the new policy 
direction under the Director General Charles de Haes. This shows that the rival faction were able to use their 
established relations with journalists not only to attack de Haes, but to ensure a measure o f  damage limitation 
for the organisation within the coverage of the "scandals".
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b and development d fields is due to the fact that they are both contested fields which follow 
long term  rather than short term  paths to ’’solving*' environmental problems. Development I
programmes and sponsored business activities exist outside the immediate concerns of the ^
world of politics, and the everyday confrontations of the environmental contest in political [
discourse. The World Wide Fund for Nature primarily use the media to inform and f
communicate with special sections of the public rather than cause embarrassment to |
established political actors. Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide |
Fund for Nature’s mobilisations appear in the F eature rather than the H om e News sections |
of the Paper.50 Indeed more than half o f the articles in the World Wide Fund for Nature [
sample were F eature  articles, which shows a tendency for approaching select sections of the j
public.51 (
\
Rather than appealing to the public en m asse , the World Wide Fund for Nature I
communicate with specialist audiences. The high quality and quantity of coverage provided |
by E nvironm enta l, D evelopm ent and S p ec ia l Features shows that the World Wide Fund for j
Nature has good established contacts with journalists. This facilitates the discursive depth (
necessary for the organisation to get across the long term  aims of its conservation and j
development projects. Such established contacts with the media enable the World Wide Fund j
for Nature to mobilise the complex "habitat” conservation issues into the public discourse. |
For example, H ugh Synge continues o u r occasional series on endangered p la n t species w ith  !
a report on the C afe m arron , th e  ra rest p la n t in the  w orld . E nvironm ent fen c in g  w ith j
extinction  (WWF Q), is typical of the formula used by the World Wide Fund for Nature to |
"package" its claims for these long  term  environmental issues. Another example from the I
"non-scandal" section of the sample is, T he land  o f  a thousand  islands gets another dressing  |
dow n. F red  P earce Indonesia. (WWF S). Long term world conservation issues do not I
possess the same immediacy and "news value" as the environmental "scandals" that are often j
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90 The section of each news article is given along with its Headline after the visual databases in the 
methodological section B.
Sl When the World Wide Fund for Nature did appear in the Home News rather than Feature articles in this 
sample it was not because their issue mobilisation activities "made the news”, but on the contrary that their 
business and development activities were reported as "scandals" by the media. Even allowing for distortions 
in the sample due to the exceptionally high media interest in the WWF’s financing and development strategies, 
the analysis is still able to classify the organisation’s contested fields from the media discourse. It is clear that 
due to special circumstances that the WWF’s promotional activities may have resonated more than is normally 
the case but that does not prevent us from analyzing the contents of the organisation’s discourse.
t*
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mobilised by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. The World Wide Fund for Nature relies 
on maintaining good contacts with environmental journalists to mobilise the specialist 
knowledge of world conservation issues.52
If the business b and development d contested fields indicate the World Wide Fund 
for Nature's prom oting  campaign strategy, when does the organisation implement a targeting  
strategy and which actors does it make publicly "responsible"?
Together the three lower ranking contested fields in the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s campaign culture account for four tenths of its responsibility contexts. Graph w 
shows that in descending order of resonance these contested fields are: government "internai" 
decision-making e (16.5%); heavy and chemical industry production i (15.5%); and transport 
and vehicle activities t (10.5%). These three contested fields are all entirely composed of 
"policy" o related responsibility contexts. The World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
communications only refer to internal governmental matters, heavy industrial and chemical 
production and transport affairs as policy matters. In other words, the organisation’s 
targeting  campaign strategies make governments responsible for regulating and sanctioning 
the actors who cause environmental damage in the field of world conservation. The World 
Wide Fund for Nature contest the deleterious actions of heavy industrialists and transport 
concerns by referring to legal regulatory standards. At the same time the organisation 
campaigns against government actors for improving the standards and enforcing 
implementation of policies which fall within its conservationist field of interest. In this sense 
the World Wide Fund for Nature’s ta rgeting  strategies are those of a conventional "pressure 
group", it enters political debate only to promote concerns that lie within the regulatory 
policy discourse that is specifically related to its specialist field of interest. The World Wide 
Fund for Nature does not seek to raise "new" contentious topics. 32
32 This also means that the WWF tends to appear in a different structure of news (van Dijk 1985 1988) than 
the more politically contentious organisations. The titles of the two articles (WWF Q, S) illustrate that the 
journalist takes a prominent and personal relation to the reading public, whilst the exotic habitat issues receive 
an elaborate narrative description and the World Wide Fund for Nature remain discreetly out of public view. 
The World Wide Fund for Nature maintain a low profile in the text. Apparently the WWF utilises this low 
profile and their special contacts with journalists to mobilise their long term issues into the news. Their 
specialist target audience for this type of issue are the sections of the public who have an interest in exotic 
places (e.g. as a possible travel destination) and the time to read detailed Features.
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Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace which attempt to politicise the 
environmental contest through the media, the "blaming" strategies of the World Wide Fund 
for Nature remain within the boundaries o f an established policy discourse. The organisation 
campaigns for better standards of regulation and implementation by Governments and for 
legal compliance by industrialists. Its strategic targeting  in the media aims to raise the policy 
concerns that are implied by its ’promotional’ conservation interests. In this sense the World 
Wide Fund for Nature’s targeting  and prom o ting  campaign activities are complementary and 
constitute different elements of a unified public communication strategy.
The distribution of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s targeting  campaign strategies 
in time across the White Paper event is further revealing.53 Four out of the five articles 
referring to the World Wide Fund for Nature during the "news event" stage of the White 
Paper appear as "policy" o responsibility contexts. Furthermore all four which appear in the 
"epilogue" phase are "policy" o contested fields (see visual database). This shows that the 
World Wide Fund for Nature strategically times its entries into political discourse through 
the media. In this case its ta rgeting  mobilisations coincide with the special opportune 
conditions for environmental policy discourse with the national Government that prevail 
around the publication of the White Paper policy document.
The special conditions of the White Paper event also facilitate the organisation’s 
collaboration with the more politicised wing of the environmental movement. During the 
White Paper "news event" phase the World Wide Fund for Nature appears in unison with 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace to contest the national environmental policy agenda on 
three occasions (WWF N O R ). Prior to the White Paper news event the organisation focuses 
on prom oting  strategies, but in the period of policy reconstruction around the event the World 
Wide Fund for Nature implements ta rgeting  strategies against the international regulation o f  
the illegal use of rhino horn by the Chinese pharmaceutical industries (WWF P), and the 
environmental damage caused by multi-national timber and mining industries (WWF S V). 
In these cases the World Wide Fund for nature is pressurising the national Government to 
take an international stance for the implementation of more stringent supra-national policies
53 For the time series of the different contested fields in the World Wide Fund for Nature sample across the 
White Paper event refer to the coding at the bottom of the graphic model for each article: contested fields 
indicators. The analysis of the White Paper "cycle" of communication is undertaken more comprehensively in 
the next section D.
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which affect its global conservation efforts. This shows that the organisation’s targeting  
strategies are designed to push its conservation interests in the forum of international politics. 
The organisation attempts to mobilise change by acting through Government. Hence the 
entrance of the World Wide Fund for Nature into politics tends to maintain a format that is 
often not contentious vis-a-vis Government actors.
To recap: It appears that the World Wide Fund for Nature has a dual campaign 
strategy in the public discourse. The organisation ’promotes* its own conservation activities 
by mobilising development d and business b contested fields as "non policy" related 
responsibilities, and ’targets* "policy" related responsibilities for actors in the contested fields 
of government decision-making e, industry i and transport t. These two elements of the 
World Wide Fund for Nature’s campaign strategy are complementary. The World Wide Fund 
for Nature "promotes" its own activities as being worthy of public and private financial 
support, by utilising good contacts with environmental journalists which ensures a favourable 
and dense coverage o f the special complex nature of the world conservation practices. At the 
same time the organisation "blames" its opponents in the field of world conservation - heavy 
industrialists, such as logging or chemical multinationals - by referring to their non 
compliance with existing international policies, which brings pressure to bear on the British 
Government to act. In favourable conditions the World Wide Fund for Nature enters the 
national political arena in allegiance with the more confrontational organisations Friends of 
the Earth and Greenpeace. On such occasions it acts like a conventional "pressure group” 
pushing for favourable changes in the Government’s policy commitments.
4. Environmental framing patterns in news campaigns: environmental issue frames 
"linking" contested fields
In section 2 . 1 compared the range of environm ental them es that Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilise into the sample of news coverage. 
In Section 3. I compared the range of responsibility contexts that are constructed into the 
same sample by the organisations’ communications. This analysis involved a reconstruction 
o f the "types" o f environmental issue frames and issue cultures (section 2.) and a 
reconstruction of the "types" of contested fields (section 3.) which appear in the news 
discourses o f the three environmental organisations. Taken together these source  and target
■amwBiuniuiMiiuiiiumiuiuimiiiuiii m
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elements o f the news discourse are considered to be indicators for the discursive action 
repertoires of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature for 
public communication. In this section 4. I attempt to analyze the relation between the 
mobilisation of environm ental them es and targeting of governm ent responsibility contexts that 
is produced in the set of news texts of each organisation. This will identify the strategic role 
of specific types of environmental issues cultures in the media campaigns of the 
organisations.
Much has been made in the ongoing analysis of the potential for environmental issue 
frames to "shift’’ across the different types of contested fields which they are active in 
constructing.54 Indeed in section 2. the term environmental issue "frame clusters" was 
coined for the combinations of environmental issue frames that are mobilised together in a 
single case of a news narrative. Earlier I argued that the propensity for them atic sh ift by 
environmental issue frames occurs due to their constructed and communicative nature. The 
"shifting" potential of environmental issue frames (and frame clusters) to communicate 
meaning by referring to different social contexts serves an important function in the 
environmental discourse: it integrates the focus of the environmental debate into a unified 
campaign - the environmental contest.
Following on from this, it is clear that specific environmental issue frames may 
sustain an integrating or unifying role within the "public campaign culture" of an 
environmental organisation. Certain environmental issues may be mobilised as "linking" 
frames, they may refer to several targeted contested fields and thus integrate the focus of the 
campaigning critique of the organisation against interrelated opponents. This process of 
mobilising against interrelated targets is an important feature of environmental campaigning, 
because it mobilises environmentalism into the public discourse as a critique rather than a 
random collection o f one-off protest issues. Furthermore, it is only by mobilising a critique 
against interrelated opponents that environmental organisations have the possibility to 
communicate the genuinely 'complex' nature of environmental problems to the public. 
Communication is not a linear process and neither is the mobilisation of the environmental
54 Even the preliminary content analysis in the graphic model (see methodological section B) - which codes 
each text for the scope of the environmental issue(s) (iss scope) and decision-making actor field (act 
field) - indicates that environmental issues do not simply repeat the spatial context of the actor field. 
Environmental issue frames can "link" different spatial contexts - from local to national to global and back 
again! - which is pan of their communicative function.
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critique. Environmental mobilisation is educational: it raises collective learning processes into 
the public discourse. The associations that are made by the organisations at the level of text -
e.g. which actors and related practices are to "blame"? - serves as a resource for other
! public actors to reconstruct the environmental contest.
[
; Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature have emerged
) as the three environmental organisations that have experienced exponential growth (by
I membership Figures - see McCormick 1991; Szesynski, Miles et al. 1995) during the upsurge
j in popularity of environmental discourse since the early eighties. Analysing their patterns of
| environmental issue frames (and frame clusters) to identify which environmental issues serveS
1 as "linking" frames across several contested fields may provide a clue to the types of
j environmental issues through which the environmental debate has emerged in recent times,
j Which environmental issues have served as the "carriers" of the critique that has been
( mobilised through the campaigns of these three organisations? Through which media
l campaigns is the "new environmental consciousness" (Jamison Eyerman et al. 1990)
\ emerging in the British public discourse?
| In this section 4., the resonance of the twelve "types" of environmental issue cultures
[ (section 2.) is distributed between the ten possible "types" of contested field (section 3.) for
j each environmental organisation. The graphs for Friends of the Earth f2, Greenpeace g2, and
[ the World Wide Fund for Nature w2 indicate the role of the different "types" of
>
I environmental issue frames in the process of target construction. The graphs illustrate which
| environmental issue frames construct which government (and industry) contested fields in the
[ media campaigns o f the three organisations.
( To clarify the representation of this data, the twelve "types" of environmental issue
i cultures are split into two: supra-national and national environmental issue frames.55 The
■ "energy", "mining" and "nuclear" issue cultures which may be the source of frames with
l
. either a national or supra-national reference are placed with "global wanning", "rainforest
* 53 As I explained in section 2., the distinction between national and supra-national environmental issue
! frames is a tendency which is made for descriptive convenience rather than a clear cut categorisation. To recap
( briefly on the description of categories in section 2.: "global warming", "rainforest”, and "rare fauna” issue
j cultures usually frame supra-national contexts because they refer to global problems. "Industrial waste
i pollution", "agricultural waste pollution", "natural environment", "car”, "green business" and "green politics"
i concern domestic problems and usually frame national contexts. "Mining" and "energy" issue cultures are
f equally likely to frame either national or supra-national frames, whereas the "nuclear" issue culture may frame
, either supra-national or national or both contexts simultaneously.
;
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etc." and "rare fauna" issue cultures which are usually the source for supra-national frames. 
These six environmental issue cultures appear in the upper graph for each organisation which 
is labelled "supra-nationalenvironmental issue framing patterns". The remaining six issue 
cultures, namely "industrial waste pollution", "agricultural waste pollution", "natural 
environment", "car", "green business" and "green politics" appear in the lower graph as 
"national environmental issue framing patterns".
The communicative properties of environmental issue frames include the potentiality 
to "link" the different social contexts of actors in the environmental contest. This is pan of 
the construction of the environmental contest and occurs in public discourse. The social 
contexts of the actors who are targeted by environmental mobilisations may differ either 
spatially (being either local, national or global etc.) or by "type" (being either industrialists 
or policy actors etc.). In this section 4. an attempt is made to analyze the environmental issue 
framing patterns that are mobilised in the news discourses of Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. Particular attention is given to the 
"linking" properties of specific environmental issue cultures across targeted "types" of 
contested field. This is referred to as the propensity o f specific environmental issue frames 
for "linking" targeted contested fields. It is an indicator for the "dynamics" of the campaign 
critiques which the organisations mobilise into the news discourse.
4.i) Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace
Environmental issue frames are mobilised either as frames of a single "type" of issue 
culture or as "frame clusters", i.e. multiple or combined "types" of issue frames. Here I 
analyze the "environmental issue framing patterns" that are produced by the overall 
environmental issue framing and target construction properties o f the organisations’ media 
campaigns. An attempt is made to reconstruct the ’role’ of specific "types" o f environmental 
issue cultures in communicating the environmental contest as part of an organisation’s 
campaign strategy.
Graphs f2 and g2 show the environmental issue framing patterns of Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace, respectively. For each organisation this is the distribution of the 
twelve "types" o f environmental issue cultures across the specific "types" of 
govemment/industry contested field which they construct in the news discourse. The graphs
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give an overall pattern for the relation between environmental issue framing and target 
construction that is produced by the media campaigns of the two organisations. This shows 
how the environmental organisations mobilise environm ental them es to target governm ent 
responsibility contexts in their media campaigns. It is an indicator for the strategic orientation 
of their respective "public campaign cultures".
An initial comparison of graphs f2 and g2 shows that Friends of the Earth’s 
environmental issue cultures are more differentiated across the ten "types" of contested fields 
than those of Greenpeace. This indicates that Friends of the Earth’s campaigns are more 
likely to be composed of environmental issue frame "clusters" than Greenpeace’s. 
Environmental issue frame "clusters" interrelate more than one environmental issue culture 
when targeting a contested field. Hence this may also indicate that Friends of the Earth’s 
campaigns mobilise a more complex critique of the causes of environmental problems than 
Greenpeace. Greenpeace has a more streamlined environmental issue framing pattern that is 
dominated by single issue campaigns, and in particular, the nuclear campaign at the supra­
national and the industrial campaign at the national level. Furthermore, Greenpeace’s 
campaigns are more oriented towards the supra-national level, whereas Friends of the Earth’s 
environmental issue framing pattern is more concentrated at the national rather than the 
' supra-national level.56
These general impressions confirm the findings o f sections 2. and 3.. Detail will now\
be added to these general statements by looking at the role of specific "types" of 
) environmental issue cultures in the structure of the organisations’ communication campaigns.
This will be done by first comparing i.a) the "supra-national environmental issue framing 
patterns" and then ii.b) the "national environmental issue framing patterns" of the campaigns 
( which are mobilised by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace in the public discourse.
!
( 4 .i.a) supra-national environmental issue framing patterns
I
j The "global warming" issue culture raises issue frames relating to global wanning,
the ozone hole, the greenhouse effect, and the production and emission of carbon dioxide and 
1 CFCs into the atmosphere. When mobilised this "type" of issue culture gives a supra-national
t
t
56 This confirms the earlier finding from the preliminary indicators in the methodological section B.
UHlUUft ii. mmiuiiMHI L!!HllllUlimin i wihhi iwmwii Himnu hhuhuh im
125
frame of reference to the environmental contest. By necessity it constructs the notion of a 
global society. The upper graphs f2 and g2 show that "global warming" issue frames "link" 
six contested fields in the news discourse of Friends of the Earth and five in that of 
Greenpeace. This means that "global warming" issue frames are ’active’ in the construction 
of more different "types" of contested field than any other supra-national environmental 
issue. "Global warming" issues are used in Friends o f the Earth’s campaigns to
highlight the following contested fields, in ranked order (highest resonance first): government 
"internal" decision-making e, party "politics" p, heavy & chemical industrial production i, 
sponsorship & research d, nuclear matters n and energy (non-nuclear) production y. In the 
case of Greenpeace "global warming" frames do not target sponsorship & research d field 
and the hierarchy o f the other five issue frames is different: government decision-making e 
is again the most resonant, followed by Greenpeace’s two primary targeted campaign fields, 
namely nuclear production n and heavy & chemical industry production i, and finally by 
party "politics" p and energy production y.
For both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, "global warming" is the issue culture 
which is most frequently mobilised as a "frame cluster", combining with other issue cultures. 
This means that it is the most communicative "type" of issue culture across different "types" 
of social contexts. The potentiality for "global warming” issue frames to "link" several 
contested fields makes this issue culture a ’special’ element o f the environmental critique. 
Although it is not the most resonant environmental issue culture in the news discourse of 
either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace (section 2.), "global wanning" frames nonetheless 
constitute a key strategic element of the organisation’s communication campaigns. Why is 
this the case? What special communicative ’effect’ do they mobilise?
"Global warming" is a supra-national issue frame which exhibits a high propensity 
for "linking" across several targeted contested fields. This is important because it enables the 
organisations to integrate the environmental contest by unifying the diverse elements of their 
protests into a societal critique. It is by reference to the "global wanning” issue culture that 
the organisations* campaigns achieve the dynamism of constructing an ’interrelated’ societal 
critique rather than being a set of single issue one-off protest campaigns. This holds for the 
cases of both Friends o f the Earth’s and Greenpeace’s "public campaign cultures".
For both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, government decision-making e is the
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most prominent contested field referred to by "global warming" issue frames.57 This implies 
that the role o f "global warming" issue frames which are mobilised in the campaign critiques 
of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace is to "interrelate" several contested fields in the 
public discourse as a unified policy target. Stated simply, Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace raise "global warming” issues to bring other contested fields into public 
communication as policy matters. In effect this unifies diverse elements of the environmental 
contest and places them under public scrutiny as a policy field of government.
In the case o f Greenpeace two primary campaigns, the nuclear and industrial contests, 
are "linked" to government policy making by "global warming" frames. Mobilising "global 
warming" frames is a way for Greenpeace to "link" their two primary campaign targets 
(against the nuclear threat and industrial & chemical pollution) and a non policy target (non­
nuclear energy) to the notion of government responsibility for policy making. It gives the 
"blaming" thrust of their key campaigns an added dimension by adding the culpability o f the 
government to that of the polluters.
For Friends o f the Earth "global warming" frames "integrate" their distinct campaigns 
which construct and define the problem (targeting industry, promoting research, and 
balancing the pros and cons of nuclear and non-nuclear energy) as a general policy concern 
o f government. "Global warming" frames are a way for Friends of the Earth to define an 
environmental problem and at the same time critically enter the energy policy field by 
mobilising "alternative" action strategies to the existing policies of government. This 
communication strategy "links" a complex appreciation of an environmental problem to the 
responsibility of the government’s policies.
Referring to endangered exotic habitats and in particular to the tropical rainforest, 
"rainforest etc.” is another environmental issue culture which automatically gives a supra­
national frame of reference to the environmental contest. Graphs f2 and g2 show that the 
"rainforest etc." issue culture "links" several "types" of targeted contested fields when 
mobilised in the public campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. "Rainforest etc." 
issue frames target five contested fields in the Greenpeace discourse and four in that of 
Friends of the Earth.
In Greenpeace’s media campaigns "rainforest etc." issue frames "link" five "types"
57 I noted in section 2. that government decision-making contested fields e are predominantly a "policy” 
related target.
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of contested fields, in ranked order: nuclear n, business & marketing b, heavy industrial & 
chemical production i, government decision-making e and energy (non nuclear) production 
y. "Rainforest etc. " issue frames most commonly target the nuclear n contested field in the 
Greenpeace news discourse. This indicates that Greenpeace mobilises "rainforest" frames as 
part of its nuclear campaign. By mobilising "rainforest etc." frames, the other contested 
fields (business, heavy industry, government policy, and energy) are integrated as ’related 
targets’ into Greenpeace’s nuclear critique.58 Articles such as Fears fo r  a  sea o f caesium  
(Gpc I) and Testim onies fro m  the  a to ll (Gpc J) are examples o f how Greenpeace mobilise 
issues of endangered exotic habitats to criticise the testing o f nuclear weapons in remote parts 
of the world. Greenpeace use the "rainforest etc." issue culture to "link" the activities of the 
following actors in their targeting critique: WWF, business, heavy industrial actors (loggers 
and multi-nationals), government policy makers and the non-nuclear energy production.
For Friends o f the Earth "rainforest etc." frames "link" a different set of contested 
fields, namely: sponsorship & development d, business b, party "politics" p and energy (non 
nuclear) y. From these four "types" of contested field, "rainforest etc." issue frames are most 
likely to target the development d and business b fields. This indicates that "rainforest etc." 
issue frames have a different role in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. 
Rather than serving a targeting  role as a communicative element of the nuclear campaign, 
"rainforest etc." issue frames constitute a prom oting  role in Friends of the Earth’s campaign 
strategy. Friends o f  the Earth’s "rainforest etc." frames highlight development and business 
activities in the news discourse. Matters o f party politics and non-nuclear energy are raised 
within a campaign discourse that focuses on development and business actors. In fact 
"rainforest" issues are not a prominent element in Friends of the Earth campaigns (section
2.). Friends of the Earth mobilise "rainforest etc." issues to enter the debate on strategies for 
supra-national conservation. This suggests that mobilising "rainforest etc." issue frames is 
part of Friends o f the Earth’s strategy for promoting its integrationist role in the 
environmental movement. It enables the organisation to comment publicly on the 
promotional, financial and development activities of (other) conservation organisations to 
alleviate environmental damage in exotic regions. In the case o f this news sample Friends 5
5* This framing pattern also indicates that Greenpeace mobilises issues concerning endangered exotic habitats 
primarily as a protest against the damage to ecosystems that is caused by activities which produce nuclear 
radiation.
of the Earth mobilised "rainforest" frames to ’spread the blame’ for the WWF scandal (see
* later).
I
I After "global warming" and "rainforest etc.", a third issue culture which gives a
I supra-national frame of reference to the environmental contest is "rare fauna". This issue
J culture refers to endangered rare exotic animal species. However unlike the other two issue
| cultures, "rare fauna" issue frames do not "link" the different targets of the organisations but
I mobilise only a single "type" of contested field in each case. "Rare fauna" issue frames have
I a low resonance and minimal significance in the campaigns of Friends of the Earth and
| Greenpeace.
I The "nuclear" issue culture relating to the damage and potential danger of nuclear
j radiation contamination may give either a supra-national or national or both frame(s) of
| reference to the environmental contest. "Nuclear" issue frames "link" four contested fields
| in the campaign discourse of Friends of the Earth and three in that of Greenpeace. This
! indicates that "nuclear" issue frames have a communicative role in the public campaigns of
I
both organisations.
For Greenpeace "nuclear" is by far the most resonant issue frame (section 2.). 
"Nuclear" issue frames predominantly target the nuclear n contested field, though they also 
"link" with party "politics" p and government decision-making e fields. This indicates that 
Greenpeace mobilises "nuclear” issues as a streamlined one issue protest campaign against 
nuclear energy production and testing. Greenpeace’s opposition to the nuclear industry is a 
prominent element in its public campaign strategy. However, the nuclear issue frames also 
"link" to party politics and government decision-making which indicates that Greenpeace’s 
nuclear campaigns relate to policy matters in addition to their primary role of targeting 
nuclear opponents with "blame".
In Friends o f the Earth’s campaign culture, "nuclear" issue frames target four 
contested fields: nuclear n, labour 1, party politics p, and energy y. As in the case of 
Greenpeace the primary target is against nuclear production and testing. This indicates that 
the nuclear contest is a key element of Friends of the Earth’s public campaign strategy. In 
contrast to Greenpeace, Friends o f the Earth’s "nuclear" issue frames "link" more contested 
fields and have a more evenly distributed resonance. This shows that "nuclear" issue frames 
have a different role in the public campaigns of the two organisations. Friends of the Earth 
do not tend simply to contest nuclear power as a single target. "Nuclear" issue frames
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’interrelate* the opponents of the government’s nuclear policy (trade unions» opposition party 
and fossil fiiel/renewable energy producers) into a campaign critique against the nuclear 
industry. This indicates that Friends of the Earth contest nuclear power with a critique that 
raises alternative policies and "solutions**. Friends of the Earth’s campaign strategy sees the 
nuclear contest as a possibility for raising an energy "package" into the public discourse as 
an alternative to the government’s policy rather than simply as a way of "blaming" the 
nuclear industry for the damage to life that is caused by radiation.59
The "mining" issue culture relating to the extraction and depletion of natural resources 
can give either a supra-national or national frame of reference to the environmental contest. 
However» in the campaigns of Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace "mining" issue frames 
have a low resonance and minimal significance. For Greenpeace "mining" frames target only 
the heavy industry i contested field» whereas heavy industry i and business b are "linked" in 
the case o f Friends o f the Earth. This indicates that the organisations mobilise "mining" 
issues to contest heavy industrial practices; however this contest is not a key element in their 
public campaign cultures.
"Energy" referring to problems o f energy production (non-nuclear) is another issue 
culture which can give the environmental contest either a supra-national or national frame 
of reference. The upper graphs in f2 and g2 indicate that "energy" issue frames "link" four 
contested fields in Friends of the Earth’s campaigns but only three in Greenpeace’s. Section 
B) showed that the "energy" issue culture is more resonant in Friends of the Earth’s 
campaigns than Greenpeace’s. Indeed "energy" is Friends of the Earth’s most resonant issue 
frame in the upper graph in f2. This implies that "energy" issues have a more prominent and 
significant role in Friends of the Earth’s public campaigns than those of Greenpeace.
For Friends o f the Earth "energy" issue frames target the following contested fields, 
in order o f rank: fossil fuel/renewable energy production y, business b, nuclear n and party 
"politics" p. This confirms that the energy contest is an important and strategic element in
39 This difference is further illustrated by the composition of the two organisations* nuclear n  contested 
fields. Friends of the Earth’s is produced by "global wanning", "nuclear" and "energy” issues frames, whereas 
Greenpeace's nuclear n  contested field also mobilises "rainforest" frames. That Greenpeace's nuclear contest 
is mobilised by frames relating to exotic nature indicates that it has a tendency to be supra-national in scope. 
I have already noted that Greenpeace's nuclear campaign contests the destruction of distant exotic native 
communities by the Western military-industrial complex (section 2.). In contrast, Friends o f the Earth’s nuclear 
contest mobilising "energy" and "global warming" frames (in addition to "nuclear") is more likely to be a 
campaign with a national focus. For Greenpeace the nuclear campaign is more likely to globalise the focus of 
its environmental critique than for Friends of the Earth.
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Friends of the Earth’s communication campaigns. In addition to contesting the practices of 
the energy industry, Friends o f the Earth mobilises "energy" frames to promote renewable 
energy initiatives, oppose the nuclear industry and identify with the opposition political party. 
Friends of the Earth’s energy campaign appears in the public discourse as an integral critique 
which identifies ’causes’ and possible ’solutions’ to the energy problems.
Greenpeace’s "energy" frames target (in ranked order) nuclear industry n, party 
"politics" p and fossil fuels/renewable energy production y fields. That "energy" issue frames 
are mobilised against the nuclear industry rather than the energy industry indicates that the 
energy contest has a different strategic role in Greenpeace’s public campaigns than Friends 
of the Earth’s. Greenpeace primarily mobilise "energy" issue frames as an element in their 
nuclear campaign or as an indication o f their allegiance with the opposition party’s policy. 
Energy problems tend to appear in Greenpeace’s campaigns for raising nuclear problems in 
the public discourse.60
"Energy" issues are a prominent "linking" element of Friends of the Earth’s 
campaigns, whereas for Greenpeace they are less important and serve primarily as an element 
in other communication campaign strategies. Friends of the Earth’s campaigns highlight 
energy production alternatives and policy options to existing practices of energy production 
and open this discourse to public scrutiny. By comparison, Greenpeace use energy issues to 
campaign aga inst the nuclear industry.
4.i.b) national environmental issue framing patterns
The six "types" of environmental issue culture which appear in the lower graphs f2 
and g2 give a national frame of reference to the environmental contest. The greater 
concentration of Friends of the Earth’s issue frames in the lower graph in f2 indicates that 
the organisation tends to focus campaigns on national contested fields. The reverse holds for 
Greenpeace whose issue cultures resonate more in the upper graph in g2. This confirms that
“  In Greenpeace’s energy y contested field, "energy* issue frames resonate less than the "rainforest" and 
"global warming" frames, whereas the reverse holds for Friends of the Earth (upper graphs f2 and g2). This 
means that two supra-national issue frames ("global wanning" and "rainforest") are more active than "energy" 
frames in targeting Greenpeace’s y energy field, whereas they are less active in the case of Friends of the Earth. 
This implies that Greenpeace’s energy contest is supra-nationally oriented whereas Friends of the Earth’s is 
more likely to have a national focus.
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Greenpeace’s public campaigns tend to be oriented towards supra-national contested fields.
Friends o f the Earth’s national contested fields tend also to be targeted by more 
different "types" o f environmental issue frames than those of Greenpeace. This indicates that 
Friends o f the Earth’s public campaigning has a higher propensity for "linking” contested 
fields into a national critique than that o f Greenpeace. By comparison Greenpeace’s public 
campaigning in the national arena is dominated by a single contest against heavy industrial 
and chemical plants. I now add detail to this general statement.
The "industrial waste pollution" issue culture refers to problems concerning the 
harmful by-products o f industrial activity such as waste emissions, effluent, toxic pollutants, 
sewage and chemicals. "Industrial waste” issue frames "link" three contested fields in the 
campaign discourse of Friends of the Earth but mobilise only one contested field for 
Greenpeace. In both cases "industrial waste" frames primarily target the heavy (and 
chemical) industry i contested field. This indicates that the public campaigns o f Friends of 
the Earth and Greenpeace have "blaming" strategies for routinely targeting industrial actors. 
Friends of the Earth’s "industrial waste" issue frames also raise labour I and government 
decision-making e contested fields. In contrast to Greenpeace’s streamlined industrial protest 
campaign, Friends o f the Earth refer also to the workplace and government policy making 
as action contexts where responses to the industrial problem may be employed. This confirms 
that Friends of the Earth's industrial "blaming" strategies are more constructive than those 
of Greenpeace.
"Agricultural waste pollution" issue frames refer to the environmental problems that 
occur as a result o f farming practices. These include agricultural waste emissions and 
farmyard slurry, use of pesticides and nitrate fertilizers, and farming techniques.
Section 2. showed that "agricultural waste" is single most resonant issue frame in 
Friends o f the Earth’s campaign culture. The lower graph in f2 shows that "agricultural 
waste" frames "link" five contested fields for Friends of the Earth, in order of rank: 
agricultural production a, energy (non-nuclear) y, heavy and chemical industry i, business 
b, and government decision making e. "Agricultural waste" issues predominantly target the 
agricultural production a contested field. This confirms that the agricultural contest against 
farmers is an important element in Friends o f the Earth’s public campaigning strategy. 
Furthermore, "agricultural waste” issue frames serve to relate this key campaign to the 
energy and industiy contests and government policy field. Although it is a streamlined
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campaign. Friends of the Earth’s criticisms of the farming lobby refer also to other culpable 
actors (such as pesticide manufacturers and government policy makers) who "share the 
blame'1 for this type of environmental problem. Section 3. showed that Friends of the Earth 
primarily targets the agriculture a contested field as a policy matter. This implies that the 
organisation’s agriculture contest is a well established campaign that constructs policy options 
against the powerful sectoral interests o f the farming lobby.61
For Greenpeace "agricultural waste" frames have little resonance and target only the 
government decision-making e field. This means that Greenpeace does not campaign against 
the farming lobby in Britain. Greenpeace leaves the agriculture contest to Friends of the 
Earth.
The "natural environment" issue culture refers to environmental problems that result 
from the destruction of the natural environment in Britain, covering aesthetic issues of 
landscape, flora and fauna and the "Greenbelt". Section 2. showed that "natural environment" 
issue frames are the second most resonant "type" of issue culture in Friends of the Earth’s 
discourse, whereas for Greenpeace they are one of the least resonant. The lower graphs in 
f2 and g2 indicate that "natural environment" issue frames "link" six o f Friends of the 
Earth’s contested fields but only two of Greenpeace’s. This makes the "natural environment" 
issue culture the source of Friends of the Earth’s most communicative issue frames across 
different "types" o f contested field. Mobilising issues that refer to nature is a key element 
of Friends of the Earth’s public campaigns, it serves to integrate their contests into a broader 
national critique. This is not the case for Greenpeace.
In order of rank, the six contested fields that are "linked" by "natural environment" 
issue frames for Friends of the Earth are: government decision-making e, heavy and chemical 
industry i, (non-nuclear) energy production y, business b, sponsorship and development d, 
and labour and welfare I. This indicates that Friends of the Earth primarily mobilise "natural 
environment” issues to target and contest the actions of government policy makers. Aesthetic 
and factual claims about the destruction of Britain’s natural environment constitute an 
effective way for Friends of the Earth to mobilise their challenge to the Government’s policy
61 The fanning lobby in Britain is an long-standing and established opponent of the environmental movement 
and has its interests well preserved by the Ministry of Agriculture. See e.g. Cox, Lowe et al. (1984) on how 
the Country and Wildlife Act 1981 was shaped by policy actors to serve the interests of the farming and forestry 
lobbies.
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agenda into the public discourse. After "blaming" government policy in general, Friends of 
the Earth's "natural environment" issue frames target heavy industrialists and the fossil fuel 
energy industry with "blame". This relates the responsibility o f the industrial culprits for the 
destruction of the natural environment to the government responsibility for policy making. 
In this way "natural environment” issue frames enable Friends of the Earth to integrate their 
criticisms of industrial practices (e.g. excavation, erection of electricity pylons in the 
country) with the campaign against the Government's policy on nature conservation.
Further to this role for interrelating the target actors, "natural environment" issue 
frames also mobilise matters relating to business activities, sponsorship and development, and 
labour and welfare. This indicates the constructive side of Friends of the Earth’s campaigns 
where sponsorship and promotional schemes for using the natural environment (e.g. 
agritourism, greening the workplace) are mobilised into the public discourse. Friends of the 
Earth is involved in joint ventures with business in some of these projects. By mobilising this 
notion o f using the natural environment in a 'better' way, Friends of the Earth’s campaigns 
promote greater public access to nature.62
When Friends of the Earth mobilises "natural environment" issue frames, it is able 
to ’target’ actors and 'promote* actors. "Natural environment" issue frames "link" a targeted 
action context with a promoted action context. This indicates that the "natural environment" 
issue culture identifies the ’cause’ and sponsors a ’solution* for this environmental problem. 
For Friends of the Earth, mobilising 'natural environment' issue frames is a way to 
interrelate the ta rgeting  and prom o ting  roles of their campaigns into an integrated critique 
which covers several key contested fields.
"Natural environment" issue frames resonate little in the public campaigns of 
Greenpeace and "link" only the heavy (and chemical) industry i and government decision­
making e fields. This implies that Greenpeace mobilises "natural environment" issue frames 
primarily in the communicative process of "blaming" industrial actors. References to the 
natural environment are an element in Greenpeace's industrial campaign, its primary national 
target, which links the responsibility of industrial actors to government policy makers.
a Friends of the Earth’s sponsorship and promotional activities for creating public access to the natural 
environment is contested in some cases by other environmental organisations (Council for the Protection of 
Rural England) because the public and new enterprises in the countryside can also be defined as the 'cause* of 
the problem.
"Car" issue frames identify environmental problems which occur due to the use and 
production of cars, such as consumerist behaviour resulting from the "car culture", exhaust 
emissions, car technology, traffic, roads and the regulation of transport (including shipping). 
Section 2. showed that this "type" of environmental issue culture is far more resonant in 
Friends of the Earth’s campaigns than Greenpeace’s. "Car" issue frames "link" five of 
Friends of the Earth’s contested fields but only three of Greenpeace’s.
For Friends of the Earth "car" issue frames "link" the following contested fields: 
government decision-making e, business b, transport t, party politics p, and (non-nuclear) 
energy y. This hierarchy of contested fields indicates that Friends of the Earth primarily 
mobilise "car" issue frames to target government policy actors with responsiblity for this type 
of environmental problem. It is probable that "car" issues raise questions relating to the 
Government’s standards of regulation for the use of cars into the public discourse (e.g. tax 
concessions for lead-free petrol, speed limits). Friends of the Earth uses "car" issue frames 
for criticising the environmental standards of existing Government policies. Furthermore, 
"car" issue frames "link" this targeting of governmental policy to the responsibility o f the 
following actors: manufacturers for technological innovation to improve efficiency and reduce 
emissions; the transport sector for road congestion; the opposition party for policies with 
higher environmental standards; and the energy sector for improving fuel efficiency. This 
indicates that "car" issue frames have an important role for integrating the diverse but related 
factors of this environmental problem into a unified campaign critique against the standards 
set by Government policies.
"Car" issues are less significant in Greenpeace’s public campaigns. These issue 
frames target the party politics p, government decision-making e, and energy (non-nuclear) 
y contested fields. This shows that when Greenpeace’s campaigns mobilise "car" issue 
frames, they serve primarily to communicate alternative policy options. However, 
Greenpeace are only likely to mobilise "car" issue frames as an sub-element of a different 
targeting campaign. For example, "car" issues may add another element of contention to a 
Greenpeace "blaming" strategy against the Government’s environmental standards or the 
polluting practices of an oil multi-national.
"Green business" issue frames are the culture of "market solutions" to environmental 
problems. They include commercial and market activities that are justified by environmental 
criteria (e.g. ethical investment, agritourism, green development projects) and are the basis
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of endless disputes within the environmental movement. Section B) showed that "green 
business" issues are not a primary concern of either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, but 
they resonate more for Friends of the Earth whose campaigns have a need to justify the 
organisation’s promotional activities.
The lower graphs in f2 and g2 show that "green business" issue frames target only 
the business b contested field in Greenpeace’s public campaigns, whereas they "link" 
business b with party politics p and labour 1 in Friends of the Earth’s. This indicates that 
"green business" frames are used by Greenpeace in their communication which targets 
business actors. It is likely that they are part of Greenpeace’s "blaming" strategies against 
business actors who make green claims for their products. For Friends of the Earth "green 
business" issue frames play a more prom o ting  role, which reflects the organisation’s more 
pragmatic approach to the environmental benefits of market activity. In Friends of the Earth’s 
campaigns "green business" frames are elements o f both "blaming" and “supporting" 
strategies vis-a-vis business actors. However, perhaps more importantly "green business" 
frames serve to "link" the green claims of the opposition party’s and trade unions’ policies 
to the emergent environmental projects o f business.
"Green politics" issue frames are the culture of "political solutions" to environmental 
problems. They include political activities that are justified by environmental criteria (e.g. 
a political party’s green policy statement, the "green ethics" of an environmental 
organisation’s practices, the question o f green democracy) and form claims which are often 
disputed by other actors. Section 2. showed that "green politics" issue frames resonate more 
in the Greenpeace discourse than in that of Friends of the Earth. Greenpeace are more 
confrontational than Friends o f the Earth in the market for political claims. Graph g2 shows 
that "green politics" issue frames are used by Greenpeace for targeting government decision­
making e and party politics p contested fields. This confirms that they are an element of 
Greenpeace’s "blaming" strategies against the policy actors o f the political establishment. 
Graph f2 indicates that "green politics" issue frames perform a similar role for Friends of 
the Earth, but in addition to targeting the official and opposition policy makers they also 
relate to the development d contested field. Friends o f the Earth mobilised "green politics" 
issue frames as a pro m o tin g  campaign strategy to intervene in the "scandal" surrounding the 
ethics o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s development projects.
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4.ii) The World Wide Fund for Nature
Here I analyze the "environmental issue framing pattern" that is produced by the 
overall environmental issue framing and target construction properties of the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s media campaign. As in the earlier cases of Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace, an attempt is made to reconstruct the ’role’ that is played by specific "types" 
of environmental issue cultures in communicating the environmental contest as part of the 
World Wide Fund for Nature’s campaign strategy.
Graph w2 shows the environmental issue framing pattern of the World Wide Fund 
for Nature. This is a distribution of the twelve "types" of environmental issue cultures across 
the specific "types" of govemment/industry contested field which the organisation may 
construct in the news discourse. Graph w2 gives an overall pattern for the relation between 
environmental issue framing and target construction that is produced by.the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s public campaigns. It shows how the World Wide Fund for Nature 
mobilises environm ental them es to target governm ent responsib ility contexts in the news. This 
is an indicator for the strategic orientation of the organisation’s "public campaign culture".
A preliminary viewing of the graphs in w2 indicates that the World Wide Fund for 
Nature's environmental issue cultures construct fewer "types" of contested field than those 
of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.63 Furthermore, the organisation’s environmental 
issue cultures tend to be less differentiated in the contested fields which they target than those 
in the campaign cultures of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. This confirms the earlier 
findings (2. and 3. above) that in comparison to the two media-oriented organisations, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature has a more limited range of campaign targets and a less diverse 
range of communication strategies for mobilising the environmental contest.
Graph w2 shows that like Greenpeace the organisation’s campaigns are more oriented 
towards the supra-national level. However, apart from the two dominant issue cultures 
"rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" there is little evidence that the World Wide Fund for 
Nature mobilises campaigns which "link" different "types" of contest fields. This implies that 
the organisation’s campaigns mobilise a simpler relation of environmental issue framing to
43 The World Wide Fund for Nature targets only four contested fields in the upper "supra-national 
environmental issue framing pattern” graph in w2, whereas Friends of the Earth’s target eight and Greenpeace 
six in the upper graphs in f2 and g2 respectively.
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target construction into the public discourse than the other two organisations. The World 
Wide Fund for Nature’s campaigns have a less ’complex’ overall environmental framing 
pattern than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Indeed it is only the organisation’s 
"rainforest" and "rare fauna" campaigns which tend to ’integrate’ the environmental contest 
into a societal critique rather than leave it as an unrelated set of single issue protest 
campaigns.
In short, the initial overview shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature has 
established ’routine’ communication strategies for mobilising the environmental contest within 
its specialised campaign field o f world conservation. This general impression confirms the 
findings o f sections 2. and 3.. Detail will now be added by looking at the ’role* of specific 
"types” o f environmental issue cultures in the structure of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
communication campaigns. As in the earlier cases, this will be done by first comparing i.a) 
the "supra-national environmental issue framing patterns" and then ii.b) the "national 
environmental issue framing patterns" of the campaigns which the World Wide Fund for 
Nature mobilise into the public discourse.
4.ii.a) supra-national environmental issue framing patterns
Section 3. indicated that the World Wide Fund for Nature has a ’dual’ strategy for 
raising contested fields in the public discourse - the organisation’s communication campaigns 
are composed of ta rgeting  and prom o ting  elements. The World Wide Fund for Nature enters 
the public discourse to ’target’ government, heavy industrialist and transport actors with 
"policy" responsibilities, and to ’promote’ business and development actors as a "non-policy" 
field for environmental responsibility. This ’promotional’ campaigning is self-referential, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature has communication strategies for legitimating its own 
conservation activities in the public discourse.
The "global warming" issue culture gives a supra-national frame o f reference to the 
environmental contest. Mobilising environmental problems which identify a threat to the 
existence of the earth as a global eco-system, "global warming" issue frames are the 
following: global warming, the ozone hole, climatic change, and the increasing production 
and emission of carbon dioxide and CFCs into the atmosphere. Section 4.i) showed that 
"global warming" are the most communicative issue frames in the supra-national
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environmental issue framing patterns o f Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.64 However, 
for the World Wide Fund for Nature "global wanning" issue frames construct only two 
"types" of contested field, namely government decision-making e and heavy (& chemical) 
industry i.
Graph w shows that "global warming" issue frames mobilise government decision­
making e and heavy (& chemical) industry i contested fields in the World Wide fund for 
Nature’s public campaigns. This indicates that "global warming" issue frames serve to 
communicate the organisation’s targeting  strategies which "blame" government and heavy 
industrialist actors for "policy" defined responsibilities. This is a more specific and less 
general ’role’ than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace whose "global warming" issue 
frames serve to integrate their other campaigns into a policy related societal critique. It is 
indicative of a more ’streamlined’ campaign strategy. For the World Wide Fund for Nature 
"global wanning" issue frames are a policy related "blaming" strategy. Referring to "global 
warming" is a way for the organisation to "blame" governments for the inadequacy of 
existing policy measures for protecting nature in the world eco-system, and "blame" heavy 
industrialists (e.g. logging, minerals extraction) for contravening such policies. The World 
Wide Fund for Nature is an international ’pressure group* which lobbies governments for 
international treaties and the implementation of supra-national regulation for protecting the 
balance of nature in the world ecosystem. That "global warming" issue frames mobilise this 
type of targeting  strategy is indicated by the titles of the two articles which refer to this type 
of environmental problem: Chaos threatens clim ate conference (WWF R), and The new  cold  
w a r  (WWF V).
"Rainforest etc." issue frames refer to endangered exotic habitats and in particular the 
tropical rainforest. The "rainforest etc. " issue culture identifies problems such as the possible 
extinction of rare exotic plant species, but also includes the dangers to the world’s eco-system 
that may be caused by the de-forestation and desertification of habitats in Third World 
nations. The "rare fauna" issue culture highlights environmental problems such as the threat 
of extinction to rare exotic animal species. Both the "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue 
cultures attribute a supra-national frame of reference to the environmental contest.
Section 2. showed that "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue cultures are the source
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64 'Global warming" issue frames "link" six contested fields in the news discourse for Friends of the Earth 
and five for Greenpeace.
for more than two thirds of the issue frames that are mobilised by the World Wide Fund for 
Nature. Furthermore, I indicated that the two issue cultures are related: "rainforest etc." 
issue frames give a more radical version of the threat of extinction to exotic habitats because 
they define the problem in relation to the "sustainability" of the global ecosystem; whereas 
"rare fauna" issue frames mobilise only the problem of a single species (e.g. "Save the 
Elephant").
The upper graph in w2 shows that "rainforest" and "rare fauna" issue frames "link" 
three contested fields in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s public campaigns. This makes 
"rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" more communicative across the different "types" of 
contested fields than any other issue cultures for the organisation. "Rainforest" and "rare 
fauna" issue frames are not only the most prominent elements in the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s campaigns but they are also the most ’dynamic’ across types of social context.
By referring to problems of "rainforest" and "rare fauna" the organisation is able to 
’integrate* the ta rgeting  and prom oting  elements o f its campaign strategy into a unified 
critique. In other words, the World Wide Fund for Nature’s "rainforest etc.” and "rare 
fauna" issue frames mobilise an ’integral’ contest into the public discourse. Lacking the 
thematic diversity o f Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace, the organisation’s public 
campaigns mobilise a ’specialist* supra-national critique of the environmental problematic 
which focuses specifically on presenting the case for the conservation of the world’s 
resources o f nature.65 This raises two related questions: Firstly, how are the ta rgeting  and 
prom oting  elements of the organisation’s communication strategies ’integrated’ by this 
dominant thematic focus? And secondly, how do the "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue 
frames combine to produce this communicative ’effect’?
"Rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue frames "link" the same three contested fields 
in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s public campaigns, namely development d, business b 
and heavy (& chemical) industry i. This confirms that there is a high association between the
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65 In section 2.ii) I described how the "rare fauna” and "rainforest" are different elements of the same 
theme. They are both issues that refer to the preservation of natural environments in the context of overseas 
development projects. The difference is one of emphasis. 'Rare fauna” frames mobilise the more traditional 
conservation issues concerning the preservation of specific exotic species, whereas the "rainforest” frames 
mobilise a more contemporary concern with the preservation of exotic habitats as a vital element in the global 
eco-system. Indeed 1 also suggested that the habitat "package” is the more radically globalising and a possible 
historical successor to the species "package”. At the present time, however, it is clear that both these elements 
combine to produce the single dominant issue theme in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s public campaigns.
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"rare fauna” and "rainforest etc." elements in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s campaigns. 
Graph w shows that for "rainforest" frames the hierarchy of the contested fields is the 
following: development d, business b and heavy (& chemical) industry i. In the case of "rare 
fauna" issue frames the rank of business b and development d is reversed, whilst heavy (& 
chemical) industry i remains the lowest.66 This implies a difference between the 
communicative ’roles’ of "rainforest etc." and "rare fauna" issue frames. "Rainforest etc." 
issue frames ’integrate’ the discourse on the marketing and financial activities of the 
organisation and policy related criticisms of heavy industrial actors within a ’promotional’ 
critique on its practical development and conservation activities. "Rare fauna” issue frames 
’integrate’ the development activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature and policy related 
criticisms o f heavy industrial actors within a critique of its own marketing and financial 
activities. In short, "rare fauna" issue frames tend to communicate the business side, whereas 
"rainforest" communicate the development side of the organisation’s ’promotional’ activities.
"Rainforest etc." and "rare fauna” issue cultures are primarily prom oting  elements in 
the organisation’s campaign strategy. Nonetheless both "types” of issue frame also 
communicate about the environmental problem in a way that mobilises a secondary targeting  
element against heavy industrial actors. This indicates that "rainforest" and "rare fauna” issue 
frames constitute a streamlined campaign to mobilise a conservation in terests versus 
industria l in terests contest into the public discourse. The activities of the culprits are 
"blamed”, but only within the context o f an overall prognosis that identifies the organisation’s 
own practical actions as a potential remedy to the problems of supra-national species and 
habitat conservation.
"Rainforest etc." issue frames "link” five contested fields for Greenpeace and four 
for Friends of the Earth, but only three for the World Wide Fund for Nature. This indicates 
that although "rainforest” issue frames resonate in higher absolute and proportionate amounts 
for the World Wide Fund for Nature, this resonance is a less ’dynamic’ element of the 
organisation’s communication strategy than it is for Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace. 
The World Wide Fund for Nature’s "rainforest etc." issue frames serve a different
66 In section 3.ü) I showed that the references to development and business activities are often self- 
references in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s campaigns, whereas references to heavy industrial actors tend 
to be policy-related targets. This indicates that business and development activities tend to be constructed as a 
promoting, and heavy industry as a targeting element of the organisation’s communication strategy.
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communicative ’role*: they mobilise a compact critique which promotes a specific kind of 
environmental practice rather than a dynamic critique which targets an interrelated set of 
opponent actors. In contrast to Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace, the argumentations of 
the World Wide Fund for Nature have a streamlined campaign orientation. This finding 
reinforces the claim that the World Wide Fund for Nature’s public campaigns primarily serve 
a ’promotional’ rather than a ’targeting’ role.
Section 4 .i) showed that unlike "rainforest etc." issue frames, "rare fauna" are not 
a "linking" element in Friends o f the Earth’s and Greenpeace’s campaigns. "Rainforest" 
frames tend to be more communicative than "rare fauna" frames. An explanation for this is 
that "rainforest etc. " frames constitute a globalising  element for the environmental discourse, 
a dynamism for spreading the focus of the critique across different social contexts which is 
prominent in the most recent wave of the "new environmental consciousness" (Jamison 
Eyerman et al. 1990). Concern with h a b ita t as a part of the global eco-system rather than 
an object of beauty (a species) has become a radicalizing element in the contemporary 
environmental discourse. It seems plausible that this radical notion of a "global nature" (i.e. 
"rainforest" frames) was initially pushed by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace and that 
this has altered the context of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s preservation interests and 
actions. The globa lisa tion  of environmental discourse has engaged the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s campaigns into the contemporary environmental discourse. Now, as a supra-national 
conservationist, the organisation has to partake in the public debates concerning global 
"sustainability". The campaign perspective has been radicalised by the environmental 
discourse rather than vice versa.
The "linking" properties o f "rare fauna" issue frames are exclusive to the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s campaigns. This indicates that the organisation’s traditional campaigns for 
the preservation o f animal species in exotic places are now part of a strategic campaign 
critique rather than one-off "single issue" campaigns. According to graph w, "rare fauna" 
issue frames ’integrate’ the development activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature and 
policy related criticisms of heavy industrial actors within a critique of its own marketing and 
financial activities. The focus on the World Wide Fund for Nature’s own marketing activities 
shows that "rare fauna" issue frames mobilise a campaign critique that is self-ta rgeting . 
"Rare fauna" issue frames mobilise a critique which "blames" business actors (and the 
organisation’s own collaborations with business) whilst highlighting the actions of
development projects and problems which they face from non-regulated industrial production. 
This indicates that the organisation’s mobilisation of "rare fauna" ñames introduces a "self- 
targeting" strategy whereby the organisation cleanses itself o f damaging associations with 
ethical investment "scandals". It is part of a strategy for a public reformation of the 
organisation’s environmental credentials (see later).
To recap: the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises campaigns that are less 
thematically diverse and target fewer opponents than Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace. 
The dynamism of the organisation’s communication strategy is carried by the "rainforest 
etc." and ’’rare fauna" issue frames which mobilise a critique on the problems of 
conservation projects and the lack of adequate regulation of heavy industrial production. 
Furthermore, "global warming" frames "link" this ’integral’ compact critique to the 
responsibilities o f governments for the supra-national implementation of policies and 
regulation o f damage to natural habitats. The environmental issue framing pattern of the 
World Wide Fund for Nature identifies the organisation’s role as a supra-national pressure 
group which promotes conservation interests and criticises the lack of policy regulation of 
heavy industrialists.
4.ii.b) national environmental issue framing patterns
The lower graph in w2 exhibits a low issue resonance. This indicates that the World 
Wide Fund for Nature's public campaigns tend not to target national contested fields. As I 
have established above, the organisation is an actor which campaigns on supra-national 
themes in the environmental contest.
Four "types" of environmental issue frames target national contested fields in the 
World Wide Fund for Nature’s campaigns: "natural environment", "car", "green business", 
and "green politics". Of these only "natural environment" issue frames "link" two contested 
fields. This low amount of issue frame "linking" across different "types" of contested fields 
indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature use one-off single issue campaigns to target 
national contested fields. The organisation makes little attempt to mobilise a national critique 
o f the environmental problematic. Indeed its entrance into the national debate in this sample 
is a response to the special opportunity that is presented by the British Government’s 
publication of its environmental policy agenda (see later).
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"Natural environment" issue frames "link" the transport t and government decision­
making e contested fields for the World Wide Fund for Nature. Section 3.ii) showed that 
these are both policy related fields. This indicates that the organisation contests the 
destruction of Britain’s natural environment as a policy responsibility for Government actors. 
This is indicated by the titles of the two articles: R oads endanger ancient fo re s ts  (WWF M); 
and M ixed  reaction  fro m  the critics67 (WWF O). "Car" issue frames also contest transport 
policy in P utting  th e  ’c a r’ in caring  (WWF U). Contrary to Friends o f the Earth’s car 
campaign, the World Wide Fund for Nature's appears as single issue contests against 
Government policy. There is little critique of the ’interrelatedness’ of pollution, damage to 
the countryside and the use of cars. The World Wide Fund for Nature tends to leave national 
environmental contest to the other environmental organisations and instead focuses on 
promoting its supra-national conservation interests.
5. The Public Campaigns of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the Worlde Wide 
Fund for Nature: globalising, personalising and moralising the environmental discourse
The content analysis has provided empirical data on the contents that are mobilised 
into the news by the public campaign activities of Friends o f the Earth, Greenpeace and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature. By comparing the different types of environmental issues and 
contested fields that appear in the three samples, I have reconstructed the specific ways that 
the three environmental organisations "frame" the environmental contest in the British public 
discourse. This data has been interpreted as an indicator for the strategic orientation of the 
communication campaigns that are waged individually by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature against their opponents. To conclude this part of the 
analysis, I now look briefly at the overall mobilisation of environmental issues and targeting 
of contested fields by the three organisations.
Graphs fg w .l and fgw.2 show the total resonance of the different "types" of 
environmental issues and contested fields, respectively, that were mobilised in the three 
months news sample of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature. Taken together graphs fgw .l and fgw.2 show that the "public campaign cultures"
67 This refers to the reception of the Government’s White Paper document.
of three environmental organisations mobilise a widely diverse range of environmental issues 
and related social contexts into the public discourse. The period of the so-called rise of the 
"new environmental consciousness" (Jamison Eyerman et al. 1990) has witnessed the 
emergence of an environmental critique in the British public discourse.68 The dynamic rise 
of these three organisations in the late eighties has been documented for the British case 
(McCormick 1991). Furthermore, these are the three organisations which are most commonly 
mentioned in the British news (Hansen 1993). Following on from this, the graphs fgw .l and 
fgw.2 may be considered to represent the collective "public campaign culture" of the media- 
oriented sector of the British environmental movement. This body of communication may be 
seen as the ’cutting edge’ of the public agenda building activities of the environmental 
movement in Britain at the time of the Government’s publication of the White Paper on the 
environment in 1990.
Graph fgw .l shows that the media-oriented movement sector’s campaigns promote 
"nuclear" environmental issues more than any other "types" of issue culture. However unlike 
Hansen’s (1993) analysis - which focuses only on Greenpeace - the graph indicates that a 
wide range of other "types" of environmental issue cultures are mobilised into the British 
public discourse. The second most prominent environmental issue in the media sector’s 
campaigns is "rainforest etc.", followed by "industrial waste", and then "rare fauna", "global 
warming" and "natural environment" which have similar prominence, and "car" and 
"agricultural waste" issues have a similar but lower prominence.
"Nuclear" issue frames may refer to a supra-national or national (or both) contexts 
and "rainforest etc." and "global warming" issue frames give a supra-national definition to 
the environmental contest. In the earlier parts of this section 4.i) and 4.ii), I analyzed the 
environmental issue framing panems that are produced by the campaigns o f  the 
organisations. The "linking" of an environmental issue across different "types" of contested 
field is taken as an indication that campaigns are waged as a societal critique rather than as 
one-off-mono-causal problems. "Nuclear", "rainforest etc." and "global warming" issues
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MI have analyzed the longitudinal changes in the British public discourse on "environmentalism" from 1987- 
1991 elsewhere (Statham 1994a 1994b). One of the key findings of the overview of the British environmental 
discourse has been that in the years 1987-91 the environmental discourse changed from two distinct discourses 
(on nuclear protest conflicts and nature conservation) to a unified discourse on environmental problems as 
"risks". The emergent "risk" version of the environmental discourse in British news relates to local and global 
social contexts and addresses the "life world" of the reader. On the basis of such findings one can make the 
claim that risk communication has made the environmental contest more ’reflexive’ in British society.
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were seen to be frames with a high propensity for nlinking" several social contexts. This 
shows that three of the most resonant environmental issue cultures in the organisations* 
campaigns also have a tendency for integrating the environmental contest as a societal 
critique. "Nuclear", "rainforest etc." and "global warming" are all "types" of issue frames 
which are communicative across different "types" of social contexts and also have a tendency 
to extend  the spatial notion of the environmental contest beyond a national concern.
The process whereby the spatial notion of the environmental contest is extended may 
be referred to as the globalisation  of the environmental discourse. "Nuclear", "rainforest 
etc." and "global wanning" environmental issue frames g loba lise  the reference to spatial 
context of the environmental contest. They are also highly prominent in the organisations* 
media campaigns. It seems plausible therefore that the campaign activities of the 
organisations may seek to introduce this dynamic process of globalisa tion  into the British 
public discourse on "environmentalism". How might the prominence which the organisations’ 
campaigns give to this "type" of environmental issue have contributed to the development of 
the environmental discourse into a societal critique?
The reasoning devices69 which carry environmental communication may be based 
on either factual, moral or aesthetic claims. Policy discourses are based on the scientific 
rationality o f "hard" facts (Eder 1995), whereas non policy related discourses may be based 
on other types of rationalities, such as moral claims or an appeal to aesthetic values. The de­
differentiation of scientific knowledge into the public discourse has been deemed an important 
feature of contemporary "risk societies" (Beck 1992) and more specifically environmental 
discourse (Eder 1993). The delegitimation of the authority of scientific "experts" has opened 
the public debate over how society should regulate environmental "problems" to other actors, 
and other types o f reasoning devices. Policy actors are no longer simply able to apply 
scientific-based rationalities to identified problems, but when challenged in the public 
discourse must justify their actions on the basis of other cultural rationalities.70 This process 
may be regarded as the increasing m oralisa tion  of the environmental discourse and the 
mobilisation activities of the organisations have been a key factor in bringing this situation
69 Gamson (1988) and Gamson & Modigliani (1989) use the concept of reasoning devices as cognitive 
categories in the analysis of public discourse. In reference to the environmental discourse, Eder (1994) defines 
three types of cognitive "frames”: empirical, moral and aesthetic.
701 discuss this point in detail in the conclusion section F.
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about.
The comparative analysis (above) has shown that "nuclear” issue frames are used to 
mobilise both policy related and non policy related contested fields (Friends of the Earth’s 
campaigns usually do the former and Greenpeace’s the latter). Policy discourse is based on 
scientific facts. The organisations’ "nuclear" issue frames are able to communicate both 
science-based reasoning devices and moral or aesthetic reasoning devices. This indicates that 
they aim to appeal to both policy actors and the public. Furthermore, it implies that the 
organisations’ campaigns have been active in promoting the m oralisation  of the 
environmental discourse.
A feature o f the m oralisation  of the environmental discourse is that the environmental 
contest is made pertinent to all members of a society. The process whereby the notion of 
the environmental contest penetrates into the moral concerns of everyday life and experience 
may be referred to as the personalisa tion  of the environmental discourse. "Nuclear” issue 
frames persona lise  the environmental discourse because they are perceived as a danger to life 
and a threat to existence. Nuclear risks are not empirically quantifiable and the ’effects’ of 
exposure to radiation unknown but a source for much public speculation.71 They are issues 
that are contested in the public discourse.
"Nuclear” issue frames have a key structural role in environmental communication 
because they de-differentiate the boundaries of "expert” and lay knowledge. Not only has it 
facilitated the notion of the spatial extension of the environmental contest, but the nuclear 
contest has also facilitated a de-differentiation of the different types of cognitive reasoning 
devices that are available to actors for defining the environmental problematic. This is 
important because it means that the knowledge on which environmental claims are based is 
no longer simply a specialist field for "experts” - e.g. scientists giving empirical facts to 
policy actors - but is opened up in the public discourse as a resource for other actors to 
legitimate their own environmental claims on moral or aesthetic grounds. In short, the 
nuclear contest has made it easy for lay actors to communicate and legitimate environmental 
claims and has been a dynamic factor in the globalisation  and personalisa tion  o f the 
environmental discourse.
71 For a case study on public communication about nuclear risks in British culture, see the analysis on the 
Chernobyl "news story” as a social metaphor 1987-1991 (Statham 1993). For the Swedish case see Nohrstedt 
(1990).
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The analysis in the earlier sections showed that "global warming” issue frames tend 
to mobilise a policy related discourse. This indicates that the environmental organisations 
raise "global warming" issues as a science-based reasoning device to open policy agendas for 
legitimation in the public discourse. "Rainforest" issue frames, on the other hand, tend to 
mobilise a discourse on the preservation of nature that is not policy related. This indicates 
that the organisations use "rainforest etc. " issues as a moral or aesthetic reasoning device for 
appealing to the "life" values of the public and moralising the public discourse. At the same 
time both "types" o f issue frame make the organisations* identified opponents responsible for 
the global environmental problematic.
Regarding the organisations’ national environmental issue frames, section 4. indicated 
that "car" and "natural environment" issue fiâmes have a high propensity for "linking" 
different "types" o f social contexts. This means that these issue frames are also a contributing 
factor to the mobilisation of the environmental contest as a societal critique. "Car” and 
"natural environment" issue frames are mobilised by the organisations to construct policy and 
non policy related contested fields. This indicates that they are used by the organisations for 
communicating science-based reasoning devices for opening up the policy field to the public 
discourse and for communicating moral and aesthetic reasoning devices for the public to 
relate these environmental problems to personal experience. In other words, "car" and 
"natural environment" issues persona lise  the environmental discourse. They both relate the 
environmental contest in a way that ties an "expert" policy field (transport and environment) 
to the public’s first hand experiences. People use cars or have an appreciation of the 
countryside or their gardens in everyday life. By mobilising "car" and "natural environment" 
issue frames the organisations are engaging in the de-differentiation of "expert" knowledge 
(technology and natural science) and public culture (cars and parks).72 When mobilised by 
an organisation, this "type" of environmental issue frame not only popularises interest in 
policy debates but also provides a cue for the public to be aware of the impact of their own 
apparently innocuous everyday activities in producing environmental damage.
My data indicates that the communicative actions of the media-oriented organisations 
has been factor in popularising the g lo b a l and persona l perspective on the environmental 
contest. By mobilising these environmental themes the organisations have extended the 71
71 On cultural de-differentiation and the mixing of elements of expert and popular cultures, see Featherstone 
(1989).
boundaries of-self-reference for the British public discourse on "environmentalism". The 
organisations define the environmental contest in a way that promotes a notion of the global 
society and refers to the persona l life  w orld  for an actor. This has the effect of making 
environmental protest into a reflexive critique for society.
When the public discourse on "environmentalism" begins to refer to the ’world’ and 
the ’life world’ instead of the ’nation* the stakes for environmental responsibilities are raised 
and subsequently the case for change becomes more compelling. Britain is no longer an 
island where some people are conservationists and some people protest against nuclear 
power, but now must bear a national responsibility for making an interrelated world - from 
private life to global citizen - into a "sustainable" environment.
Graph fgw.2 indicates that government decision-making e, heavy (& chemical) 
industry i and nuclear industry n were the most targeted contested fields by the 
environmental organisations’ campaigns. This means simply that the environmental 
organisations target government policy matters, heavy industrial, chemical and nuclear actors 
with "blame" for environmental damage. It is evidence that the media-oriented sector of the 
movement has been "active" in placing this burden of responsibility the shoulders of 
Government and Industry actors by mobilising the environmental contest as a societal 
critique. Such a finding is not surprising when one considers that the news sample covers a 
period of enhanced mobilisation that the organisations’ designed to coincide with the 
publication of the Government’s first major policy statement on the environment (see next 
pan).
The increasing acceptance of an environmentalist creed in the public discourse has 
made it imperative for Governments to intervene (or be seen to intervene) in the 
environmental contest over the last decade. Similarly, the pressure of public discourse has 
meant that heavy industrial actors, such as the chemical, petroleum and nuclear industries, 
now also have to justify their activities in ways that refer to environmental values.73
On the basis o f these fmdings, the following claim is plausible: The cam paigns o f  the  
m edia-oriented sec to r o f  the m ovem ent have p layed  a  prom inen t role in the radica lisa tion  o f  
the environm ental contest fro m  a  set o f  distinct p u b lic  p ro te sts  into a reflexive societa l
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73 For example, witness the relentless public relations campaigns of British Nuclear 
Fuels Ltd. who have attempted to mm the Sellafield reactor into a theme park.
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critique in Britain .
This would mean that by introducing the environmental contest into the public 
discourse, the media-oriented organisations have made "environmentalism" accessible to 
British society as a "collective learning process".74 In other words, British people now 
possess the cultural tools (Swidler 1986) to be able to defme their own actions and relate to 
the actions of others by referring to environmental criteria. This does not mean that the 
British have become environmentalists, but that they are able to view society through a filter 
of environmental values, if required to do so. Of course, they may choose not to, or even 
to oppose the possible courses of action, strategies or policy options that have been raised 
by environmentalists. However, as even one of the most famously intransigent of Prime 
Ministers, Margaret Thatcher, felt the need to take a "U-turn" and propose environmental 
strategies in 1988 (see later), it has become increasingly difficult for the British to choose 
not to engage in the politics of environmental discourse.
The national policy "event" may be seen as a result o f the "pressure” on the 
Government to conform with the standards set by an increasingly popular usage of 
environmental critique in the public discourse.75 When their actions are made accountable 
by the popularity of environmental critique, Government and Industrial actors are forced into 
learning how to use environmental norms to justify what they do. As I shall show in the next 
part, the Thatcher Government’s establishment of a policy agenda in September 1990 was 
not ’successful’ as an attempt to achieve legitimation for the Government as an 
"environmental actor". This outcome was due in part to the mobilisation activities of the 
environmental organisations. The role o f the organisations’ environmental mobilisations has 
been to keep up this "normative pressure" on Government and Industry to change their 
policies and practices by continually 'tightening the rules' o f what constitutes sound 
environmental practice in the public discourse. After analysing the contents of the
74 For a theoretical perspective on the importance of collective learning processes in social action see Eder 
and Miller (1986). I discuss the initiation of learning processes as part of the agenda-building activities of 
environmental organisations in the concluding section F.
75 My empirical work on the British environmental discourse 1987-91 (1994) indicates that the 
personalisation of the language in the British public discourse on 'environmentalism" is a trend that has 
occurred parallel over time to the politicisation of argumentations (e.g. the use of references to nature to 
construct norms). This implies that the environmental critique in Britain has become common usage and 
constructs political arguments. In short, environmental claims have become both more popular and more 
political.
organisations’ media campaigns, in the next part of the thesis I analyze the "cycle" of news 
coverage into which their strategic mobilisations where "packaged" to achieve specific policy 
outcomes.
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D) ’Telling Tales' - Environmental organisations and  communication strategies in an 
emergent policy agenda: claim packaging in the news cycle o f the Dirty M an o f Europe 
event
1. Introduction: discourse patterns, mobilisation and  "news events"
In the last section C) I compared a dimension of the communication properties of the 
environmental organisations as sources in the news, namely their "public campaign cultures". 
In this section D) the organisations’ communication properties as sources are contextualised 
and analysed within the news coverage of a political event. The methodology for news text 
analysis that is employed here aims to clarify the following: To what extent is it possible to 
identify a division o f communicative labour in the organisations* mobilisation activities during 
the different phases o f a political event? On what bases are the organisations able to combine 
their public communication strategies, and what factors regulate the potential for their 
communicative actions to have political "effects"? The specific contents of the organisations’ 
"public campaign cultures" are reconstructed into cases of communicative action over the 
dynamic "cycle" o f a political event.
The distribution of articles referring to Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature is given in graph D .I overleaf. G raph D .II shows the 
quantitative distribution of article references to environmental organisations in relation to the 
overall coverage o f the specific "news events". This serves for identifying the British 
Government’s launch of the White Paper policy document This Common Inheritance on the 
week commencing 24th September 1990 as the dominant "news event" in the three months 
sample.
I divide the sample of media discourse on the White Paper event into four phases: that 
"prior to the news cycle"; the "prologue"; the "news event", and the "epilogue". The 
rationale for the "news event" phase is the following: the "news event" occurs when there 
are more articles on the White Paper than those mentioning any single environmental 
organisation. The phase "prior to the news cycle" occurs before there is any coverage on the 
White Paper event. The "prologue" phase occurs before the "news event", when any single 
environmental organisation receives the same or more coverage than the White Paper. 
Conversely, the "epilogue" phase occurs after the "news event", when any single
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organisation receives the same or more coverage than the White Paper. Hence the 
chronological order of the White Paper "news cycle" phases is: "prior to the news cycle"; 
the "prologue"; the "news event"; and the "epilogue".
Following these definitions, g raph  D.D shows that the phase prior to the White Paper 
"news cycle" occurs before the week commencing 27th August. Similarly, the "prologue" 
discourse takes place from the week commencing 27th August until that commencing 10th 
September. As a peak "news event" the White Paper story lasts three weeks, from that 
commencing 17th September until the end of that commencing 1st October. Finally the 
"epilogue" to the White Paper "event" starts on the week commencing 8th October and 
continues until the end of the survey sample.1
A further "news event", the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal, augmented the 
number of references to environmental organisations at two specific times in the sample. The 
WWF scandal initially "broke" in the week commencing 1st August, then re-appeared and 
"peaked" as a "news event" during the week commencing 3rd September, lasting for two 
weeks (see graph D.II).
In the methodology section (B) above), I noted that "A" issues refer to the activities 
of the organisation and are indicators for the self-legitimation strategies of environmental 
organisations, "E ” issues refer to environmental themes and are indicators for the 
environmental problems which they seek to legitimise, and "G" issues refer to government 
responsibility contexts and are indicators for the delegitimation strategies which they use 
against opponents. Here I focus on these three discourse elements: the organisation’s activity 
issues "A"; the environmental issues "E"; and the government responsibility issues "G".2 
I analyze their relative amounts of resonance in the news cycle on the White Paper policy 
document in order to reconstruct the time series of environmental claims and contested 
"events". What discourse patterns are produced by the organisations’ mobilisations during 
the different phases of the environmental news sample?
* These four phases in the news cycle are also represented in the visual databases for each organisation (see 
section B)).
2 The analysis of the relative prominence of the four discourse elements in the environmental organisation’s 
discourses that appears in the visual databases (above), shows that the organisation’s "name” "O" is an element 
that is highly subtextualised by the other three elements in the discourse. This finding is not surprising as the 
other three discourse elements "A", "E" and "GM are issues which construct the environmental contest. They 
possess a much higher potential for discursive elaboration than the organisation's "name”, which in most cases 
is simply objectified element in texts.
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The quantitative distribution of references to Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace 
shows that in both cases their amount of coverage has a relative autonomy from peak "news 
events". In other words, the two most media-oriented environmental organisations receive 
coverage even when there are no obvious or imminent environmental "events" to be reported 
on the news agenda. This implies that much of the coverage o f environmental organisations 
is "invented" by the organisations themselves and "tuned" to the demands of news production 
and media processing.3
In the following, I comparatively analyze the discourses of Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. These were the three most resonant 
organisations in the sample (section B)). These organisations have also been cited as the 
emergent transnational movement sector that is carrying environmental politics into a new 
era by linking local and global policy concerns (Prineen and Finger 1994). It seems therefore 
pertinent to analyse the different ways in which they operate as collective actors in the 
national political culture, and to see to what extent discursive action forms a part of their 
different political strategies.4
As I have noted earlier, contemporary environmental organisations make themselves, 
their actions and the information on which their campaigns are based "newsworthy". The 
extreme case is when they "stage events", when protest actions are performed as stunts or 
in a way that is highly dramatic and visible. This ’novelty* aspect is deemed to appeal to the 
media’s perception o f a "news" story, and particularly for the tabloid press and television 
news (Greenberg 1985, Anderson 1991). This suggests that the organisations construct their 
claims into "news event" formats as a specific strategic dimension of their actions. The 
achievement of media coverage is the intended outcome of the organisations* actions. Their 
actions mobilise selected information into the media arena of public discourse, stated simply, 
environmental organisations act to "make the news". The prime examples o f such a media
3 Kielbowicz and Scherer (1986) note the ways in which social movements may "frame" their protest actions 
to coincide specifically with the news values, presentation styles, news cycles and reporting techniques of 
journalists and editors.
4 1 discuss this further in the conclusion where I consider the role of discursive strategies as part of the 
action repertoire for these environmental organisations to influence policy decisions. I agree with the assertion 
of the Prineen and Finger (1994) model that these three organisations are constructive of the basis of the future 
of environmental campaigning, but criticise their overemphasis on the transnational rather than national level 
as the key arena for policy decisions and their omission of the role of the media and political communciation 
in the environmental agenda-building process.
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strategy are Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.5
Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the activities of the World Wide Fund 
for Nature are not primarily oriented towards achieving media attention. A consequence of 
this is that the World Wide Fund for Nature’s coverage has less autonomy from the 
environmental "news events" on the media agenda. The organisation’s public profile allows 
less scope for staging "news events".
The World Wide Fund for Nature is a supra-national organisation that operates from 
Britain and raises funds for campaigning on world conservation issues (McCormick 1991; 
Szerzynski, Miles et al. 1995). The organisation is a charity and runs its own overseas 
development and conservation projects. In 1990 the World Wide Fund for Nature had a 
membership of 3.7 million in 28 national organisations and an annual income in excess of 
one hundred million pounds sterling. It is the largest environmental organisation in the world 
and co-ordinates projects in more than 70 countries.6 In 1988 the World Wide Fund for 
Nature UK distributed 5.1 million pounds to conservation projects, a third going to domestic 
and two-thirds to overseas projects.7
Partly due to its origins as a conservation organisation the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s activities are less media oriented and more hidden from the public eye. Nonetheless 
the organisation expends a considerable amount of effort and resources on fund-raising 
activities, this amounted to 1.9 million for the World Wide Fund for Nature UK compared 
to a total conservation budget o f 5.1 million pounds sterling in 1988. Indeed the World Wide 
Fund for Nature courts patronage from the influential, wealthy and respectable, whether they 
are individuals - such as the President of the WWF President Prince Philip - or corporate
5 I think this assumption of the media analysis of environmental organisations* activities is correct. 
However, it is an assumption and not a finding of most existing analyses, e.g. Greenberg's (1985), Mazur's 
(1987; 1990), Cassidy’s (1992). It is not sufficient simply to enumerate the quantitative amounts of coverage 
to reach such conclusions. More qualitative work on the discursive content of mobilisations and their reception 
by journalists and the public is necessary to substantiate such claims. The environmental organisations do not 
control the media agenda simply by achieving coverage, their mobilisations are always subject to the possibility 
of unintended outcomes. As public communications their significance and "political success" is dependent on 
the "processing" function of journalists and how they are received by specialist and non-specialist audiences.
6 The Guardian 04/09/90.
7 The Guardian 26/04/88.
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companies8, rather than appealing directly to the public en masse. This means that the World 
Wide Fund for Nature are less involved in staging "news events" than the media oriented 
organisations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.
The World Wide Fund for Nature case provides an example for the media resonance 
of a more conventional environmental organisation during the White Paper "news event".9 
At the same time it shows how media attention for the environment has radicalised the public 
activities o f such organisations beyond single issue environmental concerns into campaign 
strategies which are specialist and diversified. The following analysis will show how the 
politicisation of the environment has brought these conventional organisations into an active 
role within the public discourse. In addition the World Wide Fund for Nature became the 
subject of its own "news event" during the sample, when its financial activities and 
conservation policies were criticised by a television documentary and became a public 
scandal. The case will show how the environmental organisations shape the news when their 
activities are "bad news" rather than an "event" highlighting an issue, blaming other actors 
or forming the ’novel* basis for a news story.
The sample is divided into four distinct periods of environmental "news": that prior 
to the White Paper "news cycle"; the "prologue"; the "news event"; and the "epilogue" to 
the White Paper "event". This division represents the different phases in the "cycle" of the 
dominant "news event". For each phase I compare the discourse mobilisation patterns of the 
environmental organisations, i.e. the resonance that is produced by the combinations of the 
three constructive discourse elements MA M, "E" and "G ". I refer to the visual database, the 
titles, and the texts in order to specify the possible causes of the combinations o f elements 
in particular cases o f discourse patterns. This involves reconstructing the different types o f 
communication strategies that the environmental organisations used within the different 
phases of the White Paper "news cycle". How does the timing combine with the contents to 
produce the strategic dimension o f their discourse mobilisations? What factors determine the 
organisations potential for "packaging" contentious environmental claims into a mainstream
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• In 1988 individual private donations 'heavily outweighed' income from companies, according to The 
Guardian 26/04/88.
9 As the analysis in Section C) (above) shows. Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace tend to promote the 
range of issues that are contested in the public sphere and concern technology - the latest wave of environmental 
mobilisation - whereas the World Wide Fund for Nature promotes issues that tend to be less contentious relating 
to conservation and preservation of species.
structure o f public communication? How do the discursive framing repertoires of the three 
organisations vary in relation to events in the "cycle" of news coverage? Is there a division 
o f communicative labour between the organisations, and if so, on what basis does it occur?
l . i  Friends of the Earth  and  Greenpeace
The comparative distribution o f the organisation’s activity issues "A", environmental 
issues "E", and government responsibility issues "G" over time is shown in graph f  for 
Friends of the Earth and graph g for Greenpeace. These graphs represent the relative 
significance of the three discourse elements which construct the environmental contest over 
the sample period. They illustrate the "peaks" and "troughs" of issue resonance that are 
produced by the organisations’ mobilisation activities.
The resonance peaks and troughs of the two organisations follow similar general 
patterns. This indicates a coincidence on their part with the same "news events". However, 
a closer examination of the discourse patterns shows that Friends of the Earth’s resonance 
is more continuous and regular over the sample than Greenpeace’s, which tends instead to 
occur in specific intense "pulses". This pattern may be produced by differences in the content 
and the timing of the communication strategies of the two organisations. In other words. 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are active in the same discourse arenas, but their acts 
of mobilisation "work" differently in the news discourse. Their communications occur at 
similar times, but produce different discursive "effects". What may these general differences 
indicate for the discursive action repertoires of the two organisations?
Greenpeace’s discontinuous "pulses" of resonance may indicate an attempt to regulate 
the specific timing of their coverage more than Friends of the Earth. "Timing" may be an 
important component of the Greenpeace communication strategies whereas Friends of the 
Earth may prefer a more constant and open access to reporters.
The strategic aim of both organisations’ communicative actions is undoubtedly to 
achieve public attention. However, the difference in their discourse patterns implies the 
following hypothesis: whereas the strategic dimension of the Greenpeace communication 
"packages" consists in their tim ing, the strategic dimension of Friends of the Earth’s 
communication is more likely to be maintained in the content o f its "package", i.e. in the
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combination of elements in the environmental claim.10
In other words, Greenpeace’s mobilisation strategies may be geared more to the 
timing of media "news events" and the content of their communication more reliant on the 
occurrence of single specific "events" in the news. By contrast it appears that the actual 
semantic content o f the mobilised message may be a more strategic element in the Friends 
of the Earth’s communications. This may constitute the primary means by which Friends of 
the Earth target decision-makers through the public discourse. Greenpeace on the other hand 
may rely more on the timing of their mobilisations for targeting the decision-makers and 
communicating with the public.
The thesis regarding such a division o f communicative labour between the 
organisations may be tested by comparing the two discourse patterns during the phases of the 
White Paper "news cycle".11 The remainder of this section will be concerned with such an 
comparative analysis o f the organisations* discourses.
l . i i  W orld W ide Fund for N ature
The comparative distribution of issues relating to an organisation’s activities "A", 
environmental issues "E", and government responsibility issues "G" over time is shown in 
graph w for the World Wide Fund for Nature. This graph gives the relative significance of 
the three discourse elements over the sample period. It gives the "peaks" and "troughs" of 
issue resonance produced by the organisation’s activities.
The World Wide Fund for Nature’s general pattern of the resonance over the sample 
is different from that of Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace. This shows that the World 
Wide Fund for Nature resonates differently with the "news events" in the media agenda than
10 Here 1 consider an environmental claim to be a combination of the three elements environmental issues 
"EM, issues relating to the organisation's activities "A” and govemment/industry responsibility issues "GM into 
a specific "package” with a cultural bias. It appears in the discourse at the surface level of the news text. On 
the mobilisation of symbolic packages and reasoning devices in the media see Gamson (1988), for a critique 
see Eder (1992). See M. Thompson (1984; 1988; 1991) and Thompson and Wildavsky (1982) for an analytic 
application of Mary Douglas* concept of ’cultural bias’.
11 The initial level of comparative analysis of the discourse patterns is provided by the distribution of the 
resonance of the three discourse elements in a news week. This research strategy facilitates both a closer 
analysis of individual texts during specific newsweeks of interest, and a generalisation of the newsweeks into 
the phases of the news cycle on the policy event.
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the two higher profile organisations. It is active within a different sector of the agenda for 
public communication on the environment.
The World Wide Fund for Nature’s resonance pattern occurs in a series of 
discontinuous peaks and troughs. This suggests that like Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund 
for Nature tends to make the news in instances that are related to specific "news events". 
Cycles of peak coverage are followed by troughs where the organisation receives no 
coverage. The World Wide Fund for Nature coverage is less continuous than that of 
Greenpeace over the sample period. This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature fades 
in and out of the news, whereas Greenpeace constitutes a more permanent feature. It may 
indicate that the World Wide Fund for Nature are brought into the news by specific "events", 
whereas Greenpeace have relatively more control over the timing of the specific "news 
events" by which they achieve media prominence.
This is simply another way o f stating that the activities of Greenpeace are more 
oriented towards reaching the media agenda than those of the World Wide Fund for Nature. 
Nonetheless, the World Wide Fund for Nature case will establish the significance of the 
media agenda for a different sector of the environmental movement, a supra-national 
conservation organisation. How do the timing and contents combine in a more conventional 
organisation’s communication strategies? When and how does this type of organisation enter 
the media agenda on the environment, and what type of communication strategies are 
mobilised in the resultant discourse?
The thesis for a division o f communicative labour in the different sectors of the 
environmental movement may be further tested by adding the analysis of the discourse 
patterns o f the World Wide Fund for Nature as a case to the comparison o f Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace.
a) Prior to the "news cycle": business as usual
During the phase of resonance before the media’s "prologue" discourse on the White 
Paper, it is likely that the environmental organisations’ communication strategies were 
relatively less determined by the White Paper "event". Although the mobilisation of 
information may have been enhanced in this phase due to the imminent "event", the 
organisations are likely to retain their ’normal’ formats for communication rather than
M  it. ’
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referring directly to the White Paper. In theory at least, the news discourse from the week 
commencing August 1st until that commencing 20th August, inclusive, should be a business 
as usual period for the environmental organisations1 communication strategies.
a.i) Friends of th e  E arth  and G reenpeace
The visual database shows that the discourse prior to the "news cycle" covers eleven 
active references to Friends of the Earth (FoE A to K inc.) and seven to Greenpeace (Gpc 
A to G inc.).
The business as usual phase of Friends of the Earth news discourse is characterised 
by an hierarchical differentiation o f the three constructive discourse elements. G raph  f.a  
shows that with the exception o f the first week, an hierarchical discourse structure is 
maintained by Friends of the Earth for the remaining newsweeks, when the resonance of the 
three elements is as follows: the environmental issues "E" are most prominent, followed by 
the government responsibility issues "G ", and finally the organisation's activity issues "A” 
which are significantly less prominent than the other two. This discourse pattern coincides 
with the general trend of Friends o f the Earth's discourse structure, where environmental 
issues tend to be more prominent than government responsibility issues, and the issues 
relating to the organisation's activities are a subtext o f both.12 This similarity with the 
general pattern indicates that Friends of the Earth's communication serves a business as usual 
function in this phase. But what is business as usual for Friends of the Earth?
The most resonant environmental themes in this phase concern in the first instance, 
toxic emissions from waste processing plants and related health risks (FoE C); and in the 
second, the ethics o f "agro-tourism" projects, the town/country divide, destruction o f 
landscape, and traffic pollution of countryside (FoE D). Other high prominence 
environmental themes concern the use o f nitrates in agricultural practices and the pollution 
of drinking water (FoE H), pollution and quality of life themes related to regional urban 
decay (FoE G), and the future of energy conservation strategies in the wake o f probable rise 
in world oil prices due to the Gulf War (FoE I). This shows the wide range o f environmental 
themes covered by Friends of the Earth in the course o f their business as usual mobilisation. 1
11 See the visual database and discussion in section B).
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C) and the world energy conservation debate arising from the imminent Gulf oil price rise 
(Gpc E) produce a combination of equally high prominence environmental issues "E" and 
government responsibility issues "G". This confirms that Greenpeace mobilise environmental 
themes in a way that they are firmly embedded within a goverament/industry responsibility 
context. Also the type of environmental themes and responsibility contexts raised in this 
business as usual phase gives a preliminary indication that Greenpeace's campaign strategies 
are more oriented towards the supra-national level than Friends of the Earth 's.14
For the peak resonance newsweek commencing 13th August, the Greenpeace activity 
issues "A" are a subtext of the high resonance issues "E" and "G", which is similar to their 
role in the Friends of the Earth discourse. On the newsweek commencing 20th August, 
however, the issues relating to the activities of the organisation "A" return once more as the 
most prominent element in the Greenpeace discourse. This resonance is not produced by an 
external "news event" like the WWF scandal, but is the result of the production of "news 
event" by the organisation's own direct protest actions. The article Protesters board nuclear 
ship (Gpc G) describes the direct action of six Greenpeace activists who boarded a British 
Nuclear Fuels ship and chained themselves to machinery. The protest action occurs as part 
of the campaign against the British Government sponsored shipping trade in spent nuclear 
fuel. The action appears as a sequel to the mobilisation o f this same issue the week before 
(Gpc C ).15
This shows that Greenpeace are keen media strategists: they mobilise a specific 
environmental theme in the discourse one week, thus setting the media agenda for the 
reception of their direct action a week later. The journalists were primed, informed and able 
to apply the Greenpeace version of the contested theme without prompting when the protest 
"event" occurred. This is an example of an environmental organisation constructing a "news 
event" by a protest action that is designed specifically to gain public attention in the media. 
It also suggests that the Greenpeace’s "activist" image is more readily translated into 
targeting strategies than that of Friends of the Earth.
14 This is also a finding of the preliminary indicators from the content analyses in section B.6.
15 This finding suggests that there are two different types of activity issues "A" in the Greenpeace news 
discourse: that similar to Friends of the Earth which function as a subtext to the more prominent "E" and "G" 
issues; and those which are produced when Greenpeace’s direct action is itself the prominent subject of the 
discourse.
This use of "blaming" strategies shows that when Greenpeace mobilise an  
environmental theme, they take a more controversial and actor-orientated oppositional stance 
than Friends o f the Earth. Friends o f the Earth are more likely to let the themes ’speak fo r 
themselves’. Overall, however, the business as usual news discourses of the tw o 
organisations follow patterns that are broadly similar. This confirms that the difference 
between their discourses consists in a different emphasis o f contents rather than in a different 
location on the news agenda. The primaiy exception to business as usual for the tw o 
organisations occurs in the first week, when their discourse patterns are influenced by the 
special circumstances surrounding the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal "news event".
a.ii) World Wide Fund for Nature
The visual database shows that the discourse prior to the "news cycle" covers three 
active references to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF A to C inc.).
The discussion of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace (above a.i>), shows that the ir 
discourse mobilisation patterns were influenced in the week commencing August 1st, by the 
World Wide Fund for Nature scandal "news event". This had the effect of mobilising a 
discourse where themes relating to the activities o f the environmental movement are m ore 
prominent than either the environmental themes or govemment/industry responsibility 
contexts. It distorts the business as usual communication of Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace. Due to the special circumstances of the scandal, this phase prior to the W hite 
Paper "news cycle" does not constitute a business as usual period of communication for the 
World Wide Fund for Nature.
G raph w .a  shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature received a peak coverage on  
the week of the scandal and then received no further coverage in this phase. Indeed for this 
scandal newsweek August 1st, the W orld Wide Fund for Nature achieves a resonance that 
is higher than both Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace. This is due to the exceptional 
circumstances o f  the scandal which make the World Wide Fund for Nature’s activities into 
a "news event" in its own right.
For the scandal newsweek the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse has a 
hierarchical structure, where the organisation’s activity issues ”A" are the most prominent 
element, followed by the environmental issues "E" and the government responsibility issues
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Not surprisingly considering their topics, the latter two of these articles also mobilised 
high prominence government responsibility issues "G" (FoE G I). Otherwise the most 
resonant government responsibility issues ”G” in this phase concern the national conservation 
policy field, where the Government are reported to be discussing plans for restructuring the 
Nature Conservancy Council quango (FoE E).
This pattern of discourse mobilisation shows that Friends of the Earth's 
communication strategies primarily serve to give a voice to the environmental themes, 
whereas the govemment/industry responsibility context is a secondary, but associated factor. 
The activities of the organisation itself remain a subtext within this discourse on 
environmental themes in responsibility contexts.13 This is indeed the case for the three 
weeks of the business as usual phase from the week commencing 6th August onwards, when 
the only time that themes relating to the organisation's activities achieve a relatively high 
prominence is to relate Friends of the Earth’s involvement in an "agro-tourism" project 
restoring cottages in Cyprus (FoE D).
The exception to this pattern of business as usual communication occurs on the first 
week of the sample (graph f.a) and can be attributed to the influence of the "news event" 
scandal involving the World Wide Fund for Nature. Inevitably the scandal concerning the 
fund-raising practices, policies and lack of campaign "success" of the World Wide Fund for 
Nature draws comparisons with and comments from other environmental organisations.
G raph  f.a  shows that for Friends of the Earth this merely inverts the 'normal* trend 
between the issues relating to the organisation’s activities "A", and the problematic and target 
constructing issues "E" and "G". The hierarchy of environmental issues over government 
responsibility issues is maintained, but these are the subtext of the debate over the 
organisation’s activities concerning the internal structure, policies, and co-operation ethics, 
aid redistribution, fund-raising, merchandising and financial investment practices of 
environmental organisations (FoE A B).
This exceptional pattern in the first week due to the WWF scandal "news event" is 
repeated in the Greenpeace discourse (graph g.a). On the week commencing 1st August, 
Greenpeace’s activity issues "A" are the most resonant, but unlike Friends of the Earth the
13 Friends of the Earth’s activity issues "A" are primarily a vehicle for mobilising the more prominent 
environment and govemment/industry thematic dimensions of claims. Self-publicity is a less prominent theme 
of the organisation’s claims.
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government responsibility issues "G" are more prominent than the environmental issues "E " . 
In fact the W W F scandal accounts for only half o f the total resonance in this newsweek. In  
addition to the W W F "news event" article (Gpc B), Greenpeace mobilise an article w hich 
targets Britain’s nuclear energy policy as a false solution to the problem of global w anning 
on August 2nd (Gpc A). The high prominence o f activity issues MA" and government 
responsibility issues "G" in these two articles gives an indication that Greenpeace discourse 
is more based on the actors - who must be made responsible for issues - than the actual 
environmental issues "E" themselves. In contrast to Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace’s is 
more of an "actor" discourse.
G raph  g .a  shows that Greenpeace, like Friends o f the Earth, has a peak of resonance 
at the week commencing 13th August. However, this peak resonance appears as a pulse o f  
communication that is more exceptional to the general pattern than that of Friends of the  
Earth. This indicates that the Greenpeace discourse pattern is more volatile, changeable and 
instantaneously determined than Friends of the Earth’s. It suggests that the Greenpeace 
discourse is determined more by its co-ordination with specific "news events", whether these 
are mobilised by the organisation itself or produced by the media’s own agenda for news.
Whereas environmental issues "E" maintained a hierarchy of prominence over the  
government responsibility issues "G ” for Friends of the Earth’s discourse, the two elements 
are highly integrated in Greenpeace’s. This is shown by the close proximity of the lines "E "  
and "G" from the 6th August onwards in graph g.a. The relative lack of differentiation 
between the elements "E" and "G" indicates that Greenpeace’s mobilisations tend to "frame" 
environmental themes by referring to an equally prominent government responsibility context. 
This shows that targeting the government and industry actors with "blame" is a key element 
of the Greenpeace communication strategies. In other words, "blaming" is business as usual 
for Greenpeace.
The themes that are mobilised into the Greenpeace discourse by highly prominent 
environmental "E ” and government responsibility issues "G" concern the following: global 
warming and climate change (Gpc F) where the environmental issues are prominent; and the 
risk of accidents at nuclear power stations due to an alleged lack of safety reviews by the 
Nuclear Industry and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (Gpc D), where the government 
responsibility issues are more prominent. In addition to this, articles concerning the British 
nuclear industry’s aim to trade in reprocessing spent reactor fuel from other countries (Gpc
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"G" (graph w .a). This indicates that the discourse is dominated and contextualised by the 
issues relating to the activities of the organisation "A".
Two articles relate details of the organisation’s activities that have received public 
criticism16, one with a highest (WWF B) and one with relatively high prominence activity 
issues (WWF C). It is interesting to note that both of these articles occur in the specialist 
Environment feature section o f the newspaper. After the "bad" publicity received from a 
critical television documentary, the organisation ensures a damage limitation of its public 
image, by entrusting the public scrutiny of its affairs to the specialist environmental 
journalist. This is itself a type of communication strategy. Rather than simply criticising the 
World Wide Fund for Nature’s activities, the environmental journalist is able to relate them 
thematically to the environmental themes and govemment/industry responsibility contexts of 
which they are part.
It appears that the World Wide Fund for Nature used its contacts with the 
environmental journalist to ensure a constructive criticism of its activities, one that 
contextualises the organisation’s activities with its ’special' problems and dilemmas and the 
possible future directions it may take. In this case the thematic link between the environment 
and govemment/industry responsibility context serves as a contextual background for 
elaborating the problems of the organisation and the choices it must make to reform its 
activities. The special conditions o f the scandal "news event" produce a type of 
communication that is not present in either the Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace 
discourses. In this phase of the sample the communication strategies of the World Wide Fund 
for Nature are geared towards the "damage limitation" of its public image.
The third article (WWF A) occurred prior to those about the scandal. It appears in 
a media gossip section of the news and relates a joke about the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s annoyance with the media for referring to the panda as a "panda bear". Apparently 
the creature is a member of the racoon and not the bear family. Released two days prior to 
the scandal discourse, this serves as a timely reminder to the media and the public that the
16 Central Television’s "The Cook Report" criticised the organisation for bad management and lack of 
success in key campaigns using information from a critical internal report that was "leaked" by members of the 
organisation dissatisfied with the direction of its policies under the Director Charles de Haes. These policies 
included the acceptance of large sums of money from industrial, business and government organisations, and 
the investment of funds in multi-national companies engaged in logging in the Third World and with nuclear 
interests.
World Wide Fund for Nature’s conservation campaigns are a vital and longstanding element 
of British culture. The organisation’s famous flagship campaigns, "Save the Panda" and 
"Save the Elephant", come in for special criticism in the scandal discourse. This short 
communication is aimed at reminding the journalists and public alike of the organisation’s 
longstanding commitment and beneficial activities for conservation issues. It should therefore 
also be seen as part of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s image "damage limitation" 
communication strategy.
After its peak scandal "news event" resonance the World Wide Fund for Nature 
disappears from the media agenda (graph w.a). This shows that in contrast to Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature enters and leaves the media agenda 
in relation to "news events" that are constructed by the reporting activities of journalists 
rather than by the actions of the organisation. However, on entering the media agenda the 
World Wide Fund for Nature is able to exert some influence over the way its activities are 
reported and in particular by providing specialist information to sympathetic journalists. This 
holds even when it is necessary that the organisation’s activities are opened to public 
criticism.
As I stated earlier the World Wide Fund for Nature’s fund-raising strategies target 
specialist wealthy business, industry and government sources rather than the general public. 
Subsequently the organisation has less need for permanent mass media attention than Friends 
of the Earth and Greenpeace.17 This may explain its absence from the media agenda after 
the scandal "event". It is plausible however, that the nature o f the scandal dictated that the 
World Wide Fund for Nature should keep a low media profile whilst the consequences of the 
"bad" publicity were gauged, and its future policies, strategies and structure reformulated.
b) The "Prologue": themes ’speaking for themselves’
The "prologue" phase of the discourse on the White Paper is the three newsweeks 
from the 27th August until that commencing 10th September. During this period Friends of
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17 However "bad" media publicity may be extremely damaging, as industrial sponsors who have paid to use 
the logo and public image of the WWF are likely to disassociate themselves immediately from the organisation. 
On the role of environmental "image politics" and the relations between environmental organisations and 
industry in Italy, see Donati (1992).
the Earth and Greenpeace receive more coverage than the imminent White Paper. It 
constitutes a phase in the White Paper "news cycle" when the environmental organisations 
are more likely to mobilise claims that are intended to set the agenda for the reception of the 
policy document. This is the organisations* attempt to influence the criteria which journalists 
and the public, as well as opposition politicians, will use to evaluate the forthcoming White 
Paper.
b.i) Friends o f the E arth  and Greenpeace
The visual database shows that the "prologue" discourse covers nine active references 
to Friends of the Earth (FoE L to T inc.) and five to Greenpeace (Gpc H to L inc.).
G raph f.b  shows that Friends o f the Earth’s "prologue" peak occurs during the first 
week, that commencing the 27th August. During this week there is a constant flow of articles 
which mobilise the differentiated hierarchical resonance pattern, that I have suggested is 
typical of Friends of the Earth’s communication strategies. Environmental issues "E" are the 
most prominent, followed by govemment/industry responsibility issues "G", and then 
organisation’s activity issues "A". The prominence of environmental themes in this sector 
o f the "prologue" discourse is shown by the wide gap between the discourse elements "E" 
and "G" on the week commencing 27th August (graph f.b).
This pattern indicates that Friends of the Earth’s strategies for pre-setting the agenda 
on the White Paper focus on highlighting the content of specific environmental issues "E" 
by an intense period of communication. At this phase Friends of the Earth did not frame 
claims specifically in terms of government responsibility, it sufficed to let the environmental 
theme ’speak for itself and inform the public and the media. In other words, the first week 
o f the "prologue" constitutes an accentuated period of business as usual communication for 
Friends o f the Earth.
The four articles in this week all mobilised environmental issues "E M of the highest 
text-prominence (FoE L M N O). The specific themes are: the misuse of pesticides in 
agriculture and resulting health risks (FoE L); the disposal of nuclear waste and the future 
o f nuclear energy in Britain (FoE M); the protection of a 150 years old Chestnut tree in St 
Paul’s as a part of London's heritage (FoE N); and the public health risks arising from the 
disposal o f biologically produced hazards/vimses by a multi-national drug company (FoE 0).
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The titles of three of the articles indicate the mobilising tone of Friends of the Earth’s 
"prologue" campaign agenda: Pesticide firm s want farm  curbs (FoE L); Dramatic Rise in N- 
waste estimates (FoE M); and Vaccines buried a t drug firm  site (FoE O). Each headline 
announces the environmental issue "E" in a claim "package" that gives an affirmation of the 
line taken by Friends of the Earth and expressed in the text. This ability to disturb the 
"balanced reporting" function of journalists and reproduce its own version of the story in the 
news headline may itself be seen as testimony to the communication skills and definitional 
power of Friends of the Earth.18
The fourth article is an example o f a direct protest action by a Friends of the Earth 
local group (FoE N). The Friends o f the Earth protest action involved people climbing into 
the branches o f a 150 years old Chestnut tree to prevent it being cut down by order of a 
Court injunction. In contrast to the Greenpeace protest action mentioned above (Gpc A), the 
report o f this action mobilises environmental issues "E" concerning the rights o f nature and 
the value of heritage. It thus serves to raise an environmental theme based on aesthetic and 
moral claims, rather than discredit and "blame" guilty government and industry actors. This 
shows that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have different types of target communication 
in mind when they stage "news events". They have different direct approaches to the public 
in the "prologue" to the White Paper agenda. Friends o f the Earth’s "news event" was 
produced by the action initiative of a local group, whereas Greenpeace’s was an organised, 
centrally controlled and strategic action.
For the newsweek commencing 3rd September, Friends of the Earth’s discourse 
pattern is adjusted: although environmental issues WE" remain the most prominent, the 
organisation’s activity issues "A" achieve a higher resonance than the govemment/industry 
responsibility issues (graph f.b). The cause o f this shift in the discourse is an external factor, 
the recurrence o f the WWF scandal "news event" (FoE P) (see graph D.I1). The WWF 
scandal discourse is external to the "prologue" campaigning strategies o f Friends of the Earth 1
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11 Van Dijk’s (1985) (1991) discourse analysis emphasises the importance of the "headline" for producing 
meaning in the structure of the news. This seems a rather obvious point as the social function of a news headline 
is to "frame" the meaning of the text. However, van Dijk's linguistic based analysis claims that ideological bias 
of a news text occurs in a disruption of the balance of the "objective" reporting function of journalists. In this 
case it appears that Friends of the Earth have successfully mobilised their preferred ideological bias into the 
news headline. They have exerted a degree of definitional power over the journalistic practice and influenced 
the news representation of social events.
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but raises a debate on the ethics of environmental organisations’ investment policies.19 
During the same week Friends of the Earth makes a statement that is highly critical of the 
Government’s sanctioning o f a pressurised water nuclear reactor, Hinkley C (FoE Q). This 
gives a first shift within the ’’prologue" discourse towards a more policy oriented type of 
"framing" for Friends of the Earth’s claims.
The trend towards a more integrated discourse pattern is maintained in the last week 
of the Friends of the Earth "prologue" discourse. The graph f.b shows that the discourse 
elements become less hierarchically differentiated and that environmental issues ME" and 
government responsibility issues "G ” become integrated at an equally high level of 
resonance. In other words, the government responsibility issues "G" become a more 
prominent element in the discourse. Also the role of Friends of the Earth as an "actor" in 
the news discourse is enhanced which is shown by the relatively high resonance of activity 
issues "A". This indicates that there is a clear shift in Friends of the Earth's mobilisation 
strategies within the "prologue" phase. The environmental themes are no longer allowed to 
’speak for themselves’ but are neatly "framed" in a policy context. Their relevance to the 
imminent White Paper may not be easily overlooked by journalists, the public and politicians.
By the late "prologue", Friends of the Earth’s communication strategies have changed 
towards targeting specific environmental policy contexts. Direct pressure is placed on the 
Government policy-makers to give more attention to the organisation’s claims. In Labour bids 
fo r  green ground (FoER), Friends of the Earth holds discussions with the Labour Opposition 
Leader, Neil Kinnock, over the Labour Party’s production of an alternative policy document 
to the White Paper. This is followed the next day by a direct attack on the Government’s 
privatisation policy for the electricity industry and the environmental problems that may 
result from such a deregulation (FoE S). Both of these articles produce a resonance in which 
the government responsibility issues "G" are more prominent than the environmental issues 
”E '\  In addition they are targeted towards specialist audiences of decision-makers: the former 
appearing in The Guardian's Political Section and the latter in the City News section. This 
shows that Friends of the Earth maintains a flexibility  in its communication strategies
19 The WWF scandal raised a news discourse highlighting the activities of the different organisations and 
sectors of the environmental movement. This of course has the effect of raising the discourse element relating 
to the activities of an organisation "A", above its ’normal’ prominence relative to "E" and "G" within the text 
structure.
169
whereby it may target specific ’influential’ audiences at opportune times rather than simply 
mobilising information with the aim o f making it resonate with the general public. It is also 
worth noting that the organisation’s ’’blaming" of the Government remains thematically and 
contextually constructive, rather than simply appealing to the anti-government sentiments 
within elements of British popular culture.
In the article on electricity privatisation Friends o f the Earth take a direct and 
’controversial’ stance against the Government. This illustrates that the organisation is 
prepared to use explicit "blaming" tactics in opportune and strategically favourable 
circumstances. They nonetheless combine such direct communication tactics with less 
confrontational ones. Indeed the final article in the "prologue" phase discusses the possibility 
of ecologically balanced farming practices as an alternative to the use of pesticides (FoE T). 
This debate is outside the context of current political affairs. The article Night plough cuts 
weeds Hoe o f darkness (FoE T) informs and popularises the idea of a ’solution’ to the 
problem of pesticide use in farming, but at the same time the policy "frame" is conspicuously 
absent. It may be that Friends of the Earth is concerned that the immediate relevance o f 
proposals for regulatory policy measures is not allowed to  obscure the longer term  aspects 
of the problem of pesticide use in the public mind. Indeed the survival of the organisation 
is dependent on the public’s ability to conceptualise environmental problems as long term 
issues. This may explain why the organisation’s activity issues "A” achieve a relatively high 
prominence for long term "framings" of environmental themes (FoE T).20 These 
mobilisations serve to associate Friends o f the Earth’s actions with the long term  future of 
the environment. By mobilising campaign themes as long term  affairs Friends o f the Earth 
are in part attempting to secure their own survival as legitimate actors in the environmental 
discourse in the future. Friends o f the Earth cannot allow the public to think that short term 
"policy solutions" are "real solutions" despite the dominance o f the imminent White Paper 
over their current mobilisations. In this instance Friends o f the Earth are attempting to 
mobilise a public with long term environmental concerns.
In the "prologue" phase Friends o f the Earth’s communication strategies exhibit a
“ The graphic model shows that the article (FoE T) combines highest prominence environmental issues "E" 
with relatively high prominence issues relating to the organisations activities "A" and relatively low prominence 
government responsibility issues "G". This combination indicates that the text focusses on the the environmental 
theme and the organisation’s actions rather than the responsibilities of Government and Industry actors.
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pragmatic flexibility  in the selection of themes, target audiences and strategic timing of 
mobilisations. This is reflected by the content of their claims which is "formatted" in the 
news text in relation to specific reported "events". The organisation combines more than one 
type of strategy from its communication repertoire at a time. This indicates that a different 
combination of aims constitute the competing factors which produce the content and "timing" 
of their mobilisations, which serve as indicators for their communication strategies.
In contrast to Friends o f the Earth which "peaks" in the first week of the "prologue" 
phase, Greenpeace does not achieve any coverage in the week commencing 27th August 
(graph g.b). This indicates the different timing strategies o f the two organisations. Instead 
Greenpeace’s "prologue" peak occurs one week later, on the newsweek 3rd September. Here 
Greenpeace’s discourse pattern exhibits an hierarchical differentiation of high resonance 
environmental issues ME" from the government responsibility issues "G", a pattern that I 
have suggested is more characteristic o f Friends of the Earth than Greenpeace. It is probable 
that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace worked together and deliberately orchestrated their 
peak mobilisations of environmental claims in this phase to occur in successive weeks. 
Avoiding competition for coverage would be beneficial to the aims of both organisations at 
this phase of the "prologue" discourse. They can both have their campaign issues ’aired’ 
without competing for the limited news space allocated per week to environmental issues.21
I noted earlier that when Friends of the Earth allow the environmental issue elements 
"E" to ’speak for themselves’ they do so across a set of themes designed to pre-set the 
national agenda for the White Paper, namely: use of pesticides; nuclear waste processing; 
the risks of biological engineering (FoE L M 0). In contrast to this approach, Greenpeace’s 
highly resonant environmental issues "E" concern a supra-national theme: the severe side- 
effects suffered by the Polynesian peoples due to the radio-active contamination of the Pacific 
Islands which has resulted from nuclear testing. Fears fo r  a sea o f caesium  (Gpc I) and 
Testimonies from  the atoll (Gpc J) appear as feature articles rather than news items. These 
articles confirm that Greenpeace’s criteria for mobilising environmental claims are less 
determined at this stage by imminent national policy events than Friends o f the Earth.
In addition the articles show that when Greenpeace let environmental themes ’speak 
for themselves’, they do so by invoking a universal sense of injustice rather than identifying
21 On the competition for news space by actors in the agenda-setting and agenda-building process, see 
Hilgartner and Bosk (1988).
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specific national problems. The identification with the sufferings of the Polynesian people 
combines romanticism with a universal sense o f injustice. It serves to mobilise the 
Greenpeace "public image" that is based on the promotion o f  an ideology which advocates 
an indignant and mystically based sense of injustice in the world.22 This suggests that 
Greenpeace mobilise the theme of nuclear testing in such a format to remind the public that 
the moral high ground in the environmental discourse belongs to the Greenpeace ideals. The 
public and journalists need to know that Greenpeace serves the universal good of mankind. 
The campaign is designed to pre-set the agenda for Greenpeace to be defined as the 
"goodies" when they may be drawn into direct "controversies" with government and 
industry. When Greenpeace are not "blaming" specific actors, they are informing people so 
that they know how to react when they do "blame".
This example of the mobilisation of environmental issues "E" indicates another 
dimension of the Greenpeace public communication strategy. Greenpeace environmental 
themes draw on an romantic appeal to the exotic, which has achieved a resonance in 
contemporary culture due to the popularisation of the ideas o f  deep ecology.23 This indciates 
that Greenpeace elaborates environmental issues ”E" by working with contemporary public 
meanings and popularised elements of environmental counter-culture rather than public 
policy-related or practical logics.
A further point of note from g rap h  g .b is that Greenpeace’s working procedure issues 
"W" are more resonant than government responsibility issues "G" during the newsweek of 
the 3rd September. In addition to the lower government responsibility resonance resulting 
from the emphasis on exotic environments and de-emphasis o f explicit "blaming" strategies, 
this trend is produced by the influence o f the WWF scandal (Gpc H), which re-emerges on 
the week commencing 3rd September. In the scandal discourse the financial actions o f 
Greenpeace are compared favourably to the World Wide Fund for Nature’s. The WWF 
scandal "news event" has a similar effect to that which it had on Friends o f the Earth’s
22 In North American Indian mythology "Greenpeace" is the name of a tribe that returns to restore a world 
despoiled by man, hence "Rainbow Warriors" etc.. For a discussion of Greenpeace myths, see Pearce (1991).
23 On the "dreams of deep ecology" see Devall and Sessions (1985), Luke (1988). The popularization of 
the ideas of deep ecology has been a significant development in contemporary British culture. No longer 
reserved for the sect, the dreams of deep ecology are available and marketable to all: witness James Lovelock's 
(1979; 1989) Gaia hypothesis on the supermarket bookshelves and for that matter anything on the counters of 
the Body shop Ltd.
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"prologue” discourse, it raises a discourse on the legitimacy and ethics of environmental 
organisations’ practical activities. This raises the organisation’s activity issues "A" in the 
discourse of both organisations for the week commencing 3rd September (compare graphs
f.b  and g.b). Unlike Friends of the Earth, however, Greenpeace engages explicitly in 
criticising the activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature. Not only does this highlight 
Greenpeace’s orientation towards actor "blaming" strategies, but indicates that the 
organisation is prepared to turn these onto organisations in other sectors of the environmental 
movement.
This example illustrates that Greenpeace have a high degree of autonomy from other 
organisations in the environmental movement, and that in favourable circumstances they are 
prepared to criticise the activities of other environmental organisations as a means for 
reinforcing the legitimacy of their own actions in the public sphere. It shows that Greenpeace 
see the arena of public communication as a competitive environment for "image" marketing. 
At the same time the example indicates that the news agenda serves as a medium for 
organisations to mobilise claims that regulate the internal agenda of the environmental 
movement. Greenpeace use public communication to ethically regulate the activities of other 
environmental organisations. As Tom Burke from the Green Alliance relates:
"Greenpeace doing it their way .. keep us all honest."24
During the final week of the "prologue" Greenpeace’s discourse pattern is similar to 
that of Friends o f the Earth (graphs f.b  and g.b). The environmental issues ME" and the 
government responsibility issues "G" achieve the same high level of resonance whereas the 
activity issues "A" are a subtext of these. This marks a return to "blaming" tactics for 
Greenpeace. Like Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace’s late "prologue" discourse "frames" 
environmental claims in a way that is directly pertinent to the imminent policy event. 
Greenpeace takes the unusual step - for them - of publicly joining Friends of the Earth to 
meet the Opposition leader and discuss the forthcoming Labour Party environmental policy 
document (Gpc K). For Greenpeace this ’exceptional’ venture into the conventional party
24 Interview for EUl Project No. 42, 5/12/90. This interview was undertaken by Bron Szersynski in 1990 
as was that with Chris Rose (see later). They are used as a source of data with the permission of the project 
Director Klaus Eder.
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politics arena is a strategic attempt to de-legitimise the Government’s policy consultation 
process, and in particular its public liaison with interest groups. The joint action makes it 
clear that both Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth consider their consultations with the 
Government policy-makers to have been fruitless and that they wish their distance from the 
Government’s position to be made public.
Whereas Friends of the Earth chooses to attack the Government on the privatisation 
and deregulation of the electricity industry (FoE S), Greenpeace criticises the Government's 
record of not complying with the European Community bathing water directives (Gpc L). 
Virus risk to blue fla g  bathers describes the risks to public health of bathing at one o f the 
supposedly ’clean*  blue flag beaches. It compares the British Government's record fo r 
implementing EC directives on dumping raw sewage and on beach cleanliness unfavourably 
with the rest o f Europe.25
These two campaign themes, electricity privatisation and sea pollution, are selected 
by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace for the last week o f the "prologue" discourse. They 
constitute a specific type of thematic "blaming". Both issues are "framed" to define a concept 
of "public interest" that is critical of the Government's policies. The public may relate their 
first hand "sea-side" experiences to the possible risks of gastroenteritis, meningitis and 
hepatitis: their health has been put at risk unknown to them - the Government is to blame. 
Similarly, the privatisation of the electricity industry followed in the long line of profitable 
state industries that the Government "sold" cheaply to private investors; the public 
'experienced' this first hand.26 Now the Government is to blame for displacing the public 
control over the regulation of the detrimental environmental effects of these industries into 
private hands.
Both o f these themes deal with publicly known 'events’, but reveal previously 
unknown side-effects for which the Government policies are to be held accountable. They 
serve to make the Government publicly accountable. This shows that at the end of the
25 Both Friends of the Earth’s and Greenpeace's environmental claims are a prompt for their 
communications in the ’Dirty Man of Europe v. White Paper’ event (see below).
* Indeed a series of popular television advertisements had invited the ’ordinary* members of the public to 
become first time investors and shareholders. The infamous "tell Sid.." commercials popularised the sale of 
British Gas, whereas for the electricity industry the slogan became "tell Frank..". These advertisements made 
the de-regulation of profitable national industries a "public event" where the small first-time investor could make 
a quick "no risk" profit. Even those who remained opposed to or unaware of privatisation were subsequently 
made aware of its consequences by the sharp rise in the costs of public utilities.
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"prologue" phase the Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace "blaming" strategies take a stance 
that retains an oppositional but thematically constructive orientation within the environmental 
policy agenda. Nonetheless, both organisations are highly critical of the Government and 
their mobilisations aim to engage the "first hand" interests and experiences of the reading 
public into a direct involvement with the environmental policy discourse. Bearing in mind 
the strong relations between Government offices and journalists and the importance of 
Government sources for the news27, this ranks as a considerable mobilisation achievement 
prior to the start of the White Paper "news event" discourse.
A final point worth noting is that the graphs f.b  and g.b illustrate that the quantitative 
resonance and discourse coverage o f Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace rises and falls at 
different weeks during the prologue phase. This may in part be attributed to differences in 
the two organisations’ responses to environmental "news events" such as the WWF scandal. 
However, it is more likely to be an indication that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are 
co-ordinating their communication strategies on either an informal or formal basis, so that 
they do not compete for the limited space available for environmental news in the crucial 
phase running up to the main "event".
b.ii) W orld Wide Fund fo r Nature
The visual database shows that the "prologue" discourse covers ten active references 
to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF D to M inc.). This makes the "prologue" the 
most resonant phase in the sample for the World Wide Fund for Nature.
G raph w .b  shows that on the first week of the "prologue", commencing the 27th 
August, the World Wide Fund for Nature does not receive any coverage. This represents a 
continuation of the trend from the phase prior to the "news cycle". Earlier I suggested that 
this lack o f resonance was due to a combination of two factors: firstly, the World Wide Fund 
for Nature tend to enter the media discourse only in relation to specific "news events"; and 
secondly, the organisation are keeping a low media profile after receiving "bad" publicity 
from the scandal "news event" relating to their own financial activities and policies (see 
above a.ii)). 37
37 On this sec e.g. Hall et al. (1978), Kiebolwiecz and Scherer (1986), Einseidel (1993).
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In stark contrast graph w .b shows that on the following newsweek, commencing the 
3rd September, the World Wide Fund for Nature achieves its peak resonance, not only for 
the "prologue" phase but for the whole sample period. Indeed the organisation receives more 
coverage than the combined totals of Friends of the Barth and Greenpeace. What factors are 
responsible for this exceptionally high resonance?
On the week commencing 3rd September, the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal 
"news event" re-emerged and peaked.28 Indeed six of the seven articles referring to the 
World Wide Fund for Nature on this week cover the scandal "news event" (WWF D E F G 
H I). This shows once more that the media coverage of the World Wide Fund for Nature is 
more tied to the reporting of specific "news events" than that of Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace. In the mainstream news the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to be a news 
item rather than a news-maker, and when the organisation does act as a source, this tends 
to be in relation to specific "news events".
In the phase prior to the "news cycle", the WWF scandal was covered in the specialist 
Environment section of the newspaper. It appeared on the media agenda as item of interest 
for environmental readerships; as news it was formatted as a matter of internal concern for 
the environmental movement (section a)). The scandal remained within the confines of the 
specialist environmental news discourse. By contrast, on its second peak commencing 4th 
September, the W W F scandal becomes a headline "news event" for mainstream news. At its 
re-emergence on the agenda the scandal became a mainstream public issue rather than an 
issue of specialist environmental concern. For what reasons do the World Wide Fund for 
Nature enter the main media agenda, and how does this unusual situation affect their 
discourse pattern, communication strategies and media representation?
G raph  w .b  shows that this high peak of resonance has a similar discourse pattern to 
that when the scandal occurred in the earlier phase. For both peaks of the scandal "news 
event" the issues relating to the organisation’s activities "A" are the most prominent 
discourse element, followed by the environmental issues "E ”, whilst the least resonant 
element is the government responsibility issues "G" (graph w .b). This illustrates that when 
an environmental organisation is subject to public "blame", the govemment/industry 
responsibility context is relegated to a subtext o f the discourse. Not surprisingly the 21
21 Refer to graph D .n on article references and environmental "news events" (introduction to this section).
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contextualising theme of the discourse concerns the organisation's activities.
On the 4th September 1990, the WWF scandal hit the news. Four articles appear on 
the "news event" including the front page headline article, WWF paid fo r  helicopter used to 
kill poachers (WWF F), and the main editorial leader, Leading article: Blood and the rhino 
(WWF D). To appear in such high profile news structures constitutes an exceptional 
resonance even for the media oriented organisations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, 
and is highly exceptional for a conservation organisation like the World Wide Fund for 
Nature.29
The titles of the headline and leading articles indicate that when the WWF scandal 
emerges as a major mainstream "news event", it appears as an ethical theme concerning the 
organisation’s conservation activities, and more specifically, its sponsorship of African 
Governments that operate a shoot-to-kill policy for poachers in their National Parks. The 
"event" is headline news because the 'public interest’ has been damaged. Or at least the 
public intentions and "good will" indicated by individual donations to the organisation have 
been seriously misled. For the public discourse it becomes a "scandal" that donations to a 
charitable organisation have been used to pursue conservation policies that seemingly value 
the conservation o f rare species more than the taking of human life. In this example, an 
ethical theme - concerning the value o f human life - achieves media attention without being 
intentionally mobilised by an organisation. Instead the organisation's actions themselves fulfil 
criteria of "news value" for a different reason: they are ethically contentious and constitute 
a public scandal. This enables the journalists to make the World Wide Fund for Nature into 
a headline news story.30
In addition to the front page article and editorial leader (WWF F  D), the WWF 
scandal is also covered in two mainstream Home news articles on the 4th September. Gun 
law rules in battle to save rhinos and elephants (WWF G) continues to reveal further 
"events" from the scandal on the front page. By contrast, Swiss headquarters financed
”  On the significance of linguistic structures in the news and the prominence of headlines that are produced 
by journalistic practices, see van Dijk (1985) (1991).
30 It is worth noting that both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace use a notion of the ’public interest* in 
their "blaming" strategies v. the Government. They "frame” existing Government actions and policies so that 
they are seen to be against the ’public interest’ (see b.i) above). In this case the ’public interest' is the notion 
that is used by journalists for criticising the activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature. This shows that 
defining the ’public interest’ is an important element for mobilising "blaming" strategies against other actors 
in the public discourse.
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through stocks and bonds o f companies in rainforest logging, nuclear weapons and pesticides 
Investments tarnish green image o f WWF (WWF E), opens the scandal "events" into a 
broader discourse on the ethical context o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s financial and 
conservation policies. The focus for public debate is whether the organisation’s activities are 
ethical. Journalists raise questions concerning the ethical criteria for the activities of 
environmental organisations. In this instance the public discourse assumes a role for 
regulating the ethical boundaries of environmental organisations’ activities. This shows that 
although organisations act specifically to define the legitimate ethical boundaries for sound 
environmental practices, their own activities are subject to the same process of legitimation 
in the public discourse. The example illustrates that when used as a strategic resource, public 
communication is a weapon that may possess a 'double-edged* blade.31
It is significant that the W WF scandal was launched in the daily newspaper with the 
strongest tradition for quality reporting on the environment in Britain, namely The Guardian 
(Lowe and Morrison 1984) (Elkington, Burke et a!. 1988) (Statham 1993). I noted earlier 
that in contrast to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature has 
a specialist public among the wealthy, rich and influential. The "bad" publicity of a scandal 
might potentially destroy the interest-basis of such a public. The media reporting and 
processing of the issues relating to the scandal "events" is o f vital importance for the World 
Wide Fund for Nature. It appears that The Guardian treats the scandal in a way that will 
cause minimum rather than maximum damage to the organisation’s credibility. This suggests 
that the World Wide Fund for Nature have favourable working relations with the quality 
press.
The September 4th front page article (WWF F) plus the article extending the scope 
of the scandal into an ethical question about the ethics of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
investment policies (WWF E) are both written by Paul Brown, The Guardian's Environment 
correspondent. Brown also covered the first scandal which was confined to the Environment
31 Like their targeted opponents the government and industry actors, the environmental organisations have 
the ethical boundaries of their activities subject to regulation by the public discourse. Despite the enhanced 
autonomy for the environmental organisations to communicate relative to other public actors, that has occurred 
due to their role as knowledge specialists in a field that has recently become a "topical” fixture on the media 
agenda, their communicative actions are still subject to the constraints as well as the freedoms of public 
discourse. This shows that the environmental organisations’ claims do not have a monopoly over environmental 
truths in the public discourse. There is more than one version of environmental truth seeking cultural 
legitimation.
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section (a.ii) above). In both cases the criticisms o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
activities are embedded in an elaborate description o f the problems faced by conservationists 
operating in Third World countries. Indeed the articles contain detailed information from 
internal reports on the organisation’s activities that has been "leaked'’ to The Guardian. In 
addition a selection of self-critical quotes from activists within the organisation are included 
in the reports. This indicates that the organisations are also supplying information for the 
scandal from within.
On the next day September 5th, a further two articles appear on the WWF scandal 
in the Home news section (WWF H I). In one Paul Brown is again the named reporter 
(WWF H). Whereas on the previous day he extends the scandal concerning the 
organisation’s ethical stance in specific conservation policies to a discourse on its financial 
activities and internal problems (WWF E F), today Brown reports that World Wide Fund for 
Nature has decided to sell its share portfolios in multi-national companies and re-invest in 
companies that meet the guidelines to be set out by a new ethical committee in the 
organisation. After exposing and opinion-leading on the scandal "news event", Paul Brown 
now breaks the news of the organisation’s ethical re-formation. With Brown’s compliance, 
Controversy forces rethink on Fund's investment policy. 'Unethical' firm s to be dropped by 
WWF (WWF H) serves as a vehicle for reconstructing the organisation’s image. This time 
the "news event" is that the organisation is making its practices comply with environmental 
ethics, the World Wide Fund for Nature is re-legitimising its activities.32 After the "bad" 
publicity on Tuesday, the "good" publicity returns on Wednesday. The journalist’s "blaming" 
strategies relent, but must first explain the deviance in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
scandalous behaviour. Who was responsible for making the organisation’s activities 
unethical? What was the cause? The answer to these questions comes in the other article on 
the same day (WWF I).
Tough-talking campaigner in the wildlife fund hot seat. Wednesday People (WWF I), 
profiles Charles de Haes the director general of the World Wide Fund for Nature. De Haes 
is presented as the man responsible for transforming the World Wide Fund for Nature from
32 By other critieria even the World Wide Fund for Nature's reformed investment practices might be 
considered unethical because they involve working within the system of international finance capital. The global 
system of finance capitalism is defined by more idealist environmentalists as the cause of global environmental 
problems and in particular those of underdeveloped nations. Clearly the World Wide Fund for Nature work by 
a more pragmatic definition for the ethical basis of their environmental practices.
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an organisation with an annual income o f less than two million to one of more than a 
hundred million pounds sterling per annum. Nonetheless, the article is unsympathetic to these 
achievements, and de Haes is blamed for pursuing single-minded policies that have split the 
organisation and resulted in the public scandals concerning its activities. In short, de Haes 
is "blamed" personally for the scandals. The article concludes:
"De Haes worked for the Rothmans cigarette group of South African 
industrialist Anton Rupert, a backer and trustee of the WWF, before taking 
the top staff job at the fund, initially on a secondment from Rothmans. Some 
colleagues say that M r de Haes may still feel more at home in the world of 
money than in the world of idealism." (WWF I)
In the first sentence de Haes’ personal qualities are placed in doubt by his association with 
two elements that have a unethical stigma attached to them in British culture: smoking and 
South African business. The second sentence not only "blames" de Haes for placing priority 
on the World Wide Fund for Nature’s financial rather than ethical stance, but also indicates 
that the re-emergence of the WWF "news event" was initiated by a faction within the 
organisation who opposed the policies that were being pursued under de Haes’ directorship. 
In this sense the WWF scandal is staged as a "news event" from within the organisation. A 
faction of the organisation worked in co-operation with a leading environmental journalist by 
"leaking" confidential information and providing quotes that were critical of the 
organisation’s recent activities.33 This set the agenda for a reception of the news scandal that 
would not
do the World Wide Fund for Nature permanent damage, whilst giving a front page exclusive 
to The Guardian*s environmental correspondent.
In this instance the public discourse was used by a faction within an environmental 
organisation for regulating the boundaries of the contentious ethical issues of its own
33 The graphic model shows that of the six articles covering the WWF scandal for the newsweek 
commencing 3rd September (WWF D E F G H I), all six reported information i  produced by the organisation, 
five included citations s  from WWF members, three were "news events" staged $ by the organisation - i.e. the 
faction opposed to the leadership, and the organisation was the stated source s  in two (see preliminary content 
analysis for environmental mobilisation indicators in B.6 above). This indicates that the organisation was not 
a passive observer but on the contrary a highly active in producing the news which reported its own scandal.
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activities. An internal conflict over the competing interests of fund-raising and campaign 
strategies appears in the mass media discourse. The dissatisfied campaign activists are 
utilising their contacts and resources for media communication in order to settle an internal 
dispute. In effect the WWF scandal "news event" is mobilised from within the organisation 
itself. By using this strategy public criticism of the organisation’s activities could not only 
be limited, but controlled and directed against the financial priorities of the current 
leadership.34 The seventh article in this exceptional week of coverage for the World 
Wide Fund for Nature occurs on the 7th September. Foreign Fields. Jan Rocha in Corumba 
Brazil (WWF J), is feature article that describes the difficult plight of the Brazilian Forest 
police who attempt to prevent the poaching of caiman in the Panatal, one o f South America’s 
ecological sanctuaries. The World Wide Fund for Nature’s reported activities are twofold: 
firstly, financing research for estimating the current caiman population and evaluating the 
importance of the species in the food chain of the area; and secondly, attempting to set 
guidelines for hunting, commercialisation and conservation, in association with CITES, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora. This 
combines themes relating the the case for ecology and preservation with supra-national policy 
interests. However, the organisation’s own activities "A" appear only as a subtext to the 
prominent issues of conservation and species preservation "E" and the responsibilities of 
indigenous and foreign Governments for restricting illegal trade "G". The organisation 
maintains a low profile within the narrative structure of the text.35 This article signifies a 
business as usual communication in the news agenda for the World Wide Fund for Nature. 
After the over-exposure of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s dubious activities during the 
scandals, the article serves to re-legitimise the organisation’s conservation strategies and 
highlight the special problems that are faced in pursuing conservation projects in Third World *3
u The internal resolution to the problem, namely the establishment of an ethical committee to decide on 
policies and the withdrawal of funds from multi-nationals, obviously took place prior to releasing the scandal 
"news event" as front page news to The Guardian. This "outcome" was probably settled in the aftermath of the 
first WWF scandal that occurred due to the investigative journalism of a television documentary programme 
(without a special environmental brief). Clearly, the "exclusive" information was released to a trusted and 
reputable environmental journalist to ensure that de Haes* directorship rather than the organisation itself took 
the brunt of the public criticism and de-legitimation.
33 The visual database indicates that the article WWF J has a high prominence environmental issues "E" and 
govemment/industry responsibility issues "G", but that those concerning the organisations activities "A" achieve 
only a relatively low prominence.
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nations.36
On the newsweek commencing 10th September, after the peak of the scandal "event", 
three articles cover the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF K L M ) .  The graph w .b shows 
that from being the context o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse during the 
scandal peak, the issues concerning the organisation’s activities "A" become the subtext, 
whilst the prominence of environmental issues "E” over government responsibility issues "G" 
is maintained. This shows the there is a shift in emphasis in the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s discourse pattern during the last week of the "prologue". The issues relating to the 
organisation’s activities now take on a low profile.37
I have suggested that the World Wide Fund for Nature enter the media agenda in 
relation to specific "news events". W hat changing conditions in the media agenda produce 
this transition in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse, whereby for the week 
commencing 10th September, environmental issues "E ” are the most prominent element in 
the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse pattern, followed by government responsibility 
issues " G '\  and finally "A" issues relating the organisation’s activities are a subtext!
The low resonance of issues concerning the organisation’s activities is produced by 
the ’normalisation’ of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse after the exceptional 
scandal "news event". This ’normalisation’ process not only means a continuation of the 
business as usual discourse like the article on the preservation of the caiman (WWF J), but 
includes a reconstruction of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s public image and a re­
legitimation of the conservation strategies which it promotes. For example Investors beware 
your money may not be going where you think (WWF L), appears in the City news section 
and covers the ethical reconstruction of the organisation’s financial investment policy as the 
subtext for describing the current options that are available to the ’ethical investor’. 
Considering the World Wide Fund for Nature’s dependence on individual contributions from
36 The campaign activities of the World Wide Fund for Nature for international conservation is well 
documented. For example, see the case study on the ivory trade ban by Princen (1994).
37 This transition in the World Wide Fund for Nature discourse pattern is also visible in the graphic model. 
From the text (WWF J) onwards there is a marked drop in the prominence of the discourse element "W" which 
refers to the organisation’s activities. For the discourse element which refers to the government responsibility 
issues "G”, the reverse is holds: they become more prominent in texts after (WWF J). In contrast the 
environmental issues "E" maintain a constant and prominent resonance over the sample. This indicates that after 
the scandals the government and industry actors tend to replace the those of the organisation as the "blamed” 
actors, whereas the environmental issues are a stable element regardless of which actor is held responsible.
the wealthy, this article is significant in that it tells a specialist public that the organisation 
is once more an ethically legitimate conservation actor.
A further article Eco Soundings. Marco solo (WWF K), performs the same purpose 
for the World Wide Fund for Nature but with its general environmental public. It appears 
in the ’environmental gossip’ section and describes how The Guardian have scorned 
approaches from the Italian Federation of Hunting who wanted to pay for information that 
could be used to damage the image of the World Wide Fund for Nature in Italy. The 
message is clear, whatever its recent problems the World Wide Fund for Nature is still a 
more legitimate actor than the Italian Federation of Hunting and has the support of The 
Guardian. Indeed both of these articles (WWF K L) confirm that the World Wide Fund for 
Nature has contacts with journalists in the quality press who are well disposed to giving the 
organisation favourable coverage.
Earlier I showed that during the late "prologueN phase Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace pursue "blaming" strategies that are oppositional but thematically constructive 
towards the Government policy agenda (b.i) above). The final article in the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s "prologue" Roads endanger ancient forests (WWF M), also comes into 
this category. It describes a report to be published jointly by the World Wide Fund for 
Nature and the Royal Society for Nature Conservation which criticises the threat to 1500 
wildlife sites by the British Government’s road building programme.38 This is the first 
article which is oriented towards setting the agenda for the White Paper "news event". It is 
the first occasion that the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilise a national conservation 
issue, and like Friends of the Earth’s and Greenpeace’s articles it is critical of the 
Government within a policy context. This example also shows that the World Wide Fund for 
Nature stages "events" for the media by releasing information directly to journalists rather 
than using strategies of direct action like Greenpeace, and to a lesser extent Friends o f the 
Earth.
The World Wide Fund for Nature’s "prologue" phase shows that even in times of 
adverse publicity, environmental organisations pursue strategies that enable them to influence 
the coverage of their activities on the media agenda. In this case the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s communication strategies were limited to setting the media agenda for their own
M The WWF’s entrance into national conservation disputes is a recent feature of its development 
(Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995).
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public scandal. In  fact I have shown that the World Wide Fund for Nature were able to exert 
considerable "definitional power" in the scandal discourse and co-operated with journalists 
to set the agenda for re-legitimising the organisation’s public image. Indeed the journalist’s 
sympathetic coverage of the World Wide Fund for Nature during the scandals indicates that 
the organisation has established contacts with specific journalists rather than seeking general 
access to the media agenda like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.
By using their special contacts with an environmental journalist the World Wide Fund 
for Nature was able to ensure an informed, reasoned and sympathetic coverage of the 
problems and internal disputes within the organisation. Indeed the public discourse was used 
as a self-cleansing process by the organisation. The environmental issues constituting 
conservation themes were themselves kept above public criticism. Not only did the scandal 
"event" serve for "blaming" the organisation, but also to raise a discourse on the problems 
of preserving rare exotic species - black rhino and elephant - in underdeveloped countries. 
The special difficulties for conservation projects in Third World nations were used by 
journalists as an explanation for the ethical blunders of the World Wide Fund for Nature. 
Indeed graph w .b shows that the environmental issues "E" achieve a high resonance at the 
peak of the scandal. In this sense the World Wide Fund for Nature’s primary environmental 
themes were even made to 'speak for themselves* through the scandal during the "prologue" 
phase. The World Wide Fund for Nature’s campaign themes were in this sense promoted by 
its own scandal. No article questions the validity of supra-national conservation projects per  
se.
The environmental problems on which the World Wide Fund for Nature campaign 
require little validation in the public discourse relative to those of Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace. Similarly, journalists require less convincing, either by scientific information 
or otherwise, about the legitimacy of moral claims for the preservation of species and habitat. 
The content o f the World Wide Fund for Nature’s environmental issues is less contentious 
than that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. Subsequently, the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s key campaigns may achieve access to specialist enclaves of the environmental media 
without the need for the organisation to overtly stage "news events". This is one reason why 
the World Wide Fund for Nature enters and leaves the media agenda in relation to the timing 
of specific environmental "news events".
Towards the end of the "prologue" phase the World Wide Fund for Nature recovered
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sufficiently from the scandal to start mobilising environmental themes for the forthcoming 
White Paper ’’news event”. At this time the content of its mobilisations shifted from a supra­
national to a domestic orientation: conserving the national countryside rather than preserving 
rare species in exotic habitats becomes the new focus. Like Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace, the content of the organisation’s discourse becomes critical of the British 
Government’s current environmental record within a national policy context. The 
mobilisation of national conservation themes was most likely co-ordinated, either formally 
or informally, with those by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace on other aspects of the 
environmental policy agenda. This example provides further evidence that there is a thematic 
division o f communicative labour among the major environmental organisations, at least in 
relation to special ”news events" on the environmental agenda.
c) The "News Event": blaming the Government
G raph D .II shows that the peak resonance of media attention for the White Paper 
"event" occurs in the three weeks commencing the 17th September (section introduction
D .l). For each of these three weeks there are more articles on the White Paper than the 
combined total number of articles referring to the two media-oriented organisations Friends 
of the Earth or Greenpeace.39 This phase is the "news event" peak of the White Paper 
"news cycle". The Government’s policy document This Common Inheritance was published 
and launched at a press conference on 25th September, 1990.
The "news event" phase o f the "news cycle" presents the opportunity for 
environmental organisations to perform as legitimators or de-legitimators for the policy 
proposals put forward by the Government. Indeed it is a special period o f environmental 
discourse because the journalists and editors will actively seek the opinions o f the 
organisations to evaluate the substantive contents of the Government’s policy proposals. This 
means that the media agenda will be unusually accessible to communications by the 
environmental organisations, without the organisations necessarily having to expend all their 59
59 The total for articles on the White Paper includes those that do not refer to any environmental 
organisations. The White Paper sample was collected using CD-Rom facilities and the titles, dates and news 
section of these articles are given in an appendix after the visual databases (section B). It is worth noting that 
they are concentrated within the "news event" phase. This indicates the short attention span for "events" on the 
main news agenda, immediate "events" being the substance of news.
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energies on media agenda-setting activities and inventing "news events". It is normal media 
practice for journalists to seek the opinions of interested parties when a political "event" 
occurs, and particularly an "event" for which they may lack specialist knowledge 
resources.40
The White Paper "news event" covers the emergent public policy agenda on the 
environment in Britain and dominates this phase of the news sample. As a "news event" it 
lasts three weeks. In order to retain a sense of chronology within the large number of articles 
in this phase, I divide the sample coverage into three sub-phases: 1. Prelude: the week 
before; 2. News event: The White Paper v. "the Dirty Man o f Europe"; 3. Postscript: the 
week after. Each of these sub-phases covers a newsweek.
c.i) Friends o f the Earth and  G reenpeace
The visual database shows that the "news event" discourse covers twelve active 
references to Friends of the Earth (FoE U to f  inc.) and seven to Greenpeace (Gpc M to S 
inc.). G raphs f.c  and g.c show that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have similar 
patterns of discourse mobilisation during the "news event" phase. Their discourse patterns 
are characterised by a trough of coverage on the week prior to the actual "event", a highest 
peak coverage for the week of the 25th September, followed by a further trough of coverage 
for the newsweek after the "event" which is even lower than that preceding it.
c .i.l) Prelude: the  week before
The troughs o f coverage on the week commencing 17th September (graphs f.c and
g.c), indicates a strategy by both organisations for leaving the Government uncertain as to 
what form their (de-)legitimising tactics might take during the White Paper’s press release. 
In other words, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are playing a "waiting game" with the
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40 In fact The Guardian did have a weekly Environment Section at this time and has traditionally provided 
a higher quality and quantity of specialist and general environmental coverage than other daily British 
newspapers (Lowe and Morrison 1984) (Statham 1993; 1994a; 1994b). Nonetheless environmental journalists 
were a recent phenomenon, most newspapers in Britain establishing the post c. 1988 (Anderson 1990, 1993). 
This factor combined with the "event" being the first systematic policy statement by a British Government meant 
that most journalists - and certainly all editors - relied on the organisations for specialist information and 
opinions.
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Government» saving their mobilisation potential to achieve maximum impact during the 
following "news event" week. As the movement’s media specialists, it is likely that this 
communication strategy was co-ordinated by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace and with 
the other environmental organisations.
On the week commencing 17th September, Friends of the Earth’s discourse pattern 
has a total resonance level that is lower than that at any time during the "prologue" phase 
(graph f.b), which is indicative of the organisation’s low key approach during the first week 
of the "news event". In this week Friends of the Earth refrain from "blaming" strategies that 
highlight current Government policies and instead mobilise one of their long running 
campaigns against the peat cutting industry (FoE V). Industry rather than Government actors 
are the "blamed" targets. The unusually high resonance o f the organisations’ activity issues 
"A" is not produced by the organisation staging an "event", but by an article reviewing the 
advertising tactics of charitable organisations* campaigns. Here Friends of the Earth’s 
activities are a prominent theme because a journalist makes their public relations, 
campaigning and fund-raising strategies a focus for public attention (FoE U).41
G raph g.c shows that Greenpeace has a low total resonance in the prelude to the 
"news event": the organisation also takes a low key approach. However, in contrast to 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace takes a direct campaigning strategy even in this 'low 
profile’ week. The organisation mobilises an article which takes a highly critical stance of 
the British Government’s support for the international trade in industrial toxic waste. Toxic 
waste imports boosted by illicit trade (Gpc M) has the same format as the earlier nuclear re­
processing (Gpc C G) and sea/beach health risks (Gpc L) articles, it makes a direct and 
critical comparison between the British Government’s record of policy implementation and 
those of other European and Western states. This confirms that when entering the discourse 
on public policy, Greenpeace have a tendency for criticising national policies within an 
international context.42 The "prologue" phase (b .i) above) showed that Friends of the 
Earth’s policy-related communication strategies tend to work against the Government from 
within a national perspective. This example shows that in contrast Greenpeace continue their
41 The discourse has a pattern that is unusual for Friends of the Earth whereby the activity issues "A" are 
the most prominent, followed by the environmental issues "E" and then the government responsibility issues 
"G" (graph f.c).
42 See findings of section C above.
strategy from the late "prologue" phase, but on a lower key scale: they use explicit policy- 
related "blaming" strategies against the Government.
c.i.2) News Event: The W hite Paper versus "the Dirty M an of Europe"
c.i.2.1) newsweek: an overview
Both Friends of the Earth’s and Greenpeace’s discourse peak for the sample occurs 
at the week of the White Paper press release, commencing the 24th September (graph D .II). 
For this week Friends of the Earth has the following discourse pattern: government 
responsibility issues "G" are the most prominently mobilised, followed by the environmental 
issues "E" and the organisation’s activity issues "A" which are equally resonant (graph f.c). 
Greenpeace’s discourse pattern is similar to Friends of the Earth’s, but with minor 
qualifications. The elements in the Friends of the Earth discourse structure are more 
integrated than that of Greenpeace. For Greenpeace the government responsibility issues "G" 
are a more dominant element in the discourse, and the activity issues "A" are more 
prominent than the environmental issues "E" (graph g.c).
The high resonance of government responsibility issues "G" in both cases indicates 
that the discourses most likely consist of "blaming" frames directed against Government and 
Industry actors. Similarly, the higher prominence of government responsibility relative to the 
other two issues in the Greenpeace discourse indicates that Greenpeace target and "blame" 
these actors more explicitly than Friends o f the Earth. In addition the issues concerning the 
organisation’s activities "A" achieve a higher resonance than the environmental issues "E" 
for Greenpeace. This indicates that the Greenpeace discourse is based on actors, i.e. 
Government and Greenpeace, at the expense of raising the environmental themes.
I shall show that this discourse pattern represents Greenpeace’s prime "blaming" 
strategies, where they place themselves in direct confrontation with their targeted opponent 
actor in the public discourse. These Greenpeace "blaming" strategies reduce the 
environmental discourse to Greenpeace versus Government, a clash of actors with clear 
personalities: the "goodies" versus the "baddies". By comparison the environmental themes 
are a more integral part of Friends of the Earth’s discourse (graph f.c), which shows that 
they remain a prominent semantic element within the discourse structure even when Friends
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of the Earth are "blaming" the Government.
The "news event" phase is an exceptional occurrence, at no other time during the 
previous two phases of either organisation’s resonance do government responsibility issues 
"G" contextualise the discourse. This shows that the content of the two organisations’ 
discourse patterns is shaped by the special circumstances and pre-requisites of the White 
Paper. The exceptionally high total resonance of government responsibility issues and 
predominance of Government actor "blaming" frames, shows that the two environmental 
organisations strategically "timed" this pattern of discourse mobilisation to coincide with the 
White Paper. In this phase of the news discourse Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace appear 
in their role as de-legitimisers of the Government actors in the White Paper "news event". 
But how do their communications differ and combine in performing this role? To what extent 
are their strategies co-ordinated, and in relation to which common or individual aims and 
objectives do they act?
There are nine references to Friends of the Earth (FoE W to e) and six references to 
Greenpeace (Gpc N to S) in the week of the White Paper "event". Four articles produce 
active references to both organisations (FoE X/Gpc Q; FoE Y/Gpc O; FoE Z/Gpc P; FoE 
c/Gpc R). This high number of combined references to the two organisations confirms that 
their communication strategies are co-ordinated to work in unison for this special "event". 
In addition, the close association of their patterns of discourse mobilisation at the peak of the 
"event" shows that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace "work" as different limbs in the 
same sector o f the British environmental movement, that based on action in the news media. 
The two organisations communicate - together and apart - in the same discourse field and are 
linked by journalistic associations to the same environmental "news events". This supports 
the thesis that for the British case, it is legitimate to talk of a division o f communicative 
labour both by and within the different sectors of a single "environmental movement".
I discuss the White Paper newsweek for Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace in two 
parts: headline news and news reports
c.i.2.2) Headline news: leading opinions
4J This division of the newsweek is chronological and by news genre, but by neither strictly. Indeed 
combining these two factors the distinction is more by types of discourse narrative content or in van Dijkian 
(1985) (1991) terminology "thematic macro-structure’ of news.
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Friends o f the Earth open the week’s communication on The Guardian's front page. 
Chickens drop into generation game (FoE W ), concerns the Department of Energy’s selection 
of renewable energy projects. The article links the environmental theme of renewable energy 
sources - wind, wave, solar, and methane - with problems of nitrate river pollution and the 
ethics of "battery hen" food production. This unusual combination of diverse energy and 
agriculture themes in a single "package" enables Friends of the Earth to re-mobilise two of 
their two prime campaign fields from the "pre-event" phases (FoE H L S T). The 
mobilisation of a  multi-issue "package" serves to highlight the organisation’s key campaign 
themes in a single prominent communication. The high prominence of these environmental 
themes sets the public agenda for the reception o f the White Paper proposals.44 If their 
significance merits front page exposure, then what new proposals will the Government’s 
White Paper provide in these fields?
Here the environmental themes ’speak for themselves’ but in a news structure that is 
more prominent and open to a wider audience than Friends of the Earth’s normal coverage. 
To reach the front page of an opinion-leading newspaper with key themes on the day before 
the White Paper marks a considerable campaign achievement. It is similarly significant that 
Friends of the Earth "frame" a direct criticism of the Government’s de-regulation policy for 
the electricity industry - in terms of its low insistence on renewable sources - as a sub-text 
within the renewable energy theme. The organisation thereby re-mobilises one of the 
govemment/industry responsibility contexts with a high prominence in its campaign 
repertoire, namely the environmental consequences of the Government’s de-regulation of the 
electricity industry (FoE S).
I have shown earlier (b.i)) that electricity privatisation is one of Friends o f the Earth’s 
key policy-related target fields. Although the government responsibility issues "G" achieve 
only a relatively low prominence, the text’s position on the front page means that it has a 
high accessibility to the readership. It is improbable that an Editor would allow front page 
exposure to a more prominent target field directly criticising the Government, unless it might 
be reported as a specific scandalous "event" and the newspaper had independently legitimated 
the news sources. The front page coverage indicates that on the day prior to the White Paper
44 The text-structure of the article gives a highest prominence to the environmental issues ”E '\ a relatively 
high prominence to the activity issues "A" and a relatively low prominence to the government responsibility 
issues "G" (visual database).
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launch environmental information has a higher "news value" than usual.45
Environmental organisations are normally confined to their own sections of the 
newspaper and have their own "news structures". To reach front page headline news the 
article has to emphasize the ’novelty* of chicken excrement becoming a Government 
sanctioned source of energy production. By making this association Friends of the Earth adds 
to the "news value" of the topic. Friends of the Earth uses the media curiosity about this 
"event" as an opening for mobilising a strategically timed reminder of its own favoured 
environmental policy options to a public that is wider than the Government actors. Clearly 
Friends of the Earth’s priority is to brief specialist and general publics alike for receiving the 
Government document. At this stage it is too late to influence the contents of the White Paper 
and environmental organisations had been pursuing strategies for that task for well over a 
year.46 This piece of headline news is the only reference to either Friends of the Earth or 
Greenpeace on the day prior to the White Paper. It ranks as a successful communication by 
subtly engaging The Guardian to give high reader accessibility to Friends of the Earth’s pre­
set environmental agenda and targeted policy fields, whilst appearing seemingly at the 
initiative of the newspaper journalists rather than the organisation.47
Greenpeace makes headline news on the actual day of the White Paper "news event", 
the 25th September, 1990. Environment Secretary scorns Britain’s 'dirty m an’ tag - 
Greenpeace ’b ias’ puts Patten in rage (Gpc N), appears on page two of The Guardian, a 
prominent position in the "news structure". Whereas Friends of the Earth uses the ’novelty’ 
of the themes to raise the "news value", Greenpeace’s communication strategy makes the 
White Paper into a scandal "news event". Greenpeace literally ’hit the headlines’, the
45 In media analysis "news values" are regarded as the intersubjectively constructed categories to which the 
producers and readers refer for determining the significance of "events” in relation to their "news structure". 
For an overview see Fowler (1991).
46 This is confirmed by interview data with the activists in the environmental movement for the EUI Project: 
No.42.
47 As a quality newspaper The Guardian also has agenda-setting/agenda-buildinginterests that may be served 
by authoritatively entering the environmental debate. Communications such as this example of headline news 
may be produced by a combination of different and competing interests between the source, media and target 
actors. In this case The Guardian may have been giving high prominence to the environmental agenda to 
compete with The Times which had actively decided to lead against the Government over The White PapeT. This 
also shows that the news accessibility structure for environmental organisations is determined by factors beyond 
their control. Their specific communication strategies work within the limits of the access to the public discourse 
which may be available to them at any one time.
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organisation appears in the title of the article.4* It is worth noting that the headline of the 
article reproduces an opposition between two actors: the Environment Secretary Chris Patten 
versus Greenpeace. This finding confirms that of the overview (c.i.2.1) above), where the 
discourse pattern at the "news event" peak indicated that Greenpeace’s news content is based 
on the actors - the Government and Greenpeace - rather than the environmental themes. 
Indeed the headline indicates that the contest which is reconstructed in the article between 
Patten and Greenpeace concerns the value of the White Paper. "The Dirty Man of Europe" 
is the name of Greenpeace’s "report" on the British environmental policy record, that was 
launched the day before the White Paper and subsequently reported on the actual day of the 
White Paper’s release. The ’dirty man’ refers to Greenpeace’s version of Britain’s 
environmental record under the present Government. The environmental policy agenda in 
Britain is not the outcome o f  a contest between two actors, Greenpeace versus the 
Government. Even among the environmental organisations, Greenpeace is less involved in 
the national policy agenda than Friends of the Earth. Why then is the launch of the first 
environmental policy agenda in Britain reported as a personal confrontation between 
Greenpeace and the Environment Secretary?
Interpretation of The White Paper v. "The Dirty M an of Europe" episode requires 
reference to background contextual information. The prominence of Greenpeace at this stage 
of the debate is explained by the overall strategy that was co-ordinated by the British 
environmental organisations towards the White Paper. Greenpeace are able to act as the 
public figurehead for the environmental movement at its launch, enhancing its prestige and 
public image, whilst other organisations which in the long term seek constructive gains within 
the environmental policy field take a less directly critical stance against the Government. The 
"event" is a special case of a public policy agenda-setting strategy that was co-ordinated by 
the environmental organisations.
"(T)he decision we took about the White Paper was .. we couldn’t influence 
what went into it, but we could influence the climate o f opinion into which it 
was received, and to make sure that was pretty hostile, very critical and well 
inform ed...It was sort o f agreed that Greenpeace would act like .. shock- 4
44 On the semantic role of headlines in the structures of news see van Dijk (1985) (1991).
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troops, so that the others would be able to .. do their thing. And we decided 
that the basic thing to do was to take the attention o f the press back before the 
White Paper was launched to the unsolved environmental problems that the 
country still had .. So then the way that we decided to do that was to use this 
thing "The Dirty Man of Europe", this id e a /49
Greenpeace commissioned a "report" from the environmental media relations 
organisation Media Natura that listed seventeen reasons "Why Britain remains the Dirty Man 
of Europe" (Greenpeace UK 1990). This report was published on the 24th September, but 
only after selected political journalists had been primed with "pre-publication" copies of a 
second report that the organisation did not launch publicly. The purpose of the unlaunched 
report was to frame the political debate of the environmental policy agenda with the 
Greenpeace version. Political journalists were given opinions and preconceptions that they 
need not attribute directly to Greenpeace when reporting the White Paper "event".
"(W)hen they were asked to respond by their desk, critically, they would use 
our phrases, our ideas..If you launch something, they’d have to report the 
news as the launch, the event that was happening. Because it wasn’t launched, 
they didn’t have to report it like that."50
This strategy for ’subterfuge* of leading opinion in the news discourse was complemented 
by the "The Dirty Man of Europe" report which was launched for reporting as the ’official’ 
Greenpeace line: this is Greenpeace’s staged headline "news event" for the White Paper.
Achieving media attention was the prime strategy behind commissioning these 
"reports". The reports are factually accurate, but were never meant simply to be a translation 
of scientific findings into public information, the usual criteria for an environmental "report".
49 Chris Rose interview EDI Project No. 42, December 1990 (Interviews conducted by Bron Szerzynski and 
used with permission by Project Director Klaus Eder). Rose is a key actor in the 'dirty man* affair. His 
organisation Media Natura Ltd produced the publications for the Greenpeace "reports". Material is taken from 
his own in depth study on the pollution problems facing Britain published in 1990. Perhaps not surprisingly this 
polemic is entitled The Dirty Man of Europe: the Great British pollution scandal (1990). This nonetheless shows 
that the 'dirty man' "package” was researched and mobilised as a cultural frame from within the environmental 
movement.
30 Chris Rose interview EUI Project No. 42 , December 1990.
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The criteria for launching the reports was not simply informative, but prejudicial. ’Dirty 
man’ is a cultural frame that Greenpeace mobilised to prejudice the perceptions of those 
whose task is to assess and lead opinion on the value of the White Paper.51 The Greenpeace 
label calling Britain the "Dirty Man o f Europe" invokes a cultural frame that attaches a 
stigma o f shame to the nation. It is perhaps one of the best examples of how environmental 
organisations use culture as a resource for strategically framing political debate. The 
"reports" served as a vehicle for covertly mobilising a "symbolic package" that other key 
actors might use simply for de-legitimising the White Paper. In effect Greenpeace were 
legitimising their own ’culturally biased’ version of the White Paper in the public 
discourse.52
The Thatcher Governments had been adept at using their own version of the national 
image as a moral justification for monetary based policies - e.g. the appeal for a return to 
Victorian values in "Enterprise Culture" (Keat and Abercrombie eds. 1991) (Comer and 
Harvey eds. 1991). By referring to Britain as a ’dirty man*, Greenpeace are able to use the 
national image against the Government. Greenpeace make Britain "The Dirty Man of 
Europe" and challenge the Government to extend their nationalist convictions into the field 
of environmental practice.
"Britain: the Dirty Man of Europe" makes environmental values an essential element 
for the vitality o f the nation. For years the Government had attributed the same prestige to 
economic values within national culture. The Greenpeace label cleverly reverses the priorities 
of the Government’s image of a national culture based on ’market individualism* by claiming 
that the Government’s unsound environmental practices has brought "shame" on the nation. 
The ’dirty man’ example shows how environmental organisations mobilise and "frame" 
elements o f a national culture for strategic political aims in the public discourse. In this case 
an organisation uses the popularity of environmental themes in Britain as a cultural resource 
for playing off environmental values against economic values.
The main contention of the organisations’ campaigns had been that policies for market 312
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31 On the significance of "din* as a threat to the "purity" of the symbolic order of societies, see Douglas 
(1966) (197S) which I discussed in detail earlier in section A.
32 On social movements and the mobilisation of "symbolic packages", see Snow, Benford et al. (1988), 
Gamson (1988) and for a critical overview Eder (1992; 1995), and Johnston (1992). On ’cultural bias’ see 
Douglas (1975) and for an analytic application to actors in a policy field, see M. Thompson (1988).
regulation were unsuitable remedies for environmental "problems".53 In this instance ’state 
intervention’ is re-legitimised as a policy option by making the nation’s "shame" a moral 
claim of higher authority than the Government’s monetary policy priorities. Furthermore this 
’effect’ is achieved in the news discourse without directly raising the environmental themes, 
but by stating polemical and one-sided culturally biased ’truths’ about the condition of the 
environment. The critical "frames" mobilised by Greenpeace and their consequences for the 
White Paper became the real "news event". The White Paper launch was made into the 
revelation of a national scandal over the condition o f the environment in Britain. This shows 
that not only were the environmental organisations acting to set the media agenda, but were 
effectively using the "event" to shape the national public discourse on the environment. The 
organisations were shifting the emphasis of the policy debate to the condition of the 
environment to establish this as a vital element within the national political culture. This 
shifted political debate to a basis on which the organisations are longstanding "experts” and 
the Government relative "newcomers".
The headlining dispute between Greenpeace and the Government is a staged "event” 
that environmental organisations had designed with the intent of totally de-legitimising the 
Government’s White Paper. The headline news "makes" the Government’s environmental 
record into a "scandal" (Gpc N). Despite the emphasis on the White Paper v. "The Dirty 
Man of Europe” scandal, the article mobilises environmental themes relating the British 
imports o f nuclear and toxic waste, carbon dioxide emissions and global warming, sea­
dumping of industrial and nuclear waste, mineral prospecting in the Antarctic, and sulphur 
dioxide and acid rain emissions. As in the case of Friends of the Earth’s headline news (FoE 
W), this serves to repeat Greenpeace’s pre-"event" agenda for environmental claims (Gpc A 
C F I J M). Similarly, Greenpeace’s norm for single-issue specific mobilisations is broken 
to meet the communication priorities of the White Paper "event". Unlike the Friends of the 
Earth case however, the environmental thematic content is a secondary dem ent to 
Greenpeace's "blaming" strategies in the headline news communication. The example also 
indicates that Greenpeace tend to frame issues within a supra-national/global rather than a 
national context. Even Greenpeace’s criticisms of the national policy record is maintained
53 The internal Governmental reasons for the “failure" of the White Paper proposals were reported as the 
inability of the Environment Minister to convince his Cabinet colleagues to prioritise environmental concerns 
at the expense of monetary policies for economic growth. The Guardian 30/04/90.
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within the broader context of a comparison with other European nations, sic "The Dirty M an 
of Europe".
Whereas Friends o f the Earth’s headline news the day before focuses on the 
environmental issues "E" (FoE W), Greenpeace’s invention of a "scandal" made it possible 
to mobilise government responsibility issues "G” at a high prominence in the news structure 
on the actual day o f the "event". The staggered "timing" and range of contents that appears 
in these two examples of headline news confirms that Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 
were combining their communication strategies to achieve maximum impact on the national 
policy agenda. They were controlling the supply o f environmental information to the news 
agenda and shaping the perceptions o f journalists, the public and Government actors, whilst 
at the same time prioritising their own cultural bias o f the "policy event" in the public 
discourse.
The Government’s "new" environmental policy agenda had been effectively de- 
legitimised in the public discourse before the day of its actual launch, i.e. prior to any 
reports or public discourse evaluating the document’s contents. This had been the 
strategically co-ordinated intention o f the environmental organisations. Rather than slipping 
into the journalistic habit of overstating the importance of single "events" - and particularly 
those associated with Greenpeace - the headline news ’dirty man’ "news event" should rightly 
be seen in the context of the agenda-building activities that had been pursued by the 
environmental organisations for over a year. It was only the final coup de grace in a de­
legitimation process of the policy document that had been co-ordinated by the environmental 
organisations. Public agenda-building had already pre-set the tone for the White Paper, but 
the scandal re-sharpened the critical focus of the discourse.
"People did not sit down with wide open minds on the Tuesday Morning to 
listen to what Mr Patten had to say. They sat down with a bunch of 
preconceptions ... It was a much more alert and informed and awake audience 
than is normally the case. And that made it harder for the DoE54 to get away 
with things that it might otherwise have got away with...(T)here was a great 
deal o f context setting that went on. There was a lot o f briefing that went on.
54 Department of the Environment.
196
The NGOs appreciated the importance of the White Paper, and communicated 
the importance of the White Paper, very very effectively - to lots of different 
audiences, including the media. They also communicated the fact that they 
expected it was going to fail to live up to its expectations... That’s context 
setting .. the NGOs played a large part in the context setting. There was 
nobody else doing it. The opposition wasn’t doing i t .. the newspapers weren’t 
doing it. Their job was to report, not to challenge or criticise."55
The media agenda had been pre-set and pre-informed by the covert activities of the 
environmental organisations. Journalists were able to provide better questions than the White 
Paper could provide answers without even needing to inform themselves on the actual details 
of the new policy agenda. The "Dirty Man" rhetoric became the legitimate version and 
journalists evaluated the White Paper using symbolic frames taken directly from the 
Greenpeace "reports".
c.i.2.3) News reports: balancing views
In conjunction with the headline news, the peak of the "news event" achieves an 
additional type o f coverage, the news reports that evaluate the White Paper’s proposals. This 
media discourse provides another opportunity for the environmental organisations to mobilise 
opinions and stage events that de-legitimise the Government’s environmental policy 
proposals.
Greenpeace’s "Dirty Man o f Europe" headline news mobilisation is combined with 
a further press report on the same day, the 25th September. The media-gossip column Diary 
reports the Environment Secretary’s anger at Greenpeace’s ’dirty man* claims, and then 
describes how other environmental organisations including the World Wide Fund for Nature, 
Friends o f the Earth and the Green Alliance have been invited to breakfast talks with the 
Minister whereas Greenpeace have been omitted (Gpc O, FoE Y).
This orchestrated combination of headline news and "media gossip column" by 
Greenpeace, illustrates the organisation’s desire to target political decision-makers and
ss Tom Burke interview EUI Project No. 42 , December 1990.
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opinion-leading journalists in different genres o f news. It further underlines the media 
orientation o f Greenpeace’s ’dirty man’ communication strategy. At the same time the 
organisation’s opposition to the Government is "framed" in a way that promotes the 
Greenpeace image as an uncompromising, cavalier and stylish public actor.56 It constitutes 
a successful public relations exercise for the Greenpeace. The "media gossip" article on the 
"Dirty Man" scandal (Gpc O, FoE Y) depicts Greenpeace being excluded from talks with the 
Environment Minister, whereas Friends of the Earth are included along with the Green 
Alliance and the World Wide Fund for Nature. This presentation suits the image of both 
organisations and the needs o f the different movement sectors. Whereas Greenpeace’s 
headline news attack on the Government had effectively destroyed the possibility o f a  
successful White Paper press launch, Friends of the Earth and the other organisations 
maintain direct communication links for making claims with the leading policy actors. The 
different strategic priorities o f the organisations are served in one mobilisation of news.57
Greenpeace preserve their image for challenging powerful Government actors and 
"bearing testimony" only to the destruction of the world58, whilst Friends of the Earth and 
the other environmental organisations deal with the more pragmatic task of re-constituting 
a policy agenda for the ’immediate’ environmental problems in British politics. This example 
illustrates a co-ordinated division o f communicative labour within the environmental 
movement. The special opportunity presented by the White Paper had made such planning 
and co-operation a prerequisite of activities by the environmental organisations.
"(T)he NGOs had ran a fairly consistent campaign in a rather subtle way over
56 Sec the founder David McTaggart’s (1978) own book or other Greenpeace publicity, e.g. The Greenpeace 
Story (1988), which document the organisation’s direct actions in similar picture-book ’adventure' style 
narratives. 1 develop the discussion on the Greenpeace use of "public image" in the analysis of explicit framing 
devices and discursive stunts which appears in the next section E).
57 The ’visible* public appearance of the organisations’ actions in the news structure - in which Greenpeace 
are divided from the other organisations - is different from the strategic dimension of their actions which were 
’collective’ in the sense that they were intentionally, if only temporarily, co-ordinated for the short-term event. 
This example shows that the organisations use the news structure as a field for mobilising claims that have a 
’collective’ as well as ’individual* strategic basis in the environmental contest between them and the 
Government.
s* This is an example of the "David and Goliath" narrative which is a key element in the Greenpeace image 
and often also makes a "story" with a high "news value" content. Of course no one remembers what David and 
Goliath fought about, only who won. In the same way "winning" the public legitimation contest against 
Governments is of prime importance for Greenpeace image.
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a year, to focus on the White Paper, and to come up with at least some sort 
of understanding of the politics of it before eleven o ’clock on the morning of 
the publication. So that’s why you didn’t get a whole bunch of NGOs saying 
different things."59
Two further joint references to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are made in articles on 
the 25th September, the day of the White Paper launch.
Sparks fly  in the great debate - The issue o f nuclear power has always been a hot 
potato (FoE X, Gpc Q) appears in the Environmental section of The Guardian. It is a 
journalist’s reconstruction of the public discourse on nuclear power with "for" argumentations 
attributed to British Nuclear Fuels pic and the Atomic Energy Authority and "against” 
argumentations to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. This article simply restates the 
"pros" and "cons" of nuclear power from a neutral position. Indeed the article has a "news 
structure" that is typical of those initiated by journalists where the author remains neutral and 
opposed opinions are balanced according to the criteria of ’objective reporting’. The text was 
most likely prepared in advance by the environmental journalist and released to coincide 
directly with the White Paper launch, when the editorial demand for environmental news is 
higher than usual.
The analysis of the agenda-building activities of Greenpeace and Friends o f the Earth 
has shown that the nuclear power ’yes or no1 debate is not a key national target. Despite 
occasional general references to the national nuclear energy theme (Gpc A D), the 
organisations tend instead to format their anti-nuclear claims as specific contexts o f radiation 
"risk" problems that result from the Government’s inadequate actions. For example, in the 
national arena, six articles refer to the poor regulation/implementation standards of 
Government policy for nuclear dumping and re-processing (Gpc C G #3 N; FoE M Q). This 
shows that the organisations campaign on specialised dimensions of the nuclear debate related 
to specific ’events’.
The 'nuclear yes or no* debate is an old fashioned contest in the British environmental 
discourse. It dates from the public inquiry at Windscale and the Greenham Common protests 
over a decade ago. Public opposition and mass demonstrations against the building o f nuclear
59 Tom Burke, Interview for EUI Project No.42, December 1990.
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power stations and sites for nuclear weapons made the nuclear issue the first highly 
politicised and contentious environmental issue in Britain.60 The opposed lines of argument 
and boundaries of this debate are well known, it is neither difficult nor controversial for a 
journalist to reconstruct them. As a contentious national ’event’, public opposition to ’the 
nuclear’ per se  is no longer news. Instead environmental organisations today tend to raise 
specific regulatory aspects of "risk" technology or the global dimension o f the nuclear 
question as contentious political issues (see earlier content analyses in section C). That the 
journalist chooses an unimaginative and pre-established dimension of the nuclear debate - 
"nuclear power: yes or no" - shows that it is the organisations rather than journalists who are 
more likely to serve as ’primary definers’61 in the selection, "packaging" and framing of 
environmental themes for the news discourse. Indeed the "news value" o f this article occurs 
in the specialism of the environmental journalist rather than the newsworthiness of a 
contentious political claim. The article appears courtesy o f the editorial requirement for 
environmental news on a day of specific strategic importance for the environmental agenda 
in Britain.62 This article nonetheless confirms that Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace are 
legitimate actors whose opinions are ’routinely* reported in environmental news, even if their 
own immediate initiatives focus elsewhere. In addition, it shows that their former primary 
campaign topics are now common knowledge and an established element of Britiah public 
culture.
Another combined reference to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace occurs during 
the coverage o f the Green Party’s Conference which took place on the same week as the 
White Paper "event" (FoE Z, Gpc P). Although unrelated to the White Paper "event", this 
article is also produced by journalistic ’reporting’ criteria. It contrasts the scale o f activities 
and depth of resources of the two organisations to the impotence and amateurism of the
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60 On the anti-nuclear movement in Britain, see Ruedig (1992) Murphy (1984). For a detailed case study 
on the Windscale public inquiry, see Wynne (1982).
61 On the concept of a 'primary definer* in news discourse see the work of Hall et al. (1978). For a critique 
that extends the notion to discuss the strategies of source actors, see Schlesinger (1990). Anderson (1993) 
applies this perspective to the case of environmental news.
a The Guardian's environmental journalists are well briefed. The decision not to lead on an theme that is 
contentious in the political discourse on the environment may indicate an editorial decision to remain 'neutral* 
and objective rather than an ignorance of contemporary environmental debate. The journalist's interest is served 
by retaining working contacts with Government as well as organisation news sources.
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British Greens. This indicates that the British media considers the environmental 
organisations to be more legitimate actors in the environmental discourse than the Green 
Party. Not only do the media take the organisations’ opinions seriously, but Greenpeace and 
Friends of the Earth have established contacts and are well disposed to coverage in the press. 
The British media even appear to find the staged events and repeated stunts of the 
organisations endlessly interesting, and a permanent source of news. In contrast the British 
Green Party is seldom treated with respect, and usually with ridicule, even in instances where 
its activities may be as ’novel’ as the organisations’ stunts.
The last of the four articles which mentions both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 
appears on the 26th September, the day after the White Paper release. As the title Mixed 
reaction from  the critics (FoE c, Gpc R) suggests, this is the environmental correspondent’s 
report on the reception of the White Paper. The news report serves to ’balance the views’ 
of the Government and interested parties concerning the White Paper, namely the 
organisations. In this case the organisations act as "pressure groups", legitimate actors in the 
environmental discourse whose specialist interest makes them authoritative commentators. 
The news reports their opinions as a ’balance' to the Government position. In fact the 
organisations had pre-determined a strategy for uniting their different views in opposition to 
the White Paper. The special opportunity of the White Paper served to unite the diverse 
organisations into a single voice and is an important episode in establishing the contemporary 
British environmental movement.
"Even though they all said different things and all preserved their separate 
identities, they all said things that added up to the same point. That’s because 
they’d all been talking to each other the previous year, specifically about how 
they would handle that. Now that was also unusual in NGO terms - the first 
time I can recall that happening. So you’re dealing with a very untypical 
thing. It may not be untypical of the future, but it’s certainly untypical of the 
past."63
In this article (FoE c, Gpc R) the different sectors of the movement once more criticise the
a Tom Burke, Interview for EU! Project No. 42, December 1990.
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policy document in unison, with each organisation focusing on its specialist campaign field. 
Whilst the Friends of the Earth spokesperson highlights the deficiencies o f regulatory policy 
targets for fuel and vehicle efficiency, Greenpeace’s Lord Melchett damns the inadequacy 
of the whole Government environmental policy agenda.64 For the movement’s two prime 
media-oriented actors, this again confirms a division o f communicative labour between the 
more pragmatic, incremental and policy-related Friends o f the Earth strategies and the 
indignant Greenpeace ’actor targeted* confrontations. In this instance the other sectors of the 
environmental movement also share in co-ordinating the public discourse’s ’official’ 
opposition to the Government.
During the remainder of this newsweek Greenpeace appear in only one further article. 
Two days after the White Paper "event" a media-oriented Greenpeace stunt re-mobilises the 
"Dirty Man of Europe" scandal. The actual stunt involved smuggling toilet rolls into 
bathrooms at the Department o f the Environment offices and the Institute of Directors. Each 
piece of paper was printed with seventeen points detailing why Britain is "the Dirty Man of 
Europe". Clearly such a ’novel’ "event" was newsworthy but this time Greenpeace did not 
seek a headline news genre. As in the article documenting Greenpeace’s exclusion from the 
’internal’ Government discussions (Gpc O), the target audience for this mobilisation is the 
’media gossip’ readership.65 The Greenpeace staged event explicitly "blames" the 
Government’s inaction in the policy field. However, this delegitimation strategy works 
through the media agenda, it makes the whole White Paper discourse into a ’joke’ by 
exposing the official policy community to public ridicule. There is no articulation of any 
substantive themes, relating to either the White Paper or the environment. The British 
Government policy-makers are ridiculed by Greenpeace who at the same time boost their own 
public image. These shock tactics are designed to resonate shortly and sweetly, and prolong 
the Greenpeace victory of the ’dirty m an’ "news event" on the media agenda.
In this mobilisation, Greenpeace return to a strategy of discourse subterfuge. The 
organisation wants people to talk about their ’dirty man* success. Its target audience is not 4
44 Not surprisingly government responsibility issues "G" have the highest prominence for both organisations 
in this text (FoE c. Gpc R) (visual databases). See also the discussion of the explicit framing devices in the next 
section E.
w The article raises high prominence government responsibility MG” and organisation activity issues "A” 
simultaneously (Gpc S) (visual database), which provides a further example of the actor-based 'Greenpeace v. 
Government* narrative structure of Greenpeace mobilisations.
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simply the general public, but the opinion-leaders. The hope is that this media ’event’ might 
filter through into everyday talk o f decision-makers. The example shows that Greenpeace 
have a wider repertoire of strategies and employ more resources than other environmental 
organisations for setting the media agenda. Their primary target is the media rather than the 
policy agenda for the environmental discourse.
"(O)ne of the people in the Institute of Directors found it and phoned up the 
Guardian Diary, you see. So it sort of goes like a virus, that filters out. The 
only object was to get people in the, sort of, gossiping classes to talk about 
’The Dirty Man of Europe*...to get the phrase into a sort o f common 
parlance, but with a specific group of people, who are the friends, relatives, 
husbands, wives of the image-builders of the political parties, so that they 
would begin to think "we have a problem with this thing, ’The Dirty Man of 
Europe’."66
This added salt to the Department of the Environment’s wounds that had already been opened 
by Greenpeace’s direct confrontational stance. They had been surprised and totally outflanked 
by Greenpeace, who exerted a knowledgeable and controlled use of the media beyond that 
of the policy-makers. As Greenpeace vanished from the scene their deconstruction of the 
White Paper to "the Dirty Man of Europe" was the media’s favourite version and common 
public knowledge.
As the Environment Minister and Department of the Environment returned to the 
drawing board in the wake o f a humiliating public relations defeat, the media agenda was set 
for other environmental organisations to mobilise constructive policy proposals. After a lower 
key profile than Greenpeace at the press launch, Friends of the Earth’s mobilisation campaign 
picks up towards the end of the week. Friends of the Earth re-enters the discourse at the start 
of the reconstruction phase of policy options in news reports. This indicates that Friends of 
the Earth take a more disciplined engagement in the media agenda on environmental policy 
than Greenpeace. In the remainder of the week four references appear to Friends of the Earth 
(FoE a b e d ) ,  including the one already discussed which occurs with Greenpeace (FoE c,
66 Chris Rose, Interview EUJ Project No.42, December 1990.
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Gpc R).
Balancing act civilises media circus - M ichael White on the unexpectedly restrained 
press launch o f the Patten blueprint yesterday (FoE b), appears on the 26th September, it is 
the political correspondent’s review of the previous day’s White Paper ’’event". This article 
discusses the ’failure’ of the Environment Minister’s Bill in the political personalities genre 
which is typical of reporting on policy "events" and ministerial actors. Like the 
environmental affairs or. the nuclear issue (FoE c), this specialist political affairs coverage 
is initiated due to the high "news value" of the White Paper "event". The political 
correspondent enters the environmental discourse solely to cover the political implications 
of the "event". The environmental organisations appear as "pressure groups", the 
correspondent’s lack of a briefing on the environment permits little else. However, Friends 
of the Earth’s presence in this political affairs news discourse confirms their status as a 
legitimate spokesperson on the national environmental policy agenda. The organisation is 
cited disclaiming the suggestion that it acted to discredit the White Paper before its launch. 
This public dissociation from Greenpeace is a ’half-truth’ which indicates Friends o f the 
Earth’s intention to remain in contact with the policy-makers and its aspiration to an 
’internal’ role in the national policy discourse.
Not ju st white but deathly pa llid  (FoE a), Friends of the Earth’s own critical 
assessment of the policy document is also mobilised on the 26th September. Like 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth stage a discursive stum which aims to frame the opinion- 
leading evaluation of the White Paper. Instead of ’dirty man’ scandalmongering, Friends of 
the Earth mobilises a discursive framing device which relates the Government’s lack of 
definitive commitments to action in the White Paper. The organisation’s peak "blaming" 
strategies take a more constructive form than the Greenpeace criticisms.67 Friends of the 
Earth’s discursive strategy involves undertaking a public content-analysis of the Paper. The 
framing device is that the White Paper should be judged by its verbs:
"(O)ne searches in vain for hard pledges introduced by such verbs as
67 This article integrates the environmental "E", government responsibility "G" and organisation activity 
"A" issues at the same relatively high text-prominence level (FoE a) (visual database). This is indicative of a 
text-structure thaï is more 'balanced' between "actor contests” and environmental issues than Greenpeace's 
mobilisations.
implement, establish, enact. Instead on global warming the Government 
promises to encourage, promote, monitor or press for; on the countryside it 
pledges itself to endorse, review, consider and consult; and on towns and 
cities it will encourage and promote. This is not an action programme it is a 
discussion paper." (FoE a)
The environmental themes mobilised by this article concern: global wanning, energy, 
cars/lack of public transport, low quality of water, pollution tax proposals, conservation of 
hedgerows, beach pollution, and acid rain/sulphur dioxide pollution. These themes repeat 
earlier campaigns and reproduce them within a policy-related national scope. The criticisms 
levelled at the Government relate to its lack of policy implementation and formation rather 
than its choice o f proposed fields for the environmental policy agenda. This shows that 
Friends of the Earth is keen to mobilise its environmental claims within a constructive 
context for government responsibility issues.
Friends of the Earth explicitly name three elements that are absent from the 
Government’s commitment to an environmental agenda: public expenditure; regulation; and 
a national strategy (FoE a). Interestingly these three elements reconstruct the potentiality for 
an ’interventionist’ environmental agenda. After Greenpeace’s ’dirty man* label has culturally 
de-legitimised the Government’s free market philosophy at the "event", Friends of the Earth 
expose and play-off the same contradiction between economic and environmental values in 
this reconstruction of a potential role for Government as a ’legitimate environmental actor’. 
The message is clear: to become a legitimate environmental actor the Government must 
renounce market economics as a solution to environmental "problems". On this the two 
highest profile "experts" on environmental action in the public discourse, Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace, are unanimous.
The timing and content of the Friends of the Earth critique confirms that the 
organisation has less antipathy for the potential of Government as an environmental actor 
than Greenpeace. Whereas Greenpeace’s cultural populism targets the Government as the 
enemy, Friends o f the Earth take a pragmatic realist stance to the possible benefits of a 
Governmental environmental agenda. Friends of the Earth’s criticisms of Government are 
subsequently framed in policy contexts. Unlike Greenpeace, the organisation is not opposed 
to the principle of Government action. Friends of the Earth is more likely to mobilise an
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alternative range of policy options.
"An unfettered market cannot deal with pollution. Long-term planning, 
domestic and international regulations and agreements, as well as financial 
incentives such as taxes, subsidies, incentives, grants and permits, are all 
essential if the Planet is to get the protection it requires. Mrs Thatcher is now 
struggling to adapt to these new political imperatives of environmentalism, 
which are in stark contrast to the deregulation and individualism that she has 
promoted during the 1980s. This is why we have had two years of discordance 
between her green words and actions * a green credibility gap which is 
separating the public from the politicians.
A major chance to close this gap was missed. The 1990 White Paper,
This Common Inheritance, which Environment Minister Chris Patten has said 
would ’define the orientation of our environmental policies into the next 
century’, was mainly a disappointing reiteration of current policies. More 
optimistically, we note that the exercise may have sown the seeds for greening 
o f the government machine. The Cabinet-level committee established to co­
ordinate the production of the White Paper will remain."68
In fact both Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace knew in advance that the content 
of the Government’s policy proposals would fall short o f the Minister’s much vaunted 
promises. Indeed they had made considerable efforts to ’talk up’ expectations for the White 
Paper to make its ’failure’ appear more devastating.69 The organisations combined the 
different contents o f their mobilisations with specific timing strategies, so that each 
communication would have maximum critical impact on the Government. Greenpeace’s task 
had been to destroy the Government’s credibility on the day of the ’event’, now Friends of 
the Earth starts re-constructing the options for a better policy agenda. The boundaries for
“  David Gee, Director, Friends of the Earth, October 1990 (Friends of the Earth 1990).
w The Minister for the Environment Chris Patten had promised a revolutionary package at the previous 
Conservative Party Conference, 1989, hoisted largely by Mrs Thatcher’s petard. For a detailed review of the 
events from 1988 to the White Paper, see Lowe and Flynn (1989), Rose (1990), Flynn and Lowe (1992). On 
the environmental policy agenda in Britain, see O’Riordan (1988) for prior to, and Grove-White (1993) for after 
the White Paper.
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environmental policy options were being re-drawn to coincide more closely with the interests 
of the organisations. The "shift*1 from a de-construction to a policy re-construction strategy 
started within the newsweek o f the "event". Whereas Greenpeace staged the Toilet roll’ event 
to re-mobilise their White Paper disclaimers (Gpc S), Friends of the Earth’s special 
communication needs require a more subtle strategy.
Toronto’s anti-pollution drive - Does Chris Patten’s blueprint deserve admiration or 
abuse? Stephen Cook finds that Toronto’s planners are more ambitious (FoE e), is a feature 
article that appears later in the week. Here the Canadian Friends of the Earth organisation 
are described chairing the Toronto City Council’s Advisory Committee on the Environment. 
Toronto City Council have started to implement radical and integrated environmental policies 
and Friends of the Earth have a direct ’internal’ role in the decision making. Behind the 
comparison with the Government’s White Paper lies the suggestion the British decision­
makers could follow the same strategy.
This example shows that in contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth’s "blaming" 
strategies criticise through the semantic content of the constructed themes - environmental 
and policy - rather than de-Iegitimising the Government’s credibility as an "actor" in the 
environmental field by public ridicule. Both organisations accuse the Government of 
"inaction" on the policy front, but they mobilise their criticisms as "blaming frames" in 
different ways.
The final Friends of the Earth reference this week is not linked to the White Paper 
"event". It concerns a local group campaign against sea gravel dredging by marine 
prospectors which is damaging the beach at Filey (FoE d). This reference was probably co­
ordinated rather than initiated by the Friends of the Earth central office. As in the pre- 
"event" phases, industrial rather than Government actors are targeted as the responsible 
culprits.
c.i.3) Postscript: the week after
The graphs f.c and g.c show that the last week of the "news event" cycle produced 
very little resonance. Indeed Friends o f the Earth appears in one article and Greenpeace in 
none (graph D .II). After leading and balancing opinion on the White Paper during the peak 
newsweek, the organisations are allowing journalists and editors to write about the policy
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future o f the environment.
The Friends of the Earth article mobilises environmental themes relating to the health 
risks of diesel exhaust emissions and nitrogen oxide and acid rain pollution (FoE f) 70 The 
government/ industry responsibility context concerns the new regulatory standards of the 
European Community and diesel engine technology, both are deemed inadequate. In this re- 
mobilisation o f its proposals for a policy agenda, Friends of the Earth relinquishes the 
possibility of directly attacking the national policy context. The EC and the motor industry 
are the targets whilst the Department of the Environment licks its wounds and re-assesses the 
consequences of a public relations defeat. The article repeats the organisation’s low profile 
mobilisation pattern where environmental themes are allowed to "speak for themselves", but 
adds a policy twist.
c.ii) W orld W ide Fund for N ature
The visual database shows that the "news event" discourse covers five active 
references to the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF N to R  inc.). G raph  w .c shows that 
like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse 
pattern is characterised by a peak coverage on the week o f the White Paper press launch, 
25th September. In contrast to the discourse patterns o f Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, 
this does not constitute the peak coverage during the White Paper "news cycle" for the World 
Wide Fund for Nature. The World Wide Fund for Nature’s peak coverage occurs during the 
"prologue" phase due to the exceptional circumstances of the WWF scandal "news event" 
(b.ii) above).
c .ii.l) Prelude: the week before
On the week prior to the White Paper "news event" the World Wide Fund for Nature 
does not receive any coverage (graph w.c). Three interrelated factors may account for the 
low public profile of the organisation during this week.
Firstly, the World Wide Fund for Nature needs to promote its activities with caution 10
10 These environmental issues "E" are highest prominence which indicates that they contextualise the other 
discourse elements in the text (FoE f) (visual database).
following the "bad publicity” received during the newsweeks o f the scandal. The organisation 
is still in the process of re-legitimising the public image of its activities. Secondly, the World 
Wide Fund for Nature’s media coverage tends to coincide with specific "news events" that 
are reported by the media. In a week prior to the White Paper launch journalists are not 
likely to attribute a high "news value" to "events" relating to supra-national conservation, 
which are seen as a specialist environmental concern rather than a general concern of national 
interest. Thirdly, it is plausible that the World Wide Fund for Nature’s absence from the 
media agenda is co-ordinated with the low profile communication strategies of Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace. Earlier, I showed that prior to the "event" the different organisations 
tacitly co-ordinated their strategies for de-legitimising the Government’s environmental 
agenda. The World Wide Fund for Nature’s interest and the united interests of the movement 
are served by co-operating with the two media-oriented organisations for the White Paper 
"event".71
c.ii.2) News Event: The W hite Paper versus "the Dirty M an of Europe"
In the White Paper "news event" week government responsibility issues "G" are the 
most prominent element in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse pattern (graph w.c). 
As in the cases o f Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, this confirms that the organisation’s 
White Paper "news event" discourse highlights the responsibilities of Government. What 
types of communication does the World Wide Fund for Nature produce in the White Paper 
"news event"?
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace both "peak" on the week of the White Paper 
"event". For this newsweek the World Wide Fund for Nature’s resonance is high, but lower 
than its peak resonance which occurs during the scandal "news event" (b.ii) above). This 
indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature are less involved in the immediate news 
discourse of the White Paper launch than the two media-oriented organisations. The 
organisation has less propensity to enter the media discourse in relation to specific political 
"news events". A further difference is that issues relating to the World Wide Fund for
2 0 8
71 Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace keep an unusually low profile in the prelude newsweek. This ensures 
that their specialist communication strategies maintain a ’surprise element’ for the discursive attack on the 
Government in the White Paper "event".
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Nature’s activities "W" are a less prominent element o f the discourse than for Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace in the White Paper newsweek.72 The World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
own activities are not a prominent element in the discourse. In comparison to Friends of the 
Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature keeps a low profile as an "actor" 
in the White Paper ’’event". The organisation does not stage "events" which are designed to 
shape the immediate "news value" of the political "event". Unless compelled to do so by the 
pre-requisites of an internal crisis the World Wide Fund for Nature does not actively seek 
media coverage in relation to specific peak "news events". It does not attempt to make 
headline news. Given this less active role in "making the news" than Friends of the Earth 
and Greenpeace, how does the World Wide Fund for Nature communicate at the peak of the 
White Paper "news event”?
Four articles cover the World Wide Fund for Nature on the White Paper newsweek 
(WWF N O P Q). These occur in successive days from the day of the White Paper launch 
on the 25th September.
In the first two articles the World Wide Fund for Nature appears with both Friends 
of the Earth and Greenpeace. The articles Diary (WWF N FoE Y Gpc O) and M ixed reaction 
from  the critics (WWF 0  FoE c Gpc R) are specialist news reports on the ’White Paper v. 
Dirty Man of Europe’ "event”. In the first case the reported "news event” is Greenpeace’s 
’dirty man* scandal-mongering actions and in the second it is the Government’s White Paper 
press launch. They are written by The Guardian's gossip columnist and environmental 
correspondent respectively. Earlier I showed that this news report format serves to report 
"events" by ’balancing the views’ of the Government against their legitimate critics (see 
c.i.2.3)). In the ’media gossip’ article the organisation is invited with Friends o f the Earth 
and the Green Alliance to attend internal talks with the Environment Minister on the morning 
of the press launch. The ’news value* o f the piece is that Greenpeace has been excluded: the 
Minister no longer considers Greenpeace a legitimate "pressure group".73
In the environmental report on the ’dirty man* launch a World Wide Fund for Nature *13
72 The graph w.c shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature has a hierarchical discourse pattern for the 
week commencing 24th September. The government responsibility issues "G" are more prominent than 
environmental issues "E", whereas the issues relating to the organisation’s activities "A” are a subtext of the 
discourse.
13 As I mentioned earlier, this division suits both those organisations which aspire to ’interest group’ status 
in the environmental policy field and Greenpeace which does not.
spokesperson is cited criticising the White Paper for the lack of policy measures for 
protecting national wildlife habitats. The organisation’s opinions are reported as part of the 
journalist’s evaluation of the ’success/failure’ of the public reception of the Government’s 
launch. Here the organisation’s specialist voice rings in tune with those of the other 
movement sectors by critically opposing the White Paper policy proposals. I showed earlier 
that this united opposition was co-ordinated by the organisations for the "news event". It is 
also worth noting that the World Wide Fund for Nature’s criticism focuses on a national 
policy field. This confirms that the organisation’s communication is shaped by the White 
Paper "event".
In both cases the World Wide Fund for Nature is represented as a "pressure group" 
in British politics which acts within the bounds of interest group practices. In the second case 
it uses this status to "blame" the Government for the inadequacy of its policy proposals in 
the organisation’s specialist field.
Chinese 'flouting rhino ban ’ (WWF P) and Hugh Synge continues our occasional 
series on endangered plant species with a report on the Cafe matron, the rarest plant in the 
world. Fencing with extinction (WWF Q) appear later in the "event" newsweek. Neither 
article mentions the White Paper. After the unusual policy claims-making opportunities in 
the national agenda, the World Wide Fund for Nature returns to a more familiar supra­
national campaign field. The first article claims that Chinese pharmaceutical industries are 
contravening the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) by 
selling medicines containing rhino horn to South East Asian countries (WWF P). This 
extends the theme of rhino preservation into a supra-national policy context. The second tells 
o f the plight of a World Wide Fund for Nature botanist in attempting to preserve the Cafe 
m anon from extinction in the remote island of Rodrigues, east o f Madagascar (WWF Q).
This shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature combines the role of acting as a 
national "pressure group" with promoting its specialist supranational environmental concerns 
in the "news event" week. Just as Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace re-mobilise their 
campaign agendas in the aftermath of the White Paper v. ’Dirty man* "event", the World 
Wide Fund for Nature shows similar concern that the focus o f environmental news does not 
preclude its ’normal' supranational campaigns.
The environmental theme of the preservation of rare species is a highly prominent
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element in the discourse patterns of the two articles.74 This shows that the World Wide 
Fund for Nature raises claims about the responsibilities o f Government in the media 
discourse through the semantic content of environmental themes rather than by actor-based 
"contests", such as the *WWF versus Government* format. The organisation identifies 
government and industry responsibility contexts by elaborating the environmental themes. 
Avoiding controversy is made easier by species preservation not being a nationally contested 
environmental theme.75 Rather than "blaming" Government "actors" the World Wide Fund 
for Nature raises the preservation theme in relation to a supra-national policy field.76 The 
World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises its key environmental theme in a way that highlights 
an opportunity for Government to support its actions by applying pressure at the supra­
national governmental level. This subtle communication strategy sets the public agenda by 
identifying a hidden possibility for the Government to act. In effect the organisation is 
inviting the Government to contribute to and assist its actions as a supranational "pressure 
group".
At the same time the organisation uses this phase of high media concern to further 
re-legitimise its return to business as usual communication. The articles re-legitimise the 
World Wide Fund for Nature as a key national and supra-national actor in its specialist 
environmental field. In addition the preservation theme is mobilised as a legitimate action 
context for both the organisation and the Government. It enables the World Wide Fund for 
Nature to aspire to the status of a supra-national level "pressure group", whilst highlighting 
an as yet underdeveloped policy field where the Government may purposefully intervene at 
both the nation and supra-national levels. Whereas Greenpeace "blames" the Government 
actors and Friends of the Earth criticises by constructing an alternative policy agenda, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature defines an arena for possible future co-operation between 
themselves and the Government at a supra-national level.
74 The visual database shows that environmental issues "E" are high prominence in article (WWF P) and 
highest prominence in (WWF Q).
75 Unlike ‘risk’ themes, such as radiation or toxic waste pollution, which are based on scientific uncertainty 
at the by-products of technological production, a claim referring to the extinction of a species is less disputable 
and controversial.
w The creation of new political spaces at the supranational level is a key activity of the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (Princen and Finger 1994).
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c.ii.3) Postscript: the week after
Like Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature has less 
coverage in the week following the White Paper "news event" (graph w.c). Earlier I stated 
that this partial withdrawal from the media agenda was orchestrated by the movement to 
enable the journalists to evaluate the White Paper "news event". In this week a further article 
refers to the World Wide Fund for Nature.
Chaos threatens climate conference (WWF R), deals with the supra-national 
intergovernmental attempts to regulate the preservation of forests, and reduction of carbon 
dioxide and CFC emissions, within the environmental theme of global warming. A World 
Wide Fund for Nature spokesperson is cited commenting on the negotiating problems faced 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in building an agenda for a global 
warming convention. This article continues the trend in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
discourse pattern from the end of the "event" newsweek. In this case, however, the 
preservation issue only appears as an element of the global warming theme. In effect the 
subordination of preservation to the global warming theme extends the World Wide Fund for 
Nature’s discourse. Global warming makes preservation a "contested" and policy relevant 
environmental theme. Accordingly the World Wide Fund for Nature enters into constructive 
criticism on the supra-national governmental level.77 This example shows the World Wide 
Fund for Nature acting as a "pressure group" at the supra-national level. The organisation 
is staking a claim for a role in the emergent supra-national regulation of environmental 
problems.
d) The "Epilogue”: signs for the fu ture?
The "epilogue" phase of the White Paper "news cycle" occurs from the week 
commencing 8th October, until the end of the survey sample (graph D .II). This discourse 
constitutes a special phase in the agenda-setting/agenda-building activities o f the 
environmental organisations. After discrediting the Government’s White Paper proposals the 
organisations start mobilising the environmental themes and govemment/industry
77 The article has a combination of high prominence environmental issues "E" and government responsibility 
issues "G" (visual database).
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responsibility contexts which re-define the future policy options for the British environmental
agenda.
The mass media concern for the environmental concerns generated by the White Paper 
"event" decreases as the topic’s peak "news value" status declines. Nonetheless specific 
sections of the media take a more specialised interest in environmental affairs. They start 
evaluating the consequences of the new changes for each specific interest field and public 
policy arena.
The "epilogue" phase is the last chance for environmental organisations to re-mobilise 
"packages" for their own favoured policy agenda before environmental affairs return to 
business a s usua l status. The news agenda in this phase is constituted by news reports which 
evaluate the longer term ’effects’ o f the White Paper. It presents an opportunity for 
mobilising specialised environmental claims as policy-related "packages"78 that may be 
picked up and used by the journalists who have to report on the ’future consequences* of the 
White Paper on a specific field. At the same time this reconstructed policy "package" may 
filter through to the next generation o f decision-makers by becoming the informed and 
authoritative version for advancements in environmental policy.
d.i) Friends o f the Earth and Greenpeace
The visual database shows that the "epilogue" discourse covers fourteen a c tiv e  
references to Friends of the Earth (FoE g to t inc.) and ten to Greenpeace (Gpc T to c inc.). 
Graphs f.d and g.d illustrate the "epilogue" phases of the Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace discourses. Whereas Friends of the Earth rises to a peak in the third week o f the 
"epilogue", Greenpeace’s discourse pattern has a general tendency to decrease steadily during 
the last phase o f the "news cycle". This indicates that the "epilogue" discourse has a different 
’news value’ for the two organisations. It provides a different structure o f access to the news 
and a different context for communication possibilities. For Friends of the Earth the 
"epilogue" is an important phase for mobilising environmental claims. In contrast
n  To recap: an environmental claim is a specific "package* that combines the elements of environmental 
issues "E", government responsibility issues "G", and issues relating to the activities of the organisations "A". 
It is not simply an environmental issue but has a social context of production - namely the environmental contest 
between actors - which shapes the boundaries and significance of its semantic meaning.
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Greenpeace’s decline in resonance indicates that the organisation returns to business as usual 
more quickly than Friends of the Earth. In the "epilogue" phase there are no prime 
environmental "news events" for Greenpeace to target, the organisation returns to staging its 
own "events".
As the "epilogue" is primarily an arena for specialist policy-related claims, this 
difference confirms Friends of the Earth’s closer affinity to national environmental policy 
affairs than Greenpeace. In addition it shows that Greenpeace’s coverage is regulated more 
by the immediacy of the actual "news events", whereas Friends of the Earth seeks media 
attention with the longer term aim of entering the decision-makers’ discourse on 
environmental affairs.
The "news event" peak (c.I) above) has shown that Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace have different communication strategies for influencing the environmental policy 
agenda through the media. Indeed the development of a national policy agenda appears to be 
a secondary concern to Greenpeace but a primary focus of concern for Friends of the Earth. 
This division  o f  labour is evident in a distinction in timing between their communications for 
the White Paper: when the Greenpeace "scandal-mongers" depart from the environmental 
news agenda, it is time for the Friends of the Earth "diplomats" to take up the reins.
This distinction is produced by the different contents of the organisations’ 
mobilisations, namely their respective ’public appearances’, rather than the strategic 
intentions of their communicative actions which were similar and well co-ordinated for the 
immediate policy event. The two media-orientated organisations ’hide* the direct links of 
their communications activities from the public discourse during the White Paper "event”. 
It is strategically important for them to appear distinct. Nonetheless, it is clear that Friends 
of the Earth’s and Greenpeace’s communication strategies are not only compatible but that 
they are specifically co-ordinated to be complementary to the respective and the common 
goals of the movement.
During the first newsweek of the "epilogue", commencing 8th October, Friends of 
the Earth and Greenpeace achieve similar patterns of resonance (graphs f.d and g.d). 
Relative to the last newsweek of the "news event" phase the two organisations achieve a high 
resonance. In both cases environmental issues "E" are the most prominent discourse element. 
This discourse pattern constitutes a ’shift’ from the "news event" peaks, where the 
government responsibility issues "G” are the most dominant element. It shows that on
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entering the "epilogue" phase both organisations revert to a strategy for making the 
environmental themes ’speak for themselves’ rather than using explicit "blaming" strategies 
against the Government. The organisations’ campaigns start to employ more constructive 
environmental claims vis-à-vis the Government actors in comparison to the "news event" 
peak. This indicates a return to more moderate communication strategies against the 
Government actors.79
The first newsweek of the "epilogue" phase is the peak for Greenpeace (graph g.d). 
Four articles are mobilised (Gpc T U V W).80 This produces a discourse pattern that is 
similar to Greenpeace’s business as usual peak on the week commencing 13th August (graph 
g.a). However, at the "epilogue" peak the three discourse elements are more closely 
integrated than they were in the earlier campaign. In the business as usual phase the issues 
relating to the activities of the organisation "W" were only a subtext and not an integral 
element in the discourse. Relative to the business as u su a l phase, this shows that 
Greenpeace’s "epilogue" communication maintains the activities of the organisation as a 
prominent discourse element. Rather than returning directly to business as usual 
communication, it appears that Greenpeace’s claims continue to promote itself as an 
environmental "actor" into the "epilogue" phase. Even after the "news event" peak 
Greenpeace’s role as an "actor" is emphasised in the discourse, but how does the 
representation o f Greenpeace’s ’public image’ shift in the "epilogue” phase?
M ersey p o llu te rs breached lim its 859  tim es (Gpc T) and Poland  ’used  a s dum ping  
g ro u n d 'fo r  to xic  w aste  (Gpc W) are texts which exhibit the same structure and "weighted" 
combination of discourse elements (visual database). The environmental issues "E" and 
government responsibility issues ”G" have a high prominence, and the organisation’s activity 
issues "A" a relatively low prominence. In contrast, G reenpeace to ld  to  leave N -Test site  
(Gpc U) and its untitled sequel (Gpc V) both make the issues relating to the organisation’s 
activities "A" the most prominent discourse element. Here the analysis o f the texts (visual 
database) indicates that there are two types of Greenpeace communication in this newsweek. 19
19 The 'shift* in the emphasis of the discourse is a continuation of a trend that is identifiable at its genesis 
in the later stages of the "news event” phase.
"  For the week of 8th October, Greenpeace’s environmental issues ”E M are more prominent than the 
government responsibility issues "G", and both are more prominent in the discourse than issues relating to the 
organisation's activities "A" (graph g.d).
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It shows that two different Greenpeace mobilisation strategies are employed simultaneously 
in the news discourse in the first "epilogue" week. In the first case, the actions of 
Greenpeace are less prominent.81 The articles criticise the discharge of industrial effluent 
into Britain’s rivers (Gpc T) and exports of toxic waste by Western European nations to the 
former Eastern Europe for dumping (Gpc W). Environmental themes are discussed in a 
policy context, but the British Government are not the explicit targets for these "blaming" 
strategies. Indeed for the national river pollution case, the "blamed" actors are multi-national 
chemical companies ICI, Pilkington, Laporte, and Shell. For the European toxic waste theme 
Western companies again take the "blame", whilst the European Community is urged to act. 
This marks a return to "blaming" strategies which do not simply discredit the British 
Government as an "environmental actor". In the second case, the actions of Greenpeace are 
more prominent.82 Two Greenpeace protest stunts "make the news". A Greenpeace ship 
confronts the Soviet Navy over nuclear testing in the Arctic (Gpc U), and Greenpeace 
activists stage a "suffragette" style direct action by chaining themselves to the Soviet 
Embassy in Berlin to protest about the same issue two days later (Gpc V). In contrast to the 
"news event" phase, these protest stunts are world rather than national "events". Indeed they 
mark a return to the famous traditional Greenpeace direct actions that first brought attention 
to the organisation on the global stage.83
Together these two Greenpeace strategies re-mobilise campaign themes that were 
prominent prior to the "news event" phase (Gpc C I J). In addition, Greenpeace not only 
refrains from explicit criticism of the British Government but it shifts the "blame" to multi­
national industries and the level of supra-national governmental regulation. After the 
exceptional "news event" weeks had tied its activities to the national context, Greenpeace 1*3
11 Here Greenpeace’s activity issues "A" are a subtext of the more prominent environmental issues "E" and 
government responsibility issues "G".
e  For these articles Greenpeace’s activity issues "A" are the context for the less (or equally) prominent 
environmental issues "E" and less prominent government responsibility issues "G" (Gpc U V).
13 This type of direct protest action is a key element of the Greenpeace public image. Greenpeace has used 
this global "David v Goliath" narrative since its origin, inviting the public to participate in a ’real’ adventure 
story. The organisation intentionally promotes this invitation for the masses to become pioneers in ’real 
adventures’ by documenting its actions in adventure story-book narratives. See for example Greenpeace HI: 
Journey to the Bomb (McTaggart & Hunter 1978), or Rainbow Warrior: The French attempt to  sink Greenpeace 
(Morgan & Whittaker 1986).
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needs to re-assert its "global" orientation.*4 At the same time it is important for Greenpeace 
not to become too closely identified with the national policy discourse which has dominated 
its recent "news events". Greenpeace must be seen to ’bear witness to the world % not the 
British environmental policy field. In effect Greenpeace is ’normalising’ its public image by 
a dual communication strategy. It is also worth noting that both types of Greenpeace 
communication are "actor versus actor" narratives that are pinned onto "news events". At 
the "news event” peak it was "Greenpeace v Environment Minister", now this becomes 
"Greenpeace v multi-national industries" or "Greenpeace v Soviet Government". In the latter 
cases the "blaming" strategies focus on themes in the environmental discourse rather than 
ridiculing the character traits of a Government personality. Nonetheless, this confirms that 
Greenpeace’s "blaming" strategies rely on "oppositional actor" narratives which are 
embedded in a newsworthy "event".85
Rather than mobilising a reasoned argumentation of the environmental problematic, 
Greenpeace communications tend instead to promote a high public profile for the 
organisation, as a newsworthy "actor". In other words, Greenpeace campaigns through its 
own public image - the themes of environmental problematic are raised as an element of the 
organisation’s own culture. Indeed the close semantic relation in Greenpeace’s news 
discourse between the organisation’s image and ’the environmental contest’ - environmental 
problematics appear through a filter of the narrative about organisation’s activities - indicates 
that its mobilisation strategies have an inbuilt populist orientation.86
As it aims to appeal to a general audience, Greenpeace retains the diversity to 
represent itself as more than one type of "actor" in the news. The organisation’s image must 
be able to speak with more than one "public voice" so that it may appeal to diverse elements 
of a general audience. These examples from the "epilogue" illustrate that Greenpeace’s public 
image is an important element in its communication campaigns. The river pollution and toxic 
waste themes show Greenpeace acting as a ’responsible’ environmental organisation. They
M Like the World Wide Fund for Nature, Greenpeace is a key actor in the emerging supranational level of 
environmental regulation (Princen and Finger 1994).
w I develop this point further in the next section E) on explicit framing devices.
86 That the environmental problematic is lodged as an element o f the organisation's image in the Greenpeace 
"package”, limits the discursive depth and range o f environmental issues in Greenpeace's news discourse. 
Subsequently, the organisation's communications are 'populist', they tend to target a general rather than an 
expert or informed audience.
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offer journalists and decision-makers a news story that highlights a problem area in the 
environmental policy field. The world-wide protest against nuclear testing is a traditional 
Greenpeace campaign, it is long running and without an imminent policy solution. As a news 
story, it serves to promote the Greenpeace tradition and the organisation’s longstanding role 
in popular culture as "daring pioneers".
The cases show that Greenpeace plays the fool and the legitimate "environmental 
actor" at the same time. These diverse roles require two different types of news story that 
run parallel to each other. This confirms both the high dependency of Greenpeace 
mobilisations on their "news value", and the high compatibility between the different 
Greenpeace "packages" and a specific genre of news story. It appears that Greenpeace’s 
mobilisation "packages" are specifically designed to make news stories about confrontations 
between actors. In addition, Greenpeace’s flexibility in tuning its image to specific 
communication priorities indicates that it exerts a considerable degree of "definitional power” 
over the way that its activities are reported by the media as news. This shows that 
Greenpeace primarily acts so that its "packages" of claims are deliberately tuned to the values 
of news formats. It is perhaps more successful than any other environmental organisation at 
shaping its own news coverage.
"(T)here are only a small number of stories, so you repeat them with endless 
variations .. I don’t know whether Greenpeace ever sit down and analyse this,
I bet they do .. I mean they are really good at the media .. (T)he more you 
can position your argument, the more you can position your issue in terms of 
a story, the more you are likely to get into the media. I mean, you need 
stories, that’s what it sells .. it doesn’t sell truth, that’s a l l .. vanity. They sell 
stories and they sell opinions. B u t.. only a small number of newspapers sell 
opinions. They mainly market stories and the environment’s a wonderful 
supplier o f stories..”87
Greenpeace’s "packages" maintain a high "news value" rather than a high quality of 17
17 Tom Burke, Interview EDI Project No. 42 , December 1990.
environmental information. Nonetheless, Greenpeace may be the prim ary d e fin e d  of its 
own news discourse.
Playing the fool and being a legitimate actor in the environmental discourse may 
become contradictory roles. If Greenpeace continues to place priority on the "news value" 
of a "package" relative to the quality o f environmental information, then the organisation 
may exclude itself from the environmental agenda in favour of simply making the news 
agenda. The advent of ’the environment* as a news specialism may shift the criteria of "news 
values" away from Greenpeace’s actor-based news stories.89 Instead the quality of 
environmental information may become a more prominent criteria of environmental news. 
The D aily T elegraph 's first environmental correspondent, Charles Clover, describes how 
Greenpeace’s mobilisation tactics may devalue the organisation’s long term credibility as an 
environmental news source:
"Far too often some of the pressure groups rely on questionable science, 
rather than commissioning their own independent research or getting to know 
the appropriate independent scientist. Greenpeace, just now, are the worst 
offenders. I am not alone in being heartily sick of yet another press release 
from Greenpeace - e.g. a recent one on ’Acid rain and human health’ - based 
on the findings of some unheard-of American scientist whose credentials are 
impossible to check out. Reporting scare stories unchecked just gets 
environmentalists, and environmental correspondents, a bad name. ,,9°
Similarly, The Independen t's Richard North claims that he no longer reads the material which 
Greenpeace sends him: *19
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u The organisation initiates, produces and 'packages" the information which is processed into news formats 
by journalists. The Greenpeace case is prime example of "definitional power" by a source actor in the news, 
an aspect of the communication process that has often been overlooked by media analysis (Schlesinger 1990). 
Indeed both Anderson (1991) and Schlesinger (1990) sharpen the concept o f prim ary d tfiner to focus on the role 
o f sources as actors who construct the content o f news.
19 In fact as the case o f the Brent Spar oil platform in 1995 indicates, Greenpeace’s stunts continue to 
achieve a high media profile simultaneously across Europe.
90 Clover C. (1988), Interesting but is it N ew s?, in Elkington, Burke, Hailes (eds.).
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"In the end I stopped reading it altogether because I thought.. while a bit of 
it will be right and it will all be for the greater good of mankind, substantially 
it will be wrong in its science or its evidence or its balance."91
This suggests that there may be a historical time limit on the "news value" of 
Greenpeace’s existing communication "packages". As journalists become better informed and 
more discerning, their reception of information from environmental organisations is likely 
to be more selective. In the citation above, Clover and North demand a more rigorous 
scientific validation for the organisations* environmental claims. For policy actors 'valid* 
scientific claims are the most legitimate basis for making arguments. Environmental 
"problems" are not only raised but must be founded in authoritative scientific knowledge. 
The emergence o f environmental journalism as a specialist field may simply indicate that the 
environmental discourse is becoming established on the political agenda. Nonetheless, such 
a change is likely in the long term to promote the "news value" of the type of organisations, 
like Friends of the Earth, with aspirations to be environmental policy actors. Indeed the 
"epilogue" phase o f the White Paper serves as a ’trial run* for such organisations to 
legitimate their policy-making credentials.
From the perspective that it is highly skilled at appealing to "news values", 
Greenpeace may be deemed the most subversive o f the media-oriented environmental 
organisations. Whether its campaign "packages" contribute as much as Friends of the Earth’s 
to raising the environmental discourse, in the sense of ’environmental consciousness’, is less 
clear.92 However, the emergence of a specialist environmental news field may force 
Greenpeace to re-dress or diversify the content of its mobilisations. Greenpeace specialises 
in news innovation. If it is unable to fulfil the specialist requirements of environmental 
journalists and become a full time legitimate news source, it seems likely that the 
organisation will be pushed to a non-specialist arena o f news. Indeed Greenpeace’s "story­
making" credentials make their mobilisations a perfect fit to the populist "news values" of 
the tabloids. Rather than existing at the margins of the specialist news field, it is more likely
91 Interview 15/03/89 cited Anderson (1991).
n  By 'environmental consciousness* 1 mean the cognitive praxis of the movement (Jamison, Eyerman et al
1990).
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that Greenpeace will extend their repertoire to the mainstream popular press.93
As in the case of Greenpeace, the "epilogue" phase enables Friends of the Earth to 
experiment in the special potential of a policy-orientated news discourse - a discourse that 
is more specialised than the ’normal* environmental coverage.
Friends o f the Earth’s first week in the "epilogue" phase has similar characteristics 
to that o f Greenpeace (graph f.d). Like Greenpeace, Friends o f the Earth appears in four 
articles (FoE g h i j). Once more the high prominence of environmental issues "E" shows 
that the organisation’s communication strategies aim to re-mobilise those issues that may have 
been obscured in the actor-based discourse of the "news event" phase.94
On the week commencing 8th October, Friends o f the Earth mobilises environmental 
themes concerning: renewable energy (wind) and landscape aesthetics (FoE g); river pollution 
by agriculture and industry (FoE h); fanning techniques and the use of agrochemicals (FoE
i); and risks to public health from Nuclear plant radiation (FoE j). These articles raise a set 
of environmental themes that were prominent in the Friends of the Earth pre-"news event" 
discourse. In a literal sense, they serve the function of a public reminder. Earlier, I identified 
this public reminder function as a feature o f Greenpeace’s early "epilogue". However, there 
is a difference in the rationale of the two organisations’ mobilisation strategies. In contrast 
to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth were more constructive than Greenpeace in their 
"blaming" criticisms of the Government during the White Paper "event". The organisation 
did not simply subject Government policy actors to public ridicule. As a consequence. 
Friends of the Earth do not need to re-legitimise their status as authoritative "actors" in the 
national policy agenda. Instead of attempting to re-establish its image with journalists as a 
"political actor", Friends of the Earth’s early "epilogue" has a different purpose. It sets the 
tone for the specific policy criticisms that will be mobilised during the next two weeks of the 
"epilogue" phase.
In the second and third weeks of the "epilogue" the government responsibility issues 
"G" are the dominant element in the Friends of the Earth discourse (graph f.d). On the
93 The tabloid press in Britain has already started to realize the potential of "environmental stories". For 
example, the Braer oil tanker disaster 1993 ran for two days on the front page of The Sun as a "story" about 
polluted birds. The D aily M ail's "Save Our Seals" campaign in 1988 is one of the first examples of the popular 
press leading with environmental news. (Love 1990) (Anderson 1993).
M This trend towards re-constructing the elements for an environmental agenda is also evident in the last 
week of Friends of the Earth’s "news event" phase.
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newsweek commencing 15th October, Friends of the Earth’s government responsibility issues 
"G" displace the environmental issues "E" as the most prominent discourse element. In the 
third week of the "epilogue", these government responsibility issues "G" rise to a peak 
resonance and become the context o f Friends of the Earth’s discourse.95 Graph f.d shows 
that this shift in emphasis occurs during the two weeks of the "epilogue" when Greenpeace 
fades away from prominence on the news agenda. The discourse patterns show that the 
"epilogue" is of greater strategic importance to Friends of the Earth than Greenpeace. 
Whereas Greenpeace simply attempts to remain on the general news agenda, Friends of the 
Earth presents its constructive policy-related criticisms in the ’specialist’ environmental news 
agenda. The exceptionally high resonance of government responsibility issues "G" indicates 
that Friends of the Earth’s discourse is composed of targeted "blaming" strategies during the 
"epilogue". But what form does this emphasis on government/industry responsibility contexts 
take? Who do Friends of the Earth "blame" for what, and how?
In these two weeks of the "epilogue" the information mobilised by Friends of the 
Earth takes a systematic critical approach to the environmental policy agenda in Britain. Two 
articles on the second week, describe Friends of the Earth participating in the Labour Party’s 
launch o f "An Earthly Chance" - the Opposition document on environmental policy (FoE k 
1). Friends of the Earth add legitimacy to the Opposition’s policies by their active presence 
at the press launch. Indeed this activity establishes Friends of the Earth’s credentials as a 
potential environmental policy "actor".96 The articles refer primarily to domestic 
environmental themes: the future o f nuclear power; roads and traffic; carbon dioxide 
emissions; energy conservation; river pollution and water quality; and food standards (FoE 
k 1). Friends o f the Earth’s favoured regulatory policy options are outlined for controlling 
emissions, water quality, energy labelling, "green" mortgages, recycling, car-taxes, and the
95 On the week commencing 22nd October, the government responsibility issues "G" are exceptionally 
prominent in the Friends of the Earth discourse. They are more resonant than any other discourse element at 
any time during the "news cycle* (except for “news event" peak). The government responsibility issues ’’G" 
are also considerably more prominent than the environmental issues "E” which indicates they are a type of 
*blaming” frame.
96 This repeats a story from the "prologue” phase where Friends of the Earth are reported to be in 
negotiations with Labour leaders over environmental policy options (FoE R, section b.l)). Here the reported 
Opposition policy agenda includes proposals on Friends of the Earth’s key campaign issues. This indicates that 
Friends of the Earth used the White Paper "event* as a way of establishing contacts and negotiating with the 
Opposition.
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building of new nuclear power stations. The organisation’s options are attributed a high 
profile and their participation is seen as a valued contribution to the policy-making process.
Friends of the Earth’s support for Labour’s environmental agenda gives it the 
opportunity to demonstrate its "interest group" credentials and embarrass the Government’s 
environmental policy-makers over their lack of consultation during preparation of the White 
Paper. The news discourse allows Friends of the Earth to experiment with the image of a 
legitimate environmental policy "actor". At the same time, Friends of the Earth are able to 
apply a constructive "blaming" strategy to the Government’s new policy agenda. The 
organisation defines a set of potential contexts for Government regulatory action, by 
highlighting environmental policy options that are different to those of the Government that 
have been de-legitimated by the White Paper "event".97 This indicates an attempt to ’court’ 
the influential decision-makers who will decide on any future policy directions that may be 
taken by the Government. Rather than simply binding its policy options to the alternative 
agenda o f the Opposition, Friends of the Earth are in fact attempting to reconstruct a new 
notion for an environmental policy agenda. The organisation is setting the boundaries of the 
discourse for a future policy agenda in British politics. Its "blaming" is critical but highly 
constructive.
For example, D raft prospectus fo r  pow er se ll-o ff leaked  (FoE r) and Cuts in  fa rm  cash  
nw ill cause exo d u s" (FoE s) appear at Friends of the Earth’s "epilogue" peak.98 In the first 
case, Friends of the Earth launch "secret" drafts of the Government’s plans for energy 
privatisation as an "event" for mobilising criticisms relating to the possible environmental 
consequences of the de-regulation proposals. In the second, the policy debate over the 
Government’s agricultural subsidises is used as an "event" for Friends of the Earth to 
criticise the use o f agrochemicals and farming practices. In both cases Friends of the Earth 
use "policy events" as an opportunity for mobilising environmental claims. Each time the 
environmental claim contests the Government’s regulation by market forces and offers 
’interventionist* alternatives. The organisation is able to shift the context of the debate to a 
focus on two o f its key policy campaigns, namely energy production and agricultural
91 This process of 'alternative specification' by interest groups for policy communities is an important aspect 
of the policy agenda-building process (Kingdon 1984).
98 These two articles have highest prominence government responsibility issues "G" (FoE r s) (see visual 
database).
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practices. At the same time environmental claims become a basis for defining the role of 
Government as a legitimate regulatory policy actor. Framing devices are mobilised which de- 
legitimise the Government's claim that the market and environmental regulation are 
compatible programmes. In effect the policy debates are re-orientated to a discussion about 
Friends of the Earth's favoured policy options and specialised interest topics. The spectre of 
an 'interventionist' state environmental policy is re-mobilised.
L ucas tu rn s b lind  eye to  w orries on diesel em issions (FoE p) and G reenpeace puts  
com pany in dock  (FoE q Gpc a) appear on the same week. These articles combine high 
prominence environmental issues "E" with high prominence government responsibility issues 
"G" »  ¡n the first article, Friends of the Earth "blames" the motor industry for not 
developing technological innovations that comply with environmental standards. Policy 
targets for cutting emissions appear as a critical sub-discourse to the main "blaming" 
strategy. In the second article, Albright & Wilson, a multi-national chemical company are 
"blamed" for illegally discharging waste into the sea and the implementation of European 
regulatory emissions standards appears as a critical sub-discourse. In this case Greenpeace 
stage an "event" to "blame" the Industrial actor, whereas Friends of the Earth relate the 
environmental theme to the national policy context.9 100 Once more Friends of the Earth 
shifts the discourse to a policy context where the organisation has a policy alternative. 
Industrial rather than Government actors are explicitly "blamed", but in a way that highlights 
a 'potentiality' for the Government to regulate industry's environmentally harmful activities 
through the policy formation and implementation process.
This shows a difference between the "blaming" strategies of Greenpeace and Friends 
of the Earth. Greenpeace "blames" the Government "actors" at the "news event" peak, 
whereas Friends of the Earth’s "blaming" strategies operate principally in the aftermath of 
the "news event". Friends of the Earth’s "blaming" strategies are policy constructive. Indeed 
the organisation employs reason  rather than ridicule in its "blaming" strategies. This
99 In contrast to the articles (FoE r s), these two only have high rather than highest prominence government 
responsibility issues "G" (FoE p q) (visual database). This indicates that for (FoE p q) the government 
responsibility issues "G" are highly prominent but are more integrated with other discourse elements in the text 
than (FoE r s). In other words, the environmental issues "E" are more prominent than in the policy debate.
It is reported that Friends of the Earth have referred the Government to the European Commission 
because the cadium discharges from the chemical works exceed the limits of an European directive (FoE q, Gpc 
a).
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complies with the need for Friends of the Earth to establish itself as a potential actor in the 
policy field. Whereas Greenpeace led the environmental movement through the brief moment 
of media glory at the White Paper "event", Friends of the Earth are more influential in 
setting a critical but rational tone for re-evaluation o f the future policy options.
Friends of the Earth's "epilogue" reconstructs an alternative policy agenda to the 
White Paper in the public discourse. Information is mobilised relating alternative proposals 
for the following "problem" areas: river pollution (FoE h m q), agricultural practices and 
pesticide use (FoE i m s), domestic energy consumption (FoE n), transportation of toxic 
substances (FoE o), car emissions (FoE p), energy production (FoE r). This shows that 
Friends o f the Earth are able to raise their key national campaign fields in the "epilogue" 
phase. It confirms that the organisation’s strategies are adept at entering and guiding the 
policy-related phase of the news discourse.101
In addition the organisation is able to flex its ’interest group’ aspirations by 
collaborating with the Labour Party’s production of an alternative environmental policy 
agenda. This provides another news forum for Friends of the Earth’s key campaign themes 
and favoured policy options. As the "cycle" of high resonance draws to a close in the final 
week, the "epilogue" discourse has provided a forum for Friends of the Earth to strategically 
mobilise its favoured policy options.
Is  th is the  dawning o f  the age o f  aw areness? Ju d ith  W att reports on K atherine 
H am nett's cam paign fo r  environm entally frien d ly  cotton  (FoE t), is the final article in the 
Friends o f the Earth "epilogue" discourse. Here Friends o f the Earth adds vocal support to 
an initiative from the fashion industry and the Pesticides Trust, Green C otton 2000 , for 
promoting cotton that has been grown and treated by methods which limit the damage to the 
environment by pesticides and chemicals. Friends o f the Earth are willing to give public 
consent to environmental initiatives that are made by industry. This indicates a further 
dimension of the organisation’s ’interest group’ aspirations. Establishing bargaining roles 
with industrial actors will be a feature o f any future possibility that Friends of the Earth may 
have to act as an environmental ’interest group’ or be part of a policy community. In contrast
101 For Friends of the Earth's national campaign fields and favoured policy options, see the organisation’s 
report, H ow Green is Britain? The G overnm ent's Environmental Record (Friends of the Earth 1990). The 
publication appeared soon after the White Paper, actually in the "epilogue" phase. At the end of each chapter 
a list of policy proposals appears for each campaign field. This report is further evidence of Friends of the 
Earth’s strategy for framing the debate for a reconstruction of the national environmental policy agenda.
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Greenpeace only appears to criticise industrial actors in the public discourse.
Graph g.d shows that Greenpeace’s resonance decreases over the two weeks of the 
"epilogue", when Friends of the Earth’s constructive "blaming" strategies are highly 
prominent. In contrast to Friends of the Earth, this phase o f the White Paper "news cycle" 
presents fewer opportunities for Greenpeace. Greenpeace’s aims have less affinity with the 
pragmatic steps of establishing an alternative set o f national policy-options. Greenpeace only 
enters the discourse when "news events" coincide with one of their key campaign themes, 
or when they themselves make a "news event". For example, they enter the news on the 
Labour Party’s alternative environmental agenda to "blame" the Labour leaders for going 
back on promises they had made regarding the Sellafield Nuclear plant (Gpc Y). Similarly, 
R iver a ttack  (Gpc Z) reports a Greenpeace direct action as the prelude to a further staged 
"news event", namely Greenpeace’s legal action against the illegal discharges of chemical 
waste by the multi-national Albright and Wilson (Gpc a FoE q).102
Even when government responsibility issues ”GM become a more dominant element 
of the Greenpeace discourse in that last week of the sample (graph g.d), this does not 
indicate a constructive appeal to the national policy agenda. Instead the articles concern the 
global themes o f mineral extraction in the Antarctic (Gpc b; WWF V) and Nuclear testing 
(Gpc c) within a supra-national rather than national policy context. In other words, 
Greenpeace maintain their business a s usual communication strategies that are characterised 
by direct actions, stunts and "blaming” Government and industry actors. As far as 
Greenpeace is concerned, the national environmental policy agenda merits little elaboration, 
unless there is good "Public Relations" image-capital to be made.
d.ii) World Wide Fund for Nature
The visual database shows that the "epilogue" discourse covers four references to the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF S to V inc.). On the first week of the "epilogue" phase 
the World Wide Fund for Nature is absent from the media agenda. The organisation’s
1(n The article Greenpeace pu ts company in dock (Gpc a, FoE q) illustrates the division o f communicative 
labour between Greenpeace and Friends of Earth in the "epilogue" phase. Greenpeace make the "news event" 
and directly blame the Industry "actor", whereas Friends of the Earth introduce a national regulatory policy 
context to the discourse.
S 552S
227
coverage is concentrated in the second and third newsweeks of the "epilogue" before it 
disappears once more from the news agenda in the final week (graph w.d).
The distribution of resonance indicates that the World Wide Fund for Nature ’targets’ 
its environmental claims to peak at the second week of the "epilogue". Earlier I showed that 
Friends of the Earth’s claims for reconstructing the national policy agenda peak in the third 
week of the "epilogue" (d.i) above). This indicates that the organisations with primary 
interests in the national and international dimensions of the Government’s policy agenda 
focus their claims on different newsweeks. It is plausible that Friends of the Earth and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature co-ordinated the timing of their peak communications so that 
their claims do not compete for coverage. Which dimensions of the environmental policy 
agenda do the World Wide Fund for Nature’s claims reconstruct during the "epilogue" 
phase?
On the week commencing 15th October the World Wide Fund for Nature appears in 
three articles (WWF S T U), followed by another on the next week (WWF V). At the peak 
resonance on the second newsweek the organisation’s discourse pattern is similar to that in 
the last week of the "prologue" when it is attempting to advance claims for the forthcoming 
"event" and ’normalise’ its discourse after the scandal "event" (b.ii) above).103 This implies 
that in the "epilogue" the World Wide Fund for Nature is mobilising a concentrated series 
of "packages" that make business as u su a l claims.
In contrast to Friends of the Earth, environmental issues ”E" are more prominent than 
government responsibility issues "G" in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s "epilogue" peak 
(compare graphs f.d  and w.d). In the "epilogue" Friends o f the Earth’s claims construct a 
context for Government or Industry actors to change their ineffective or harmful activities 
(d.i) above). Instead the World Wide Fund for Nature’s discourse pattern indicates that it 
attempts to reconstruct elements of the policy agenda by raising environmental themes which 
’speak for themselves’. This confirms that in contrast to Friends of the Earth, the World 
Wide Fund for Nature’s constructive criticisms of policy fields are carried by elaborating the 
specific environmental theme. Friends o f the Earth’s criticisms communicate by constructing 
an action-context for implementing alternative policy options. This difference indicates that
103 In both cases the environmental issues "E" are the most prominent discourse element, with government 
responsibility issues *'G" less prominent and the issues relating to the organisation’s activities "A" a subtext of 
the discourse (graphs w.b and w.d).
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Friends of the Earth’s communications are more oppositional to the activities of Government 
and Industry, whereas the World Wide Fund for Nature dispute the environmental thematic 
priorities of the existing policy agenda rather than the proposed mechanisms for 
environmental regulation.
The la n d  o f  a thousand islands gets another dressing down. F red  Pearce Indonesia  
(WWF S) raises the preservation of mangrove forests in Indonesia. As in the latter stages of 
the "news event" phase (c.ii) above) the World Wide Fund for Nature raises the preservation 
theme in association with the potential for supra-national intergovernmental regulation. 
Earlier forest preservation was mobilised as an element of the "global warming" theme to 
relate the possibility for a supra-national regulation of climate change (WWF R). In this case 
forest preservation is mobilised as an element of "sustainable development" which similarly 
shifts the focus of the theme onto a context for the supra-national regulation of timber 
logging. The World Wide Fund for Nature continues to make public its aspirations to be a 
leading "pressure group" actor in the emergent supra-national agenda.
On the following day the World Wide Fund for Nature re-enters the national 
environmental agenda appearing in two articles (WWF T U). A ntique rhino horn trade halted  
a fter th efts fro m  country houses (WWF T) raises the theme of illegal international trade in 
rare species by relating how the Department of the Environment has banned the buying and 
selling of rhino horn. This re-mobilises a supra-national theme from the "news event" phase 
(WWF P) and at the same time puts the World Wide Fund for Nature and the Department 
of the Environment in a co-operative role at the national level. The implication is that this 
co-operation may be purposefully extended to the supra-national level of regulation. It is also 
worth noting that article is written by The G uardian's environmental correspondent Paul 
Brown. This confirms the existence of a regular channel o f communication between Brown 
and the World Wide Fund for Nature and the utility of this contact as a resource for the 
organisation to enter the media agenda.
P utting  th e  *car * in  caring  (WWF U) appears in the M otoring  section of The 
G uardian. The World Wide Fund for Nature gives support to a business initiative called the 
Environmental Transport Association which promotes less use of the car and campaigns 
against Government transport policies but at the same time provides services to motorists. 
This example illustrates that like Friends of the Earth, the World Wide Fund for Nature is 
prepared to enter into environmental initiatives with business actors. In addition this
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sponsorship of the Environmental Transport Association enables the World Wide Fund for 
Nature to re-mobilise a key national campaign theme - road building as a threat to habitats - 
from the "prologue" phase (WWF M).
The final article covering the World Wide Fund for Nature appears in the third week 
and is once more written by the environmental correspondent Paul Brown. The new  cold w ar 
(WWF V Gpc b) raises the preservation of Antarctica as a theme which previews the 
forthcoming Antarctic Treaty Conference in Chile. It is the only article which explicitly 
mentions the White Paper in the World Wide Fund for Nature’s "epilogue" phase. The 
World Wide Fund for Nature are depicted in a national lobbying alliance with Greenpeace 
against the Government. The British Government’s pro-mining stance is shown to be odds 
with nations such as Australia, France, Italy, Belgium and New Zealand and reference is 
even made to Britain as the ’Dirty Man of Europe’. Here the World Wide Fund for Nature 
"blames" the Government, but does so under cover o f the association with Greenpeace and 
the critical authorship of the environmental correspondent. This shows that the organisation 
are less likely than either Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace to directly "blame" or 
scandalise the Government actions in the public discourse. At the same time the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s claims serve once more to construct a supra-national policy agenda. The 
claims push for specific measures and a role for the organisation within the emergent supra­
national policy agenda.
£) ’Speaking in Tongues’ - Image Politics: Accessing and Biasing the News by Cultural 
Critique
1. Introduction: from collective identity to "public image"
One of the assumptions of this analysis is that the contemporary environmental 
movement is characterised by the activities of a professionalised sector of organisations which 
acts strategically in the public culture to achieve political objectives. Historically, this phase 
of development has replaced the earlier phases of mass mobilisation which were characteristic 
of the dynamic emergence of the environmental movement in the political mainstream in the 
mid eighties.1 The analysis has shown that Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature are organisations which have distinct identities as collective actors 
who appear in the public discourse. Each of the three organisations uses different types of 
framing strategies to construct the environmental contest. According to theories on social 
movement organisations2 one of the key functions of an organisational structure is that it 
provides an institutional resource which maintains a future capacity for strategy that is not 
dependent on the spontaneity of mass mobilisation. Moreover, the organisation’s formation 
of a collective identity constitutes part of this institutional resource.3 For the case of the 
established environmental organisations, we may extend this notion of the utility of a
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1 Sec the discussion in the introduction section A. The historical development of the environmental 
movement which becomes characterised by the increasing dominance of a few professionalised multi-national 
organisations at the expense of the more spontaneous earlier phases of mobilisation is well documented, see e.g. 
Eyerman and Jamison (1989). Jamison. Eyerman et al. (1990), Szersynski, Miles et al. (1995) and Rucht
(1995).
* This perspective initially comes from the resource mobilisation approach which focuses on an 
organisation's utility of internal resources, e.g (McCarthy and Zald 1977), but is also present in the later 
political process approaches, e.g. (McAdam 1983), (Kriesi 1991), (Tarrow 1989), which acknowledge the 
importance of the political opportunities that are available for collective action.
3 Pizzomo’s (1978) essay on collective identity and political exchange cites the example of the trade unions' 
organisations, which are able to draw on embedded institutional resources to find a basis for political negotiation 
and bargaining with their opponents even at times when the labour movement is at a low ebb. This implies that 
an established collective identity serves as a residual resource. Melucci (1980; 1988; 1989) advocates such a 
position, he states that when identity is produced as part of a more institutionalised form of social action, it may 
crystallise into a an organisational form, system of rules or leadership pattern. This implies that at a later stage 
of a movement’s development, a collective identity is no longer simply a basis for shaping expectations and 
calculating the costs and benefits of action, but it becomes routinised into an instrumental resource for 
negotiating objectives with other collective actors.
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collective identity as an institutional resource, and refer to the way that the "public image" 
of an organisation works in the public discourse. The thesis is that environmental 
organisations use their "public images" to achieve legitimacy for themselves as collective 
actors, for framing the environmental agenda, and to achieve their political objectives.4
The last section D dealt with the environmental organisations’ public agenda-building 
mobilisations through the news during a specific set o f related key events in the 
environmental contest. The diachronic analysis of the organisations* communication strategies 
over the ’Dirty Man of Europe’ "news cycle" has provided a detailed account of the 
discursive reperto ires of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature in the public discourse. When added to the content analyses o f the organisations’ 
"public campaign cultures" in section C, such findings have contributed to a new 
understanding of the role of the environmental organisations as a news source. It appears that 
by using communication strategies the environmental organisations are able to exert a 
’relative* influence over the production side of environmental news. For the special case of 
environmental news, this constitutes a change in the conventional relationship between the 
media institutions and their sources in the production of news5. Furthermore, it indicates that 
the environmental organisations are a ’type’ of ’collective actor’ which is able to exert 
influence over the media’s ability to attribute meaning to events. The environmental 
organisations’ acts of mobilisation into political culture, constitute a type o f discursive 
practice that affects the production of public texts. This intervention into the process whereby 
events acquire meaning in the public discourse may be referred to as a "framing" potential.6
4 One attempt to take account o f "public image" as a factor in the development of social movement 
organisations is the study by Walsh and Cable (1989) on the management dilemmas o f movement actvists in 
attempting to co-ordinate mobilisation after the Three Mile Island accident.
3 For a critical review of the literature on source-media relations, see Schlesinger (1990). Specifically 
Schlesinger argues that most media research is too 'media-centric* and that it ought to focus more on the role 
of news "sources” in the process o f the production of the ideological contents of news. This perspective on 
source strategies has been taken successfully up for analyses of environmental news, see e.g. Anderson (1991;
1993), and on the communication o f risk by scientists on climatic change Monnont and Dasnoy (1995).
6 This notion of a framing potential for environmental organisations arising from a privileged access to 
specialist knowledge and information resources - resources of factual or moral claims about the environment - 
replaces the notion of mobilisation potential in the conventional conception of asocial movement (e.g. McAdam 
1983, Tarrow 1989). The discussion on an extension of the notion of consensus mobilisation in the introduction 
(section A) is pertinent here. The concept of "framing" is widely used as the analytic category for the 
ideological constructs that are mobilised by social movements to contest opponents, e.g. Snow and Benford et 
al. (1986), Snow and Benford (1988; 1992), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Gitlin (1980), and Eder (1995).
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The reconstructions of the environmental communications that are made by Friends 
of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature from the sample on the ’Dirty 
Man’ event (sections C and D), have shown that the organisations construct the elements of 
their "public images" as a resource for legitimating their interests against other actors in the 
environmental contest. This finding gives a fresh impetus to the phrase "image politics" for 
the special case of the environmental organisations. It indicates that a condition for the 
environmental organisations’ ability to engage in political action is that they sustain a 
permanent presence in the system of public communication. This permanent presence in the 
system of public communication constitutes the symbolic form of a "public image".7
When a "public image" appears in the news, actors are able to recognise and relate 
the organisations’ activities to their social relationships by referring to existing knowledge 
about them as collective actors. Everyone knows what the organisations stand for in a general 
sense and so the particular details are easily encompassed within a prior notion of an 
organisation’s "public image". According to theories on the collective identity of social 
movements, the "visibility" of a social movement in the public sphere serves as a symbolic 
means or "sign" for building a constituency during periods of mobilisation. For example, 
Melucci (1988; 1989) articulates such a perspective when he discusses the latency and 
visibility of social movements: namely, the need to sustain the identity of a movement in 
submerged actor networks during periods of non-mobilisation and in the public sphere during 
phases of mobilisation when collective actors confront public policies. The "public image" 
of a movement organisation that I wish to advocate here, extends this notion for the case of 
an established movement organisation which has a permanent presence in the public sphere 
rather than existing through alternating phases or "cycles" of "visible" mass mobilisations 
and periods of submerged "latency". When an organisation becomes a permanent "sign" in 
the media discourse - as Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature have over the last decade - its potential and strategies for political communication 
become more sophisticated too. A "public image" constitutes the institu tionalisa tion  of the 
identity o f a collective actor as an element of the public culture. As such it can be used by
7 This notion o f the "public image” of an organisation requires that the mobilisation of meaning, i.e. 
"symbolic packaging", is considered to form the basis of collective action. The term "symbolic packaging" is 
taken from Gamson (1988; 1992; 1995) and Gamson and Modigliani (1989) but is attributed a more central role 
to the construction of action than it achieves in his work.
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an organisation as a strategic resource for negotiating demands with other actors.
The three environmental organisations that I discuss here, constitute the units of an 
established social movement. These movement organisations all engage in critiques of 
specific policy decisions in the public discourse rather than simply representing a public 
"sign" of p ro test and opposition to Government.8 As a form of political action in 
contemporary societies, environmental protest has shifted from mass confrontations and 
demonstrations at nuclear sites to the specialised production of normative critiques for the 
system of public communication. Nowadays, it is by legitimation in the system of public 
communication rather than by direct action or pressure group negotiation that environmental 
protest impacts upon the policy decision-making processes of Government in Britain. 
Accordingly it is the "visibility" of the environmental organisations on the public agenda 
rather than the mass mobilisation activities o f their respective constituencies which is the key 
factor that determines whether the actions o f Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature maintain the potential to exert influence over the Government^ policy 
agenda or not. The formation and sustenance of a "public image" is a vital resource for 
contemporary movements to engage in political confrontations. As far as environmental 
protest is concerned the ’age of the masses* and mass demonstrations has been surpassed by 
the ’age of communication’ and the "image politics" of a small number of well organised 
professional activists.
Professional movement intellectuals (Jamison, Eyerman et al. 1990) draw on specialist 
information resources - "expert" environmental critiques, such as the factual findings of 
alternative science or the moral claims o f deep ecology - and utilise their personal links with 
the media (and Public Relations) institutions to mobilise critiques against specific Government 
policy decisions. This process o f mediating the environmental critique from the discourses 
of "experts" to the public discourse o f the mass media involves the construction of 
environmental claims into a political strategy.9 As elements of a political strategy, the
* In the introduction (section A) I drew the distinction between the collective actions of the environmental 
organisations and the less organised and more spontaneous protests such as that against the exportation of live 
animals in Britain. These constitute two different types of mobilisation that may or may not be complementary.
9 This also indicates that the communicative actions of environmental organisations may be seen as a link 
in the process whereby expert and public knowledge resources for environmental concern becomes de­
differentiated. Such a process of the de-differentiation of expert and public cultures has been cited as a feature 
of "postmodernism* (Featherstone 1989).
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environmental claims which are mobilised by the organisations must fulfil two requirements: 
firstly, they have to resonate in the public culture; and secondly, they have to counter and 
delegitimate the cultural authority of the rationality of Government policy making. The 
"expertise" of the professional activists of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature lies in their capacity for mediating environmental claims from the 
obscurity of expert discourses - science and deep ecology - into specific critiques that are 
pertinent to the public policy decisions that affect everyday lives of the British citizens. This 
dissertation has undertaken an analysis of this process whereby environmental claims are 
mediated into the public discourse, a process that I have labelled "environmental 
mobilisation".
2. Discursive Practices in Public Texts: explicit framing devices and discursive stunts
In section C the overall structural contents of the environmental contest that is 
mobilised into the news by the campaigns of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature were compared. In section D a diachronic comparative analysis of the 
organisations’ discursive fra m in g  repertoires was operationalised over the "cycle" of the 
Dirty Man event. I now analyse a third dimension of the organisations’ environmental 
agenda-building activities. I look at specific examples of their discursive practices that appear 
in public texts to identify how the "image politics" of the environmental organisations enables 
them to exert a "definitional power"10 in the mainstream news coverage. This involves 
identifying the "framing" strategies o f the organisations and the normative constructions 
which they produce in news narratives. I analyse examples where Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature use discursive practices which directly
10 Hansen (1993) introduces the concept of "definitional power’ in his analysis of how Greenpeace mobilise 
the environmental contest into the news. However, his analytic use of the term in that research omits the notion 
of the opponents against whom the environmental contest is waged. Power is based in social relations, and 
without an adequate concept of the targets of communication strategies - the supporters and opponents in the 
social contest - it is unclear in relation to who or what "definitional power" is realised. If Hansen’s (1993) 
implication is that "definitional power" is realised relative to journalists rather than opponent actors, then this 
contradicts his earlier seminal work on the ’complex’ social construction of the environmental contest in the 
news (1991), which rightly rejects the linear model of communication and stresses the inadequacy of the 'media- 
centredness' of many discourse analytic approaches on agenda-setting/agenda-building. What is required is a 
notion of "definitional power" that relates the process of the production of public texts to the power relations 
that are at stake in the social contest over environmental problems.
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penetrate the semantic structure of the news narratives o f public texts. I refer to such 
discursive practices as explicit framing devices and discursive stunts. These are the 
techniques which are used by environmental activists for "packaging" cultural information 
into discursive "frames" (such as e.g. direct quotations, comments, use of social metaphors, 
"catchphrases") which are reproduced "empirically" in the semantic contents of news 
narratives by journalists when they report the news.11
In this section E I use the explicit framing devices and discursive stunts as units of 
analysis for the discursive practices o f Friends of the Earth Greenpeace and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature which appear in the news. The elements o f a news narrative that I refer to 
as explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are linguistic products of a source actor that 
are used in the make up of a newstext. Explicit framing devices occur when a reporter 
directly cites the opinion of an activist from an environmental organisation and appear in the 
form of attributed direct quotations and commentaries. Discursive stunts are metaphors or 
"catchphrases" that are used by a source actor for interpreting events, and which are then 
used by the journalist in a non-attributed way. Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts 
cover a continuum of techniques for environmental activists to make space within a news 
narrative for lodging "cultural bias".12
Explicit framing devices are the direct quotes and citations and discursive stunts the 
"catchphrases" and metaphors that are "produced" in news narratives by the source strategies 
of environmental activists. These were coded for each organisation and each article in the 
analysis (see methodology section B). The examples of explicit framing devices and 
discursive stunts are cited directly from the texts and provide units of analysis for comparing 
the "public images" by which the organisations aim to achieve self-legitimation, and the de­
legitimation of opponents when they make environmental claims in relation to specific "news
11 Gamson’s (1988; 1992) use of the concept of ■framing devices* is not always explicit as to whether the 
identified "frames* are those which are empirically mobilised into public texts by actors or his own 
interpretation of what in fact the actors are trying to mobilise into the public discourse. I refer to explicit 
framing devices and discursive stunts as the former, the semantic parts of a news narrative which may be 
attributed either directly or indirectly to the statements of a source actor. They are an indicator for how an 
collective actor presents itself to achieve legitimacy for itself and its arguments in the public discourse - how 
its visible "public image” constructs contentious political meaning into the language of the public discourse.
u An ideology is culturally biased information. On "cultural bias" see the discussion o f Mary Douglas 
(1966; 1975) in the introduction (section A). Thompson (1984) has applied the concept to the cultures of sets 
of actors who operate with a specific rationality - policy actors and scientists.
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events’1.
Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are contextualised within the agenda­
building contents of a text (that have already been analysed in Section D above by comparing 
the relative prominence of the three types of issues "A", "E" and "G" per newsweek). They 
constitute the self-mobilisation of identity by a collective actor in the public discourse. It is 
by this process of "public image" construction that the organisations’ agenda-building 
activities translate into political strategies.1 *3 Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts 
add an extra flavour or character to the mobilisation of the environmental contest because 
they are linguistic structures with a polemical orientation which make the agenda-building 
properties of a text’s contents into an easily digestible moral contest between actors. In short, 
the function o f explicit framing devices and discursive stunts is to ’gel’ the deeper structural 
agenda-building contents of an environmental mobilisation into a narrative structure of news 
that may be easily and unreflectively digested by a reader. By comparing the explicit framing 
devices and discursive stunts of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature it is possible to establish the different types of "definitional power" which the 
three environmental organisations seek to exert by "image politics" in the public culture.
"Britain - the Dirty Man of Europe" may be seen as an example of both an explicit 
framing device and discursive stunt that was initiated by Greenpeace (with the consent of the 
other environmental organisations) and which became the public "catchphrase" for damning 
the British Government^ proposed environmental policy agenda. This example has been 
discussed at length in section D .14 Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are also
11 Benford and Hunt (1988) have highlighted the dramaturgical dimension of social movement action as a 
potential for challenging power. They identify four analytic dimensions of this type of communicative actions:
scripting; staging; performing and interpreting. In my perspective the collective identity of an organisation has 
become routinised through mass media coverage into a ‘public image". This achievement of a "public image" 
then becomes renewed and used by the movement intellectuals as a resource for constructing claims into the 
media discourse that relate to contemporary political events. In this way the organisations' media resonance as 
a 'public image" constitutes a resource for communicating to a mass constituency and at the same time a
resource for challenging the authority of political opponents.
14 In the terms used by Snow and Benford (1988; 1992) the "Dirty Man" frame would be the "master 
frame” for the environmental movement’s opposition to the Government’s policy proposal. Snow and Benfords’ 
approach rightly identifies the collective identity of a social movement organisation as a resource which is used 
for strategic purposes but tends to refer to "frames" and "master frames" in a generalised rather than an 
empirical case specific way. This detracts from the potential of "frame" as an analytic concept. Gerhards and 
Rucht’s (1991) empirical case study has shown the role of "masterffames" in enabling different organisations 
to combine their activities in a protest campaign. In this study the "Dirty Man" masterframe enables the 
organisations to collaborate against the Government's proposed environmental policy agenda. The "Dirty Man"
mobilised by the organisations in more routine examples o f political communication. They 
may be seen as the cultural "tools" (Swidler 1986) or mechanism by which organisations bind 
the agenda-setting properties of their mobilisations into a moral narrative that resonates in 
the public culture of a society. Existing empirically in the texts as polemical linguistic 
structures, these moral narratives constitute the cultural "pegs" on which the organisations 
are able to lodge the deeper structural agenda-building contents of their claims (e.g. sets of 
biased information - scientific "facts", moral and aesthetic appeals) within the structures of 
news. Explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are symbolically "packaged" (Gamson
1988) to enter the language of the public discourse and to resonate as elements of the public 
culture. Not only do they add the cultural appeal of "novelty" to the "news value"* 15 of 
environmental policy as a topic, but explicit framing devices and discursive stunts are 
designed to "stick" in the public culture, so that people begin to use these biased 
"catchphrases" and polemics for referring to the Government’s actions. When they are 
successful, explicit framing devices and discursive stunts produce the dual effect of bringing 
previously hidden aspects of environmental policy into mainstream public view and biasing 
the way in which people evaluate the Government’s record on policy. Explicit framing 
devices and discursive stunts indicate how an organisation utilises the resource of its 
"visibility" as a collective actor, its "public image", in the public sphere. This process 
whereby an organisation uses its identity as a strategic resource constitutes a form of "image 
politics".
The environmental organisations engage in "image politics" by constructing normative 
oppositions between actors in the texts of public discourse. Here I analyse the "public 
images" which constitute their identities on the public stage and which they use as a resource 
for constructing social oppositions to other actors in the environmental contest. Building on 
the analyses of news contents o f the organisations* agenda-building properties (sections C and 
D above), I compare the explicit framing devices and discursive stunts of Friends o f the 
Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. This comparative analysis will
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mastcrframe provides a collective identity for the organised movement sector's campaign and it is within this 
masterframe that the distinct identities of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature 
are built and operate for this event. In section D 1 referred to this as a division o f communicative labour in the 
communication activities of the three environmental organisations over the cycle of the policy event.
15 For a review of the concept o f “news values* see Fowler (1991).
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show how the organisations use their "public images" in empirical cases where they mobilise 
political daims. To whom and on what bases do the organisations’ "public images" appeal 
in the news? And how do they use their "public image" to embed normative claims (and 
political bias) into the public culture?
2.i) Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace
The analysis of the "news cycle" of the Dirty Man event has shown that the 
environmental organisations have different communication strategies for penetrating and 
constructing the semantic contents o f public texts. In contrast to the World Wide Fund for 
Nature, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace consistently produce and "package" news 
contents in all four phases of the "cycle" of the event (see above section D). On account of 
this, the two most media-oriented actors may be considered to be the primary "source" 
mobilisers in the Dirty Man "news cycle". What are the characteristics of the "public 
images" that are produced by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace when they mobilise the 
environmental contest against Government opponents?
The Greenpeace news discourse is based on "actors" and "events" (see section D). 
This indicates that the organisation’s communication strategies have a general tendency for 
"packaging" the environmental contest into news stories which have a high "news value". 
One cultural techniques that Greenpeace uses for gaining access to the public communication 
structure is the tactic of direct actions. These incidents o f protest actions are deliberately 
staged as ’novel’ stunts to raise the "news value" and profile of coverage (Greenberg 1984; 
Rucht 1995). There are several examples of this communication strategy in the news sample, 
including reports on Greenpeace ships sailing into military exclusion zones, protesters 
chaining themselves to a Foreign embassy, boarding ships transporting radioactive waste, 
smuggling toilet rolls into the Department of the Environment, and so on (Gpc G S U V X 
Z). This type o f communication strategy reproduces "actor oppositions" (Greenpeace v. an 
Opponent) as the basis for news stories and "packages" them with a high "news value". That 
the technique of direct action stunts produces news narratives with a high profile "actor 
opposition" is illustrated by the Headlines of such examples, e.g. P rotesters B oard  N uclear 
Ship  (Gpc G); G reenpeace T o ld  to L ea ve  N -Test S ite  (Gpc U); and G reenpeace Ship R eleased  
A fter D iscovering  ‘N uclear Test S ite  ' (Gpc X).
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Direct action protests tend to be reported in a new s genre  that simply describes the 
actors and the event, i.e. what happened and who did it. This type of news narrative gives 
Greenpeace and its targeted opponent a high public profile and highlights the conflictual basis 
of the relationship between the actors as part of the environmental contest. Such a 
communication strategy is useful for raising the profile o f the environmental contest as a 
conflict in the public discourse but provides only a limited scope for elaborating 
environmental problems. It may therefore be seen as a strategy for entering the public 
agenda.16
Since Greenpeace’s current ambitions extend beyond entering the public agenda, i.e. 
constituency building, and towards building a public agenda for environmental problems, i.e. 
political objectives, the organisation needs other communication strategies for placing its 
brand of environmental concerns in the public sphere. When direct protest actions are not the 
basis for the Greenpeace news coverage, the organisation still has a routine practice for 
constructing "actor oppositions" into "news stories" - it uses the technique of discursive 
stunts. In cases o f discursive stunts an organisation uses a cultural construct (e.g. a social 
metaphor, caricature, or catchphrase etc.) as a mechanism for penetrating the linguistic 
structure and semantic contents of a public text. This communication technique uses an 
appeal to a resonant element of British culture (e.g. the appeal of the drama or ’novelty’ of 
an event told as an adventure story, or the humour of an irreverent criticism of a famous 
politician, or a reference to a well known cultural element such as the "Frankenstein" story - 
see below) to construct a social opposition between actors in the contest. Discursive stunts 
are a mechanism for mobilising a normative critique or ’cultural bias’ (Douglas 1975; 
Thompson 1984) into the representation of the environmental contest in the news.17 
Discursive stunts are important because they enable Greenpeace to penetrate mainstream new s 
genres that do not simply report protest events but which provide space for evaluating their 
consequences and discussing the environmental problematic in more elaborate detail. As part
16 Historically the technique of direct actions was the initial strategy that was used by environmental 
organisations for breaking into the news discourse, see e.g. Greenberg (1985), Jamison and Eyerman (1989), 
and Rucht (1995). Judged by the four dimensions of dramaturgical social movement action (Benford and Hunt 
1988), direct actions are discursive practices which mobilise 'scripting', 'staging’ and 'perfoming' dimensions, 
but are less able to mobilise the 'interpretative' dimensions of the protest. In contrast explicit framing devices 
and discursive stunts also mobilise ’interpretative’ dimensions of protest into the news discourse.
17 Discursive stunts thus belong to a phase o f mobilisation when an organisation has established itself as a 
"public image” on the public agenda.
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of a communication strategy, discursive stunts mobilise a news narrative that has a greater 
potential for environmental agenda-building and contesting public policy actors than direct 
actions.
The distinction between direct action stunts and discursive stunts relates to the 
historical phase o f environmental mobilisation. In the initial or early phases of environmental 
mobilisation, protest action stunts served as a means for an organisation to enter the public 
agenda. Now that they are established public actors and environmental problems common 
knowledge, the organisations exist in a phase of environmental mobilisation when the public 
discourse provides an opportunity structure that is open to more qualitative environmental 
claims and policy oppositions. In this sense discursive stunts have succeeded direct action 
stunts as the basis for a communication strategy. Protest has become more discursive and 
now aims to enter the language of the public discourse. For collective action incidents of 
symbolic actions have been replaced by the mobilisation of symbols, i.e. "frames", in the 
public discourse.
A feature of discursive stunts is the production of "catchphrases" which serve as a 
cultural shorthand for the Greenpeace polemic. The "Dirty Man of Europe" is an obvious 
example of such a "catchphrase". In cases of discursive stunts, the "news story" becomes 
more than a reported event about an incident of antagonism between conflicting actors, i.e. 
Greenpeace v. British Government, the news narrative itself evaluates the environmental 
contest. The two actors are attributed value-laden roles as opposed "characters” in a narrative 
that relates a social contest. Once more this is evident from the Headline: Environm ent 
Secretary scorns B rita in 's 'D irty  M a n ' Tag. G reenpeace 'b ia s 'p u ts  P atten  in a  R age  (Gpc 
N).
The discursive stunt technique produces oppositions between "actors” whose narrative  
roles in the text are attributed with values that have been pre-defined in the information that 
is given to journalists by Greenpeace. Discursive stunts and explicit framing devices are often 
combined in a news narrative. Discursive stunts make the news space for environmental 
organisations to make the direct claims that appear in explicit framing devices. In this way 
an organisation is constructive in the production of a news narrative which promotes its 
"public image" and delegitimates that of its opponents.
In the case of Greenpeace, explicit framing devices are used to re-enforce "actor 
oppositions" as the narrative basis through which the reader is intended to view
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environmental problems. For example, when commenting on the ’Dirty Man’ event and the 
British Government^ proposed environmental policy agenda. Lord Melchett, executive 
director of Greenpeace, is attributed with the following explicit framing devices:
"There is  noth ing  in B rita in i  fu tu re  p la n s th a t w ill rid  us o f th a t tag (D irty 
M an o f E u ro p e )” (Gpc N)
"We are a  non-party organ isa tion  bu t the environm ent is  a p o litica l m atter and  
w e com m ent upon it. C hris P a tten  m ust fo rg e t abou t words and sta rt taking  
action  to  p ro tec t, defend  and h ea l the environm ent. " (Gpc N)
The first explicit framing device constitutes the organisation’s opponent delegitimation 
strategy: Greenpeace delegitimates the British Government as an environmental policy actor 
by re-affirming the ’Dirty Man’ catchphrase. The second constitutes a self-legitimation 
strategy: Greenpeace asserts itself as a collective actor. Here Greenpeace asserts a right for 
itself as an actor in environmental politics whilst engaging in direct conflict with the 
Environment Minister’s policy record. The environmental problematic itself remains 
submerged beneath the actor conflict. This is characteristic of Greenpeace’s "public image". 
Repetition of explicit framing devices is another technique that Greenpeace uses in order to 
make them stick in the public culture. To maintain the ’Dirty Man’ polemic, Greenpeace 
(again in the persona of Lord Melchett) uses an explicit framing device to reassert the "actor 
opposition" in a later article.
"The G overnm ent has dodged  th e  im portant issues by reiterating existing  
inadequate p o lic ies a n d  has a vo ided  m aking any new  com m itm ents w hich  
w ould p r o te a  the en v iro n m en t." (Gpc R)
Greenpeace’s ’Dirty Man* explicit framing devices confirm the importance of 
constructing clear "actor oppositions" for the organisation^ communication strategies. "Actor 
oppositions" are constructed into the news narrative of texts. This is a key element in the 
organisation’s mobilisation of its own "public image" and engagement in "image politics". 
Moreover, this communication strategy is not just tied to the exceptional case o f the ’Dirty
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Man" event, but examples of the discursive stunts and explicit framing devices that construct 
"actor oppositions" also occur in more routine cases of Greenpeace coverage. Further 
examples of constructed "actor oppositions" include "Greenpeace v. British Nuclear Fuels 
Ltd. " on the international transportation and dumping of radioactive waste (Gpc C G W), and 
"Greenpeace v. Global Nuclear Military Complex" on nuclear testing in the natural 
environments of the Pacific Islands (Gpc I) and the Arctic (Gpc c). In the first case, 
Greenpeace campaigners are attributed with the following explicit framing devices which 
construct the contest against BNFL:
"If these shipm ents are banned  in Am erica on safety grounds, then they should  
be banned  fro m  the UK. W e m ust not becom e the w orld i nuclear dustb in"
(Gpc C)
"BNFL (British N uclear F uels L td .) is turning the U K into the nuclear dustbin  
o f  the w orld. This sh ip  p o ses a  serious risk  to coastal com m unities and the  
ecosystem  o f the Irish  Sea . " (Gpc G)
In the first explicit framing device the British record as a policy actor is compared 
unfavourably to that of the United States, and in the second, a similar opponent 
delegitimation strategy is used to introduce an environmental problem as a risk to society. 
As in the ’Dirty Man’ event, these explicit framing devices against the British Nuclear 
Industry’s policy for the importing radioactive waste also use a discursive stunt, a 
"catchphrase" - "Britain the Nuclear Dustbin of the World" - on which to pin the polemic.
Greenpeace not only contests the activities of obvious opponents, such as 
Government, Military and Nuclear Industry actors, but also opposes other environmental 
organisations when their activities conflict with Greenpeace interests or movement ideals. On 
two occasions during the WWF scandal "actor oppositions" were constructed by Greenpeace 
against another environmental organisation, namely "Greenpeace v. the World Wide Fund 
for Nature" (Gpc B H). This indicates that Greenpeace is a competitive actor in the market 
for "public image". For the World Wide Fund for Nature scandal, the Greenpeace Press 
Officer is attributed with the following explicit framing device:
"The role o f  pressure groups is n o t to  see the  o ther persons p o in t o f  view . 
G reenpeace research issues (and) com e to  conclusions a bou t w hat needs to  be  
done to  so lve  problem s. I t is  no t a  m atter on w hich  there can be com prom ise. 
N egotia ting  w ith  G overnm ents neu tra lises pressure groups by fo rc in g  them  in to  
com prom ises. " (Gpc B)
This example indicates that self-legitimation and opponent de-legitimation strategies are 
prominent and combined elements in Greenpeace’s mobilisations. "Blaming" strategies 
directed against other actors are an almost permanent feature of Greenpeace’s public 
communication (see secition D). Greenpeace constructs the environmental contest into a 
conflict between themselves and other actors. Opposing actors are placed into competition 
in "news events". How do these "actor opposition" narratives which are mobilised by 
Greenpeace work as a basis for making environmental claims in the public sphere?
A key narrative genre that is produced by Greenpeace mobilisations is a news 
"scandal". Direct actions and discursive stunts are designed to make obscure "events" appear 
"scandalous", which raises their "news value" and makes them visible on the public agenda. 
Furthermore, the organisation attempts to make its polemics and "catchphrases" stick and 
then circulate in the public culture by reinforcing them with explicit framing devices. For this 
reason Greenpeace messages are simple and repetitive. Greenpeace uses its "public image" 
to achieve cultural resonance. It assumes public legitimacy as a collective actor as an a  priori 
element o f this constructed "public image". An outcome of this communication technique is 
that the "news story" which is offered for public legitimation concerns "who are the good 
actors?" and not "on what basis is an actor good or bad?".
The organisation pre-determines the identities or "public images" o f the characters in 
a "news story" by releasing information that is culturally biased. This biased information may 
be based on sets o f "expert" data. For example, "scientific facts" may be released from 
reports relating the possible risks and dangers to the British public health as in the cases of 
the polluted beaches (Gpc L) and rivers (Gpc T) and safety o f nuclear installations (Gpc D). 
Otherwise the biased information may be based on an aesthetic or moral appeal that has a 
resonance in British culture, for example an appeal to the "paradise lost" o f unspoilt peoples
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(Gpc I J) and places (Gpc b e ) .18
Greenpeace does not open the partiality of its claims for legitimation in the public 
discourse. Instead the information - laden with ’cultural bias’ - appears as a contextual 
background for the "news story" narrative relating how "actors" contest "events". This 
indicates that Greenpeace symbolically "package" the legitimating basis for their 
environmental claims into the narrative structure rather than the thematic content of news.19 
It is the values that are attributed to the competing actors (Greenpeace v. an opponent) in the 
narrative structure of the "news story" and not the actual agenda-building contents of the data 
(e.g. the truth of scientific facts or moral and aesthetic appeals) which carry the 
environmental claim that is made. In the Greenpeace news discourse, environmental 
information is used to construct the morality of the "characters" of the competing actors. The 
success of Greenpeace^ projection o f its own "public image" is thus an important factor for 
determining the organisation’s potential for making communication strategies for the public 
sphere.
Relative to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth’s mobilisations are more compatible with 
the news structures (van Dijk 1988) which report political "events” and in particular those 
covering national policy "events". This means that Friends of the Earth’s access to the 
structure of public communication is more dependent than Greenpeace on the topicality of 
environmental affairs on the public agenda, i.e. their "news value". At the same time the 
organisation’s own actions contribute to this "news value" of environmental affairs by 
mobilising contentious claims. Friends of the Earth maintains the "public image" of a 
"pressure group" in the news coverage. As environmental policy is an emergent and not an 
established part of the national policy agenda, this "public image" of a "pressure group" is 
itself a construction. Friends of the Earth does not yet enjoy the insider status and 
institutional contacts of an established pressure group in the policy making process (Grove- 
White and Burke 1989) (Grove-White 1989) (McCormick 1991). The organisation is acting 
in the public sphere to promote such an arrangement. This indicates that Friends of the
11 The notion of "paradise lost” is the countercultural opponent to the dominant code that has been 
engendered in modernity and is a common element of environmentalist frames of reference (Eder 1990; 1995). 
Greenpeace mobilisations that appeal to this notion are likely to resonate in British culture.
19 Van Dijk's analysis (1985, 1991) distinguishes between structures and thematic contents in news 
discourse. On the symbolic "packaging” o f claims-makers, see Gamson (1988; 1995).
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Earth’s potential for source mobilisation is linked to the emergence of the environment as a 
policy issue into British public affairs. Friends of the Earth aims to gain access to those 
"news events" which constitute an emergent institutional agenda on the environment, i.e. the 
news genres of mainstream politics and specialised public affairs.
As an aspirant "pressure group", Friends of the Earth mobilises claims into the news 
coverage on environmental policy discourse.20 This type of news coverage on the national 
policy discourse tends to report the competing claims which are made by actors, and other 
interested parties, in relation to specific current events. Thus Government Ministers, civil 
servants and regulatory bodies (FoE E H Q S a b c  e h o r ) ,  Opposition spokespersons (FoE 
R k), sponsored scientific bodies (FoE O T j  m), farmers (FoE L i s ) ,  business and industrial 
representatives (FoE L O V p), trade unions (FoE J), non-governmental organisations (FoE 
U), other environmental organisations (FoE A B 11) and consumers (FoE n) all appear in the 
news coverage of Friends of the Earth. Typically the arguments which are presented in such 
news reports are based on "expertise" that derives from the actor’s specialist role in the 
policy process. W hen actors disagree or contest the interpretation of specific incidents or 
policy events, two sets of competing factual claims (e.g. scientific facts21) appear in the 
news report, each sponsored by a respective actor. For example, in the cases of policy 
discourses relating to the Government’s regulatory standards for nuclear power installations 
(FoE Q j)  or the purity of water (FoE h), collective actors may dispute the findings of the 
available scientific evidence. Friends o f the Earth attempts to bias and "package" its own 
preferred interpretation as the legitimate version among these reported competing 
environmental claims. The organisation's source strategies open the competing set of claims 
by the actors for public legitimation or delegitimation, by penetrating the narrative structure 
of the news reports on specific instances, occasions, and episodes from the environmental 
"contest". How do the cultural techniques of explicit framing devices and discursive stunts 
work within Friends o f the Earth’s communication strategies?
The first point to make is that Friends of the Earth is able to use quantitatively more 
explicit framing devices than Greenpeace as the organisation is routinely sought by journalists
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K This type o f environmental news coverage has emerged and increased in Britain from 1988 onwards 
(Anderson 1991), (Statham 1994a).
21 Scientific facts are the usual basis for claims in policy discourses (Eder 1995).
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as a specialist to comment on mainstream environmental and policy related events. Being less 
tied to making claims that construct "news values" into the news narrative about the event,
i.e. producing a "news story", Friends of the Earth is less "image" assertive than 
Greenpeace. Being tied principally to the mainstream coverage of environmental "news 
events”, the organisation’s claims have a more stable and constant "news value".“  
Subsequently the organisation appears more regularly over the different phases of the news 
"cycle" than Greenpeace (see Section D),
Over the duration of the Dirty Man "news cycle" Friends of the Earth uses the tactic 
of direct actions - i.e. "staging events" - to achieve media coverage less frequently than 
Greenpeace. Indeed on the two occasions when direct action strategies are used to achieve 
national media coverage, it is by a local rather than the national Friends of the Earth 
organisations (FoE N d). I have indicated that "staging events" by direct actions tends to be 
a strategy for entering rather than building the public agenda. In the two cited cases (FoE N
d), local Friends of the Earth organisations use the tactic of "staging events" to bring a 
localised environmental problem to national attention. This shows that staging direct action 
events is not a regular technique for the national Friends of the Earth organisation to enter 
the structure of public communication.
Like Greenpeace, however. Friends of the Earth does produce discursive stunts. 
Discursive stunts allow environmental organisations the news space to make claims through 
the semantic structure of the news narrative. How do the discursive stunts that are used by 
Friends of the Earth contrast with those of Greenpeace? An example of a discursive stunt by 
Friends of the Earth occurs in an article which covers the news topic of the Government’s 
policy for privatisation and deregulation of the electricity industry (FoE S). When the 
Government advertises the privatisation of the electricity distribution companies with the 
slogan "tell Frank”, Friends of the Earth contests the slogan by replacing it with the 
catchphrase "Frankenstein". This catchphrase is combined with an explicit framing device: 
this communication strategy enables Friends of the Earth to penetrate the claims which are 
embedded within the news narrative, and state that the environmental cost o f pollution 
produced by a privatisation policy will (like Shelley’s Frankenstein) be "uncouth and 
distorted in its proportions".(FoE S). 23*
23 This is particularly the case since the emergence of environmental discourse on the mainstream news
agenda, which for the British case is usually dated from 1988 onwards, see Anderson (1991), Love (1990).
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The ’’Frankenstein" example shows that Friends of the Earth is able to use discursive 
stunts as a technique for embedding political claims into the structure of news narratives. As 
the headline Frank Makes his M onstrous Debut (FoE S) indicates, in contrast to Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth does not make itself the leading "actor" in a news narrative relating an 
"actor opposition". Instead it draws on an existing cultural myth as the basis for constructing 
an explicit framing device which opposes a specific policy measure. The organisation’s 
discursive stunt produces a framing device that refers to a countercultural theme - the 
"Frankenstein” myth - which is deeply rooted in the identity o f modernity and is resonant in 
British culture.23
Friends o f the Earth uses the symbolic resonance of this myth in British culture as a 
mechanism for constructing ’novelty’ into the reporting o f an environmental policy event. 
This raises the "news value" o f the topic and presents Friends of the Earth as an actor who 
is involved in the conflict. Furthermore, it enables the organisation to achieve a relative 
’control’ or exert a degree o f "definitional power" (Hansen 1993) over the media’s 
representation of the claims which are made by the actors in this policy event. Friends of the 
Earth applies a ’cultural bias’ to the structure of the news narrative where the competing 
claims of the opposed policy actors (including those o f the organisation itself) are 
contextualised. This communication strategy successfully achieves a resonance which 
delegitimises the Government’s privatisation policy measures. By achieving media resonance, 
Friends of the Earth’s political communication becomes an ’act’, a discursive practice, which 
intervenes into and reconstitutes the legitimating basis of the relationships between actors in 
the environmental contest. It is by maintaining a degree o f "definitional power” over the 
process whereby claims are legitimated in news narratives, that the organisation is able to 
intervene in the mediation of the environmental contest in the public discourse to the 
relationships of the social actors who are in conflict. In its own news coverage, Friends of 
the Earth exerts a ’relative control’ over the way that the environmental problematic is 25
25 Originally entitled Frankenstein; or, the Modem Prometheus (1818), Mary Shelley's novel provides a 
metaphor, the 'monster*, which signifies the self-created risk to life that is posed by mankind's emerging 
scientific domination o f nature. The Frankenstein myth provides a potent social metaphor which has been used 
as a cultural resource by acton for criticising the dominance o f the scientific method as the rational basis for 
modem society. The "Frankenstein/monster* metaphor is a key signifier for the countercultural tradition which 
has opposed the culture o f modernity from the outset. On this dualistic cultural coding o f modernity, see Eder 
(1990, 1995). As the discussion o f Mary Douglas (1966, 1975) in the introduction (section A) showed, 
contemporary societies are as likely as primitive societies to use symbolic exchanges for communicating about 
social problems.
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presented and viewed as a contested public policy matter in Britain.
In contrast to Greenpeace which constructs its "public image" into a mythical 
character as part of a strategy for raising "news values" and achieving coverage by ’novelty’ 
appeal, Friends of the Earth maintains a "public image" as a "pressure group" in news 
narratives. Friends of the Earth appears as a real and serious actor rather than a mythical and 
fantastic character. Instead of constructing fictional content into events and producing novel 
"news stories", Friends of the Earth achieves the ’novelty’ to resonate in the public discourse 
by drawing on the cultural power of a myth that appeals to a countercultural tradition in 
British culture. Not only does Friends of the Earth have a less contentious "public image" 
than Greenpeace in the public sphere, but the organisation’s discursive stunts are designed 
to provide news space for embedding political claims in mainstream public affairs news 
genres rather than being tied like those of Greenpeace to the "scandal" news genre. This is 
indicative o f a general difference in the discursive actions of the two organisations: namely 
that Greenpeace constructs itself as a conflicting "actor" in the news, whereas Friends of the 
Earth is more likely to have its opinion sought by journalists within the routine practices for 
covering environmental affairs. As a collective actor, Friends of the Earth is considered a 
legitimate spokesperson or "voice" by journalists for commenting on environmental public 
policy affairs. Furthermore, the organisation’s mobilisations impact upon a thematic structure 
of news24 which is more likely to exert a cultural pressure on the actors in a policy 
discourse than the populist "news stories" of Greenpeace. Friends of the Earth aims to 
communicate through the media to specialist policy communities and the ’attentive public’ 
of environmental sympathisers, it must therefore maintain a "public image" that has 
legitimacy with both audiences.
The technique of discursive stunts is less prominent in Friends of the Earth’s 
campaign repertoire than that o f Greenpeace. It would be counterproductive for the 
organisation’s aspirations as a policy actor simply to court populist appeal like 
Greenpeace.25 A corollary to this is that the organisation’s "public image" as a "pressure
24 By thematic structure o f news, I mean the semantic form which the ideological contents take on in a news 
narrative. This is akin to what van Dijk (1988) terms the "thematic macro-structure of news". Different types 
of structures of news are referred to as genres in everyday parlance.
25 Friends o f the Earth does not wish to compete with the "public image" o f Greenpeace. Earlier, 1 
discussed this functional differentiation but at the same time compatibility o f the two organisations’ 
communication strategies over the news "cycle" in terms o f a division o f communicative labour (Section D).
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group” accords it with more scope in the structure of news for using explicit framing 
devices. Since it has more direct channels of access to the mainstream news and an interest 
in preserving its "public image” as a spokesperson on environmental policy matters, Friends 
of the Earth uses the tactic of discursive stunts more sparingly than Greenpeace. In the case 
of Friends of the Earth, the tactic of discursive stunts is preserved for highlighting key policy 
oppositions when the organisation has a special need for entering the news agenda, e.g. in 
the key campaign against the Government’s privatisation of public utilities.
Although it attributes an identity to the whole environmental movement’s "cycle" o f 
criticism on the White Paper, the ’Dirty Man’ "scandal" is principally a Greenpeace stunt. 
(Section D). However, Friends of the Earth participate in the delegitimation o f the White 
Paper by contributing further ’ad hoc’ discursive stunts to revitalise the Dirty Man event.
In the first case, Friends of the Earth uses a discursive stunt to contest the 
Government’s policy record the day after the White Paper is published (FoE a). To 
immediately capitalise on the high "news value" for environmental affairs that is produced 
by Greenpeace’s Dirty Man "scandal" and the Government’s own publicity for the This 
Common Inheritance document, Friends of the Earth’s discursive stunt contends that the 
intent of the policy document should be judged by the verbs that it uses "endorse, review, 
consider, and consult" rather than "implement, establish and enact" (FoE a). This is an 
attempt to bias the reception o f the White Paper by drawing the readership into a text 
analysis o f the document. It indicates that Friends o f the Earth’s discursive stunts are oriented 
towards biasing how actors interpret, view and ’read’ the environmental agenda in relation 
to policy events, rather than making high profile novel "news stories" and achieving 
coverage. Friends of the Earth has a communication strategy for environmental policy 
agenda-building rather than opponent delegitimation by actor "blaming strategies".
Whereas discursive stunts are used in exceptional circumstances, explicit framing 
devices are a more common technique for Friends of the Earth to bind the deeper structural 
agenda-building contents of their mobilisations into news narratives. An example of a high 
profile Friends o f the Earth explicit framing device is supplied for the Dirty Man event, 
when David Gee the Director o f Friends of the Earth is cited in a news report:
nThe Paper gives no firm  targets and timetables fo r fu e l efficiency and vehicle 
efficiency measures. There were vague promises and little action ." (FoE c)
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In this case (FoE c), Friends of the Earth criticises the Government for the inadequacy of its 
commitment to policy instruments for regulating fuel consumption, technology and the use 
of private transport. In contrast to Greenpeace’s explicit framing devices, claims are made 
on the basis of the policy measures being "inefficient" rather than against the Government 
as an "actor”. Friends of the Earth’s explicit framing device extends the concept of 
"efficiency” from an economic calculation to an environmental standard for policy strategies. 
By using the term "efficiency", Friends of the Earth introduces environmental criteria into 
the notion o f a legitimate form of environmental policy practice. The organisation mobilises 
a criticism that is strategically pragmatic in relation to the Government policy record and 
which at the same time promotes an extended notion of the concept of "technological 
efficiency".
Another case of a discursive stunt relating to the Dirty Man event that is combined 
with explicit framing devices occurs in an article where the Government’s White Paper policy 
strategy is compared unfavourably to that of the City o f Toronto (FoE e) - a city where 
Friends of the Earth are routinely consulted in the town planning process. In this example 
the discursive stunt gives Friends o f the Earth the opportunity to mobilise several explicit 
framing devices in the context of the Dirty Man policy event. In one of the explicit framing 
devices, a Friends of the Earth spokesperson is cited as follows:
”Traffic jam ? They still think the answer is a wider road. They don*t think 
how they might cut dependence on the car and they make no linkage between 
transportation and environmental pollution. " (FoE e)
This explicit framing device is directed against the specific policy field o f private 
transportation and emphasises how environmental concerns cut across the conventional 
boundaries of policy sectors. The criticism is that existing policy makers lack the vision and 
’thinking’ to take an integrated policy approach to environmental protection. Once more 
environmental criteria are introduced as a better and more legitimate basis for policy 
strategies than the conventional policy approaches of Government.
These examples show that in contrast to the polemical approach of Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth’s explicit framing devices constitute a communication strategy for using 
reasoned arguments as a critique of specific features of existing policy measures. It is on the
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basis of such "reasoning devices" (Gamson 1988) rather than dramatic "effects" that Friends 
of the Earth attempts to "stick" its claims in the public culture. Compared to those o f  
Greenpeace» Friends of the Earth's explicit framing devices reason rather than rhyme in the 
narratives o f public discourse.
In the instances cited above, Friends o f the Earth is building an alternative 
environmental policy agenda which competes with that of the Government in the W hite 
Paper. For most types of established public policy this role of "alternative specification" 
whereby choices and options are narrowed takes place away from the public agenda, when 
specialists co-operate with policy actors (Kingdon 1984). Here Friends of the Earth is using 
the news space which it achieves from its "specialist" status as an environmental "pressure 
group" to mobilise reasoning devices which constiuct an alternative policy agenda in the 
public sphere. Furthermore, it is challenging the rationality o f conventional policy norms by 
extending notions such as "efficiency" from simple economic value criteria (e.g. cost/benefit 
analysis) to environmental value criteria (environmental cost/benefit analysis). This type o f  
discursive action constitutes a dual communication strategy: in the short term it legitimates 
what Friends o f the Earth considers to be a sound environmental practice as the basis fo r 
policy standards (introducing environmental costs); and in the longer term it promotes an 
integrated "thinking" towards the development of an environmental policy programme. 
Excluded from influencing the process of consultation in the "policy stream" where the 
Government prefers to benefit from the knowledge of economists and scientists26, Friends 
of the Earth carries its own knowledge specialism on environmental practice to the 
Government through the public sphere. In effect, the reasoning devices which Friends of the 
Earth mobilises into the public sphere may be seen to constitute the formation of an 
environmental policy "counterdiscourse".27
In this instance Friends of the Earth are introducing environmental value critieria into 
the norms of established policy discourse. It is the "expertise" which the organisation has in
26 In 1990 the Conservative Government's "thinking" on environmental policy was influenced in particular 
by the policy proposal documents o f the economist David Pearce who favours "market" and non-state- 
interventionist policy solutions to environmental problems (Pearce 1989) (Rose 1990). The notion that the 
market can effectively regulate polluting practices and bring environmental benefits without state intervention 
is a contentious position that the environmental movement have steadfastly opposed.
27 Terdiman (1985: 13) defines a "counterdiscourse" as one which mobilises "an alternative, liberating 
newness against the absorptive capacity o f those established discourses".
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introducing environmental value criteria to policy norms that is the basis on which it draws 
and exerts "definitional power" in the public discourse, and which it uses as a collective actor 
to oppose Government policy strategies. Friends of the Earth utilises its "public image" - the 
fact that it is already a legitimate environmental actor in the public discourse - to make 
claims as a "specialist" against actors whose environmental credentials are less legitimate 
(e.g. Governments and the scientists and economists who advise them on policy-making).
The earlier analysis of the strategic agenda building contents of the news coverage 
showed that Friends of the Earth campaigns on a wider range of policy based environmental 
topics than Greenpeace (see Section C above). This feature is also reflected in the range of 
reasoning devices which comprise Friends of the Earth’s discursive repertoire. Indeed there 
are several examples where Friends of the Earth mobilises explicit framing devices that 
contest different policy sectors. Friends of the Earth’s countryside campaigner Robin 
Maynard is attributed with the following explicit framing device that advocates policies that 
will make farmers introduce the assessment of environmental costs into their farming 
practices:
"We have been calling fo r  farm ers to get o ff the treadmill o f over-intensive 
agriculture fo r  over 10 years. I f  they wish to avoid being thrown onto the free  
market, they will have to prove they can deliver farm ing systems that conserve 
rather than damage the resources o f soil and w ater." (FoE i)
For the campaign on energy policy, Friends of the Earth campaigners mobilise an explicit 
framing device which aims to discredit the notion of market price as a legitimate basis for 
regulating the use of energy resources in a way that is environmentally beneficial:
"Oil does not pay its way. I t produces carbon dioxide and the greenhouse 
effect, urban smog, benzine pollution and many other hazards. None o f this 
is reflected in the prices, so alternative cleaner fuels such as wind, wave and 
solar pow er are ai a disadvantage... (S)hort sharp increases don ft tend to lead 
to energy conservation"... "Price changes will not make people alter their 
behaviour i f  they are tied to particular fu e ls ." (FoE E)
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Energy policy field is also related to the domestic home, when Friends of the Earth uses an 
explicit framing device to relate the rights of the individual consumers to the Government’s 
record and responsibility for energy policy:
”House buyers have as much right to know whether their prospective home is 
hopelessly energy inefficient as they do i f  it is collapsing with dry rot. What 
is needed is some firm  direction from  the Government and we are disappointed 
this is obviously not forthcom ing." (FoE n)
The examples cited above show that Friends of the Earth intends to construct an 
environmental agenda that extends the notion of policy practice beyond the use of free market 
regulatory mechanisms. Indeed the organisation extends the economic rationale to take 
account o f environmental costs and builds this notion into a new language for policy making 
based on environmental values. The explicit framing devices show that Friends of the Earth 
mobilises a "public image" of itself as ’specialist’ commentator on environmental policy. The 
organisation legitimates itself as a "pressure group” in the general field of environmental 
policy and engages in "alternative policy specification”. However, as the environment is an 
emergent and not an established policy field in Britain, Friends of the Earth’s discursive 
practices may still be considered as a component of what is principally an public agenda 
building strategy. Specifying alternatives whilst the Government is attempting to form its first 
national environmental policy agenda constitutes a strategy for delegitimating the 
Government’s authority as an actor who is fit to make policy proposals.
The explicit framing devices indicate that Friends o f the Earth has a communication 
strategy for opposing the Government’s preference for market based policy solutions to 
environmental problems. In each case the technique involves introducing environmental 
criteria to an economic rationale as the basis for a policy measure. The organisation presnts 
itself as a pressure group acting in the public interest. Friends of the Earth is able to draw 
on its authority as a well known and long standing specialist campaigner on the environment 
to advocate such measures. This "public image" not only serves for constructing policy 
critiques against the Government, but for introducing environmental policy matters in 
digestible formats to the reading public. In the example on home efficiency (FoE n), the 
concerns of the public - as "consumers" and "homeowners” - are integrated within the wider
... .
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schema of an environmental policy. This shows that the reasoning devices that are used by 
Friends of the Earth are designed so that members of the public can relate the normally 
hidden world o f policy matters to their own lives, interests and actions. The organisation acts 
in the public discourse not only to shift the cognitive boundaries of environmental policies, 
but to make environmental reasoning itself an accessible cognitive element of the public 
culture. In this way Friends of the Earth’s discursive actions popularise environmental policy 
concerns and engage a degree of social ’reflexivity’ into the public agenda building process 
for environmental policy.
I have shown that Friends of the Earth mobilises environmental policy critiques rather 
than "actor oppositions" into the public discourse. This feature of the organisation’s "public 
image" extends to its role within the environmental movement, which is illustrated by the two 
explicit framing devices that are mobilised during the WWF scandal (FoE A B):
"The environmental movement is always in debate between the absolutists and 
the pragmatists. There is a role fo r  both and I  do not think that the debate 
should go away, i f  anything it should get more intensen (FoE A)
"What's coming out clearly now is that the learning curve really is being 
climbed very rapidly indeed. Development organisations are realising that 
development simply cannot work unless it's  rooted in sound environmental 
practice. By and large they know now that they need to listen to the voices o f 
the indigenous peoples ” (FoE B)
In the first case, Friends of the Earth defends the heterogeneity and diversity of the 
environmental movement as a sign o f its health, and in the second it defends the World Wide 
Fund for Nature’s dubious actions by emphasising the W W F’s learning and expertise in 
bringing sound environmental practice to underdeveloped regions. This indicates that Friends 
of the Earth is less prepared than Greenpeace to make "image" capital at the expense of other 
environmental organisations and takes a more pragmatic and integrationist role within the 
movement.
Environmental claims tend only to appear in Greenpeace’s news coverage as a 
subordinate element to the organisation’s own "public image" as a collective actor. On the
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basis of this finding one can make the general statement that Greenpeace does not enter the 
public agenda by the ’’news value" of the quality of its environmental claims - e.g. by "sound 
scientific research" - but by dramatising the environmental contest into an ongoing and 
compelling "event" with a high "news value". Greenpeace pre-defmes the cultural biases of 
the opposed actors who appear in a news text. This is achieved by packaging the "news 
events" as a narrative model that gives simple moral lessons to the reading public: "the 
goodies" v. "the baddies"; "David v. Goliath"; "the winners" and "the losers". Such 
narrative models are highly compatible with the types o f news structures which report 
"events" with populist appeal and mainstream human interest values. They have a ’novelty* 
element - man bites dog - which raises the "news value" by giving a populist twist to a 
reported "event" in the social contest. Greenpeace invariably appear as "the goodies", the 
noble and daring underdog fighting at insuperable odds against more powerful opponents "the 
baddies", e.g. a Government Military nuclear complex or a multi-national exploiter or 
polluter. In the same way that interpreting the "David v. Goliath" narrative requires 
knowledge only about the outcome - "who won?" - and not the contested issue over which 
they fought, Greenpeace require public comprehension only as the "winners", "the goodies", 
the morally justified.
It is not environmental claims but the "news stories" of Greenpeace which invoke a 
*reflexivity* into the public discourse. People are not engaged into the environmental contest 
but into following the narrative of a drama that is played out between "good" and "bad" 
actors. This drama serves as a social metaphor for indicating who one should support in the 
environmental contest. It is by using social metaphor to construct a moral narrative that 
Greenpeace enables readers to identify the social relationships which are at stake in the 
environmental contest. Furthermore, it is on this simplistic but highly effective basis that 
Greenpeace appeal to the public and seek legitimacy as a collective actor through mainstream 
news. This communication strategy implies that Greenpeace engages in "image politics" to 
court mass favour in the public discourse rather than to gain activists for the cause.28
As a visible environmental actor, Greenpeace’s own "public image" has a higher
n  The 'open' unabashed populism of Greenpeace’s mass environmental campaigns is in stark contrast to 
the 'closed* hierarchical structure o f its organisation and the inaccessibility which this has to the base o f  
environmental activism. This has led to criticisms of the 'opportunism* of Greenpeace tactics from within the 
movement and academics who believe that as a political ideology environmentalism ought to sustain the notion 
o f  'base democracy* (Eyennan and Jamison 1989) (Rucht 1995).
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"news value*' than the scientific, normative or aesthetic basis of claims which it ’’packages" 
onto the public agenda. This is why the organisation’s environmental claims appear as 
polemical self-evident truths, they are not intended to be open for discussion or legitimation 
by others, including the reading public. Another outcome of this proclamatory and self- 
affirmatory nature of Greenpeace’s communications is that opponent actors attempt to de- 
Iegitimise Greenpeace by claiming that it is not a serious actor.29 The Greenpeace discourse 
remains impervious to such disclaimers, however, as the organisation does not enter the 
structure of public communication to engage in dialogue with Government and Industry 
actors. Greenpeace aims primarily to popularise and heighten the public perception of the 
flaws in their opponents’ activities on specific environmental topics. Furthermore, the 
organisation aims to raise its own prestige by fixing its own "image" in the public discourse 
as "the winners" and "the morally righteous".
Despite the repetitive and tautological basis of the "news stories" which it produces, 
Greenpeace’s claims-making nonetheless retains an apparently permanent "news value" in the 
structure of public communication. By constructing dramatised "news events" the 
organisation gains the liberty to repeat the same polemics continuously without becoing 
"boring" and subsequently being excluded from the mainstream news agenda. This indicates 
that the strategic dimension of Greenpeace’s mobilisation activities occurs in the 
dramatisation o f "events” and embedding of claims in public fictions, i.e. biased narrative 
representations of reality. Greenpeace makes itself appealing as a collective actor by 
constructing narratives in the public sphere which serve as a social metaphor for interpreting 
the environmental contest by relating to the actors. Greenpeace tends to make the 
environmental contest into a children^ nursery rhyme or adventure story, where the moral 
lessons for the public are clearly embedded in the qualities of the "characters" who act out 
the contest in a news narrative.
Two good examples of this embedding of political claims into public fictions were 
noted earlier. In addition to defining the British Government^ policy agenda as the "Britain 
the Dirty Man of Europe" event, Greenpeace contested British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.è 
international transportation of radioactive waste with the catchphrase "Britain the world$ 
nuclear dustbin". Such slogans are not intended to arouse reflective thinking by the public
29 For example, this was the claim o f the Environment Minister Chris Patten after the Dirty Man event.
about the environmental problematic, on the contrary they serve as cultural shorthand for 
making the political claims of Greenpeace immediately accessible to the language of public 
life. This does not necessarily mean that Greenpeace £ political claims are trivial, it merely 
indicates that the organisation uses its "definitional power" for constructing narratives in the 
news which educate people towards Greenpeace^ way o f "thinking". In the same way that 
nursery rhymes are intended to give moral guidance to the behaviour of children, Greenpeace 
invite the British public into a "collective learning" process30 about the environmental 
contest by indicating who they should support.
In this sense Greenpeace^ communication strategies have a populist orientation. The 
organisation works at the cutting edge of public culture by mixing the cultural appeal o f 
environmental claims with anti-authoritarian caricatures and "novelty" stories that have 
mainstream cultural appeal. This does not mean, however, that Greenpeace necessarily 
trivialise political communication by their sensationalist tactics. Indeed the historical role o f 
Greenpeace, as the Dirty Man case testifies, has been influential in popularising 
environmental issues on the British public agenda. Unless the environment is sustained as a 
topic with a visibility on the public agenda there is no reason for Governments to be held 
accountable by environmental criteria for their actions.
Friends of the Barth’s news discourse is less dependent than Greenpeace’s on the 
dramatic effect o f media stunts, direct actions and constructed "contests" between opponent 
actors in "news stories". Nonetheless, the organisation appears more frequently on the news 
agenda and exerts a potential for mobilising environmental critique into policy discourses. 
This indicates that Friends of the Earth’s communication strategies raise and sustain "news 
values" on a different basis than Greenpeace. Friends o f the Barth’s communications 
penetrate the news coverage on environmental "events" as a matter of routine without 
necessarily dramatising actor oppositions into a "news story" narrative. Indeed the examples 
indicate that the dramatisation o f "news events" is only a marginal element in Friends of the 
Earth’s overall discursive action repertoire which instead tends to rely more on public 
"reasoning devices". Whereas Greenpeace has even generated its own genre of "news story", 
Friends of the Earth enters mainstream news structures as a serious environmental actor - a
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30 On the role o f  collective learning processes in the construction of social reality, see Eder and Miller
(1986). The notion o f  social learning has been applied to the development of environmental politics (Princen 
and Finger 1994) and the development of environmental policy (Weak 1992).
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legitimate "pressure group". Why is Friends of the Earth’s "public image" taken more 
seriously than that of Greenpeace, and what type of opportunity structure does this provide 
for exerting "definitional power"?
In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth’s discursive actions constitute a 
strategy for entering into a dialogue with opponent Government and Industry actors. This 
makes Friends of the Earth’s role in the public communication of environmental affairs 
different from that of Greenpeace. Rather than popularising environmental themes by self- 
promotion, Friends of the Earth promotes the advent of an environmental policy dialogue by 
generating claims that are designed to permeate from within the public agenda and which 
exert influence over policy discourses. Friends of the Earth may be an unconventional policy 
actor, but it makes environmental problems a topic for political debate and at the same time 
relevant to everyday life and practices. Whereas Greenpeace makes environmental claims that 
are indivisible from the organisation’s own "public image", Friends of the Earths "public 
image" makes the organisation’s own interests indivisible from the future for environmental 
claims. It acts within the structure of public communication to shape the political "outcomes" 
of environmental affairs in Britain.
This approach not only legitimises Friends of the Earth’s actions and its "public 
image" but more importantly it legitimises the idea of a political dialogue on the environment 
in Britain. The environment is an emergent topic on the public agenda and Friends of the 
Earth’s activities have contributed significantly to stimulating and shaping this process of 
emergence into mainstream politics. Friends of the Earth legitimates the notion of a political 
dialogue on environmental problems as the course of action that should be taken by both 
policy communities and the ’attentive public! The claims which the organisation mobilises 
are designed to resonate with both policy-makers and the public, and serve to construct 
Friends of the Earth as the ‘mediator’ between the two in the emergent policy dialogue. In 
this way, the organisation makes environmental concern appear to be a ’normal’ and rational 
element of political decision-making. Its activities attempt to "establish" environmental 
politics as a routine concern of conventional political actors, their advisors and their publics. 
This indicates that Friends o f the Earth’s communicative actions are strategic and defined by 
organisational interests within the agenda for environmental politics in Britain. By promoting 
the establishment of a national environmental policy agenda Friends o f the Earth is also 
promoting the potential for its own future interests and activities.
A key institutional function of the organisation for a social movement is to maintain 
a future capacity for strategy at times when the popularity o f the movement may fade from 
the public agenda, e.g. at the end of a "cycle" o f mass mobilisation (Pizzomo 1978).31 
Friends of the Earth 's "image politics" in the public sphere fulfils such a role for the British 
environmental movement. By maintaining an integral presence within the media coverage of 
environmental policy matters and promoting its favoured notion of policies, the Friends of 
the Earth "public image" ensures that public policies are held accountable for their 
environmental "effects", and that environmental policy decision making remains "visible" at 
times when the attention of the public is focusing on other topics, e.g. during the Gulf War.
Friends o f the Earth’s potential for "definitional power" in the structure of news is 
not wholly determined by the "news value" of the environment within current affairs.32 The 
organisation can use its "public image" as a resource for forcing policy events onto the news 
agenda, as it does in the cases of discursive stunts. Policy-related news reports are the 
primary context in which the organisation acts as a "source" mobiliser for environmental 
dialogue. Friends of the Earth enters public communication and uses "reasoning devices" to 
make the claims of political, business and other actors open to legitimation or delegitimation 
on the basis of environmental criteria, whilst at the same time resonating with public accord 
(e.g. by identifying consumer preferences or benefits). It is this process o f legitimation which 
the organisation seeks to influence by using its "public image" as a resource for mobilising 
cultural bias into the public media.
Whereas Greenpeace polemicises environmental claims into a popularity contest 
between opposing actors, Friends of the Earth constructs an environmentally based notion 
of the "public interest", i.e. the environment as a "common public good", as the legitimating 
basis for future social actions. This strategy raises the interests at stake in environmental 
policy decision-making from the "hidden" privacy o f policy communities to the concerns o f  
the 'attentive public' which are expressed in the public sphere. It is by working in the 
structure of public communication that Friends o f the Earth is able to legitimise a specific
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31 See the discussion in the introduction to this section E .1 .1 .
32 The environmental organisations own communicative actions play a constructive role in sustaining the 
quality and quantity o f the "news value" of environmental affairs, but external factors beyond their control, e .g . 
the Chernobyl accident, British Government policy initiatives, the Rio Summit etc.., define the longer term and 
macro dimensions o f  the opportunity structure that is available in the public discourse for their discursive 
practices and communication strategies.
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version of the emergent environmental public agenda. And it is by acting in the public sphere 
that the organisation exerts this "definitional power" over policy events in the environmental 
contest.
Whatever other actors do or say in the environmental policy dialogue, Friends of the 
Earth may always introduce environmental value criteria which dismiss, qualify or extend 
the context of the claims that are made. The organisation politicises the existing deleterious 
activities of opponent actors by presenting "alternatives" based on environmental norms and 
making these options seem more viable, rational and practical. Friends of the Earth’s notion 
of the viability, rationality, and practicality of legitimate environmental actions is founded 
on the basis of research (scientific findings) and the evidence of practical experience 
(experience from environmental policies and practices), i.e. "sound science" and "common 
sense". Communicating publicly about these more viable, rational and practical "alternatives" 
delegitimises the existing Government regulatory policies, and industrial practices and 
stimulates the public discourse on ’sound’ environment practices.
Friends of the Earth will only cease to have a permanent "news value" when it has 
an established basis for consensus with opponent policy and public actors - when it agrees 
and negotiates interests within a Government policy stream. At such a time the environmental 
policy dialogue will be "institutionalised" and remain ’closed* from the ’politics’ of 
communication in the public agenda. This is an unlikely scenario for the foreseeable future 
in Britain33, which is not only due to Conservative Government’s intransigence in producing 
a national environmental policy agenda. Indeed an ’institutionalisation’ of the environmental 
dialogue also runs counter to the interests of Friends of the Earth. The organisation draws 
its potentiality for "definitional power" by permanently re-constructing an "attentive public". 
As in the case of Greenpeace’s cultural populism, Friends of the Earth’s political activism 
is also dependent on maintaining a resonance within British public culture.
33 Since environmental problems are socially defined and constructed on the basis o f competing sets of 
scientific facts, their resolution is always dogged by the incommensurability of claims that are made. For this 
reason environmental problems that are founded on technological risks invite more rather than less 
communication in the public sphere (Beck 1992; Eder 1992; 1995). For this reason it is unlikely that they will 
disappear from the news agenda regardless o f whether Friends of the Earth are at some time in the future 
included in the policy community or not.
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2.ii) The W orld  Wide Fund for N ature
Unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, which have emerged to prominence over 
the last decade riding the wave of public concern for technological risks to everyday life, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature is a longstanding and established pressure group. The preceding 
discussion (Sections C and D) on the World Wide Fund for Nature case has confirmed that 
the organisation enters the news discourse on a different basis than the two media-oriented 
organisations Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. As an organisation that is engaged in 
practical conservation activities and supra-national development programmes, the World 
Wide Fund for Nature uses the public discourse as an institutional resource for publicising, 
promoting and legitimising its own interests and activities. However it does not depend solely 
on resonance in the public discourse and the contributions o f private individual donations to 
ensure its existence. Although the flora and fauna themes which the organisation raises do 
have a widespread popular appeal, the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to enter the public 
discourse to communicate with specialist audiences. These audiences include the business 
sponsors who provide the major source of the organisation^ financial resources, international 
policy makers and bodies such as the World Bank which have influence over the 
Governments in Third World regions, conservation and overseas development activists and 
environmentalists who maintain a special interest in the field of species, habitat and 
environmental protection.
This means that rather than being a "primary definer’ for mainstream environmental 
public affairs, the World Wide Fund for Nature uses the news coverage to promote and 
defend its established "public image" as an "expert" in the specialist field of species and 
habitat preservation and overseas environmental development. It tends only to be in 
circumstances created by the special topicality of conservation issues - whether due to natural 
disasters, international meetings to establish treaties for protection and preservation of species 
and habitat, or publications about the "success" or "failure" of the organisations 
development programmes - that the World Wide Fund for Nature enters the public agenda. 
Section D indicated that unlike Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the organisation was 
not engaged in agenda building activities that were designed to influence the national 
environmental policy agenda throughout the "cycle" of the Dirty Man "news event". Instead 
the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilised criticisms against the British Government's
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environmental policy agenda only when external circumstances provided an opportunity for 
’’voicing" opinions and claims. Such an opportunity occurred at the peak of the Dirty Man 
"news event" and in the "epilogue" phase, when the Government’s environmental policy 
preferences had been soundly discredited and the possibility arose for "alternatives" to be 
heard and raised in the public discourse.
When compared to the cases o f Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, the World Wide 
Fund for Nature is less likely to engage in discursive practices simply as a strategy for 
entering the public agenda. The organisation has less need for communicating with ’the 
masses’ than Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The supra-national conservation campaign 
issues of the World Wide Fund for Nature are less politically contentious in the national 
context that those of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace which tend to oppose the 
technological risks to everyday life. Public consensus for conservation issues is less 
contentious than for the ’unknown’ problems o f technological risks, and courting public 
favour is a less important element o f the organisation’s political strategy. The World Wide 
Fund for Nature has already established contacts with the national and international policy 
communities on overseas environmental development (Princen and Finger 1994) (Szersynski, 
Miles et al 1995). This means that the World Wide Fund for Nature enters the public agenda 
in special circumstances, when the reporting of "news events" by the media provides an 
opportunity for the organisation to "frame" an aspect of the debate which serves to promote 
its interests in the conservation Field.
The basis of the World Wide Fund for Nature’s claims-making activities is different 
from that of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. As a source actor, the organisation is less 
active in producing news narratives which define the environmental contest in the news.34 
The organisation^ claims tend to be lodged within linguistic structures of news that are 
produced by the journalists, e.g. "news events" covering the Government’s planned changes 
to national policies for conservation or the protection of rare species (WWF M O), or 
reporting on international conferences for setting regulatory standards (WWF P R V), or 
attempts to enforce sanctions (WWF P T), or even the public scandals relating to the WWF’s
34 This claim is confirmed by the findings of the preliminary content analysis on environmental mobilisation 
indicators (B.6) and in the analysis of the news "cycle" in Section D which show that the World Wide Fund 
for Nature "stage" less "news events’ to achieve news coverage and are less frequently the "source" o f articles 
than either Friends o f the Earth or Greenpeace.
own fundraising practices (WWF B C D E F G H I ) o r  relating to the special problems of 
environmental development programmes and species preservation (WWF J Q S).
The World Wide Fund for Nature is nonetheless active in producing the thematic 
contents that appear in the narratives of such news reports. As the analysis of the WWF 
scandals demonstrates (Section D), the organisation is able to utilise good contacts and access 
to specialist environmental journalists to achieve favourable coverage at times of crucial 
importance. In less exceptional circumstances, the organisation is more likely to be reported 
in relation to an event concerning its specialist Field of environmental interest or related 
policy discussions than actively seek mainstream publicity for its own activities. In contrast 
to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the World Wide Fund for Nature is a more 
conventional "source" actor in the social production o f news. Furthermore, the organisation 
tends to appear in a specialist genre o f environmental news, namely that which covers 
conservation problems in relation to development practices, domestic policies for overseas 
aid and supranational regulatory bodies for species and habitat preservation.
For this combination o f reasons the World Wide Fund for Nature does not use the 
tactic of direct actions to achieve media attention. As a pressure group in the estabished 
policy community for international and overseas development - serving as an advisor on 
supra-national regulatory bodies, such as CITES and IPCC35 - the organisation’s opinions 
are cited by journalists as a routine part of their reporting function.
The World Wide Fund for Nature also uses the tactic of discursive stunts less than 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. The legitimacy of the organisation’s conservation aims 
and practices are not contested36 and so the World Wide Fund for Nature is less "image" 
assertive than either Friends o f the Earth or Greenpeace when it exerts "definitional power" 
over the news. The organisation is often directly involved in the production o f a specialist 
structure of news, appearing in the Environmental Section of The Guardian when a 
sympathetic reporter uses the specialist knowledge of the World Wide Fund for Nature to 
report in detail on a conservation problem. In such cases the organisation itself keeps a low
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33 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC). For details o f the WWF’s actions with these bodies, see Princen and Finger (1994).
36 Apart from the exceptional circumstances o f the "scandal" relating to the World Wide Fund for Nature’s 
finances. Even then the legitimacy o f  the conservation of habitat and species was not called into question; only 
the methods that the organisations had used to pursue these aims were contested.
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profile in the news narrative, though it will be named and may be attributed with an explicit 
framing device.
As the campaign topics of the World Wide Fund for Nature are less conflictual than 
those of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace, the organisation has less need to embed a 
’cultural bias’ into the new narrative on the environmental contest. Rather than introducing 
self legitimation and opponent delegitmation strategies which ’bias’ the "objective” reporting 
function of the journalist, the World Wide Fund for Nature tends to achieve legitimation for 
its environmental issue topic without mobilising discursive stunts. Examples of discursive 
stunts are rare in the World Wide Fund for Nature sample. The primary cultural technique 
by which the organisation enters the linguistic structure of a news narrative is through 
explicit framing devices.
In the case of the WWF scandal about the alleged "shoot to kill" policy against 
poachers (Section D) the World Wide Fund for Nature uses its direct links with a specialist 
environmental journalist to mobilise an explicit framing device that is self-legitimating as pan 
of a ’damage limitation’ strategy:
"Radical measures are needed to prevent the rhino from  becoming extinct and 
to keep the elephant population from  dwindling to insignificant numbers... We 
don’t run the law in those countries, but we are aware that these guards are 
at great risk. In many countries the equipment they operate is w ell below the 
standard o f that used by the poachers. Without the valiant efforts o f those 
game wardens none o f these animals would survive. * (WWF G)
In contrast to Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace whose explicit framing devices are 
short and polemical, the World Wide Fund for Nature is attributed more space within the 
structure of the news narrative for developing its argumentation. In this case the 
organisation’s controversial policy for supplying weapons to game wardens is defended by 
elaborating the dilemma that is faced in preventing animals from becoming extinct. Another 
example where the organisation is given the news space for developing its argumentation as 
an explicit framing device occurs when the Development and Conservation Officer, Clive 
Weeks, is cited elaborating the specific problems faced by overseas environmental 
development programmes:
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"Huge sums o f money are now available fo r  aid work on the projects in the 
fie ld . The trouble is that there are not enough people to back up the aid  
packages. Britain, fo r  one, has not invested in training. We have over­
specialised. We don't need people with Masters degrees but people who can 
integrate the different disciplines. There is a great need fo r  renewable 
resource managers, fo r  multi-disciplined teams. I  am extremely worried that 
there will not be enough trained people to give sound advice. A t the moment 
there is a great gap in the age profile o f people working on overseas projects.
There are a lot o f people in their fifties and sixties. The next lot are in their 
twenties. This is a direct result o f not sending enough technical people 
overseas as back up over many years. There has to be a fundamental change 
in training at Universities. What is the point o f  seeing agriculture, forestry, 
livestock as different disciplines? They should a ll be integrated. Conservation 
is, finally, people." (WWF C)
The reasoning here is that an "integrated" thinking should be taken towards 
conservation and that this requires an approach that includes people within the process. In 
this example a specialist environmental feature article provides the World Wide Fund for 
Nature with the opportunity for elaborating in detail the problems that are encountered in 
shifting from being a traditional conservationist organisation towards embracing a ’process’ 
based approach to environmental conservation and development. This type of the 
organisation’s explicit framing devices are part of a promotional and educational strategy. 
The World Wide Fund for Nature is able to directly state its case on the problems faced in 
the contemporary context of its specialist practice o f environmental development. The news 
narrative provides the space for presenting these arguments to the specialist public who 
follow the environmental news section.
The World Wide Fund for Nature’s supra-national campaign against the use of rhino 
horn by the pharmaceutical industry in China again uses this type of explicit framing device 
that is a "reasoning device" which elaborates the environmental problematic which the 
organisation is seeking to promote:
(R)hinos are continually killed in Africa and Asia to  supply the needs o f the
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large Chinese pharmaceutical industry... There was no way o f knowing how 
many o f these valuable works o f art have been ground down into powder by 
the drug corporations. Clearly the main purpose is to earn as much foreign 
currency and as large a profit as possible." (WWF P)
7  was deeply saddened that such beautiful pieces, so rare, irreplaceable, 
were going to be ground dow n ." (WWF T)
In the First case (WWF P) the organisation serves as a conservationist specialist identifying 
the context of the problem in a way that relates "causes” (demand and need for foreign 
currency) and "effects" (killing of rhinos). In the second case (WWF T) the explict framing 
device has a reasoning device which claims that the destruction of beautiful antiques (made 
of rhino horn) is wrong on moral and aesthetic grounds. These two examples illustrate that 
the World Wide Fund for Nature attempts to achieve a public understanding and a cultural 
acceptance of the legitimacy of its campaigns by articulating them on the public agenda.
In cases of explicit framing devices that refer to policy events, the World Wide Fund 
for Nature is presented with less space in the structure of the news narrative for stating 
arguments. For example, in an article covering the prospective Conference on Climate 
Change held at an intergovernmental level (WWF), the World Wide Fund for Nature is 
restricted to the following explicit framing device:
"We are facing the prospect o f total chaos" (WWF R)
This indicates that in the news coverage of international policy events the World Wide Fund 
f for Nature is simply presented the news space to comment that the event is not going
\ successfully. This constitutes a less explicit type of "blaming” strategy than those which are
i
\ employed in the news discourse by Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. However, the
[ special opportunity that is presented by the ’Dirty Man’ event enables the World Wide Fund
j for Nature to make a rare excursion into commenting on national political affairs and use
f explicit framing devices that are more confrontational than those which are usually mobilised
I by the organisation.
The week before the ’Dirty M an’ event, the World Wide Fund for Nature mobilises
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an explicit framing device that is directly critical of the Government’s domestic road building 
policy:
"On average eight important wildlife sites were threatened by each 
Department o f Transport roads scheme ... I f  this figure holds true fo r  the 
whole o f England the Government's current roads programme will damage or 
destroy over 1 500 wildlife sites. " (WWF M)
This criticism of the British Government’s policy agenda indicates that the World Wide Fund 
for Nature is involved, although less centrally, in the construction of the ’Dirty M an’ "news 
event" with Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace.37 Furthermore, the explicit framing 
device contains a discursive stunt which calculates that if the road-building programme is 
extended to the size o f England 1 500 wildlife sites would be under threat. This use of a 
discursive stunt by the World Wide Fund for Nature indicates that in special circumstances 
the organisation will use news coverage for entering into conflict with the Government over 
national conservation interests. In such cases the claims that are made by the World Wide 
Fund for Nature tend to appear in an explicit framing device. During the Dirty Man "news 
event", Simon Lyster of the World Wide Fund for Nature is cited as follows on the This 
Common Inheritance policy document:
"We were hoping fo r  much bigger measures to protect Britain's remaining 
wildlife habitats on land and in the sea. " (WWF 0 )
Once more this shows that the World Wide Fund for Nature will enter the national 
environmental contest when there is a favourable opportunity structure for political 
communication, however the organisation makes claims only within its special field of 
interest.
The World Wide Fund for Nature^ influence on political decision-making hinges less 
on the "definitional power" that it exerts in the media than either Friends of the Earth or 
Greenpeace. Nonetheless, favourable coverage on the organisation’s specialist environmental
37 Section D indicated that the communications o f the organisations were co-ordinated at the peak of the 
Dirty Man event.
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issue topic - world conservation - with an educational orientation is an important part of its 
overall campaign strategy. In the World Wide Fund for Nature case» the opportunity 
structure for discursive practices that is provided by news coverage is based primarily on the 
explicit framing devices which the organisation uses to publicise conservation issues and their 
related supra-national policy communities. In special opportune circumstances the World 
Wide Fund for Nature will also criticise the Government’s national policy on conservation.
3. "Image politics" - introducing a moral ’reflexivity' into the public culture
In the ’age of environmental communication’ the "public images" which the 
organisations are able to lodge and sustain in the mass media discourse constitute a vital 
resource for collective action. In recent years environmentalists have become a bête noire for 
politicians in Britain. It is not simply by chance that politicians find the rhetoric of 
environmental claims so easy to co-opt but the implications of this new language so difficult 
to integrate with other competing policy demands. The special location of environmentalists 
as the representatives of a counter-cultural code in contemporaiy societies38 means that a 
mere mention of the organisations, their "public images", introduces elements of a normative 
critique into the public discourse. After producing a "public image" through years of 
environmental activism, this "public image" of the collective actor becomes the basis for 
achieving news space for claims. This occurs once the environment becomes an established 
topic in the news. Necessarily, at this stage of development the organisations’ actions are 
communications-based and media-oriented.39 On the production side of news, this type of 
collective action promotes effective communication channels for the environmental 
organisations to become established as routine news sources for journalists. On the reception 
side, the mainstream news facilitates public access to the organisations* claims, where they 
are open to cognitive reflection, criticism and consumption.
Sustaining the potential for penetrating the structure of news with environmental 
claims over the long term involves the construction, formation and instrumental utilisation
M Environmentalism is a counter-cultural critique of the dominant code of modernity (Eder 1990; 1993).
w Gamson (1995:p. 15) indicates that social movements that are challengers to cultural codes have the central 
site of their collective action in the mass media: "With an elusive target, like a cultural code, the mass media 
often become the central site of action."
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of a "public image". This constructed "public image" constitutes how the environmental 
organisations present themeselves and appear as collective actors on the public stage. A 
"public image" is distinct from the collective identity through which an organisation sustains 
a constituency.40 Operating as a routinised form of political expression, a "public image" 
mediates the existence of a legitimate claims-making actor to a wider public constituency.41 
Not only does a "public image" serve as a symbolic shorthand for the countercultural code 
with which it is associated in public knowledge, but its resonance in the media serves as a 
basis for negotiating objectives with political opponents. As it is easily recognisable by other 
actors, a "public image" becomes a shorthand for the normative critique which the 
mobilisation of identity carries as a basis for political action. In  this sense a "public image" 
is a cultural "tool" (Swidler 1986) for constructing the normative critiques of political claims 
into the public culture. I have referred to the ability of a collective actor to exert this type 
of "definitional power" (Hansen 1993) in the media as "image politics". It is by using 
resources o f "public image" that the organisations are able to legitimate their actions, appeal 
to their constituencies and delegitimate their opponents actions in the public sphere. This 
process of constructing "image politics" by the environmental organisations impacts on the 
social relations that define the environmental contest in Britain. It is the relative control or 
"definitional power" which the organisations have been able to exert over the public 
discourse which has brought them into a lasting confrontation with Government actors over 
environmental policy, most notably in the ’Dirty Man’ event. At this historical stage in the 
environmental contest, the political "success" of environmental mobilisation - judged by its 
agenda-building potential - depends on the communications resources and media resonance 
of the environmental organisations. Political protest is no longer dependent on mass 
demonstrations. A small number o f professional activists working in organisations based on 
communications media can exert power by legitimating their political claims in the public
401 distinguish between the 'public image" of an organisation in the mass media and the collective identity 
of a social movement in the introduction to this section E.1.1. In the symbolic form of a "public image" the 
identity of a collective actor is manifest as a strategic resource for communicating in the mass media.
41 In this sense the resonant "public image" of a collective actor in the mass media maintains a potential for 
communicating the frames of a protest campaign to a wider audience. The presence of the "public image" of 
the organisations in the mass media is a reminder of the normative critiques of environmental protest and as 
such constitutes a cognitive resource for the actors in society to re-evaluate their actions. See the discussion on 
the extension of the "frame alignment model" (Snow and Benford et al 1986) from consensus mobilisation to 
the mobilisation of frames in the public discourse (section A).
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discourse.
The overall increase in the mass media coverage of environmental affairs in recent 
years (Love 1990) (Anderson 1991; 1993) has heralded a de-differentiation of environmental 
policy discourses and mainstream public discourses in the public sphere. This process is in 
part a result o f the campaign activities of the environmental organisations, which have 
brought scientific knowledge on environmental problems into the public realm and placed the 
science that is used by the policy-makers into question.42 Due to this change, environmental 
policy discourses must now achieve legitimation in the public sphere. Subsequently, the 
environmental organisations are able to profit from the "image" capital which they have 
accumulated relative to Government actors and exert a degree of "definitional power" over 
the public debate on the environment. It is not by an expertise in scientific investigation over 
the basis of environmental problems, but by an expertise in communicating to the public that 
the environmental organisations maintain a potential for delegitimising the Government’s 
policy agenda.43
In this section E of the analysis I have compared the explicit framing devices and 
discursive stunts of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature. 
The analysis has shown that the three organisations construct claims into news narratives in 
different ways.
In contrast to Friends of the Earth and the World Wide Fund for Nature, 
Greenpeace’s claims tend to penetrate the structures rather than the thematic contents of news 
narratives. The environmental contest is made into an ’adventure story’ that is acted out in 
the public culture between actors whose moral status has been predefined, Greenpeace the 
"goodies" v. British Government the "baddies". The dramaticist basis of Greenpeace’s
42 Beck’s (1992) work on the reflexivity of scientific knowledge in conditions of uncertainty or “risk" is 
pertinent here. When experts dispute the scientific "facts”, as in the case of environmental problems, actors 
must find other ways of legitimating their claims in the attempt to produce a consensus as the basis for a 
political strategy. This is why environmental problems produce a lot of political communication and cannot be 
"solved” internally by conventional public policy communities.
43 It is perhaps worth noting that since the "Dirty Man" event the Government have responded to this 
situation and now use tax payers’ money to buy prime time television advertising space to promote the "public 
image" of their own preferred environmental policy options. For example, "Helping the Earth begins at Home" 
was a glossy booklet sent by request to viewers of these televsion advertisements on January 11th, 1993 by the 
Dept, of the Environment’s Energy Efficency Office. It addresses the problem of global wanning as an issue 
of individual responsibility for energy conservation. The Department of Environment and Government policy 
takes a very low profile in the document. It appears that the environmental organisations’ monopoly for building 
environmental agendas through symbolic actions in the public sphere may be waning.
discursive strategies may be seen to make the organisation the "dandy"44 of the British 
environmental movement.
Greenpeace’s "public image" in news narratives is that of a self-assertive, 
unconventional and morally justified "character". However, it is not for environmental 
dialogue with other actors that the organisation enters the system of public communication. 
Like that of a "dandy" the organisation’s "public image" is a sign that aims to make other 
people talk. Greenpeace’s discursive strategies have a populist orientation. More specifically, 
they introduce the environmental contest as an event in which the public can be involved by 
taking the side of Greenpeace. Freed from providing the rationality of scientific proofs, the 
organisation’s communication strategies introduce the environmental contest as a moral 
narrative into the mainstream public culture. Greenpeace makes the environmental contest 
a reflexive element of British culture by de-differentiating the boundaries between the 
"expert" languages of policy discourse and the everyday languages of public discourse on 
environmental topics. Greenpeace’s communication strategies moralise the characters in the 
environemtnal contest and have done much to produce the situation in contemporary societies 
whereby "we are all environmentalists now".
In contrast to Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth "packages" claims into the thematic 
contents o f the news rather than into the structure of the "news story". Friends of the Earth’s 
brand of "blaming" strategies makes the thematic contents, namely "what the actors do", 
their aims, interests and proposals, their action-contexts, and not the narrative roles, namely 
"who they are", their character traits and "public images", the focus for legitimation. The 
organisation tends not to attribute explicitly prejudiced narrative roles to actors and raise the 
"news value" simply by dramatising "events" like Greenpeace. Instead it raises the 
significance of environmental "events" by politicising the activities of actors in the 
environmental policy discourse. Friends of the Earth constructs and mobilises environmental 
norms for policy discourses and social life. This effectively introduces environmental policy 
into the public discourse as a dialogue and constructs environmental policy discourse as an 
arena for "collective learning processes" on sounder environmental practices, thus placing 
the existing practices of actors under scrutiny. Friends o f the Earth’s communication
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44 A "dandy" does not break the codes of public convention by speech but by being unduly devoted to 
smartness in fashion and dress (Oxford English Dictionary), which causes a scandal and makes others talk or 
gossip.
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strategies moralise the rationality o f environmental policy dialogue.
Friends of the Earths discursive actions constitute a strategy for political 
communication that maintains a degree of pragmatic flexibility. This flexibility enables the 
organisation to combine the long term aim of introducing "new thinking" into policy making 
with the short term aim of opposing the present Government^ preference for non­
interventionist market solutions to environmental problems. In both cases, Friends of the 
Earth mobilises environmental value criteria to construct an alternative environmental policy 
agenda. Furthermore, the organisation enters specific policy fields - e.g. roads, agriculture, 
energy - in a way that the practices of Government and Industiy are linked to the action- 
contexts of the public (e.g. as motorists and consumers). In addition to confronting the public 
this promotes the notion of an ’integrated’ environmental policy strategy.
In contrast to Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth which in different ways construct 
the environmental contest as a reflexive element into the mainstream public culture, the 
World Wide Fund for Nature uses discursive practices to publicise a specialist field of 
environmental activities. The organisation seeks to have the problematic of environmental 
overseas development and conservation described accurately in specialist sections of the 
mainstream public discourse. At opportune times the World Wide Fund for Nature comments 
on the policy related dimensions of supra-national negotiations in this specialist field, and was 
even prepared to criticise the national Government during the special opportunity structure 
that was provided by the ’Dirty Man’ "news event". The World Wide Fund for Nature has 
benefitted from the de-differentiation of specialist "expert" discourses and public discourses 
using the greater resonance of environmental themes as an opportunity for raising the 
complex topics of species and habitat preservation. Unlike Greenpeace and Friends of the 
Earth, however, the organisation appears to have been less active in producing this de­
differentiation o f specialist environmental discourses, policy discourses and mainstream 
public discourse. The World Wide Fund for Nature’s communication strategies mobilise its 
issues into the media discourse as moral concerns. This promotional tactic has a long term 
educational goal.
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature use their 
"public images" as a resource for constructing political confrontations with opponent actors 
in relation to the specific events in the ongoing contest. The analysis of the explicit framing 
devices and discursive stunts which are used by Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the
World Wide Fund for Nature for penetrating the structure of news narratives, has shown that 
movement activists have a sophisticated repertoire of communication strategies for attributing 
a ’cultural bias’ (Douglas 1975; Thompson 1984) to the media representation of the events 
which constitute the environmental contest. The organisations mobilise claims that are 
critiques of the policy positions of Government. This shows that communicative actions of 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature are not only designed 
to achieve "visibility" for the social movement, but as cases of "image politics" constitute 
social critiques which make certain types o f industrial practices, policy thinking and public 
policy measures contradictory. The "definitional power" which the environmental 
organisations exert in the public discourse serves the function o f "problem specification” for 
the environmental contest in Britain. However, the organisations also define the basis of the 
arguments and social metaphors - the cultural "tools" (Swidler 1986) - through which such 
problems are viewed and interpreted. In this way the "image politics" of Friends of the 
Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in the public discourse introduces 
a cultural reflexivity into the social relations of actors in the environmental contest in Britain. 
It mobilises a normative critique that challenges the image that British society has o f itself.45
The communicative actions of the organisations literally provide the cultural tools for 
actors to relate the contemporary events of the environmental contest to their social relations 
- as consumers, voters, car drivers, ramblers, economists, policy makers, politicians etc.. 
This extends the notion of "framing" the environmental debate from that of building an 
environmental agenda to that of shaping the national political culture for the reception of 
environmental claims. The organisations promote an environmental agenda by seeking to 
introduce new forms of environmental policy thinking which are at the same time pertinent 
to the social sphere of everyday life. This introduces environmental norms into the language 
o f public life and involves a de-differentiation of the cultural boundaries between public 
policy communities (scientists, policy makers) and the general public. It is this process of de- 
differentiation between the boundaries of the "experts" of closed policy communities and the 
everyday lives of the British public that is mobilised into the language of public discourse by 
the discursive actions of the environmental organisations.
Their access to the semantic and institutional resources for public communication
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4S Here I refer to the reflexive image that a society produces and reproduces about itself as a collectivity. 
Touraine (1981) sees this constitutive process of action as the "self-production" of society.
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about environmental topics enables the movement activists to encode biased claims into the 
dialogue for environmental policy which is lodged in the news. The "public image" of the 
environmental organisations is continually constructed by this communication process and 
penetrates the perceptions of the actors in British society. In this way, the environmental 
organisations promote their policy preferences by mobilising cultural critiques which 
legitimate and sustain their partially based claims. Their success in framing the environmental 
debate with these communication techniques impacts upon the social relationships of the 
competing actors in the public contest over environmental policy. Not only do the 
environmental activists legitimate their own organisations, and delegitimate Government 
actors, but through the public communication media they are able to influence how British 
society looks at itself (and reconstructs its environmental future).
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F) The Political Outcomes of ’Talking D irty’ - Environm ental Organisations, 
Communication Strategies and the Policy Agenda.
1. Introduction
In the introduction (section A) I noted the cyclical pattern of the environment as a 
salient issue on the public agenda. The literature on social movements has also noted the 
periodic fluctuations of activism and mobilisation by the concept of "cycles of protest” 
(Tarrow 1982; 1989). The notion of a ’life cycle’ is common to theoretical perspectives on 
social movements: the ’life cycle* starts with a phase of mass public mobilisation and finishes 
with the co-option of the movement’s concerns by established actors in the political system. 
This process is referred to as the institutionalisation of a social movement and may be 
characterised by an increasing bureaucratisation of the organisational structure, a hierarchical 
leadership pattern, and the establishment of links with actors in the policy-making process.1 
Once the zenith of protest action is over, the ’life cycle’ of the movement is declared dead. 
At this point it is common to shift to an organisational level o f analysis where the issues of 
identity and life change that were considered an essential element for consensus mobilisation 
are no longer considered pertinent.2 According to this perspective, the social movement - 
as a collective actor - gives way to a pressure group or political party, or its claims may
1 This is the classic model for the institunonaliation of a social movement drawing on analysis of the 
development of the labour movement in a modem society; an example is the classic study by Michels on the 
German labour movement. A lesson to draw from the theoretical literature on "new social movements" (e.g. 
Olofsson 1988, Eder 1985; Offe 1985) is that the movements in contemporary societies are expressions of the 
changes in the condition of modernity. The model for the development of a contemporary social movement need 
not therefore follow the example set by the development of the labour movement in industrial society. On the 
contrary, the thesis for a ’risk society* (Beck 1992) implies the existence of a set of public concerns with a 
rationality that cannot be institutionalised within the logic of the existing political system.
2 In social movement research this is expressed in the rational choice basis of the resource mobilisation 
approach to analysing social movement organisations, e.g. Zald and McCarthy (1977). Criticisms of such an 
approach have established that the symbolic resources of an identity - that represent a more expressive 
rationality - may also be an important component of a social movement, e.g. Melucci (1980; 1989). One of the 
key tasks for contemporary research is to make models for social movements that bridge this dichotomy between 
the analysis of collective identities and social movement organisations (Cohen 1985; McAdam and Tarrow 
1988).
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simply be co-opted by existing political actors, see e.g. Kaase 1990 and Cracknell 1993.3
The position of Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for 
Nature in Britain in 1990 presents something of a paradox to this model for the development 
of a social movement. All three organisations were experiencing the highpoint of a dynamic 
phase of development where their memberships had reached unprecedented levels. Such 
popular expressions of support for the environmental creed were also being expressed in 
public opinion polls, in the European election and in a developing green consumer movement 
(see section A). A new set of global environmental issues were emerging as a critique of 
traditional perspectives on the environment and the broadsheet and tabloid media were 
providing more news space for environmental concerns. In 1990 the social movement 
carrying the environmental critique to British society was in a rude state of health. At the 
same time the three largest environmental organisations were not part o f the established 
policy community on the environment, nor was the environment an established feature on the 
public policy agenda. Likewise the British Green Party was conspicuous only for its marginal 
position in public life. Political concern for the environment could not be said to have been 
institutionalised into the political system in Britain.
That the emergence of the environmental movements in Western Europe and North 
America over the last quarter of a century has experienced cyclical phases of development 
is commonplace in sociology (Brand, Buesser et al 1986; Brand 1990; Ruedig 1995). The 
comparative work of Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990) on Sweden, Denmark and the 
Netherlands has described four phases in the development o f a environmental movement. In 
chronological order these may be characterised as follows: a phase of initial public education 
(’62 to *68); a new kind of organised ecology movement (’69 to *73); a social movement at
3 Organisational perspectives based on rational choice logics maintain this bias for seeing the 
institutionalisation of a movement or a co-option of its goals into the political system as a linear development. 
In social movement research, the concept of political opportunity structure POS (Eisinger 1973; Me Adam 1982) 
was introduced to make the relative openness and responsiveness of a political system a factor that explained 
the effectiveness of social movement organisations beyond a mere discussion of the mobilisation of internal 
resources, i.e. the resource mobilisation model. When operationalised, the political opportunity structure model 
is at its most explanatory when comparing the levels of protest in different nations, see e.g. Kriesi, Koopmans 
et al. (1992). However the model is not able to provide an adequate explanation for cases of movements where 
the logic of collective action contradicts the rational basis or logic of the political system. It is for this reason 
that in the introduction (section A) 1 proposed a communications-based perspective on social movements that 
gives a cognitive twist to the notion of political opportunity structure. The claims of environmental organisations 
which contradict the technical logics of environmental policy-making can exist and be institutionalised as a 
counter-cultural critique into the mass media discourse without these ’effects’ necessarily being translated or 
incorporated directly as issues into the political system.
its highpoint experiencing organisational specialisation and a practical orientation to politics 
(’74 to ’80); a fragmented movement dominated by a cluster of specialist competitive 
organisations (’80s to ’90s).4 The environmental movement in Britain in 1990 exhibited 
features of these latter two phases: a network of specialised organisations in an emergent 
movement sector with an practical orientation to politics, where three organisations - Friends 
of the Earth, Greenpeace and the W orld Wide Fund for Nature - were becoming the 
dominant public voices of the sector. However, there are important differences from the 
phases of development that are noted by Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990).
Firstly, for the British case o f an environmental movement in 1990, it would not be 
correct to characterise the activities o f  the big three organisations as ’competitive’. A 
specialisation of campaign interests and the division o f target publics made it possible for all 
three to undertake dynamic expansion in a period of unprecedented popularity for 
environmental themes.5 Neither did the organisational emergence of Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature necessarily occur to the detriment of other 
smaller organisations. Organisations such as the Green Alliance specialise in making contacts 
and networks with policy communities and not achieving high public profiles. Their specialist 
activism was complemented by maintaining chains o f interpersonal networks with the public 
campaign sectors of the larger organisations.6
Secondly, although the organised movement sector exhibited a practical orientation 
to politics, Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature were also 
active in stimulating and mobilising the broader cultural movement of environmentalism by 
raising public awareness on the new issues of risk technology and global interdependency. 
Friends of the Earth’s aerosol campaign which related responsibility for CFC production, 
ozone depletion and global climate change to individual consumer action illustrates this point. 
Governments could be pressurised whilst at the same time the ’risk society* (Beck 1992) 
could be mobilised. Through the media campaigns wider publics of individuals could be
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4 The dates in parentheses are offered by Eyerman, Jamison et al. only as a rough guidlineof developments.
5 Between 1986 and 1990 the memberships o f  Friends o f  the Earth increased from 25 000 to 200 000; 
Greenpeace from 70 000 to 380 000; and the World Wide Fund for Nature from 107 000 to 231 000. In 1992 
Friends o f  the Earth had 119 paid staff; Greenpeace 110; and the World Wide Fund for Nature 205 
(McCormick 1991; Szersynski, Miles et al. 1995).
6 The Green Alliance is also financed for national campaigns partly by receiving contributions from the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (Rawcliffe 1993).
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made aware of threats to the life-world posed by the ’risks’ of dangerous technologies. By 
making the local/global linkage of the new environmentalism a known element of the public 
culture, the campaigns of the largest environmental organisations allowed wider sets of 
individuals access to the symbolic resources of identity, self-reference and involvement that 
are deemed essential components for collective action7.
Thirdly, unlike the previous phases of mobilisation, collective action was no longer 
manifest in mass public protests against single issue concerns, but was determined by the 
potientiality of social networks of individuals that were less visible in the public sphere. The 
phase of professionalisation, specialisation and differentiation in the organisational 
development o f Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature was 
marked by an increase rather than a decrease in the cultural dynamism of the social 
movement. Supporters of the environmental creed had never been so plentiful, nor had such 
a range, wealth or depth o f environmental ideas been present in the public culture. 
Furthermore, this increasing popularity of environmental knowledge constituted the 
environmental movement as a potentiality for inducing ’ad hoc’ acts of social change. For 
example, the climate of public concern that facilitated the emergent green consumer and 
i ethical consumption movements was produced by the media campaigns of the largest
j environmental organisations - such as Friends of the Earth’s Aerosol campaign. At their high
| point in the early 1990s, the apparent emergence of this new sector of the environmental
! movement - the green consumer8 - meant that businesses started to pre-empt what they
perceived as public opinion and market their own brands of green products. Friends of the 
! Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature responded to the increasing
i awareness of business to environmental concern by entering into sponsorship deals and
| adding legitimacy to certain branded products.9 This example illustrates that the permanent
I
[ --------------------------------------
 ^ 7 Here 1 refer to the concept o f collective action developed by Melucci (1980; 1988; 1989; 1992) which
1 rightly emphasizes that symbolic resources are a central element of the construction of collective action in
i contemporary societies.
, 1 On the green consumer movement in Britain from the perspective of its key activist and advocate, see
Elkington (1990); Elkington and Hailes (1988).
i
i 9 Friends of the Earth has sponsored the activities of business sectors using tropical hardwoods. The World
Wide Fund for Nature developed links with the Body Shop to promote consumer awareness of products made 
using rare species. Greenpeace focuses more on marketing its own brand products. None of these sponsorship 
activities by the major organisations have gone without criticism from within the movement. However such 
criticism has done much to sustain other strands of the movement, such as deep ecology, rather than cause its
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salience o f the major environmental organisations in market for "public image" became vital 
for the maintenance of a movement that could exert a degree of strategic influence over the 
practices of targeted opponents, and at the same time shape the potential for future changes 
in cultural perceptions.
The findings of the empirical sections of this dissertation have established that a 
significant dimension of the protest actions of the three largest environmental organisations 
in Britain were lodged in the news discourse. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the 
World Wide Fund for Nature employed communication strategies that framed the media’s 
representation of the environmental contest. The organisations’ actions were able to shape 
the deep thematic contents and linguistic news structures by which the environmental contest 
appeared in the public discourse. Their communicative actions were strategically co-ordinated 
to delegitimise the environmental credibility of the Government in the cycle of news coverage 
on a policy event. I have referred to the potential o f the environmental organisations to 
influence political outcomes by using discursive media strategies as a form of "definitional 
power". I now discuss the policy outcomes that were produced by the symbolic actions o f 
the environmental organisations in the ’Dirty Man* event (2.), before evaluating how the 
environmental organisations* actions in the public discourse make them a unique type o f 
’collective actor’ (3.).
2. Beyond the  Dirty M an: symbolic action and policy outcomes
We have seen that at the height of their popularity in 1990, the environmental 
organisations were able to unite in the ’Dirty Man of Europe* masterframe* 10 and co-ordinate 
their activities at an unprecedented level. This was a potentially formative moment in the 
emergence of institutional links between the major organisations in the environmental 
movement. Prior to this, interorganisational strategies for communication campaigns had 
tended to be based on personalised and informal contacts between activists in the
demise.
10 The concept o f "masterframe" is taken from Snow and Bcnford (1988; 1992). A "masterframe" gives an 
identity to a unified campaign by a set o f  collective actors. It is constructive to the process of network-building.
organisations rather than providing the basis for collective action.11 Acting within the ’Dirty 
Man’ masterframe the three major environmental organisations pursued their own public 
agenda-building strategies: Friends o f the Earth’s media campaign aimed at alternative policy 
specification; Greenpeace’s at cultural populism; and the World Wide Fund for Nature’s at 
promoting a specialist environmental concern. In the ’Dirty Man’ event, however, these 
different organisational objectives were actively united into a collective campaign against the 
British policy community. What then were the political outcomes of the ’Dirty Man of 
Europe’ event, and to what extent can these be attributed to the actions of the environmental 
organisations?
In 1990 the political opportunity structure seemed favourable for environmental 
organisations to enter the national policy domain. In 1989 the new Secretary of State for the 
Environment Chris Patten had attempted to set the tone for an era of co-operation by offering 
the following commitment at his Party Conference:
"as open a dialogue as I can with constructive and well-meaning 
environmental groups ,. they have much to contribute to our understanding 
and to the development of policy."12
Following in the wake of the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Royal 
Society in 1988, and later claim at Party Conference that "it is we Conservatives who are the 
true friends of the earth", it appeared that the political opportunity structure might be 
becoming responsive to the set of ’challengers’ who had done so much to establish the 
credibility of environmental claims. Regardless of the Prime Minister’s well documented 
opportunism for personalising the definition of contentious issues into a populist appeal, there 
can be little doubt that these statements of political intent placed the environment on the 
agenda for British politics (Grove-White 1993). Early in 1990 Parliament passed the
11 Many professional activists have career patterns that move between one or more o f the various 
organisations. Professional activists in specific organisations are given honorary positions on the board o f others 
(Szerzynski, Miles et. al. 1995). Friendship ties are an important resource for co-ordination of organisational 
activities and extending the network o f the organised sector o f  the environmental movement. Indeed this 
provides another indication that environmental organisations exhibit features between those of a social movment 
and a formal organisational structure.
12 Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 11th October 1989. For a discussion o f  the implications 
o f the changes in Conservative Party thinking, see Flynn and Lowe (1992).
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Environmental Protection Act which was the first major legislation on the environment since 
1974. Mass media coverage on the environment became more specialised and detailed as the 
environment became a political topic (Anderson 1991). The Conservative Government had 
initiated a political opportunity structure that was conducive to environmental claims and had 
created a degree o f expectation for action in the policy domain. A formative moment 
appeared to be coming for environmental policy in Britain.
The Environmental Protection Act 1990 introduced several features as up-dates to 
British environmental policy: a comprehensive licensing system for factories; Integrated 
Pollution Control; and controls over the release of genetically modified organism (Rose 1990; 
Weale 1992). Whereas the Environmental Protection Act 1990 introduced piecemeal 
measures into specific fields o f environmental policy, the White Paper document This 
Common Inheritance was intended to produce a new integrated policy approach to the 
environment that would make a definitive commitment to environmental objectives. In theory 
this appeared to offer a unique opportunity for the environmental organisations to make 
inroads into the policy-making process.13
The British style of politics and policy-making is characterised by secrecy, elitism and 
social closure (Richardson and Watts 1984). Traditionally policy makers have placed faith 
in the expertise o f scientists to come up with ’technical fix’ solutions to environmental 
problems (Grove-White 1993). Moreover, in British policy communities the objective of 
economic development had always been considered to be incompatible with environmental 
protection (Weale 1992). The neo-liberal credentials o f the Thatcher Government were well 
established. These factors created inbuilt barriers to the adoption of a new perspective on 
environmental concerns in Whitehall. Hence there was considerable speculation among 
environmental activists over how the Conservative Government would introduce 
environmental concern as an ’interest’ into the policy community.14 Would and could the 
environmental organisations be co-opted as pressure groups into the policy-making process?
13 A White Paper is a statement on resolved government policy. It is usually preceded by the publication 
o f a Green Paper which is a discussion document that is intended to offer an opportunity for comment and 
debate prior to the drafting of a White Paper. In the case of This Common Inheritance the Green Paper stage 
was omitted. This can be taken as an indication of the Government’s urgency in establishing a commitment to 
the environment and at the same time its unwillingness to engage in a wider public discussion over the policy 
outcomes that such a commitment may take.
14 For example, see the article "Will green pressure groups press on?" in the environmental journal Samizdat 
November/December 1989.
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Following in this British policy tradition for trusting in technical expertise, an 
Environmental Charter from the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1988 had stated 
that action should be based on the best scientific and economic information (Flynn and Lowe
1992). As a relative ’latecomer* to environmental politics, the Thatcher Government turned 
to a set of experts for their ’new’ environmental policy thinking. An economist, Professor 
David Pearce, had been commissioned to write a ’think paper’ on environmental pricing by 
the Central Policy Unit of the Department of the Environment. Entitled "Sustainable 
Development"15 this report claims that environmental results can be achieved by market 
mechanisms without necessarily raising public expenditure (Rose 1990). Taking up the 
findings of this report as a justification, Conservative Government thinking explicitly 
favoured the market rather than the state as the mechanism for regulating environmental 
pollution.
Although the Government’s new stance on the environment had established 
environmentalism as a political topic in the media, it had not radically altered the 
membership structure or thinking of the policy community. The knowledge resources which 
were incorporated by the policy community were those of economic and scientific experts. 
Innovative thinking for producing a new integrated policy strategy for environmental 
problems was restricted to the possible adoption o f neo-liberal market mechanisms and 
technological advance. At the height of the green consumer movement and with the 
emergence of business opportunities for the development of ’clean technology*, it appeared 
that controlling environmental pollution through the market might be a way for stimulating 
efficiency rather than retarding economic development. The Secretary of State for the 
Environment expressed his own preference for the introduction of a carbon tax. The 
movement intellectuals of the environmental organisations were faced with a dilemma. The 
rhetoric for environmental change was being promoted by the Government which in itself 
offered a prospect for institutional changes. However, the potential for the organisations to 
influence the direction of environmental change and policy innovation was limited by their 
inability to penetrate the embedded logics and social closure of the policy community.
In this dissertation I have documented how the strategies of Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature were expressed in the public sphere.
a The Pearce report was published as a book with the title Blueprint fo r  a Green Economy (Pearce 1989).
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Whereas Greenpeace took responsiblity for staging criticism of the White Paper by 
constructing the ’Dirty Man of Europe’ event, Friends of the Earth and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature mobilised constructive policy criticisms both before and after the peak of 
the news event. This division o f communicative labour was designed to serve the ’dual’ 
strategy of the movement: to discredit the cultural authority o f the Government’s chosen 
policy approach, whilst maintaining the possibility for a future agenda for ’ecological 
modernisation’ within the institutional structure of the policy community. The environmental 
organisations had very little influence over the contents of the White Paper. It became 
essential therefore to exploit the knowledge resources which they had generated within the 
public domain to exert a degree of "definitional power" over the reception of the document. 
This symbolic action would influence the potential for future attempts by Governments acting 
beyond the limited perspective of the present attempt to construct an environmental policy 
agenda.
By the time that the document This Common Inheritance was launched in September 
1990, the commitment of the Thatcher Government to a new environmental agenda had 
waned considerably. Even the innovative use of market mechanisms that had been proposed 
by the experts in its policy community was absent from the final document. Facing 
competition and resistance from Cabinet colleagues, the Secretary of State had been forced 
to drop his favoured legislative commitments. In addition to listing 350 measures that were 
already on the statute book the White Paper offered only minor piece-meal initiatives rather 
than a new thinking: the continuance of the new cabinet committee on the environment and 
naming of environmental responsibilities in each government department; a ministerial level 
energy efficiency committee to limit carbon dioxide emissions and counter global wanning; 
countryside measures including the protection of hedgerows; a programme against noise 
nuisance; and proposals to protect architectual heritage.
The failure o f the This Common Inheritance document to state a new commitment and 
outline a fundamentally new policy approach for environmental protection did not come as 
a surprise to the movement intellectuals of the environmental organisations. Although 
welcoming the new opportunities for making environmental claims, they had remained 
sceptical of the Government’s commitment to environmental goals and its potential for 
translating environmental rhetoric into principles and acts of public policy. Neither did the 
environmental organisations favour an environmental policy approach based on the market.
The idea that a combination of consumer pressure, business competitiveness and new 
opportunities for technological development would provide solutions to environmental 
problems was anathema to the organisations. Such a perspective usurped the need for the role 
that they themselves had developed in generating environmental awareness. As a market 
project, the political discourse about the environment would be replaced by market exchanges 
between producers and consumers. Organisations such as Friends of the Earth and the World 
Wide Fund for Nature favoured a more state interventionist and regulatory system of 
environmental policy which might offer the future possibility of their introduction as 
’specialists’ into the decision-making process.
The symbolic actions of the environmental organisations over the news cycle of the 
’Dirty Man’ event did not simply discredit the public policy proposals of the Government, 
but used the White Paper as an opportunity for discrediting the technocratic logic of the 
policy community and regaining the initiative as the environmental knowledge specialists in 
the public domain. The Thatcher Government had failed to produce a radical environmental 
policy agenda because of a lack of ministerial commitment to environmental objectives.14 *6 
However, its actions had introduced the environmental discourse to the institutional settings 
of the policy community which had begun to build its own agenda. Having made at least a 
minimal progress the Government expected the environmental organisations to respond with 
a set of ’could do better’ proposals. Instead, as I have documented, the environmental 
organisations exaggerated the failure of the White Paper to fully discredit the cultural 
authority of Government and their policy advisors as environmental actors. Whereas 
Greenpeace boosted its public image by making Government actors appear foolish and unfit 
to make environmental policy, Friends o f the Earth specified an alternative state regulatory 
policy agenda that was made to seem more rational than that of the Government. Through 
the image of the ’Dirty Man of Europe’ the environmental movement used the public 
resonance of environmental themes as a strategic resource for re-asserting the incompatibility 
of economic and environmental values.17 The symbolic actions of the environmental
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14 The ministerial level disputes between the Secretary o f State for the Environment Chris Patten and the 
Treasury and Transport Departments in particular are well documented by ’leaks* that appeared in the press.
See for example Rival ministers 'w ill block Patten green initiatives' which appeared in The Guardian on April
30th 1990.
17 See the detailed discussion in Section D on the ’Dirty Man’ frame.
tai»miwMnniinii!t«iiiunm!iH!i!!!!iiiBmiHiumiutin«iLmiiiii
285
organisations had the political objective of influencing the scope for future Governments to 
make environmental policies. In this way the environmental organisations re-asserted their 
authority as the ’architects’ of the the new political spaces where the definitions of 
environmental problems and public policy solutions are made. The comments of a movement 
intellectual Tom Burke shortly after the ’Dirty Man’ event show that the environmental 
organisations were aware that they were using resonance in the mass media discourse as the 
basis for this political strategy:
M(Y)ou could say that we’re sort o f back to square one, in a sense, but not 
really in what we’ve done. W e’ve closed off a load of options for them. They 
can’t, you know, the idea that you can solve problems just with free market 
mechanisms, without any regulation or intervention, is finished as a political 
idea in the Conservative Party ... (I)t’s in that sort of way that 
environmentalists make progress - really by making things, by redrawing the 
boundaries o f what’s possible politically, until you’ve gradually boxed in 
government into going your way, rather than getting them to agree to do a 
particular thing, because governments don’t do that. Governments just work 
with the possible. They don’t usually adopt. I mean, the idea that you can 
send them lobbyists, who’ll sell them an idea and they’ll just do i t , .. it never 
happens."18
The symbolic actions of the environmental organisations in the mass media discourse 
did not achieve any specific policy goals. However they exposed the closed policy community 
to the public sphere and delegitimated its cultural authority as a set of environmental policy 
experts. Like the emperor in the children’s fairy tale The Emperor's New Clothes, the 
Secretary o f State for the Environment had the nakedness o f his environmental policy 
proposals exposed to public ridicule. Where the environmental organisations triumphed over 
the Government was in an understanding o f the need to define strategies for environmental 
action within the context where they achieve a legitimacy, namely the public culture of the 
mass media discourse. Legitimacy for environmental public policy may not simply be drawn
’* Tom Burke interviewed for the EUI Project N o.42  on 5/12/90 by Bron Szersynski.
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from the technical expertise of a closed policy community but must also be promoted within 
the public sphere.
After the Dirty Man event the political opportunity structure for environmental claims 
that had been opened by the Thatcher Government’s environmental rhetoric closed once again 
as the environment drifted away from the public agenda. By the end of the year Thatcher had 
been replaced as Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party by John Major. Since 
1990 environmentalism has experienced a downturn in its cycle of fortune being replaced by 
other issues on the public agenda. This has affected the environmental organisations which 
have experienced a leveling out and even a decline in subscriptions since 1990. Nonetheless 
Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature remain unchallenged 
as media-specialist environmental organisations and in place to act when a more favourable 
political opportunity structure presents itself. At present their actions make sure that the 
norms o f the ’Dirty Man’ rhetoric remain the authoritative public account of the 
Government’s environmental policy actions.19
In the aftermath of the ’Dirty Man* debacle the Department of the Environment has 
learnt the necessity of symbolic action and publicity for legitimating environmental policy 
actions. In January 1993 the DoE’s Helping the Earth begins at Home campaign was 
broadcast at the commercial break of a popular television soap opera. Without mentioning 
Government policy, the advertisement used the potent imageiy of a child’s perspective on 
global wanning before giving a phone number which viewers could ring to receive further 
details. The booklet sent to people on request addresses the the problem o f global warming 
as an issue of individual responsibility for household energy conservation. The actual 
contents of the proposals differ very little from the "Save it!" energy conservation campaigns 
that appeared after the oil crisis in the seventies. It would appear that the Department of the 
Environment has realised that even strategies of inaction require symbolic packaging.
3. Environm ental organisations: towards a ’new* type of collective actor?
The professionalisation and strategic political orientation of Friends of the Earth,
19 For example 'Dirty Man' delays clean-up o f sea appeared in The Observer on 11th December 1994. It 
is just one o f  the many examples where the organisations re-invoke the 'dirty man* rhetoric as the authoritative 
account of the Government’s environmental policy actions.
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Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature have been well documented.20 
Nonetheless, it would be premature simply to argue that this process o f organisational 
development confirms the end of the existence of the social movement21 In 1990 the 
dynamic organisations of the movement were necessary to sustain, build and educate a broad 
consensus o f public support. However, this new organisational impetus had brought only 
negligible rewards in achieving closer links to the environmental policy communities. It is 
perhaps more accurate to characterise these organisations as part of a new type of collective 
actor, one that is neither a pressure group nor a social movement that brings people onto the 
streets, but a movement which mobilises collective action in the arena between politics and 
culture. In such a perspective the function of the mass media in selecting themes for the 
public agenda makes the media discourse the arena for collective action. The ability of the 
organisations to achieve a resonance in the mass media discourse provides the vital link in 
their dual aim o f raising cultural awareness and achieving political objectives. What are the 
features which define these environmental organisations as part of a special or ’new* type of 
collective actor?
One attempt to produce a model for the environmental organisations which 
acknowledges them as a new type of collective actor is the organisational perspective of 
Princen and Finger (1994). Drawing from case study analyses o f the organisational relations 
that are made by environmental NGOs22 at the transnational level of politics, Princen and 
Finger (1994) emphasize the historically unique qualities of these organisational actors and 
the opportunities for politics which they produce. This "translational linkages" perspective 
argues that environmental organisations act both as independent bargainers and as agents of 
social learning in environmental politics (1994:p.217). The distinctive basis of the 
environmental organisations’ actions is that they challenge the limitations of the state-centric
20 For details on the professionalisation, bureaucratisation and formal organisational structures in Friends 
o f  the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund for Nature in Britain, see Weston (1989), McCormick 
(1991) and Szersynski, Miles et al. (1995). For theoretical perspectives on the status and effectiveness o f such 
strategic organisations, see Eyerman and Jamison (1989) and Rucht (1995) on the case of Greenpeace.
21 This is the perspective of Weston’s (1989) polemical attack on Friends o f the Earth, where he accuses 
the leaders of self-interest and a ’betrayal* o f ideals.
22 Princen and Finger (1994) use the term environmental NGOs (Non governmental organisations) for the 
movement sector which is under discussion, e.g. Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and the World Wide Fund 
for Nature.
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political system and identify the political implications of biophysical trends at local and global 
levels. Such actions are considered to be constitutive of a new type of environmental politics 
that is emerging in the transnational arena.23
That the actions of environmental organisations link the biophysical to the political 
world is acknowledged by other perspectives on the environmental movement.24 The linking 
of local and global by environmental organisations is a much discussed element of the new 
environmentalist ideology, but is seldom seen as central to the political action of 
environmental organisations in the way that it is by Princen and Finger (1994). They are 
right to point out that the organisational structure o f environmental organisations facilitates 
exchanges of knowledge and experience from the local community to the policy community 
that may in some cases introduce changes in the form of international policy agreements. 
However, this does not necessarily imply that the transnational level of environmental politics 
is in some way substituting and replacing the authority of the nation state as the arena for 
political action. On the contrary, the findings of this study, the social movements perspective 
of Jamison and Eyerman et al. (1990), and the policy perspective of Weale (1992) suggest 
that the political strategies of contemporary environmental organisations are both active and 
contextualised within the national level of a political culture.25
Princen and Finger (1994:p.226) identify the dynamic factors of "translational 
linkages" which produce social change as ’institutional change’ and ’social learning’. This 
change is seen as the outcome of the organisations’ actions. Princen and Finger’s concept of
23 Princen and Finger consider the actions of environmental organisations to re-defme the basis of politics, 
they state (1994:p.232): ”(W)hereas NGOs of all kinds - human rights, women’s, public health, and so forth - 
also exploit transnational linkages, environmental NGOs inject scientific and earth-centred concerns into 
political and economic situations which would otherwise relegate such concerns to the margins. In this 
translational mode, environmental NGOs transform politics by redefining its subject matter.”
24 Indeed one might argue that Jamison and Eyerman et al.’s (1990) knowledge-based perspective and 
cognitive perspectives on risk communication, e.g. Conrad (1990), Thomson and Wildavsky (1982), are 
superior in that they consider the mediation o f  the scientific knowledge o f experts about the natural world into 
the wider process o f  the social construction o f  political claims.
23 Jamison and Eyerman et al. state (1990:p.7): "(S)ocial movements are national and local, even where they 
are global in scope and ambitions . . .  (T)he knowledge interests of environmentalism took historical shape 
through the prism o f  national political cultures.” Albert Weale’s perspective on the new politics o f pollution 
states (1992:p.221): "Many observers have noticed an increased sensitivity to risk among modem populations, 
revealed in public concerns about product safety or occupational safety, and rising trends in the pursuit of 
professional negligence litigation, as well as in worries about environmental pollution. The regulatory institutions 
and processes of the modem state provide the focus for the political mobilisation of these concerns."
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’institutional change' is little more than descriptive, its simply states that institutional 
arrangements for dealing with environmental problems have changed in response to 
environmental decline. Their concept of 'social learning* identifies three ways in which the 
actions of the environmental organisations contribute to societal transformation: framing 
issues; building communities and coalitions that oppose existing political structures; and 
setting examples and standing in for governments by environmental practice. Here the 
Princen and Finger perspective accurately lists some important dimensions of the 'new’ 
features of the organisations* actions. However it is restricted in explanatory power: firstly, 
by the omission o f communication from the notion of an organisation’s action; and secondly, 
from the omission o f communication as a context for action within the policy process that 
brings about institutional change.26
The "translational" mode o f an environmental organisation’s actions requires a basis 
and field for action. In this dissertation I have emphasised that the knowledge specialism of 
environmentalism as a counter-cultural critique is a resource for such actions and that the 
mass media discourse provides the context where this environmental critique may be 
’translated’ into political strategies that act against the authority o f policy communities. This 
’translational’ mode o f actions by the environmental organisations makes them a special type 
of collective actor - one which combines the desires of a social movement with the needs of 
a political organisation. In contrast to conventional political actors they do not seek to  act as 
groups representing socio-economic interests in a redistributive conflict, but their protest 
actions are on behalf of an ’ascriptive collectivity’ and not a social group.27 At the same 
time, the environmental organisations have achieved legitimacy as collective actors from the 
mass media institutions, businesses and politicians and have developed organisational 
structures. This places their collective actions beyond the parameters of a social movement.
The problematic for environmental organisations and at the same time the factor
26 Even their discussion o f  the framing o f  environmental issues fails to mention communication strategies 
or the achievement of mass media coverage as part o f the process o f social learning. Princen and Finger reduce 
framing to an ad hoc ’effect’ o f the organisations’ actions rather than seeing it as a process that is constitutive 
o f  their collective actions. At one point they mention that the organisations’ acts of ’norm enforcement* in a 
policy regime may bring about ’institutional transformation* but this point is acknowledged as a debt to a 
reviewer (1994:p.226).
27 Offe (1987) writing on the new social movements sees this difference between the definition o f political 
goals for social groups (interest-based politics) and for an ’ascriptive collectivity' as part o f  the distinction 
between the "old" and the "new" paradigms for politics.
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which makes them a dynamic and new type of collective actor is that they act in an ‘as i f  
scenario of politics. Environmental organisations mobilise political claims on behalf of an 
ascriptive collectivity. That the environmental organisations construct their political action 
on the basis of constructing an ascribed collective identity, the "public good" (a specific set 
of cultural norms)2*, is what makes their politics ’communicative’ rather than 
’representative’. The environmental organisations* political aims are defined on the basis of 
an ascriptive collective identity and not by the socio-economic interests of a social group. 
This makes the rational choice model for politics which is based on interest negotiation 
between social groups competing over the redistribution of resources unsuited for the 
collective actions of the organisations.28 9 The actions of the environmental organisations 
subscribe to a different cultural logic and take a different social form. Their actions are 
strategies for ’communicative’ rather than ’representative’ political goals, but they must 
attempt to translate their ’communicative’ goals into to a language that makes sense also to 
the ’representative’ interest politics of policy communities. It is in attempting to mix the 
opposed cultural logics of these different sets of political claims that the communicative 
actions and political strategies of the environmental organisations draw their distinctive 
identity. In contrast, the policy communities which they target are not only guided by the 
logics of representing socio-economic interests but tend also to be characterised by social 
closure.30
This exclusion from the elitist policy communities forces the environmental 
organisations to orient their political strategies through the mass media discourse. Like a 
social movement, their collective actions create new public spaces in which the power and
28 The environment is a "public good' in that it is a resource that is defined as belonging to everyone. The 
communicative actions of environmentalists not only construct the notion of the 'public* as an ascribed 
collectivity, but they also define the basis for a 'good life’ for (his society, a moral basis for its actions. 
Environmentalists tell society what ought to be the moral basis of its actions, i.e. they construct what should 
be the "public good" as a collective identity for society.
29 It is for this reason that analyses which measure the success or influence of social movements 
organisations on the political system that are based on rational choice models - see for example the studies 
reviewed in Huberts (1989) and Gundelach (1989), and the resource mobilisation perspective - are unable to 
account for the true value of the cultural agenda-building properties of the organisations actions.
30 Weale (1992:p.212) notes that habitual trust in scientific expertise and secrecy are characteristic o f the 
the small and relatively closed policy elites in Britain. He states: "Britain's .. dogged attachment to secrecy in 
the enforcement of pollution control can only be understood in terms of long-standing features of its political 
system, not least in die social closure practised by policy elites." Grant (1990) and Richardson and Watts (1985) 
identify similar features in the British environmental policy process.
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cultural logic o f the policy elites is rendered visible. Unlike a social movement, however, 
the media messages which are mobilised by the organisations transform the ascriptive 
collective identity of environmentalism - "the public good" - into a set of strategic political 
communications.31 In the ’Dirty Man of Europe’ case the version of the "public good" 
defined by Thatcherite British national identity was questioned by the introduction of 
environmental norms. Such examples of collective action challenge the cultural authority of 
the scientific knowledge which is the basis on which the policy community acts. It also 
indicates that the closed policy communities of political actors may be pressurised into 
appearing in the public sphere to legitimate their actions. Mass media discourse becomes the 
new field for these political conflicts. The environmental organisations constitute a type of 
collective actor which exerts a "definitional power" over political actors and institutions 
through the media of public communication.
The environmental organisations are not easily co-opted as an actor into the 
bargaining of the political process, not least because their actions are part of the construction 
o f a cultural ideal that is held for society - "the public good" - and do not represent the 
interests of a closed social grouping in society. The ’communicative’ politics o f the 
environmental organisations makes the political actors appear to be ’unrepresentative’ of the 
interests of society. The potential of the environmental movement to exert an influence over 
the political structures and policy making processes in society will depend on its ability to 
change the logic of actors in the political system. In this sense, the environmental 
organisations are the structural manifestations of a new attempt to create a public space for 
a politics. Their communicative actions attempt to build networks with political actors that 
will facilitate the development of a new logic for politics - a politics for ’ecological 
modernisation’. This introduction of the cultural bias of environmental claims into politics, 
makes the basis o f political action more ’reflexive’, as society begins to negotiate a different 
rationality for its progression into the future. Emerging contacts between environmental 
organisations and policy communities that have been generated through media strategies are 
the first institutional steps towards changes in environmental policy thinking and action.32
31 This highlights that symbolic production is central to the basis o f  the environmental organisations* actions 
and that the mass media discourse is the primary context for their collective actions.
32 The perspectives o f  social theorists on ’reflexive institutionalization’ as the new type of emergent 
structures in contemporary societies are pertinent here. See the contributions in Beck, Giddens and Lash (1995).
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This emerging network o f contacts between the policy community and the 
environmental organisations is generated in the structure of the public discourse. The 
exchanges of information between the actors are based on claims that are lodged and 
communicated in the media discourse. The policy community is exposed in the public sphere 
and needs to assert a political legitimacy for its claims. Actors in the policy community 
attempt to re-legitimise their political authority by negotiating the basis of the contradictory 
claims - their own and those of the environmental organisations. However, as they are based 
on different cultural logics these opposed claims may be ’incommensurable’, it may not be 
possible to find a basis for compromise between the two positions. In such cases, the 
resultant conflicts are likely to keep the politics o f the environment visible in the public 
arena.
When recurrently forced to seek political legitimacy for their actions, the networks 
of the policy community will take on a structural form that is characterised by the necessity 
for the production of knowledge and information and maintaining channels of communication 
to the mass media. As the environmental organisations do not have ‘insider status’ in the 
networks of policy community, they are forced to act as members of an ’as i f  policy 
community. Their communication strategies in the public discourse are constructive of a 
policy discourse that defines options which are not yet accepted as possibilities by the 
’insider’ actors in the policy community. Under such conditions policy-making becomes a 
discursive process. The policy community is constituted as a loosely connected 
interorganisational field of actor networks built on exchanges of information - a "policy 
domain".33 In this sense, the mass media discourse where the agenda-building 
communications of actors are lodged becomes a structure of the national policy domain. 
Environmental claims become institutionalised into the public discourse as a cultural element
33 Analyses of the formation of public policy decisions from agenda-setting perspectives (e.g. Kingdon 1984) 
have noted the development of such interorganisational networks. So have cognitive and discursive models for 
the construction of "policy outcomes" as a process, see Knoke and Burleigh (1989), Laumann and Knoke
(1987), Burstein (1991). By introducing the notion of culture to the policy process, such authors see the policy 
process as an interactive field, a "policy domain" over which core actors, collective actors and issue publics 
contest, negotiate and legitimate specific decisons. For the case of environmental policy, Weale (1992:p.217) 
identifies three functions of such a policy discourse: to defme the nature of the policy problem; to conceptualise 
the relevant interests that agents may have in relation to that problem; and to formulate innovative, and 
potentially credible, solutions to those problems. This discursive model for the policy process moves beyond 
the rational choice based model for an organisation by acknowledging that the different logics by which the 
organisations interact, compete and are contextualised in a political culture.
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that legitimates and shapes the boundaries of the possibilities for policy action.
In this new institutional arena the interest bargaining of pressure groups and experts 
is replaced by a policy discourse that actors contest and which must achieve public legitimacy 
in the media. Environmental knowledge and communications specialisms provide the 
resources for the environmental organisations to act as innovative agents in this process 
where politics is constructed and reconstituted. The extent to which the organisations 
maintain a capacity for introducing social changes will in part be dependent on the extent to 
which established political elites are responsive in their policy thinking to the charges brought 
against them.
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